

LECTURES
ON THE
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.



LECTURES
ON THE
HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

BY
WILLIAM ARCHER BUTLER, M.A.
LATE PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN.

EDITED
From the Author's MSS. with Notes,
BY
WILLIAM HEPWORTH THOMPSON, D.D.
MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

SECOND EDITION, COMPLETE IN ONE VOLUME,
REVISED BY THE EDITOR.

London:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1874.

[All Rights reserved.]

Cambridge:

**PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.**

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE Lectures which I have undertaken to edit were delivered to the students of Trinity College, Dublin, from the newly-instituted chair of Moral Philosophy, of which Mr W. Archer Butler was the first occupant. In the interesting Memoir of the Professor, written by his friend and literary executor the Rev. Thomas Woodward, and prefixed to the volume of Sermons published in 1849, we are informed that this chair was first founded by Dr Lloyd the Provost in 1837, and that Mr Butler was appointed to fill it "immediately upon the expiration of his Scholarship." According to the data furnished by his biographer, this honourable distinction must have been conferred upon him before he had completed his twenty-sixth year, and it would seem that he entered without delay upon the duties of his office, which he retained until his premature death, which took place in 1848. The present Lectures seem to have been delivered during the first four years of his professorial life, as we may infer from an interesting notice inserted in the *Dublin University Magazine* for 1842, in which Lectures on Aristotle (forming the last series in these volumes) are expressly mentioned. Before that period, however, the Professor had ceased to write his Lectures *in extenso*: for we are told that "in the Ethical Lectures on which he was then" (1842) "engaged

he had abandoned the custom of *reading* his Discourses." It would seem to follow that his design of writing a complete history of Philosophy was never realized, and that the Lectures which have been placed in my hands were, in fact, all that their Author penned upon that subject. A large pile of papers now in my keeping contains ample materials for structures never completed, and furnishes striking evidence of Mr Butler's varied and extensive reading.

In explanation of the delay which has taken place in the publication of the finished Lectures, it may be well to state that the MS. remained in the possession of Mr Woodward (whose professional engagements prevented him from undertaking the labour of editing it) until some eighteen months ago, when the present publishers purchased the copyright from that gentleman. Having previously expressed a favourable opinion of some specimen Lectures which had been shewn to me (one of which is annexed to the Memoir before referred to), and being further informed that no other Editor was forthcoming, I was induced to undertake the task proposed to me, in the hope of stimulating the interest in such studies, languid though it be and intermittent, which does undoubtedly exist in this country. I hoped, too, that the Lectures, after all allowance had been made for a posthumous and unfinished work, would tend to raise rather than diminish the reputation of an Author, whom, though personally unknown to me, the masterly, "Letters on Development" had led me to rank among the most gifted spirits of his generation. My task has been rendered both more laborious and more interesting by the fact that the references to original writers, without which a history of Philosophy is of little use to the student, were almost entirely wanting in the MS. In the endeavour to trace the authorities I have naturally been led to a closer

consideration of some of the Professor's views, which, in not a few instances, has induced me to expand a reference into a note, and in some cases to give my reasons for dissenting from the statements in the text. With the text itself I have meddled as little as might be, finding it difficult to prune the redundancy without impairing the force and impressiveness of the Author's language. Greater liberty has been used with the interspersed translations, though even here I have mainly confined myself to the tacit removal of inaccuracies by which the sense was affected. These, it is fair to say, were neither numerous nor very important; for though Mr Butler did not pretend to the title of an exact classical scholar, the philosophical acumen of his mind has generally enabled him to seize the true meaning of even the more recondite works of Plato and Aristotle.

It is no part of an Editor's duty to criticise posthumous writings which are given to the world partly on his own responsibility. He has a right, however, to state how far that responsibility extends; and I say, therefore, without hesitation, that the Lectures included in the Introductory Series appeared to me unequal in merit to those that follow, and that I wished to withhold them. They were evidently hastily composed—as in fact appears from notices in the Author's handwriting—and in some places they bear the appearance of having been produced to meet a sudden demand. Their rhetorical pomp of style, a meaning not always definite in itself, and frequently obscured by the very excess of illustration, the frequent repetitions, and, above all, a certain vacillation of judgment on speculative questions, are faults which must strike the intelligent reader, and which would, I am persuaded, have been acknowledged by the accomplished Professor himself. I have consented to edit them in deference to the opinion of

persons better able than myself to estimate their probable reception by the mass of readers, to many of whom, it is thought, some of the characteristics in question may prove attractive rather than repellent, while those of maturer taste may be induced to tolerate the style in consideration of the really fine vein of thought and sentiment which it conceals.

Of the Lectures which follow, the most original are those on Plato and the Platonists, which fill nearly the whole of the second volume. They are, unquestionably, as the Author informs us, "the result of patient and conscientious examination of the original documents;" and they may be considered as a perfectly independent contribution to our knowledge of the great master of Grecian wisdom. Of the Dialectic and Physics of Plato they are the only exposition at once accurate and popular with which I am acquainted; being more accurate than the French, and incomparably more popular than the German treatises on those departments of the Platonic philosophy. The Author's intimate familiarity with the metaphysical writings of the last century, and especially with the English and Scotch school of psychologists, has enabled him to illustrate the subtle speculations of which he treats in a manner calculated to render them more intelligible to the English mind than they can be made by writers trained solely in the technicalities of modern German schools, or by those who disdain the use of illustration altogether. To the Ethics and Politics of Plato equal justice has not been done, but from notes which have come into my possession I am inclined to think that this defect was in a great measure supplied in the unwritten Lectures on Ethics to which allusion has been made.

The brilliant Lecture on Neo-Platonism which concludes the fourth series I make no apology for publishing,

though sensible that the subject has of late received additional illustration. How much of it came from secondary sources, and how much from the fountain-head, it may be left to the curious to investigate.

The three Lectures on Aristotle contain an able analysis of the well-known, though by no means well-understood treatise, *περὶ ψυχῆς*. They were preceded by a discourse on the literary history of the Philosopher and his writings, which, as the subject has been treated satisfactorily by others¹, it seemed on the whole better to omit. An unfinished fifth Lecture on the Physics is omitted only because it is unfinished. It is a most promising commencement of a detailed examination of the Aristotelian theories of nature, which it is to be regretted that Mr Butler never completed.

In composing his comparatively brief notices of the *earlier* Grecian schools, the Author appears to have made considerable use of the German histories of Philosophy, especially that of Ritter. His estimate of Socrates, on the other hand, evinces the same independence of judgment and the same preference of original documents which mark his Lectures on Plato, and, as far as they go, those on Aristotle also: but the subject is handled in a manner too slight and cursory for its importance. In the notes I have endeavoured to direct the attention of students to sources of more complete information. The account of the minor Socratic sects, which concludes the first volume, will be found valuable by those University students who may wish to understand the allusions to the tenets of those schools or their founders with which the Platonic dialogues abound. The Megarian doctrines are explained with especial clearness, and the history of this succession of Sophist-philoso-

¹ As by Professor Stahr in Dr Smith's *Dictionary of Biography*, Mr Blakesley in his *Life of Aristotle*, &c.

sophers appears to me to be treated with remarkable ability.

From these observations it will be seen that the description of this work in the title-page needs some qualification. The absence, for instance, of any account of the Stoics and Epicureans is a grave omission in a history of Philosophy. It would doubtless have been supplied had the Author completed his original design, for very copious collections for the purpose are to be found among his MSS. As the Lectures stand they constitute a history of the Platonic Philosophy—its seed-time, maturity, and decay: and on such a work the very omission of the collateral sects bestows a unity which it might not otherwise have possessed. To the theologian the importance of studying this philosophy is becoming daily more apparent; and it is no slight honour to the great Protestant University of Dublin to have furnished the first or one of the first examples in recent times, of an upright and intelligent history of Platonism written by an uncompromising defender of the catholic truths as well as of the historical evidences of Christianity.

I ought to add that the very complete Index which will be found at the end of the Second Volume, has been prepared by my friend Mr H. MONTAGU BUTLER, Fellow of Trinity College, to whom my best thanks are due.

W. H. T.

CAMBRIDGE,

Dec. 12, 1855.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

IN preparing this new Edition, for which the Publishers announce that a demand exists both here and in America, some use has been made of treatises which have appeared since the former publication. The notes have in parts been enlarged, new references added, and doubtful statements modified or withdrawn. The text, also, has been carefully revised, some remaining inaccuracies have been removed, and a certain though limited discretion has been assumed in the removal of rhetorical superfluities.

The Editor's estimate of the value of the Lectures seems to have been confirmed by the continuance of the demand for them in the face of the important English contributions to the History of Ancient Philosophy which have appeared in the interval.

W. H. T.

July 1874.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTORY SERIES.

	PAGE
LECTURE I.	
On the Science of Mind, or Psychology	1
LECTURE II.	
On the Science of Real Existence, or Ontology	18
LECTURE III.	
On the compass and meaning of the term Ontology, and on the terms substituted for it	36
LECTURE IV.	
On the Possibility of an Inductive Science of the Mind	53
LECTURE V.	
The same subject continued	70
LECTURE VI.	
On the superiority of the Science of Mind to all other Sciences	86
LECTURE VII.	
On the disciplinary value of the Science of Mind, its diffi- culties, and the spirit in which it ought to be pursued	101

FIRST SERIES.

	PAGE
LECTURE I.	
On Ancient and Modern Histories of Philosophy	117
LECTURE II.	
On Definitions of Philosophy, and on the province and functions of a historian of Philosophy	138
LECTURE III.	
On the Indian Philosophies	154
LECTURE IV.	
On Greek Philosophy, its origin, characteristics, and stages of Development	170
LECTURE V.	
On the early efforts of Philosophical inquiry in Greece. The Ionic and Atomic Schools	189
LECTURE VI.	
On the Pythagorean and Eleatic Schools	208
LECTURE VII.	
The Sophists. Socrates	226

SECOND SERIES.

LECTURE I.	
Socrates and his followers. The pure Socratics. The Megarics	243
LECTURE II.	
The Megarics continued	258
LECTURE III.	
On the Cynics and Cyrenaics	274

CONTENTS.

XV

PAGE

LECTURE IV.

On the Life and Writings of Plato 292

LECTURE V.

On the Platonic Dialogues 310

LECTURE VI.

On the Philosophy of Plato as a whole 328

LECTURE VII.

On the Dialectic of Plato. The Theætetus 344

LECTURE VIII.

The Dialectic of Plato continued. The Ideal Theory . . . 360

LECTURE IX.

The Ideal Theory continued 376

THIRD SERIES.

LECTURE I.

On the Physics of Plato. The Timæus 391

LECTURE II.

The Physics of Plato continued 409

LECTURE III.

The same subject continued. The Psychology of Plato . . 427

LECTURE IV.

The Psychology of Plato continued 442

LECTURE V.

On the Ethics of Plato 458

LECTURE VI.

The Ethics of Plato continued 473

FOURTH SERIES.

	PAGE
LECTURE I.	
On the Successors of Plato. The Academy	488
LECTURE II.	
The Successors of Plato continued	499
LECTURE III.	
On the Neo-Platonists	510

LAST UNFINISHED SERIES.

LECTURE I.	
On the Psychology of Aristotle	523
LECTURE II.	
The same subject continued	537
LECTURE III.	
The same subject continued	551

INTRODUCTORY SERIES.

LECTURE I.

GENTLEMEN,

IN undertaking the important task of directing, or at least of stimulating, your studies in the general philosophy of man, I am aware that I appear before you in a character which greater abilities than I can ever hope to manifest would require courage to sustain. I enter alone and unarmed (save, as I trust, by a love of truth and a simple desire of diffusing it) upon a field of contest, where some of the mightiest intellectual leaders that the world has ever known are now only known in their prostration, a field on which a new adventurer, however humble his pretensions, exposes himself therefore to the scorn of assailants who would depreciate either his subject or himself, who either believe that what Locke and Leibnitz failed to discover must be undiscoverable, and therefore be literally non-existent in relation to the powers of man, or (by what he admits to be a far more reasonable prejudice) that difficulties which have baffled such sagacity as theirs, can scarcely have been reserved for his vision to penetrate. It is no misemployment of your time to occupy some portion of it with a consideration of at least the former of these prepossessions. To believe a subject unworthy your attention is practically to disqualify you from attending; and as long as the importance of any branch of knowledge, or the possibility of its attainment, is questioned, the most laboured general statements of its nature and bearing may expect to be received with distrust or indifference.

Of myself I shall say little. If I have commenced by expressing my real sense of the peculiar difficulties and responsibilities of the office I have ventured to undertake, it was less in order to attest my own feelings and to solicit

LECT.
I.

*Difficulties
affecting a
Lecturer on
the History
of Philoso-
phy.*

LECT.
I.

*and the
present
Lecturer in
particular.*

general indulgence—for to these things I trust it would be almost superfluous to advert—than, by deepening your feelings of the importance of the subjects we are met to discuss, to impress upon you, as hearers, the part which it becomes you to perform in such a capacity. It would little interest you to be told that your professor must, for the present, be content to come before you with the rapid results of brief and disturbed reflection—the fragmentary speculations of occasional leisure; and that with the defects of a preparation so cursory, not he is to be charged, but the circumstances of a calling before whose demands—arduous, constant, and imperative—even the duties of this chair, urgent as they are, sink into comparative unimportance. As little would it interest you to learn that the grateful acknowledgments which his feelings prompt towards those who have placed him in it, only augment the diffidence under which he labours as to his powers of justifying their choice; that if he is relieved from the hazards of a contrast with able predecessors, yet the very fact that he is so relieved, only serves to remind him how naturally it will be expected, that a choice thus singular should be met by merits correspondingly unique;—nay, that in the unavoidable tendency of all hearers to comparisons, he is perhaps saved from such a contrast with a line of immediate predecessors only to be contrasted with the favourites of each hearer's studies and experience, with the philosophic ancestry of ages, with the congregated luminaries of every country and every time. These are considerations which, however momentous to your lecturer, are of little moment to you. It would not, indeed, be judicious or warrantable to insist on them. To enlarge on my own convictions of responsibility would be to suppose that they could be questioned; to suggest to you a spirit of indulgence would equally be to suppose you in peril of forgetting what is assuredly the simplest, and ought to be the least laborious of human obligations.

*Subject of
these Lec-
tures de-
fined.*

Gentlemen, the matter becomes of more importance when I pass from the Lecturer to his subject. Let us then endeavour to define, before proceeding to any detailed investigations, What is the subject we are to consider? What are its claims upon your attention? What are the difficulties or encouragements of the study? And what the requisites for its profitable pursuit? Such considerations are indeed better estimated at the close of a course than at the commencement of it, better appreciated as deductions from the student's experience than as preliminaries to it: yet even now they may tend, by exalting our conceptions of the subject—to awaken, and by defining

its aims—to direct attention. This study, which involves the logic of all other studies, has also a logic, and, I will add, an ethic of its own. The general laws of all inquiry undergo some striking modifications in their application to the study of man; and the moral habits which are demanded in all the researches of truth, become peculiarly tested in the management of this. I may perhaps, then, indulge the hope, that the few preliminary investigations which I purpose to premise, may in some measure serve as the same rapid education for this philosophy which this philosophy itself is for universal science.

During some seven or eight Lectures of the present term it is my intention to discuss these preparatory topics. For the *STYLE* in which the discussion may be conducted perhaps the best mode of securing your indulgence would be to explain its purpose. That purpose is determined by the capabilities of the machinery which is put into my hands to work. There are two ways by which the thoughts and feelings of a single mind may be made the thoughts and feelings of many:—by writing and by speech. Now though writing be only a series of signs of speech, it possesses one great and exclusive advantage—its parts are not merely successive in one sense, but co-existent in another: and hence, any point of a written argument may be reproduced at pleasure in all its original vividness, while no point of a spoken communication is capable of reappearance except in the fainter form of remembrance,—every such exertion of remembrance being not only a withdrawal of attention from the present (which the written document also requires), but a positive and irrecoverable loss of whatever the present may be conveying (which the written document preserves for inspection). This distinction, then, at once establishes the difference of object in establishing the difference of capabilities between the book and the lecture. In books we address the thoughtful reflection of the solitary student in language suitable to the peculiar advantages which books alone possess,—that of enabling him to go back upon his progress, to count its steps, and (if attention ever flags, or the difficulty of the argument require it) to bring up his arrears without any present loss. The necessary deficiency of oral instruction ought (as I conceive) to make its object in a great measure different, and its style altogether so. The one case of the experimental sciences excepted, its true utility will ever be less the communication of new and profound truth, if that truth require a long course of reasoning, than the production of an interest, the creation of a taste, the stimulus given to the circulation of

LECT.
L

thought. You will understand, then, that my purpose will be not merely to deliver truth, but also by any means that occur to me to make it generally acceptable; and I request, once for all, that the execution may be measured by the declared object,—an object which makes the endeavour to interest your fancy and your feelings as real and necessary a part of my duty as the direct communication of truth itself.

*Mental
Philosophy
is to be re-
solved in
two lights.*

The subject of Mental Philosophy may be considered in two lights, and approached by two corresponding roads of access;—it may be regarded as it is the beginning, or as it is the end, of all human studies. These two opposite yet harmonizing aspects of the subject we will now consider at some length;—contrasted in their nature, and of very different degrees of practical utility, they nevertheless serve to reflect on each other a reciprocal illumination which distinguishes each by enlightening both.

*The in-
quiver may
set out from
the Mind it-
self; pass-
ing from the
considera-
tion of its
laws and
facilities to
their mani-
festations;*

I. Setting out from THE MIND ITSELF, as the great receptacle at once and instrument, both of knowledge and of activity, we may consider it as the sole original substance of all the diversified phenomena of the intellectual and the voluntary life. We may regard science and action as its remote product and creature; or rather we may neglect the product in the process of production. In this view of the relation of things, the human soul is contemplated as the starting-point, not as the goal of knowledge,—as its initial requisite, not as its final attainment. The mind is regarded as a simple nature, which, while preserving a perpetual identity with itself, evolves from its own essence (of course under certain exterior conditions) all the varieties of scientific truth. Placed in apposition with external nature, it begins to labour upon all around it by its own inherent and mysterious activity; mingling itself with nature it transforms and assimilates it to its own likeness, and the result is—a mechanical system of the universe, a system of quantitative science or mathematics, a system of optics or acoustics, a system (when, among the number of its evolutions, in a manner externalizing its own nature, the machine, at once engine and material, labours on itself) of intellectual and moral principles! In like manner (in continuance of this view of the Mind and its Philosophy) the Imagination and the Emotions are considered to simply reveal themselves in the creation of Poetry: the world of Nature which, by the agency of Reason, was just now elevated into the dignity of a scientific order, is now, by this portion of the same versatile essence, either employed—its positions and relations being altered—as the material of new structures, or—remaining itself unaltered—becomes

charged with all the emotions of the mind itself; thus giving occasion, as we shall hereafter see, to the two great divisions of the poetical genius and its manifestations. From generation to generation this varied activity, in all its different directions and intensities, goes on unabated; until at length it reaches its existing point (whatever that may be), and all that is, at this hour, registered in books, as well as all that has been but inwardly conjectured—the verified discoveries and the faint suspicions of philosophy, the recorded visions of poetry, and the unrecorded but incessant poetry of hope and remembrance in every age—all are only the different attitudes assumed by this one unchanged yet ever-changing essence.

In this view, then, Gentlemen, the Philosophy of the Mind is to be regarded as the first step of science; because it is the observation and theory of that without which science cannot exist. In the logical relationship of the sciences it holds this position; and in this view unquestionably its study would actually be the first undertaken by a Being of a superior world descending to contemplate and scrutinize the attainments of ours. Let me illustrate a thought which may illustrate others.

Let us imagine (imaginary suppositions are admissible in scientific discussions when they enter not as hypotheses for the reason, but as pictures for the fancy) a Being possessing such enlargement of capacity as to command in his sensitive and intellectual scope a vast range of the habitable worlds of the universe; and enabled, by concentrating attention, to study any particular individual of the splendid group, even as we are able to fix attention upon a single field in an expanded landscape. That such a conception is not without plausibility sufficient for its purpose, those will concede who remember that we ourselves actually stand in a very similar relation to the little worlds of animated nature which the microscope can discover in every drop of water. Such a Being as I have supposed philosophizing upon worlds, would probably deem no object more worthy of immediate investigation than the several proportions of knowledge, attainable by each of these divisions of the intelligent universe. But such a study, if conducted as we study the literary history of countries, would be a tedious, uncertain, and, to the gifted spirit we are accompanying, a superfluous, process. He enters upon the special investigation of each with a wide general induction formed from all. Such a Being, already informed, by contemplating his gigantic scheme of analogy, of the several degrees and capacities of intellect, would have already learned to pronounce on their relative possibilities of

LECT.
I.

attainment. His sole or chief inquisition would be into the psychology of each nation of intelligences; and in its psychology he would see, in a manner, its whole attainments involved. Each species of intellects would of course labour upon the field of external knowledge exposed to its view, and the actual acquirements would vary as it varied; but yet—the laws and the limits of investigation, as general formulas, should be sought in the respective psychologies alone. To confirm the truth of this representation we might ask whether in this world of ours, where the field of knowledge is the same to so many species of animals, the sphere of attainment is not invariably determined by the mental elevation. Knowledge is the product of Mind into Nature; and where one element remains the same, the knowledge evolved will be directly as the other. If then such a Being as we have been supposing were to fix his curiosity upon our world, the volumes he would first open in order to collect the general outlines of his information would be—not the records of our academies of science, not the physics of Newton nor the mathematics of Lagrange, brilliant but partial glimpses of our Reason—nor yet the endless tomes of our poetry and romance, a still more circuitous path to his purpose,—but (if he could find any to be trusted) the simple catalogue of our common faculties, in which he would see potentially present every truth that Reason ever mastered, and every image that fancy ever unveiled to the poetical idolatry of mankind.

* Mental
Philosophy
may be the
last arrived
at.

II. But though it be conceivable that the philosophy of the human mind might present itself in this its logical priority as the first and principal object of speculation to the reason of a comprehensive observer, there is also another and a very different path by which the same great subject may enter the field of thought. If in the method just described it be assumed as the first, it may also be arrived at as the last term of science. While the accomplished observer we have imagined, comprehending from the eminences of a higher intelligence a compass of prospect denied to man, might demand it as the simple prerequisite for all his general conclusions as to man's susceptibilities of knowledge and of power; it reveals itself to the humbler faculties of man himself only at the close of a long course of researches. Let us pursue the steps of the discovery,—the true genesis of philosophy. If your guide on the way shall appear to deviate from his object, he will trust to your candour not to decide, until you are in a position to compare the point of attainment with the direction of the journey. As the mind is first aroused

Historical
genesis of
Philosophy.

to consciousness by sensation, it continues for a long period to maintain the direction it has originally received; and the understanding is the last thing understood by itself. Solicited by necessity, and then aroused by wonder, and then stimulated by curiosity, and then perhaps rewarded by unexpected discovery, the faculties are at first wholly engaged by the vivid and exciting world around them. That the infancy of science resembles in this respect the infancy of nature, seems to be a fact unquestioned by all its judicious historians; and the exceptions, to which we may hereafter refer, will be seen not to disturb the real sovereignty of the principle. The world is all to man at first; he forgets that in truth he is all to the world. The soul, essentially a foreigner in the earthly sphere of sense, may at least be permitted to indulge the curiosity of a foreigner also. Were I appointed to plead its cause instead of to investigate its history, I might remind you on its behalf, that among its earliest developments of scientific energy have been those which seem to beat against the outer wall of its dwelling; and that astronomy, the science of the remotest realms of the sensible universe, has preceded the classification of earths and the systems of vegetable and animal nature. The stars which seem to glitter on the confines of the world of sight, are the earliest objects of its contemplation; and the adoration that at length mistakes them for their Maker is but the melancholy resource of an imagination exhausted in the effort to pass beyond them. May we not say of the soul at this crisis of its history, that just so a prisoner confined for a time in a narrow cell, at first eagerly assails the outer door of his gloomy abode, watches each sparkle of light* that seems to gleam from without through its crevices, and at last—finding all unavailing—retires with a sigh to the corner of his dungeon, and, as his eyes contract to their situation, becomes by degrees reconciled to the darkness.

Man's faculties first awakened by outward phenomena.

To continue the history of intellectual development,—cursorily, because only with a view to after conclusions,—from observations of outward nature more or less accurately collected and disposed in a rude symmetry, the mind frames its first hasty edifices of natural science; edifices destined themselves to be but the materials or the scaffolding of a future and better architecture. Circumstances probably of casual utility first suggest the important abstraction, by which, neglecting the particularities of material things, it regards them as all existing in place, and as admitting accurate admeasurement of their mutual distances; and then as existing in space, and capable of

Second step—relations of Space. Geometry.

LECT.
I.

measurement in their three dimensions. The conceptions of space and figure as an object of science being once obtained, they are not likely to remain unfruitful; more especially as demanding no further aid from sensible observation these abstractions meet the favourite tendencies of the meditative genius. Hence originate the mathematical sciences, the unparticipated creation, and thence the chief glory of human reason; sciences in which the infinite variety of relations secures perpetual novelty; and in which the elementary simplicity of the notions which these relations modify entails on all their consequences their own incomparable distinctness. Happy, if born out of physical necessities as to their historical use, and out of sensible perceptions as their metaphysical condition, these daring sciences had not too long abandoned their humble parents; until, at perhaps the greatest æra of human reason, under the guidance of modern genius, the brilliant wanderer (who in the last flights of the Alexandrian school had, under the auspices of Proclus and his followers, almost disappeared in the densest clouds of metaphysical speculation) was once more reclaimed, deductive sagacity restored to inductive observation, the abstractions of pure space once more bound to their physical concretes, and the soul and body of natural science united in one immortal frame.

Limits of
mathematical science.

Now, Gentlemen, observe to what point we have followed the progress of the scientific genius; and observe also at what point the limits of these double energies of observation and reasoning already appear to be inexorably set. For it is one of the paradoxes of the human mind, that amongst its earliest efforts it reaches its farthest limits; the geometry of a schoolboy is conversant with subjects that the geometry of Laplace cannot overpass. The early mind has not indeed explored the immeasurable riches of the intervening country; but nevertheless it has truly reached its boundaries. In physical inquiry we perceive that our primitive investigator has observed the constant successions of many phenomena, and has imagined much, doubtless, that he has not observed: in Mathematics he has detected many relations of figures, and found them to be different aspects of the same extensions; many relations of numbers, and found them to be different expressions for the same number. For some time, doubtless, the pursuit of knowledge is so ardent that the pursuer is lost in his object; and the object, diffusing and enlarging to the view, seems itself to comprehend all things. The very confusion of the vast and shifting prospect dazzles and bewilders, but fixes and fascinates the eye. The mind is not yet worthy of a philosophy. Even if a moment's

reflection were at this time to revert from the extent of the prospect to the structure of the intellectual organ that beholds it, and in a relative sense creates what it beholds, we can easily imagine that the result, disclosing so much weakness with so much strength, would at first appear humiliating and repulsive. Admitted to a glimpse of the interior of the temple of nature, the early naturalist stands at the portals, astonished by its vastness, and appalled (as yet) by its mysterious gloom; far from suspecting that he is himself the noblest object in the edifice, he only aspires timidly to borrow respect from his position, not to confer it, to lose his petty individuality in the immensity of things, and become, in a manner, a portion of all around him. Gentlemen, long before the achievements of inductive science had illustrated the mind itself with the very light it was casting upon nature, there was a higher philosophical accuracy in the inspired computation of the Psalmist. If he, in his early astronomy, "considers the heavens, the work of the fingers" of God, and asks, "What is man," that he can become an object of affection and care to the Architect of a universe, it is not that he may place man below these splendid, but inanimate structures; his argument—prophetical purport apart—is not directed to sink man below nature, but to exalt God above man and nature. Setting the human reason far beneath that Divine reason which formed it and all things, he argues the beneficence of the Godhead in affirming the elevation of man, and glorifies the Author of Nature in exalting its interpreter. "Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet!"

But, Gentlemen, that recoil from the outward to the inward world which man, of his own definite will, might perhaps remain for ever without effecting, (similar to that reverse passage from the inward to the outward, which a great French metaphysical critic of the last century—and I perfectly agree with him—has called an *instinct plus sûr que la raison même*), this retreat of the observer upon himself is at last effected by the spontaneous course of reason. May I here request your special attention to a train of observation which will reward the very small exertion it requires.

It may be conceived that in the mind of some sagacious and ample genius, a review is held of all its actual attainments. I am, for the sake of distinctness and brevity, ascribing to a single mind what, you will readily apprehend, is, in point of fact, the gradual process and combined result of many minds. At first, perhaps,

LECT.
I.

The mathematician can give no account of the fundamental ideas of his science, Extension and Number.

Ultimate facts of physical science lead in like manner to metaphysical inquiry.

Sequence.

Force and Causation.

such a mind reflects upon that portion of its knowledge which holds the pre-eminence in utility and in accuracy,—its knowledge of the mutual distances and positions of material objects, its various devices for ascertaining them, for measuring their size, and computing their numbers. These reflections from their very nature have concern with abstract magnitude, being independent of all varieties of sensible structure. By an easy process of successive analysis the mind of our reflector passes from results to elements, from propositions proved to those definitions which, as geometrical data, state the simplest conceptions and combinations of figure, or as names of numbers, the infinite variety of repeated units. The inquirer pauses. Can the human mind advance no farther? Gentlemen, the *geometrician* can advance no farther. The science of related magnitudes is arrived at the limits of its dominion. Reduced to its definitions, it resigns its office; content with investigating the relations of extensions and numbers, it relinquishes to a superior authority the presiding ideas of extension and number themselves.

Perplexed by this unexpected limitation, the mind we are accompanying next perhaps recurs to its acquirements in the science of the mutual action and individual structure of bodies themselves. Here at least, with all plain and palpable to the senses, it may hope to escape those humbling repulses which checked its former course. Event follows after event, and body is bound to body with a definiteness and precision which leaves nothing in mystery. Clearer eyes, and an ampler field of vision, might perhaps be desirable; but scarcely a clearer or an ampler judgment. Yet stay! Event follows event; does this indeed involve no subject of speculation apart from the sensible fact? Is there no relation here detected which physical science cannot explain, because physical science presupposes it? Not only this, but the same event follows the same event. Is there no new relation inserted here which the science of nature is not to anatomize as its subject, but to revere as its parent? As the inquirer advances the prospect thickens and darkens on his view. This piece of marble, thus compact and ponderous, may, under percussion, resolve into dust. What is it that now retains these atoms of dust in union; and what is it that annihilates the union, and for a massive whole presents a heap of severed particles? An obvious analogy calls the agent Force. And what is force? Shall we style it the unknown cause of equilibrium and of motion? What then is a Cause? How has the relation arisen? And how is it thus inextricably involved in every exertion of

force? If this mass be subject to such laws, the world, nay, the universe, is but a large mass; and if this body require a cause to bind and to loose it, the universe itself must require a cause. Where then, in what reservoir, shall we deposit this great original fountain of causation? But more still; it appears that this same body, unbound by its proper forces, will dissolve in sunder,—unsupported, will fall to the earth. As the one arises from the excess of a superior force, so, doubtless, does the other. It seems then that the natural tendency of force is to produce Motion. Motion is a succession of events, and, like all successions, presupposes that relation of time which we approached so unavailingly before. But it supposes another element; it is evolved in Space; that is, it exists in that elementary nature or notion, which in our former mathematical researches we were obliged to surrender as the appanage of a higher and mightier science.

LECT.
I.*First Cause.**Force produces motion,**which again implies the idea of space, of which material science also can render no account.*

Such, Gentlemen, we may imagine to be the baffled speculations of the inquiring student of material nature at the close of his researches. Thus it is that, by slow degrees, and through the steady path of analysis, the mind is half won to itself from the world of external appearances. But even yet, perhaps, it is not prepared for that happy and systematic view of things which can alone reduce to light and order this vague and heaving chaos. Absorbed in that thoughtful reverie which such conceptions of the profoundest mysteries of nature are so apt to produce, we may represent the mind as now sinking back upon itself in the very attitude which withdraws it from the contemplation and influence of external things. The supposition is perfectly consonant to truth. The great fundamental notions which I have mentioned¹, space, time, causation, and so forth, are in fact the main conduits between the inner and the outer worlds; appearing to belong almost equally to both, they form the portals by which the mind enters upon nature, or retreats from nature into its own more wondrous depths. Our reflector, then, leaving these notions as they exist in the independent reality of the world and its Author, for the same notions as they exist in the perceiving mind of man, has already opened to himself the gates of psychological investigation. He summons the mind before the tribunal of its own reason; and expanding in the faithful mirror of memory all or much of its past experience, he awakes to a truth, which, however obvious when expressed, no one possessing the slightest philosophical genius, ever yet perceived for the first time in all

*Thus the mind is won back to itself from nature.**Space, time, and causation, hold an intermediate place between the subjective and objective.*

¹ [“The idea of space seems interposed between the two great worlds of matter and mind, belonging to both and neither.”—*Author's MSS.* Ed.]

LECT.
I.

*The inquirer
awakened
to the reality
of the sub-
jective.*

*Laws of
nature re-
solvable
into laws of
mind.*

its force without an emotion of admiration. He begins to perceive all that knowledge of outward nature which he had been accustomed to regard as wholly terminating in its material objects,—as a something appertaining to the stars, the fire, the waters, or whatever else was his subject of physical inquiry,—itself silently taking its place as a part of the long train of his habitual thoughts and feelings. Not only are his conceptions of moral duty, law, and propriety, beings of the mind, but all the variety of sciences are the “secretions” of the faculties. He learns that for all which is added to sensible impressions, which, exclusively of remembrance and comparison, could not raise the impressed being to a higher rank than that of the meanest vegetable, he is solely indebted to the incessant activity of the invisible principle within him; that the mind invests the world with the intellectual chains of its own laws and relations, as it invests it with colours; and that, if all which the mind does for the world could be abstracted from all which the world does for the mind, the result would be the same as if the reader of some splendid work of philosophy or fiction, a *Principia* or an *Iliad*, were in the midst of his sympathizing enthusiasm to be struck with total fatuity, and suddenly sink to beholding an unmeaning succession of black characters upon a white surface, instead of that array of visions or speculations which the volume—like the world around it—in merely suggesting by previous mental laws, seemed itself actually to contain and produce.

*Primary
Ph.osophy,
to which all
special
sciences
necessarily
lead up.*

Thus, Gentlemen, by faithfully following the course of a consecutive analysis, I have brought you to the same final point from which our philosopher of a higher world was enabled to set out. You now perceive how it is that the investigator of the external world learns at last to discover both (to adopt a Kantian expression) the “receptivity” and the modifying agency of his own mind; how he finds that to every branch of human knowledge, both as to its material and its process of growth, there is a definite limit beyond which it cannot pass, and at which every subordinate science yields up all further authority to the primary philosophy; and how each separate species of rational inquiry by successive resolutions into its components, attenuated, as it were, to its elements, is bound to disappear into this one first, last, and all-comprehending science. Thus is the mind to knowledge what the *prima materia* of the schoolmen was to the sensible world, the single substance of all its phenomena; and thus a perfect theory of the mind would be analogous (though distantly indeed) to what the coveted “science of substances” was

imagined to be, as compared with the ordinary natural philosophy of observed qualities. It teaches not indeed, as that mistaken and impossible science was expected to do, to determine, *a priori*, all the powers and susceptibilities of bodies; but even in its present state it can and does determine, *a priori*, what is the course of reasoning adapted to any possible subject, and what are the last necessary limits of discovery in any possible pursuit.

Of all these illustrations, which of course you will understand to be intended only as such, the high and noble purport is, the following simple but magnificent generalization, that there is a philosophy which is to every specific philosophy what that specific philosophy is to the individual objects of its classifications, that the sciences which theorize the world may be themselves theorized, that the subjects of their inquiry and the relations whose endless varieties they detect, may be themselves resolved into classes of subjects and classes of relations, that these classes of subjects and relations are themselves again amenable to one grand final classification, as the attributes of a single permanent substance. Gentlemen, that substance is the mind of man, and that philosophy is the philosophy of the human mind.

This philosophy described.

I trust that now you will have perceived the mutual bearing of the two directions in which I told you our philosophy might be approached. You will have perceived that the one method, beginning with the analysis of the mind, derives all the sciences from it; that the other, beginning with the sciences, derives the philosophy of mind from all of them: that the one proceeds from the centre to the circumference, the other from the circumference to the centre; that the one discovers everything in the mind; the other, the mind in everything. And it may be necessary to add, that you can easily infer, how unlikely to be chosen, in the actual history of human learning, as well as how unwise and preposterous for a being formed as man is formed, would be that former mode of synthetical inquiry which from a prior enumeration of all the faculties of the mind, would conclude as to all the varieties of its development, and all its possibilities of acquisition; how impossible is any synthesis which is not preceded by some analysis; how certainly such a speculation, if undertaken by man, would be based on an inadequate enumeration; and how, therefore, in its full extent, it must be left to those superior intelligences whom I have instanced as employing it, and who may be supposed (fortified by a vast previous experience in the natural history of minds) to

Process from mind to nature, and from nature to mind, further illustrated.

First process synthetical, second analytical.

LECT.
I.

detect, with one glance at the world and its interpreter man, the scope of his reason in its application to his scene. It is indeed a fortunate adaptation of that presiding wisdom which rules the growth of the world's reason as it does that of an individual, that that philosophy, which, as I have shewn you, is the law of laws, the classification of classifications, the ultimate term of science, should for the most part be evolved in its due place: not appearing, as an inductive philosophy, until the reason of man has sufficiently acted itself out in nature to display the diversity of subjects and relations which the theory of the mind undertakes to reduce to system.

But though assuredly I would not presume to offer to this age and audience any discussion of the theory of mind which was not essentially analytical, I have, on the present occasion, sketched its synthetical aspect likewise, because I am not now considering the *method of prosecuting* the subject, but *the subject itself*; and this double view of the science of thought, as the beginning and the end of human studies, is eminently calculated, by contrasted lights, to hold the subject in a strong and steady illumination. Shewing you that it is at once the science of which all others are cases, and the *residual science* which remains when all others are subtracted; it evinces, by combining both views, that you cannot pitch upon any spot, whether public or secluded, in the vast territory of human knowledge, at which you will not find yourselves at the same point, moving *to* and moving *from* this philosophy, while in the very process of the motion you are practically developing its truths.

*Practical
influence of
general
views of
metaphysical
science.*

The first conclusion to be drawn from this dominant character, which thus forms the prerogative of the metaphysical philosophy, is all but expressed in the very statement of the fact. It is a topic which we shall have hereafter to resume, but which I think it well, for purposes of immediate use, to anticipate in some degree in this place. I allude to the practical influence which our views of the principles of this science must exert over the progress of every other. Cultivated as the sciences now are, by separate detachments of labourers, this influence, I admit, becomes less prominent and perceptible; men are more engaged with the details, and less with the principles; the same hands are seldom busy at both; and I am not so bigoted to my own pursuits as not cordially to join in felicitating the world upon the change. It is the result, and it is the cause, of the multiplication of knowledge. I rejoice in the indication which such divisions and subordinations of labour afford; that the intellectual manu-

facture is thriving, and that the enlightened tastes of the age keep the market in perpetual demand. When I speak of the influences of this more abstract philosophy over the sciences, I surely do not desire that the influence should be so unnaturally aggravated as to consume those subject sciences it sways; that the government should be increased until it should have nothing to govern, and supremacy expire in its own completion! No, Gentlemen; the reciprocal security of physical and metaphysical science is in their constant union and parallel motion;—the direct grasp of the one and the comprehensive scope of the other make them the hands and the eye of philosophy; and they should consent and harmonize, and mutually impart instruction, as you will hereafter learn that these organs do! And, however I may “magnify my office,” I will freely concede that I know no period of philosophical history so deplorable as that long and gloomy one (the scholastic ages) in which men, forgetting the practical developments of reason in the frivolous sophistry which they mistook for an effective study of reason’s nature and properties, considered that they had done their duty as leaders of the public intellect when, by the toil of years, they had succeeded in adding a new page of verbal combinations to the barren folios of their fathers, and in contributing by the everlasting “Distinguo” a new illustration of the almost infinite divisibility of human thought! I will go farther, and add, that a period not wholly unworthy of rivalling it in this industrious perversion of the course of inquiry, and overweening estimate of purely metaphysical deduction, was that succeeding age, the earlier part of the seventeenth century, which, with transcendent merits of its own, had not escaped the inheritance of its predecessor’s errors;—an age in which the ambition of each illustrious thinker to assume the sole throne of the newly-emancipated mind of Europe, urged each to attempt embracing the whole circle of knowledge, and to reject all assistance either of preceding or contemporary genius, and in which, as an inevitable consequence, there being actually no time for the tardy process of inductive collection, the metaphysics of the philosopher almost invariably determined his entire scheme of physical doctrine. Who could imagine that the question of free-will at one period has been intimately concerned in the question of a vacuum; and, more marvellous still, the moral character of the Deity involved in the phenomena of elasticity! The long line of inference which connected in logical consequence these antipodes of the world of thought, was not drawn, Gentlemen, in the brain of some dreaming schoolman; it

*Schoolmen.**Seventeenth century.**Leibnitz.*

LECT.
I.

Scholastic
metaphysics
too exclu-
sive; Car-
tesian
too arbi-
trary and
ambitious.

Logic and
metaphysics
of an age
must affect
its scientific
labours:

though the
men of the
age be un-
conscious of
such in-
fluence.

existed in a mind which no learned institution should hear even censured, without a reserve of respect and admiration, the mind of Godfrey Leibnitz¹. But, while I make these concessions, and admit of the scholastic ages that their metaphysics were too exclusive, and of the Cartesian age that its metaphysics were too intrusive and arbitrary, I cannot admit that in our own age they ought to be, or can be, without influence upon the progress of natural science. Whether in constituting and fixing the vast and massive base of all knowledge; by furnishing and illustrating the primary notions of geometry, or the science of space and figure, of algebra, or the science of pure magnitude, of mechanics, or the science of force, of chemistry, in its thousand provinces, as the science of material structure; in exhibiting with constancy and rigour the rules by which alone the edifice can be durably raised; or in tracing the limits beyond which it is not given to any human power to extend it, it would be preposterous to deny that the metaphysical and logical principles of an age must act upon its direct scientific labours, inasmuch as those principles, reduced to a systematic form, are not only the very essence of its knowledge, but, in a manner, the authorized exponent and representative of the public judgment, deliberately issued, upon its own intellectual subjects, progress, character, purpose, and destinies. As the reason of man influences his will, so does the mental philosophy (which is the collective judgment) of a people influence and guide its scientific activity; and as the one influence in innumerable cases occurs without any immediate reference to any settled or systematic theory of conduct, so also that secret, but important directive light, which I may term the latent metaphysic of an age, may operate irresistibly and incessantly, without having its source, its mode, or its power, detected. That such influences—the invisible elec-

¹ [I am unable to cite any passage from Leibnitz which exactly corresponds to either of the notions here attributed to him. In his Letters to Clarke (Postscript to Letter IV.) he objects to the doctrine of a *vacuum*, that it derogates from the Divine Perfection; and in the *Confessio Naturæ* (an early work), he mentions elasticity as one among the properties of bodies which demonstrate the existence of an incorporeal principle. See also his proof of Immortality, *ibid.* It is however quite true that Leibnitz sought to subordinate physical to moral, efficient to final causes, and that he would in the present day be pretty generally condemned for unduly extending the sphere of metaphysic. Thus, "la Physique même a quelque chose de morale et volontaire par rapport à Dieu, puisque les lois du mouvement n'ont point d'autre nécessité, que celle du meilleur." Nouveaux Essais, Liv. II. c. xxi. § 13. See also Opp. Leibn. ed. Erdmann, p. 106, a, where he warmly approves Socrates' depreciation of physical causes in comparison of final in the *Phædo*; and *ibid.*, p. 678. Epist. ad Bierlingium: *efficientes causae pendunt a finalibus, et spiritualia sunt natura priora materialibus, uti etiam nobis sunt priora cognitione, quia interior animam quam corpus perspicimus, quod etiam Plato et Cartesius notarunt.* Ed.]

tricity of the whole body of science—do exist, those indeed only can deny who deny that the subjects of all inquiry are ultimately metaphysical subjects, and that the rules of all inquiry are ultimately logical rules; a statement, the latter member of which would be to contradict an unquestioned definition, and the former of which, even considered not as a matter of definition, but of fact, I trust you will be in no danger of admitting, after the combined synthetical and analytical investigation of the subject of the philosophy of the mind which I have had the honour of presenting to your acceptance upon this day.

LECT.
I

*Subjects of
all inquiry
ultimately
metaphysical.
Rules of
inquiry
ultimately
logical.*

Gentlemen, upon our next day of meeting I purpose, after extending the analytical discovery of this philosophy through its other departments, as poetry, history, and our personal experience, to attempt exhibiting to you the primary division of the subject; a division, in which, as I shall feel obliged to depart very widely from the philosophy now popular in these countries, I fear I shall have even more reason to require your indulgence than I have had upon the present occasion.

LECTURE II.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
II.

OUR last meeting in this place was occupied with a general preliminary account of the nature of our subject,—an account not certainly so distinct and luminous as I trust you will have formed for your own use at the close of our researches, but serving sufficiently as an introductory and temporary guide—an outline map which you will hereafter fill and colour for yourselves. In a case like this, we must in some measure anticipate what is to come, while we cannot take full advantage of it; we must borrow from the future to illustrate the present, while yet to borrow much would be only to obscure it; and in attempting the preliminary “abscissio infiniti” which is necessary to the methodical delivery of every course of doctrine, it is often hard to avoid for a while condemning our hearers to that perplexed suspense in which it is so much easier to pronounce what a subject is *not* than to define what it is. The exposition of every philosophical subject must, at first and for a time, repose upon the future which is afterwards to repose upon it; content with that twilight illumination whose light is uncertain because reflected from a sun not yet arisen.

Conclusion arrived at in the foregoing Lecture.

You will remember, Gentlemen, that I attempted to shew you by what processes deductive and inductive the great and dominant science of sensibility, intelligence, emotion, and action, is arrived at; how it is assumed at the beginning or detected at the end, of the long and labyrinthine journey of scientific speculation. It is, as I evinced, the *prime* or the *ultimate* science; the mystic fountain of all the streams of knowledge, or the ocean as mysterious in which their waters are lost. More especially I insisted upon the latter of these views,—the view which is best adapted to an assembly of restricted and fallible human intellects;—shewing you how in constructing the philosophy of man we achieve for all science the same lofty generalization which the sciences themselves achieve for their own respective objects; how the same resem-

Philosophy of man the science of sciences.

blance or identity of qualities which they apprehend in the multitude of different instances, and to which they therefore apply a common name, is also to be discovered in their own ultimate subjects of inquiry and processes of inquiry, and is made amenable to the same principle of nomenclature; how, in short, the metaphysician inducts his universal laws from *them*, as they induct their universal laws from external nature. So far we had proceeded, and from these views we had begun to draw some obvious but practically important conclusions, when I was last honoured with your attention.

But, Gentlemen, I request you particularly to observe that when I represent our science as a generalization from all the varieties of Natural Science, though I describe truly I do not define adequately. Such a description, though valuable for its present purposes, is far from doing complete justice to the claims of this philosophy. In narrating the generation of the universal science, I have derived it, historically, from a more or less advanced physical science, from which both in the order of time and in the order of *reasoning* it naturally evolves itself. But though, certain disturbing influences excepted, it is thus true that it is not through the pathways of feeling and imagination that men travel into metaphysical inquiry, yet the science whose birth I have traced for you from the speculative reason soon asserts a dominion coextensive with human nature itself. I have shewn you that what is termed the Philosophy of Mind is the ultimate science of Nature; you must remember that it is also the ultimate science of Man, and the science of man "*humani nihil alienum putat*." Were the labours of the mind in the collection of facts and the ascertainment and application of laws, or in the logical comparison of its own conceptions, the whole story of its activity,—were the character which Voltaire has somewhere bestowed upon Clarke (that of being a "mill for reasoning") an adequate definition of universal humanity,—to have proceeded thus far would be to have reached the limits of our scope as natural philosophers of mind. The heritage of our metaphysics would be confined to the transcendental problems bequeathed by our mathematical and physical sciences: a rich inheritance indeed, and a responsible one, but not yet all that humanity has to offer to its own reflection. The sciences—mighty monuments as (even in their present state, without regard to their future development) they unquestionably are to the dignity of the spirit of man,—are not to be considered as its only glory. It has assumed other positions which demonstrate other faculties,—positions the evidence of

This is, however, an inadequate definition.

LECT.
II*Imagination, emotion.**Science of man includes the theory of the faculties and their products.*

which is among us in a thousand forms. In its treasures of poetry and fiction it has ceased to reason, in order to imagine and to feel. Here then the science of mind addresses itself to new problems; and in the analysis of the great productions of verbal or pictorial poetry, resolves poetry into the poet acting, and, by its cautious course of successive generalizations, attains to the mental laws of imaginative agency in its relation to the production of elevating or pleasurable emotion, as it attained to the law of the gravitating force in its production of all the diversified yet consenting harmonies of the universe. The *Iliad* is to an Aristotle what the planetary appearances were to a Newton; that is to say, each is equally an aggregate of phenomena which confusedly pointed to some predominating law or laws, themselves the utterance and the development of some presiding mind. All intellectual arts disclose the intellect that originates them, and are the outward portraiture of inward faculties and laws. This is true alike of creation itself, and of the secondary and subordinate creation which is denominated poetry; the Art or, to speak more correctly, the Science of Criticism is the physics of the World framed by imagination under the guidance of taste; in both, phenomena very different indeed in their nature but very similar in their scientific aspect, are resolved and classified; poetry is the "nature" of genius, and, if you will have it so, nature itself is—the poetry—or the poem—of God.

Here, then, in virtue of its systematizing authority, we have extended the domain of our philosophy beyond the region of the sciences; and we find that it traverses the fairy land of fiction and of feeling with as assured a step as that with which it marks its supremacy in the former territory;—gathering and classifying the ornamental flowers of fancy as carefully as before it classified the useful fruits of speculative truth. The facility and amusement of the investigations may indeed differ in these very different provinces, but the principle of progress to the psychological theorist is the same, whether it lie through the pleasure-grounds of imagination, or through those regions which, though containing mines of internal wealth, may perhaps be, as is always remarked of the districts rich in mineral treasures, externally desolate, rugged, and difficult of access. The science of observed nature, whether mental or material, is ever uniform with itself; the position of the mind in relation to these subjects of its inquiry admits of one mode of progress, and admits of it alone.

Philosophy of History included in

And the same philosophical analysis which I have described as reducing to law and order the recorded pro-

cesses of science and the recorded impulses of imagination, is obviously applicable to every other record of mental action. (I am still regarding our science in its more popular aspect, as the ultimate science not of nature but of man.) History, then, which in its widest sense may be defined as the record of "the development of things in time," and in its more restricted sense becomes the register of only human changes, is itself no more than an assortment of facts for our arrangement: a truth of boundless importance and fertility, which it has been reserved for later ages to discern, and for future ages to verify. "What species of amusement or instruction," says Mr Godwin, "would history afford us, if there were no ground of inference from moral causes to effects, if certain temptations and inducements did not in all ages and climates produce a certain series of actions?...the amusement would be inferior to that which we derive from the perusal of a chronological table, where events have no order but that of time." (*Pol. Filt.* I. 268.) A great principle is always first carried to excess; it rushes into the mind with a force which impels it to the opposite extreme, and across every barrier of caution; like the lightning in suddenness and brilliancy, it seems, like it too, to fill at once the whole breadth of the horizon of thought. Mr Godwin does not stand alone in modern times, in exaggerating beyond its real limits that greatest of conceptions, the philosophy of history; and the authority and ability of Frederic Schlegel have already, I fear, urged the notion to extravagance, in his views, so widely circulated abroad, of the historical development of the laws of intelligence. But, Gentlemen, the disguises of a truth must not tempt you to doubt its substantial reality; and it is one of the most valuable lessons in the ethics of philosophical inquiry, to learn how to see truth in its excesses, and to defend it even when it deserts itself. Principles, great and novel, seem, like men, to have their wild season of youth, and seldom pass to their sober application without a previous period of extravagance. And there exists a philosophy of history, though it be never destined for the perfection of our philosophy of nature; there are periods, and generally determinable periods, in the march of men and empires, though the perturbations be too intricate and their causes too minute to allow us to give these historical recurrences the accuracy of our astronomical cycles. But on the present school of philosophical history I must postpone any further comment, until our next term, when in rapidly surveying the history of philosophy itself, I shall hope to find opportunities of noticing this kindred subject. But, in addition to

LECT.
II.the Philosophy of
Man.General
conception
of History

LECT.
II.

all these more deliberate manifestations of nature and of man which I have presented to you as subjects for your philosophical anatomy, and subjects in two lights, both as to the matters upon which they are engaged, the truths they reveal (which terminate by resolving into the final topics and truths of metaphysics), and as to the mental procedures they call into action; in addition to these great specimens of nature and of mind which are contained in the museums of science and literature, I have finally to note another, a fourth rich material for reflective analysis with which you are provided, not by erudition, but by nature. We have detected our metaphysics where man probably first found it; in the labours of physical science searching for truth of laws and principles; we have discovered it in history recording truth of facts and events; we have found it, more latent but not more inactive, in Poetry, beautifying and transmuting both the former, and have known, or, I trust, will hereafter know, how to interpret the deep-thoughted sentence of Aristotle, φιλοσόφωτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποιήσις ἱστορίας ἐστίν (*Poet. c. 9*)¹. But beyond all these records of "instantiæ prærogativæ" for your psychological inductions, we are not to forget another vast and important volume, that diary whose pages are for ever augmenting in number,—the volume of your personal experience. In that region of knowledge every man is his own historian; and in it (though, as a distinct source of attainable truths, I have placed it apart) we may all find the miniature representation of that wider historic theatre which has

Individual experiences are materials of psychological induction.

A kingdom for a stage, princes to act,
And monarchs to behold the swelling scene.

Such indeed is the sameness of human motives and all the variety of external scenes of action, that each individual is truly a microcosm of the whole moral universe; and if, not confining ourselves to the actual experiences, we were to consider the susceptibilities, of any given human being, it might be affirmed intelligibly enough that a single individual contains within himself an undeveloped infinity of individuals, that each man is in possibility all men, and that each life renewed amid other scenes might be multiplied into a history of the world. And perhaps, were history to be considered,—or could it be constructed,—as the record of the progress of the human race towards happiness, it is with such biographies that it would mainly be concerned; for the happiness of a nation is after all only

Every individual a microcosm.

Political history an aggregate of personal histories.

¹ ["Poetry is a thing more philosophical and weightier than history." *Ed.*]

the aggregate of personal happinesses, and the philosophy of its history the philosophy of personal motives. The pride of human nature seems indeed to have consecrated the same—perhaps fortunate—fallacy in its patriotism, which the reason of human nature so long admitted in its logical speculations; in each alike we have learned to invest our arbitrary genera and species with existence, to forget that the “singulars” alone possess it; and by a sort of realism of the emotions, the long predicamental line of country, province, county, family, and the rest, assume a definite being and attributes,—their interests and their honour are matter of thrilling import—to many who scarcely recognize the existence or value the happiness of any one individual included under these idolized abstractions!

There are some occasions indeed in which the connexion, or rather the identity, of these two great spheres of psychological induction—personal and historical experience—is strongly and instructively established; I allude to those instances in which we can actually detect the agency of private motives in effecting vast national changes,—instances which at once break the powerful spell, that, by separating the fields of individual and national humanity, so constantly exalts the life of past history into a certain godlike or superhuman scene, in which *if* individuals like ourselves are conceived at all to act, they are, as it were, dilated into the vastness of the mighty multitudes they control, and assume to themselves the magnitude of the interests they are directing. An illusion, I may add, in its general purport and effects not unlike that old and authorized dogma of the essential difference of the heavenly and earthly motions, which was one among the many reasons that left it to an Englishman of the seventeenth century to explain the theory of the universe. The instances of which I speak, though they occur oftenest under despotic governments, are least often detected there; and, accordingly, it is in the contemplation of such scenes, or in living under such constraints, that the illusion has its fullest sovereignty. There the kingly nature is not merely superior to that of ordinary men, it is of another origin and essence; it acts by peculiar laws, and owes no allegiance to the inductions of psychology. Yet there, precisely, its melancholy community of being is most firmly established; and there even the attribute of superior power may most feebly be doubted. The Philosophy of Mind vindicates to itself the biography of courts and the history of power, in reducing power itself when most uncontrolled to the control of the invincible

*Examples
of this tendency.*

LECT.
II.

laws of universal humanity. "Domination itself," says Rousseau, "is servile when it depends on opinion. You depend on the prejudices of those whom you govern by prejudices. To conduct them as *you* please, you must conduct yourself as *they* please." "Oh!" he afterwards adds, after quoting the well-known anecdote of Themistocles and his child^a, "what little conductors we should often discover for the greatest empires, if from the prince we could descend by degrees to the first hand that gave the impulse in secret!" (*Emile*, Liv. II.) A thought which might suggest a comparison of such a government to an unequal bulk of matter in mechanics, whose centre of gravity (that centre on which the whole is set to rest for support, and where its entire force is accumulated for action) lies not at either extreme, but at some point not far from the preponderating side, but secret and invisible in the interior of the mass. I introduce the comparison in order to extend it in strict adherence to our present subject; for in the machinery of public and historical affairs, even such a director as this unseen manager of empires is himself the creature of motives produced by other agents in endless variety and succession; just as the mechanical point of which I have been speaking is itself, wherever it be placed, the result of a thousand combining influences, every atom of the mass really contributing to determine it. Thus it is that there is a sort of horrible "representative" government even in the favouritism of an oriental tyranny.

But these are only one class of the innumerable cases in which history itself teaches us to identify, as subjects of philosophical contemplation, the life of individuals and of nations. And we require such admonitions. That it is an enormous complication of personal motives which composes the whole actual substance of the grand totalities of history, is, as a speculative truth, easily understood and admitted; but when the whole is presented, we neglect the innumerable parts: and a historical view of an empire, especially where our guide aims at elegance of style and systematic narration (such a history as Gibbon's), may be compared to the view of the natural body; in the symmetrical "effect" of the entire we forget that it is indeed an effect, that the shape is only the determining surface of masses of interwoven tissues and endless anatomical details, the visible result of which is that outward complexion of harmony and grace, whose very beauty it is to hide them. The same value is thus attached by psycho-

*The course
of history
determined
by minute
causes.*

^a ["Ce petit garçon que vous voyez là, disoit Thémistocle à ses amis, est l'arbitre de la Grèce; car il gouverne sa mère, sa mère me gouverne, je gouverne les Athéniens, et les Athéniens gouvernent les Grecs." *Ed.*]

logical students of history to minute disclosures, which is attached by the anatomist to those rare surgical opportunities which allow the play of the living machine to be witnessed. To the tears of a certain woman many ages ago (to cite an instance from Helvetius) Europe demonstrably owes its present situation, and (I may add) the whole history of modern times, its precise development and character. If the tears of Veturia had not disarmed Coriolanus, the Volsci would doubtless have destroyed Rome; if Rome had fallen, the world would never have known that long chain of victories which in elevating a single empire changed the state of every other; modern Europe would not have triumphed over its ruins or received the impression of its powerful influences, nor, therefore, have been what it is to-day. I take the liberty of adding Helvetius's instance, that we might trace the same great results to even meaner parentage, and find, by a similar course of deduction, in the geese of the Capitol the ancestors in order of events to the dynasties and policies of the Cæsars and the Bourbons. Minute personal agencies, then, abound in all histories; for they are, in truth, the ultimate atoms into which all the events of history are finally resolvable. The Philosophy of History, therefore (if you will allow me one more illustration), bears to the philosophy of personal experience, much the same relation which Mechanics bears to Chemistry; the one theorizes the forces and motions of the masses; the other the intimate structure of each, and the arrangement and disposition of its component particles. When the influences of private and individual minds are detected, we have the two departments united; as when the practical mechanic becomes a temporary chemist in examining the strength and structure of his materials: such records restore the unity of human nature, remind the reason of what the imagination is so apt to forget, and teach us that the history of mankind is still the history of men.

*Physical
analogies.*

Gentlemen,—I have now won the right of reminding you with how accurate an obedience to the inductive spirit of the age, (in its own sphere so invaluable,) we have conducted our investigations of the subject of the metaphysical philosophy. Without any formal display of the external apparatus of the scholastic method of division and subdivision, which for obvious reasons of utility it is my object in this place to avoid as much as is practicable, I have exhibited to you four great fields for the cultivation of psychological inquiry. These are: the truths, subjects, and processes of science; the recorded results and processes of imagination; the facts, causes, and general laws

*Four great
fields of
psychological
inquiry.*

LECT.
II.

of history ; and the treasures of direct personal experience. I have not pretended, as you will conclude or conjecture, from the style (purposely unscholastic) in which I have discussed them, to present these divisions as possessing the adequacy of a scientific distribution, but as being sufficient to suggest to you the extent and the variety of those territories over which our philosophy exerts a direct and perpetual control. It exerts such a control, I have told you, because it is the last and highest generalization from them all. Science in all its branches is, as it were, the rich and variegated tapestry which is woven upon this common ground ; Poetry in its widest sense, and all its many kinds and divisions, is but the practical form of a portion of this philosophy ; mankind in the grand and melancholy review of History are but performing its evolutions ; and in the private experience of mere individual life, every action is an experiment, every practical rule a tacit theorem in the same universal science of the soul. I have now, therefore, described to you the philosophy of the mind *under a purely inductive aspect ; that view under which it takes its place with lofty humility as the first, of physical sciences, but still a physical science, above all others in the extent of its conclusions, agreeing with all in its method of obtaining and employing them.

*Inductive
Psychology
a physical
science.*

*But the
philosophy
of Mind
not ex-
clusively
inductive.*

But, Gentlemen, I should not be acting with the sincerity which forms an important article in those ethics of philosophical inquiry to which I have already alluded, if I did not confess it as my opinion that the philosophy which is now and in these countries usually designated by the title of the Philosophy of Mind, has, when rightly considered, a scope beyond the inductive inquiry of contingent truth ; and that even when I ventured to describe it to you as the grand and final classification of all the varieties of all the sciences, being to them what they are to nature,—as the physics to which experimental science was itself an experiment, geometry a fact, and algebra another fact,—as including the “axiomata maxime generalia” of which the *Paradise Lost* might be a poetical instance, the age of chivalry a historical,—even in these representations I had not exhausted the claims and offices of philosophy. There is, Gentlemen, a region which lies beyond the scope of the popular metaphysic of our age and country, a region upon which the heavy clouds of the scholastic and mystical theology have indeed long been suffered to rest, and whose substantial existence, confounded to the common eye with the mists that encompassed it, has at last been almost rejected in rejecting them. I refer to that profound, perhaps abstruse, certainly most important department of

*Question of
the objective
validity of
knowledge.*

speculation, which is devoted to investigating the objective reality of our knowledge, and the inferences as to real and independent existences which can be concluded from the constitution and principles of our intellectual being. Such a branch of study—the second great division of the system of metaphysical inquiry which I propose to you—would include as its chief subjects those important topics, the independent reality of material substance, the reality and value of abstract truth, the absolute nature of time and space, and, above all, the real eternal and necessary existence and attributes of that great animating principle of all things which antiquity, by a noble and just analogy, entitled the soul of the universe, and whom it is given us—while by the force of irresistible convictions of His Deity we can place Him on the throne of the universe,—by the revelation of His assumed Humanity, to welcome to the almost nobler throne of the heart. All these considerations are of the kind which have been termed *a priori* reasonings, that is, reasonings which conclude the reality of certain existences from notions and convictions shewn to be inseparable from our intellectual nature, as distinguished from conclusions obtained by the aid of experience and analogy. Whether the human reason is competent to effect this vast and momentous transit from relative and subjective classification to objective and absolute reality, has in all ages been a matter of disputation. Researches of this kind, prosecuted indeed with very various success, and sometimes pursued into the boundless forests of intricate verbal distinctions with a very deplorable waste of industry, formed the great theme of metaphysical science almost until the age of Descartes, who was himself one of the most enlightened cultivators of this region of speculation. The scholastic metaphysicians, however, on whom the yoke of an external authority pressed heavily, and who, set in the close harness of ecclesiastical dogmas, were too laboriously employed dragging the ponderous chariot of the church in triumph to have opportunity for exulting in the wide champaign of speculation—were scarcely ever attracted to the profound logical questions that this branch of knowledge involves. Occasional scepticism, the great stimulant of philosophical activity, was either too feeble to rouse them to examine the basis of their enormous fabrics of ontological science, or was consumed in skirmishing among the intricacies of its outer fortifications. The great question—perpetually recurring to the few who *think* in metaphysics—whether reason can directly recognize the absolute, is, so far as I have ever seen, untouched in their writings. At this time the triumphs of the inductive

*of material
substance,
of space
and time;*

of God.

*Meaning
of a priori
reasoning.*

*Causes of
modern de-
cline of the
possibility
of meta-
physical
science.*

LECT.
II.*Scottish
school.**A metaphy-
sical based
on, but
transcend-
ing psy-
chology.**Kantian
epoch.**Testimony
of Augus-
tine.*

physics seem in these countries to have destroyed the taste for such inquiries, and when contemplated in the clear, piercing, and brilliant light of positive discovery, the dim shadows of ontology, if seen at all, seem only the gaunt and ghastly spectres of a departed philosophy, phantoms which haunted the midnight of science, and, lingering through its early dawn, have not even yet wholly vanished before its growing splendours. The majority of the chief authorities of our country in later times not only neglect this high metaphysic of absolute truth, but deny its legitimate existence. Dr Hartley only approached, Mr Hume disbelieved, Dr Reid doubted, Mr Stewart reiterated his doubts, and Dr Brown—the genius and spirit of whose philosophy is that of Hume, with the negligent morning-gown of Hume exchanged for a gorgeous and spangled court-dress—denies the possibility of *a priori* deduction as applied to the Deity, reduces the knowledge of mind as a substance to the evidence of memory, traces the knowledge of matter to such an application of the Humian theory of physical sequences as I conceive contradicts the theory itself by still supposing a principle beyond it, and discourages all researches of real existence not contained in direct experience and the law of the belief of similarity of future to past, by constantly affirming that every form of knowledge must be relative to the knowing mind,—a certain truth indeed within its proper limits, but one which still leaves open the further question, whether there may not be principles in the mind, forms of our intellectual consciousness, which, though, considered as a portion of consciousness, they be relative and personal, yet, considered in themselves, are the all-sufficing proofs of independent irrelative existences. Whether there be not absolute apprehension of absolute natures, as well as relative belief of relative truths : whether, by a process wholly indescribable because altogether unique, the “pure Reason” (to adopt a phrase that marks an epoch in philosophical history) does not assert its own incommunicable privileges as a revelation from the reason of the universe to man, and not as a projection of man upon the universe, a revelation present to all, appropriated by none, and bearing with it essentially a character of objective, independent, and absolute. It is with a view to this identity of the absolute reason in all minds, that the sublimest of the Latin fathers as well as one of the loftiest of philosophical speculatists (St Augustine) has spoken so constantly of the “Intus” in domicilio cogitationis, nec Hebræa, nec Græca, nec Latina, nec Barbara veritas.” (*Confess.* II. 13.) But need I recur to the authority of that incomparable person for proofs of

LECT.
II.*Recognition of an objective reality by the greatest thinkers in all ages.**Pythagoras and Plato.**Malebranche and Descartes.**True principles of philosophical criticism.*

the depth of that conviction of all patient uncorrupted thinkers,—that our perceptions of Truth descend upon us from on high, and that our reason is the faint but faithful shadow of the reason of God? What do you suppose gave permanence or power to the mystical numbers of Pythagoras and the realized ideas of Plato? What secret influence taught one of the subtlest of modern minds his vision of all things in God, or so long supported the idealism of the followers of Descartes? Never be induced to believe, Gentlemen, by any dexterity of sleight or sarcasm, that such diviners of truth as these, if they did go astray, went astray with a folly, which, if you believe the vulgar representations of their views, was truly grosser than the hallucinations of lunacy. Those who honour me with their attention will hear, I avow it, a very different species of criticism. I would gladly teach you to prefer contemplating the truth that gave such systems their still undestroyed charm, to resting in the errors that disfigured and enfeebled them. I would willingly lead you to a reverence for the leaders of our human reason, even when, misled by the double fascinations of imagination and emotion, they sometimes rather wished a theory than established it. While you sternly discountenance the result of error, accustom yourselves, by tracing out its origin, to disintricate the germ of truth it invested; refute incomplete views not by rejecting but by completing them; and remember that even when, by too fondly worshipping a partial vision of truth, great thinkers have erred, a certain modified admiration is due to those very errors which flow from an excess of intellectual elevation. It is a feeling of this kind which, in despite of logical reclamations, will ever give an echo in exalted minds to the celebrated declaration of Cicero, that even an error shared with Plato was better than the truth of others. In the particular instance before us, the hypotheses of Plato, Augustine, Norris, Cudworth, Malebranche, and the rest, seem to me to have all been the sensible or imaginative forms of real truth. The inseparable conviction that reason is in its essential nature irrelative, that “states of mind” and “modifications of thought,” and the rest of the vocabulary of the popular philosophers of the day, will never exhaust the mighty mysteries of absolute truth which the mind directly contemplates when it recognizes the necessity of causes and substances, and a first cause and a first substance—the conviction, often undefined but always present, that to know by the reason is to know in the God who is Himself the reason of the universe—this was the one great basis of all these various structures of philoso-

LECT.
II.

phical system, which, however fantastic in their architecture, were none of them unsolid in their foundation.

*Statement
of the au-
thor's con-
victions.*

But to enter into any actual discussion of this great question would now be premature. I confess, and with the sincere humility which becomes me in differing from my first masters in these studies, that my apprehension of the importance of the science of Real Existence, as a legitimate branch of metaphysical speculation, which was among the earliest convictions of my mind, has not diminished with its growth. Nor has my anxiety to see these profound questions established and elucidated been overcome even by the repulsive obscurity of the small portion which I have been able to penetrate of those antagonists of Kant, who, since the death of that great man, and during the latter section of his life, have been mainly engaged in discussing them; or by the seductive popularity, grace, and brilliancy of those very opposite teachers, who, by a prejudice not perhaps altogether to be regretted, reject every species of investigation which cannot be reduced to the forms of the Baconian logic, and tolerate no metaphysical science but that which our admirable Scottish cotemporaries have denominated the Inductive Philosophy of the human mind.

*Assertion
of the pos-
sibility of
metaphysi-
cal, not in-
compatible
with a due
recognition
of the value
of inductive
science.*

And, Gentlemen, while I have just now vindicated to the metaphysical philosophy a class of investigations to which there is no analogy in any inductive science whatever, while I contend that we impair the majesty of the First Philosophy when we confine it to the rich but restricted field which the authors to whom I have last alluded were content to cultivate and adorn, I trust that from the manner in which I depicted the former (or psychological) division of our subject, you will acquit me of any weak or presumptuous purpose of disparaging the philosophy of induction. I am not worthy to praise it as it should be praised; yet even I can contemplate with astonishment its conquests, vast, various, and secure; that invincible caution with which it has progressively mastered territories of truth so long abandoned to a dogmatism that had subjugated everything to its authority but Nature herself; and with which, by substituting unwearied vigilance in this great warfare for the rash and rapid errors of the former tactique, this slow but triumphant method, like Fabius of old, "cunctando restituit rem." These are avowals almost superfluous in the countryman of Boyle, speaking the language of Newton.

I shall close this subject with some observations which, as not demanding much previous reflection, may fittingly be introduced in this early part of our discussions.

The first is this ; that you may discover in the twofold distribution of Universal Metaphysics into the Philosophy of the Mind properly so called, and the Science of Real Existence, an analogy, not unworthy of notice, to the corresponding resolution of the complex Science of Physics into the departments of observation or experiment, and of mathematical deduction. In pure psychology, as in experimental science, we abstract in order to classify; in ontology, as in mathematics, we abstract in order to apprehend the necessary relations of our abstractions. The one is the reproduction of consciousness under the form of system; its aim is to transform it by successive simplifications from a confused aggregate of mental states into a definite catalogue of functions; as it were, to take asunder the many-coloured web of experience and lay the unravelled threads in bundles according to their colours and shades of colours, the whole web being still present, but the whole under a new form and collocation. But if we retain the whole, we retain nothing more; psychology is never wider than the consciousness it reconstructs. If it be the object of the science to be "the whole truth," it is equally its object to be "nothing but the truth." In all this its identity of aim and method with the material sciences of observation is obvious; and has been illustrated in a thousand forms by authors with whom I may presume my academical hearers sufficiently acquainted. The *other* division, having duly received this strict and methodized report from reflection of the entire contents of the consciousness, proceeds by the instrumentality of reason to hold judgment upon reason itself, to examine the scope and value of this rich inventory of knowledge, and to determine its relation to the eternal realities of absolute nature. The similarity of this species of inquiry (I no longer say its "identity," for the relation here detected, of the relative to the absolute, is purely *sui generis*), the resemblance to the mathematical sciences consists in this, that in both we search for relations not only fixed in fact but necessary in essence, which we not merely believe will, but know must, exist.

If these views be correct, it may naturally be expected that as the busy experimenter, a Priestley or a Boyle, is seldom the profound mathematician, so the devoted psychologist will not generally be deeply interested in those high speculations which contemplate the relation of reason to the universe. And this parallelism is verified in the history of philosophy. You do not look for a theory of association from Spinoza or Schelling. Again, it may be expected that these divisions of metaphysical speculation

Relation of Metaphysics to Psychology illustrated by that of Experimental to Mathematical Physics.

Psychological investigation frequently indulges to metaphysical inquiry;

is more popular,

LECT.
II.

should correspond with their physical counterparts in their relative popularity with the mass of thinking men; and that the same preference which the variety and activity of the chemical discoverer obtains above the abstractions of the pure mathematician, should also belong to the inductive inquiry of consciousness, as compared with the absorbed and remote investigations of the source, scope and authority of reason.

and usually
precedes it
in order of
time.

A third scholium is this;—that as mathematics take their first rise out of abstractions from physical experience, so the ultimate researches of ontology may be observed to originate in at least a partial pre-existent psychology; and we may perceive—what we might have conjectured—that reason is not weighed in the balance until some previous attempt has been made to ascertain its shape and dimensions. The actual position of German philosophy—the great theatre of this mode of speculation—will very definitely illustrate this observation, which I introduce not as an isolated fact, but as a principle of method. The existing German schools owe their historical origin to the appearance of the *Critique of the Pure Reason*, in 1781.

The Ger-
man pre-
ceded by the
Scottish
school.

What was the origin of that performance, which even its despisers (who, I believe, are in this country much more numerous than its readers) must allow to have achieved an epoch in the history of the mind, if not by its merits, at least by its influence? Gentlemen, the *Critique* was in reality the genuine descendant of the early Scottish school of Reid, which was itself traceable to the alternate coincidences and controversies of the ultra-Lockians with the last brilliant remnants of the Cartesian spiritualism. Now the labours of Kant were themselves an effort—though certainly a cautious and measured effort—at vindicating the authority of reason in relation to the world it interprets; and so far as they were such they arose out of a previous psychological system, the system of Kant himself, as it grew into its enormous proportions out of his own slow and laborious classifications of the categories of reason. But the many who believe that the great professor of Königsberg betrayed the cause of human reason,

Kant.

His suc-
cessors.

will oblige me to pass to a late period. Pause then upon the daring edifices of Fichte and Schelling, and examine if the principle does not hold, that ontological systems are chronologically subsequent to philosophies of mind. These systems—at least the systems of Schelling and his followers—suppose the Kantism they oppose; that is they, for the most part, admit the logical analyses of Kant, while they despise the timidity of his restricted conclusions; that is, their ontology, be it sound or visionary, is built

upon a pre-conceded analysis of the intellectual powers and laws; and from an antecedent *formal* logic originates that *substantial* or essential logic which directs its efforts to give to the reason itself an immediate contemplation of absolute objective being. Gentlemen, I do not now venture to decide—perhaps, under the circumstances of the case, I owe an apology for at present canvassing, at such length, the general legitimacy, or the processes, or the successes, of these efforts. They form a branch of metaphysical investigation of which the very phraseology is probably novel to many of you; and which has been (as I have already remarked) almost wholly neglected by our most influential guides in later times. I may however add that I have for my own part derived little satisfaction from the bold solution offered by the most famous of our German contemporaries—the Plotinus of this age—for the great problem of reason, and that I must agree with that cold but just decision of Dugald Stewart with which the great Scottish psychologist frowns from his presence that monster unacknowledged by consciousness, the “intellectual contemplation,” of Schelling, renewed by the master of the French eclectic school under the title of a “pure apperception:” yet I cannot consent to relinquish the vast inquiry, and I still believe that a middle course (something like that which, as far as I can collect from very imperfect sources of information, has been adopted by Bouterwek⁴) may be found, which shall establish the internal independence of reason, in some sense its essential “objectivity.”

³ [*Anschauung*. (*Intellectuelle* as distinguished from *sinnliche*). Schelling thus describes the difference between his own use of this term, and that of his more cautious predecessor: “Kant gieng davon aus: das Erste in unserer Erkenntniß sey die Anschauung. Daraus entstand gar bald der Satz: Anschauung sey die niedrigste Stufe der Erkenntniß.” “Aber,” rejoins Schelling, “sie ist das Höchste im menschlichen Geiste, dasjenige, wovon alle unsere übrigen Erkenntnisse erst ihren Werth und ihre Realität borgen.” And elsewhere: “Uns wohnt ein geheimes, wunderbares Vermögen bei, uns aus dem Wechsel der Zeit in unser Innerstes, von allem, was von aussenher hinzukam, entkleidet das Selbst zurückzuziehen, und da unter der Form der Unwandelbarkeit das Ewige in uns anzuschauen. Diese Anschauung ist die innerste eigenste Erfahrung, von welcher allein alles abhängt, was wir von einer übersinnlichen Welt wissen und glauben. Diese Anschauung zuerst überzeugt uns, dass irgend etwas im eigentlichen Sinne *ist*, während alles übrige nur *erscheint*, worauf wir jenes Wort übertragen.” Schelling's *Philosophische Schriften*, pp. 165, 208. Compare Plato, *Theat.* p. 183, E. *φαίναται τὰ μὲν αὐτῇ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ὀράμεων*—Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίναται γε—Ποτέρου οὖν τίθης τὴν αὐτῇ;—Ἐγὼ μὲν ὦν αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐρεπέρχεται. Also the context from p. 184, C. ED.]

⁴ [Better known as the historian of Modern Poetry and Eloquence: a popular and elegant rather than profound writer. His philosophical reputation, which is of a secondary order, is said to rest on his *Apodeiktik*, and his *Handbook of the Philosophical Sciences* (1820). Bouterwek was first a Kantian, but afterwards adopted the views of Jacobi. In his *Introduction to the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences* he reasserts the physical principles of Aristotle. ED.]

LECT.
II.

and direct apprehension of absolute truth. But this is matter for future consideration, and whichever way your opinion inclines, you will at least admit that the subject deserves the honour of inquiry. I must remind you, however, for fear of misconstruction, that the force and cogency of all demonstrations of existence, as demonstrations, will remain unaltered, whether you assign them an absolute reality or only a relative and inferential truth.

On the whole, you will, I trust, agree with me as to the object of these latter remarks, that we shall best pursue that method which has been pointed out by the progressive developments of the human mind, and in our discussions in this place postpone these speculations of the higher logic until we shall have examined with some care the actual furniture of the human mind.

Here then we pause for the present, and, bound by the strict necessities of method, defer to a future period our conceptions as to that world

"To us invisible, or dimly seen,"

which lies beyond our consciousness, and of which the pure reason reveals only the bare existence and the primary attributes. On our next day we shall again return to the mind itself, and to the humbler, but perhaps safer, philosophy which classes its varieties,—a restricted subject, perhaps, if compared with the former, yet how vast if it be remembered to include every form of thought, knowledge and feeling! Leaving that mighty sphere of essential reality for our daily and less ambiguous region of experience, I might tell you with Milton,

"Half yet remains unsung, but narrower bound
Within the visible diurnal sphere;
Standing on earth, not rapt above the pole,
More safe I sing.".....

On our next day of meeting, then,—after briefly summing, and more explicitly enforcing, the views which in a merely suggestive form I have adduced to-day,—I will attempt to sketch for you some of the various aspects under which the philosophy of which we have now gained the general idea, has been contemplated in various periods of the world's history. This task (a natural completion of our present topic) I shall hope at least partially to accomplish, in citing and illustrating some of the numerous titles by which it has been designated—as "Wisdom," "Philosophy," "Metaphysics," and the rest. As I am not aware of this information having been anywhere reduced to an available form, such a discussion will serve the great object which

I still propose in these discourses,—that of constantly making them a stimulant and supplement to your own independent researches. And, at all events, these considerations, historical and philological, will possess the popular merit of being less abstruse and obscure than the subject which occupied the latter half of this lecture can ever admit of being.

LECT.
II.

LECTURE III.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
III.

*Recapitu-
lation.*

*Philosophy
both induc-
tive and
speculative.*

IN my last address to you, I completed the first great division of the general subject of Philosophy. I endeavoured to explain to you that I was disposed to divide it in direct reference to the objects of its consideration, that is to say, according as these objects were simple phenomena, or the great realities deducible from the existence of these phenomena: according, therefore, as its method was inductive or speculative, enumerating the facts of consciousness, or investigating existences not cognizable by, but involved in, that consciousness. The one division of the science, for example, resolves the whole internal experience into a few faculties (or ultimate modes of consciousness); it reduces all the known varieties of mental posture into phenomena of sensation, phenomena of intellect, phenomena of sentiment, phenomena of volition. The other, basing itself upon the "return" handed in by this analytical inquiry, and detecting in the phenomena it contains, or some of them, certain characters that involve realities beyond the scope of immediate consciousness, finds in the laws of the human reason—speculative and practical—a revelation of the absolute laws of the universe, and more especially the involved certainty of that Supreme causative and reasonable nature, who is the Law of Laws, and the depositor in the human mind of those principles of truth which we possess as the testimonial and manifestation of his all-containing and all-disposing existence. "Cogito ergo sum" was the well-known postulate of Descartes; to those who can reflect, "Cogito, ergo Deus est," will not appear a less cogent conclusion.

I acknowledged that in this distribution I had departed from the philosophical chart designed by our most popular authorities. To enter into any defence of such a course would be at present misplaced; the event will vindicate it, or nothing can; and I am not sorry to defer as long as possible a trial where success alone can justify revolt.

I might indeed produce countervailing authorities; but that I do not wish to occupy your time with a conflict of names where reason only should decide.

LECT.
III.

I ought to observe, however, that when I term these departments the Philosophy of the Mind, and the Philosophy of Real Existence,—or, to use the compendious Greek forms, Psychology and Ontology,—I employ this latter term in a sense considerably different from that which was so long consecrated by scholastic usage. The ontology of the schools (however we may adopt Leibnitz's well-known remark as to the general merits of these disputants) was unquestionably a very misguided and unprofitable branch of speculation. The reason is obvious,—they disjoined it too much from the anatomy of the mind itself, and consequently suffered this most sublime and interesting inquiry to lose itself in a wilderness of words. The same reason will account for the fact which I noticed in my last lecture,—that they omitted altogether, or almost altogether, the logical question, how far absolute truths and real existences can be concluded from mental states that at first appear to be wholly relative and subjective. Now in the investigation which I would propose to you under the title of Ontology, these inquiries would form, as assuredly they ought to form, a principal article of discussion. And thus the rational ontology of this school, instead of being "*scientia maxime universalis circa ens, ejusque proprietates genericas, seu circa genericas rerum notiones quibus singulares comprehenduntur occupata*," would form for the most part an important department of universal logic. "Logic," Gentlemen, is the science of those relations which constitute human knowledge. (As an "art" its definition flows from this, exactly as the idea of any art from its correlative science; it is the practical application of the truths which the science discloses.) Scientific or Theoretic Logic may therefore be said to consist of two departments, which, though I dislike instituting new titles, might perhaps be conveniently styled *formal* and *substantial* Logic: the former being the Logic which analyses the reason as it evolves itself in the formation of knowledge, and thus a portion of general psychology; the latter, the investigation of the connexion

Psychology.
Ontology.

Ontology of the Schoolmen unprofitable.

Reason of this.

Logic as a science and as an art.

Distinction of formal and substantial logic.

¹ [Among the Schoolmen, Leibnitz was most influenced by Thomas of Aquinum, though, in conformity with the spirit of the age, he rejected his Realism. See Ritter *Geschichte d. Philos.* XII. p. 65, and the references, to which may be added the following: Nec vereor dicere Scholasticos vetustiores nonnullis hodiernis et acumine et soliditate, et modestia, et ab inutilibus quæstionibus circumspectiore abstinencia longe præstare.—*De Stilo Nicolii*, c. 27. Ed.]

LECT.
III.

*Lord
Brougham's
use of the
word onto-
logy re-
jected.*

between the relations formed by the mind and the reality of things, and thus constituting a principal part of the speculation, which for brevity I have included under the title of Ontology. A more extended use of this word, which has been sometimes adopted, I notice to exclude. It is that in which, all human science being considered as the science of what *is* or what *ought to be*, the former branch is designated as "ontology." This employment of the term has the weight (whatever that may be) of Lord Brougham's authority. There seems however to be no great advantage gained by disturbing established nomenclature in order to convey the old distinction of physical and ethical knowledge. The Science of Ontology, therefore, as I would define and distinguish it, comprehends investigations of every real existence either beyond the sphere of the present world, or in any other way incapable of being the direct object of consciousness, which can be deduced immediately from the possession of certain feelings or principles and faculties by the human soul.

*Objection
to any use
of the term
answered.*

It may be asked, why adopt this long and mystical Greek term to express a class of inquiries which you seem just now to have considered as a portion—an exalted portion doubtless, but still a portion—of Logical Science? Because though we arrive at them through conclusions of the conscious reason, and therefore through the path of Logical Science, and though the legitimacy of this transit from consciousness to absolute truth may be a fundamental question in the inquiry, yet the entire inquiry swells beyond the limits of that substantial or higher logic of which I spoke. It does so, first, because though it be within the competency of logic to establish the connexion of the phenomenal with the real, yet it is not accurately within the compass of logic to discuss the real existence itself. The higher logic and the higher physics differ in short as the common logic of physical inquiry from the subject of that inquiry. Secondly, and chiefly, because the science of logic is the theory of the relations that constitute knowledge, and the deductions of which we are now speaking are capable of being raised upon other portions of our nature besides the purely intellectual. This is a consideration of importance; and may perhaps evince that the science of Real Existence is capable of an extension beyond what is conceived by its most devoted cultivators in our age. The innovation, Gentlemen, requires your indulgence; yet I will dare to claim your attention. It is a general principle that the human mind, in *all* its aspects equally, supposes some corresponding counterpart of posi-

*Ontology
transcends
the province
of Logic.*

*Proposed
extensions
of the term
ontology.*

tive reality. The idea is of immense compass and importance. Regard the intellectual part: it concludes a "sufficient reason" for all things, and a final sufficient reason, which by irrefragable proof gives us the Divine Intellect. Regard the voluntary part (in combination with the reason): it claims a source of existence to all things, and finally a mightier source of existence than can be supplied by any secondary ancestry, and thus through the principle of causality (a principle of reason developed by the experience of the will) learns directly to rest in a first and Divine will. On this point a considerable number of reasoners, who admit the cogency of ontological reasoning in general, pause. But can we no further clear away the dust of sense, and expose the mirror which contains the full image of God in the soul of man? Regard the *moral* nature of this same mind; remembering that every original capability of the mind is equally liable to the supervening influences of cultivation, or neglect, or perversion, but that to be duly estimated it should be regarded in the state of cultivation, carefully considering that the "cultivation" of which I speak is not to add to the capability, but simply to give it brightness and prominence. Just as we judge the true purposes and beneficial tendencies of the earth, neither by the barren wilderness which neglect has produced, nor by the wild unprofitable vegetation of a field of weeds, but by the result which is evolved from the application of reason to the native capabilities of the soil. Contemplate then the moral nature, and may it not be shewn that the inherent sense of right and wrong, when brought into its full development by the high culture of education and reflection (not to speak of any higher influences), does truly establish the real existence of some superior nature—no longer Creator, but Judge—which by its own essential constitution necessarily acts by the principle thus deposited in the human mind as the perpetual testimony of the existence and agency of such a being? Hither also some few of our English and foreign guides have ventured to advance. They have granted that a Divine Judge may be inferred in the same manner as we have inferred a Divine Intellect and a Divine Will. But, Gentlemen, man does not merely reason and will,—and by the inevitable force of an instinctive deduction regard his reason and will as the counterparts of a Final Reason and Will;—nor does he merely recognize the distinctions of justice and injustice, and recognize them through the densest mists of passion and prejudice, which, like every other atmosphere, distort the direction of the light rather than destroy it: he also, by as real a susceptibility of his original

LECT.
III.*and lastly,
of the emo-
tion*

constitution, *feels* all the variety of passions and emotions. Shall I advance, Gentlemen, or will you dread the vulgar charge of mysticism when you accompany me in proclaiming that there is for this portion of the human spirit likewise a real and permanent object correspondent; in short, that there is an "ontology" of the emotions, whose aim is to demonstrate that they also demand and attest a scene beyond the present, and an object such as no modification of passing consciousness can supply? that by an invincible conviction each desiring heart may be made to feel the truth which each reflective intellect can prove? Thus it is that man's entire nature may be made to display the testimony of a God, and the prophecy of a future world! and that such proofs and speculations belong immediately to the science termed Ontology you will not deny, if you remember that I have already defined it as that science which undertakes to shew what inferences as to real existences, not capable of being in this world direct objects of consciousness, can be deduced immediately from the existence of certain states and functions of the human mind. I have introduced the qualifying term "immediately," in order to discriminate these conclusions from the multitude of inferences as to past and future existences which are attainable by mere analogy; and I have stated that the existences deduced by these ontological reasonings are not "capable of becoming direct objects of consciousness in our present state," in order to distinguish these convictions from those which principles equally immediate produce relative to things not present; for instance, the veracity of memory, and of that law of our mind which gives to the future a certainty not inferior in degree (though only conditional in kind) to that which the faculty of memory bestows upon the past: the law, namely, which compels our belief in the stability of nature, that is, to express plainly a matter which has often been made, perhaps, needlessly mysterious, the law which obliges us to believe that the same continues the same, and the relations of all things continue unaltered in whatever part of time or space they be considered. From such conclusions as these of memory, or of the constancy of nature, the reasonings which I have been considering at such length, are discriminated, then, in this respect, that the latter are not capable, as are the former, of being themselves, at least in the present scheme of our nature, portions of our immediate consciousness, whether past or future. This however does not in the slightest degree invalidate the certainty with which—breaking the bonds of that present scheme—the reason of man perceives beyond itself an universal reason, beyond the will

an universal cause, beyond the moral faculty a principle of universal right, beyond the affections a scene adequate to their expansion and an object adequate to their concentration. We do no justice to the primal elements of our human nature when we deny a place in our philosophical systems to these vast and assured conclusions; nor is it fitting that these majestic convictions—the topics with which poetry adorns her pages and oratory animates her thousands,—should be suffered to stray through the world, without being at length claimed and reduced into the fold of a strict and scientific method. They teach us that we are not only formed for eternity, but actually living in eternity; that our nature may well bear the shock of a “change” which is in truth no change; and that much which is yet to be known by experience is now known by inference. We see indeed “through a glass darkly;” but remember that though the dimness of a glass may cloud the rich colouring and the perfect beauty of an object, it does not hide or alter one inch of the general outline.

Gentlemen, the science which I have thus distinguished into its two great departments, of relative phenomena and absolute existences, which in the former view we have considered as a purely inductive philosophy, like all its brethren (though more exalted in its scope than any), patiently observing and constantly classifying—the prize lying here for him who has the keenest eyes to detect and disentangle from all the variety of complex thought, those circumstances of generic identity which form a basis for classification, which, again, in the latter aspect we have seen interrogating the functions and principles thus established, and discovering involved in them a true objective world presided over by a mighty Spirit, who, in making our minds the mirror of his own, has enabled us in gazing on the mirror to refer the reflection to the reality:—this great science, as it has been in most ages of the world cultivated under some form or other, so it has received a great variety of titles, many of which are still almost indiscriminately applied to it, and some have nearly or altogether perished with the peculiar views which produced them. A slight consideration of these designations is not only recommended by respect for antiquity, and by the natural progress of the subject, which has now brought us to a point where we can afford to pause, but will also, if I mistake not, be found of considerable advantage in illustrating its general nature. A difference of names for (apparently) the same notion will usually be found to correspond to a difference of aspect under which it has been viewed; and in studying

*Different
names of
the s.
thus
tinguished.*

LECT.
III.

the progress of the human mind you will often find that an explanation of terms might be made to amount to history of philosophy.

*Sophia, or
wisdom.*

At an early period in the annals of knowledge, when its compass was so limited as to admit of being easily comprised within a single head, the general appellation of "wisdom," or its equivalents, was applied to it all; and it is in this comprehensive sense that the term was attributed to the earliest Greek sages, to the Egyptian and Oriental teachers of knowledge, and among them to that illustrious monarch whose name even in fable is still the talisman of the East, and whose title of Wise seems to have included not merely the "understanding heart to judge the people," but also a large proportion of learning derived from purely physical observation. It appears, however, to be certain that the "wisdom" of primitive Greece was principally of a moral and political character; and the definition of Horace which refers the doctrine of that period to legislative prudence, and the regulation of civil life, is probably a correct historical depiction:

Fuit hæc sapientia quondam
Publica privatis secernere, sacra profanis,
Concubitu prohibere vago, dare jura maritis,
Oppida moliri, leges incidere ligno.

From this prominently moral aspect of that universal learning which was then entitled *wisdom*, you can easily understand the subsequent process by which the same title became appropriated to all investigations of the nature of the mind and of those laws of duty which, collected from the mind itself, are elevated by reflection into rules of conduct to control that mind from which they originate. Omitting for the present the investigation of the kindred appellation *σοφιστής*, in the time of Aristotle I find the term, if not more restricted, certainly more speculative in its import. With him wisdom (*ἡ σοφία*) is the investigation of the first elements and causes of things, including, The Good and the reason of things, among these causes: in his own concise words—*δεῖ αὐτὴν (τὴν σοφίαν, sc.) τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν, καὶ γὰρ τὰ γὰθὸν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἐν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν.* (*Metaph.* I. 2.) As the philosophy of Greece advanced, the Stoics, whose views, as far as they were novel or influential, were principally of an ethical character, again appropriated the phrase to the conduct of life; and their "wise man" whom Horace has so shrewdly satirized, and whom Epictetus has so sublimely depicted, was independent of all merely scientific learning but that which taught him the general principles of that universal system with which it was his duty to link

his destinies. The passive fatalism of the Stoic, however, passed away, leaving upon the high-road of that history of the soul, which one day will so far outweigh the poor chronology of empires, a mighty monument, not indeed of the wonders which the unassisted human mind can attain, but (what is scarcely less important) of all which it is competent to conceive and desire. In the subsequent use of the same word by the inspired writers of the New Testament, though we may observe an occasional reference to the merely sectarian and scholastic usage (as where it is said that "the world by wisdom knew not God"), yet the direct and chosen import is wholly moral and practical, as in the singularly beautiful description which St James gives of what he terms the *wisdom from above*, and which, as you all doubtless are aware, is wholly composed of its influences and operations upon the heart and affections. In modern times, however, this term, "completing the cycle of its history," seems to have reverted back to something not very unlike its original signification among the gnomics of Greece; and no one expects in the *Traité de Sagesse* of Charron, and still less in the conversational use of the word among ourselves, anything more, or less, than the direction of high intellectual power by high moral principle.

I may remark in passing, as a fact for those who cultivate that most curious and interesting branch of inquiry, the history of Words, that both the Greek and Latin forms of this important term have suffered an almost equal degradation in our English usage; the Greek form being, with perhaps one technical exception², only represented by "sophist" and its derivatives, and the Latin form "sapientia," "sapient," &c. being strangely enough condemned to the almost exclusive purposes of irony.

A similar extension, for similar reasons, was in the first ages given to that humbler term, "Philosophy," which has since borne so important a part in the history of human advancement. This celebrated word, which, originating in early Greece, has since visited nearly all European languages, owes its birth, according to uniform tradition, to Pythagoras of Samos, who it appears, first of all the great thinkers of old, was "wise" enough not to call himself so. "Wisdom," says his Alexandrian commentator, "is conversant about those fair things which are first, and divige, and incommixt, and always the same; by participation whereof we may call other things fair. But 'philosophy' is an imitation of that science, which likewise is

² [The academic word "Sophi," as distinguished from "Freshman," is apparently meant. ED.]

LECT.
III.

an excellent knowledge, and did assist toward the reformation of manners." (Iamblich. *Vit. Pyth.* 59.) Surely you cannot now remain ignorant of what *Wisdom* and *Philosophy* signify! But to remove the veil of mystical language, Pythagoras's notion³ was plainly this, that the title of Wisdom should be appropriated to that kind of knowledge which the Architect of the universe possessed of his own works material and moral, which he beheld as the outward image and adumbration of his own eternal mind; and that the title of Philosophy, or the aspiration after Wisdom, was suitable to the imperfect, gradual, and progressive knowledge which the human spirit is permitted to attain of the laws enacted by the Divine. This, then, may serve as an instance of the instruction which I told you was sometimes derivable from the history of a single term, and with this purpose it may be useful as well as interesting to dwell for a while upon the infancy of a title whose long career of existence has been since so famous. In the adoption of this word (combined with some slight but authentic traditional records of his doctrine) you discover two cardinal principles held and proclaimed by the illustrious founder of the Italic school. First, that the eternal mind alone deserved the title of "Wise," or perfectly intelligent; a principle which it is impossible not to connect with certain declarations in those inspired writings of which some have supposed Pythagoras may not have been wholly ignorant, but by which it is at all events easily conceivable that the oriental instructors of Pythagoras may have been indirectly, or even directly, influenced. "The Lord possessed me," says the author of the Book of Proverbs, speaking of that which we term Wisdom, "in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was, &c." In this article of the Pythagorean exposition you may already perceive the faint germs⁴ of the bolder Platonic theory of the reality and pre-existence of the Divine ideas; a coincidence between which and the inspired passage I have quoted was doubtless in the mind of Milton, when, describing the consummation of the work of creation, and after previously borrowing from this very passage one of his most daring images*, he tells us that the Divine Artist returned to

³ [Qu. his biographer's? Ed.]

⁴ [The doctrine in Iamblichus is *Neo-platonism*, not "faint" but full-blown. Pythagoras is indebted for much of his "wisdom" to the same source. Hence, doubtless, its "oriental" aspect. Ed.]

* "The golden compasses prepared

In God's eternal store." See Prov. viii. 27.

his heaven of heavens to contemplate how the new-formed world shewed

LECT.
III.

"In prospect from His throne, how good, how fair,
Answering his great *Idea*," vii. 557.

The second doctrine involved in the selection of this term by its inventor was not less important in relation to man than the former in relation to the Deity. It was implied in the connexion of the σοφία and φιλοσοφία, that the great object of human science was the discovery and contemplation of the order thus impressed, and because it was impressed, by the Divine nature upon the material and moral universe,—a principle which again, according as it was viewed in its speculative or its practical aspect, evolved itself in the Platonic definition of *science* as the contemplation of ideas, and in the Platonic criterion of moral perfection as assimilation to God. I need scarcely pause to remark what a striking example these successive modifications present of a tendency, which, in tracing the historical filiation of sects and systems, I shall hereafter have constant opportunities of noticing—the tendency which great ideas have, when once breathed abroad upon the world, to become at once more distinct in their expression, and more intense in their degree, with the progress of thought; how conjectures fructify into doctrines, speculations rise into systems, and the vague diffusive suppositions of one century harden and crystallize into the definite positions of another.

So far then for the primitive application of the term Philosophy, which, like the "Wisdom" of which it was intended as the copy and counterpart, at first involved the whole mass of knowledge which the period possessed, beyond the practical informations of immediate experience. But as science broke asunder into the sciences, and the objects of knowledge came near enough to the eye to be seen in different directions, these separate objects, and of course the separate pursuit of them, received distinct designations; and the term Philosophy, sometimes preserving its generality, stood for the habitual prosecution of any kind of learning; and sometimes contracting its range, became appropriated, as by Aristotle, to the investigation of those supreme principles which give law to all the subordinate departments of knowledge. In the former usage it stood for science universally, in the latter, for the universal science. When the term was thus unfixed you may easily imagine with what latitude it was sometimes employed; and I suppose none of you have read without a smile the definition which (at the opening of nearly the

LECT.
III.

most perfect fragment of contemplative antiquity) the Roman philosophical orator has given us of "Philosophy;" a definition in which we may see something more of the orator than of the philosopher—much more of the rhetorician, perhaps, than of either. "Philosophy⁶," says he, "is the art of *speaking with copiousness and elegance* upon the greatest questions." It would be doing much injustice, however, to Cicero to conclude that these words (though it cannot be denied that they are very characteristic of the writer) comprise his full conception of the objects and compass of studies which he repeatedly describes in terms not more glowing than comprehensive. *As a general fact it may be observed that he, as well as the other Latin writers, leans rather to the moral than the intellectual use of the term⁷; in this practical sense of the term (when no qualifying adjective is united with it) Cicero has been followed almost uniformly by the long line of authors and conversers who have spoken and written since the classic ages.

Dialectic.

Gentlemen, to the Platonic theory of the principles of knowledge its great propounder seems to have given the title of *Dialectic* (a term in which you trace the influences of his Socratic education). By his rival, however, this term was degraded to signify the logic of probabilities⁸; and in modern times it has become synonymous with logic in general, being perhaps more directly applied to the arts and artifices of argumentative disputation. With reverence to the mighty spirit of Plato, it may, I think, be fairly said that his application of the term was the least justifiable of the three.

⁶ [The passage runs thus in the original: "Hanc enim perfectam philosophiam semper judicavi, quæ de maximis questionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere."—*Tusc. Qu.* I. 4, 7. The context, as well as the words themselves, prove that this was not meant for a general definition of philosophy. Cicero is speaking of the compatibility of philosophical with rhetorical studies, and of the particular philosophy which, as an orator, he himself preferred. ED.]

⁷ "Tu Inventrix legum, tu magistra morum et disciplina." And in the same book (*Tusc. Qu.* 5): "Est autem unus dies bene et ex præceptis tuis actus, peccanti immortalitati anteponendus!" (a thought of which we have the religious aspect in the 84th psalm).

⁸ [I think that this statement is founded on a misconception of Aristotle's meaning in the first chapter of the *Rhetoric*. It would be more correct to say that he limits dialectic to the refutation of fallacies. See *Soph. Elench.* 2. Διαλεκτικοί οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων συλλογιστικοὶ ἀντιφάσεις. "The Dialectician is one who reasons out the contradictions implied in popular notions"—evidently a description of the Socratic method. In this same chapter he distributes discussion (τὸ διαλέγεσθαι) under the four heads of didascalical (his own method), dialectic, peirastic (arguing for exercise or trial of strength), and eristic (arguing for victory), oddly enough making διαλεκτικὴ a branch of τὸ διαλέγεσθαι. In another place, *Metaph.* III. 2, 20, he distinguishes dialectic from philosophy, of which, in its highest sense, dialectic is in Plato the synonym. Compare also *Soph. Elench.* c. 11.—ED.]

The Platonic "Dialectic" appears in the writings of Aristotle under the celebrated title of *Metaphysics*. For this word, under whose imposing auspices so much that is valuable, and so much that is absurd, has since been given to the world, you are, I presume, aware that we are not indebted to Aristotle himself, but to one of his ancient commentators, Andronicus of Rhodes, who is supposed to have intended by the inscription upon his manuscripts, τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, that the fourteen books so styled were to follow the physical treatises in the order of place and transcription, perhaps in that of study, perhaps in that of rank and dignity. It is not very certain that in any of these respects the methodizer perfectly understood the intentions of his author. From this equivocal and accidental parentage, however, subsequent ages have received a term which sometimes stands for all philosophical inquiries into the mind and its conceptions, and sometimes for every speculation, when it becomes unintelligible. Its stricter signification is still pretty much the same with its ancient one—the investigation of the causes and principles of things, as far as reason can penetrate and arrange them*. The portion of Aristotle's writings which pass under this title, have, in every age, been the peculiar study and perplexity of critics; and I have little doubt that their prolonged and almost despotic authority is a good deal traceable to the very conciseness of their oracular sentences, which, sometimes signifying everything or nothing, as the reader pleased, by a very singular contrast allowed every speculator to find his own fancies authorized by a writer who was yet the most curt, condensed, and dogmatical, the world has ever known!

To speculations of this kind the title has also been given of The First Science, (ἡ πρώτη σοφία, or φιλοσοφία,) and "The Mother Science;" the authorities of Aristotle, Descartes, and Lord Bacon, (not to speak of innumerable names of minor note) sanctioning its application, though not all to accurately the same notion. In one passage of his writings Lord Bacon conveys in his own peculiar style (certainly the most admirable combination of picturesqueness and precision that ever was devoted to philosophical purposes!) much the same views which I have been endeavouring to convey to you of the relation in which these.

* "Prima pars philosophiæ," (says Descartes in strict consonance with his peculiar method,) "est *metaphysica*, ubi continentur principia cognitionis, — inter quæ occurrit explicatio præcipuorum Dei attributorum, immaterialitatis animarum nostrarum, necnon omnium clararum et simplicium notionum quæ in nobis reperiuntur." In another place he styles Philosophy a tree whose roots are metaphysics, trunk physics, and the branches all the separate sciences. (*Epist. Auth.*)

studies stand to all others—adopting to express them the title we are now considering,—“*Alius error est, quod post singulas scientias et artes suas in classes distributas, mox a plerisque universali rerum cognitioni et philosophiæ primæ renunciatur; quod quidem profectui doctrinarum inimicissimum est. Prospectiones fiunt a turribus aut locis præaltis,—et impossibile est, ut quis exploret remotiores interioresque scientiæ alicujus partes, si stet super plano ejusdem scientiæ neque altioris scientiæ veluti speculam conscendat.*”—*De Augm.* I. Descartes' use of the same phrase, which he employs as precisely synonymous with metaphysics, (“*Hæc est quæ prima Philosophia, aut etiam Metaphysica, dici potest,*” he says in the prefatory epistle of his *Principia*,) is so constant as to make it unnecessary to cite any particular instance. It is enough to say that the celebrated *Meditations*, which, when they first appeared, produced an impression upon the European mind only rivalled by that of Locke's Essay about fifty years later, and which are still deeply worth the perusal of all who take an interest in these pursuits, were originally published in 1641, under the title of *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*. Descartes' notion of this “First Philosophy” was nearly, or wholly the same, with that of Aristotle⁷; and both include under it, though by a very different chain of connexion, all abstract discussions of the existence and attributes of the Divine nature. The Aristotelian theology is the ultimate term of the Aristotelian physics; the Cartesian theology, of the Cartesian philosophy of mind:—each arrives at the necessary existence of God, the one, through the external world of matter and motion, seizing the great truth of a prime Mover,—the other, from a contemplation of the internal world of thought, pronouncing the reality of that infinite Being whose “idea” we can neither exclude from the mind, nor modify when there. You can easily conceive how these very opposite aspects of the same great truths heightened the resolute hostility of the two schools; a hostility somewhat obtrusively expressed in the old editions of the *Principia* of Descartes (that edifice

⁷ [Aristotle's description of the *Philosophia Prima* is worth transcribing: *Ἐλ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐστὶ τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐν πρώτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ· ἐλ δ' ἐστὶ τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ἐν πρώτῃ· καὶ περὶ τοῦ θέντος ἢ ἐν, ταύτης δὲ εἰς θεωρησά, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ τὰ ἐπάρχοντα ἢ ἐν. *Metaph.* v. 1, 12: “If there is no existence apart from the compound existences in nature, physics must be the first science. On the other hand, if we assume an immutable existence, that existence must take precedence of the former, and the corresponding science must be the first, and because the first, a universal philosophy. The office of this philosophy must be the contemplation of substance or existence as such—of its essence and its essential attributes.” He had previously styled it *Theology* (*τρεῖς δὲ εἰεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματικὴ, φυσικὴ, θεολογικὴ*). ED.]*

of sublime hypothesis !), where the bold soldier of Touraine is depicted setting his right foot upon the prostrate volumes of his master, with an inscription beneath proudly importing that he who had solved all the miracles of nature remained himself the only unexplained miracle on earth:—

LECT.
III.

Assignansque suis quævis miracula causis,
Miraculum reliquum solus in orbe fuit!

I have already given you some account of the objects which by the scholastic authors were included under the title of "Ontology;" and I have, I hope not ineffectually, endeavoured to exhibit to you the more definite and important topics which I would wish under the same designation to substitute in their place. We may therefore pass to the old and convenient term which has lately been revived by many of our continental contemporaries, "Psychology," which is intended to express with perfect simplicity the investigation of the appearances and laws of the mind apart from all ulterior applications. To form an expressivè contrast with Ontology, a term has been given currency by some living philosophers (philosophers are fond of triumphing over the Roman emperor's impossibility!); and though I believe the coinage has not got much circulation in this realm, it certainly passes for a legal tender in Germany. The term is Phenomenology^a, and is cautiously expressive of its precise objects—the apparent in contrast with the real, τὸ φαινόμενον as distinguished from τὸ ὄν. By the word Pneumatology was formerly intended the general science of spirit under its various subdivisions, angelic, diabolical, and spectral, as well as the living soul of man; in short, a universal spiritual physics. Although in this bold theory of the superior intelligences the positions must have been, apart from the authority of fathers and a few scriptural passages, wholly arbitrary, this difficulty did not prevent some of the schoolmen from calmly apportioning to each class its respective science; and those who left to wither in neglect the rich field of the human heart, understood perfectly the capacities of the archangel Michael, and could appropriate their separate offices to every order of the heavenly hierarchy. We are told that in the mystic volume of man's destinies there are "things which the angels desire to look into;" the

Psycho-
logy.Phenome-
nology.Pneuma-
tology.

^a [The word was coined, I believe, by Hegel. It is not synonymous with "psychology," rational or empirical, but is rather the science of Man as he develops himself in history: if we may venture to put that interpretation on the description of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, with which we are favoured by a recent historian of recent German philosophy: "*Die Welt ist das Phänomen, und also die Wissenschaft die Phänomenlehre des sich selbst als eine Gemeinde freier Ich erscheinenden Ich.*" "the science of the phenomena of the Ego appearing to itself as a community of free Ego's." Ed.]

LECT.
III.

bolder curiosity of man has not only "desired" to reciprocate the knowledge, but more than once has dared to imagine it in his possession! "Pneumatology," however, to follow the fortunes of the term, rapidly became the exclusive science of the human spirit; the brother spirits being either relegated to their distinct provinces (Angelography, Dæmonology, &c. &c.), or appended as a supplementary subject to the department of Natural Theology. In this sense the designation is still often employed; though as a philosophical term it has been, perhaps justly, censured as including, or insinuating, something hypothetical as to the physical nature of the mind. It is a curious example of the metaphorical and the literal use of words or ideas, that in this instance we actually possess two important and wholly dissimilar sciences, named from the same original term, the one (Pneumatics) in its literal, and the other (Pneumatology) in its figurative application: it will, perhaps, surprise you to be informed that even by so late a writer as Adam Smith the word Pneumatics was still employed to denote the science of the soul.

Ideology.

The authority and ability of M. Destutt-Tracy have given some limited circulation to the term "Ideology," as a title for the philosophy of the mind. When you remember what are the doctrines which this writer (a follower, though an independent one, of Condillac) labours to support, you will sympathize with the degradation of a term, which from once standing for the mysterious exemplars of the intellectual world of Plato, has sunk to serving the purposes of the philosophy of mere sensation. Indeed, the story of this famous word might form a varied and instructive tale; and in the long fortunes of the "Idea," sometimes exalted above the sphere of earth, and as invariably depressed by the very extravagance of its own ambition, the Scott of philosophical romance might find at once a hero and a moral.

With particular and special titles for the mental philosophy (such as for instance "The Theory of the Representative Faculty") I do not now concern myself; as originating out of peculiar views, the names are there a part of the systems, and only to be canvassed in canvassing them.

Among some of our contemporaries⁹ it is not unusual

⁹ [I know not to whom Professor Butler alludes. "Egoism" is commonly used to denote a particular theory of perception, which resolves all phenomena into modifications of the conscious subject; e.g. the theory of Fichte. So applied the word is expressive enough, and hardly deserves the sarcasm in the text. It is not more barbarous than its homonym "egotism," and much less so than "egomism," which occurs in "Baxter On the Soul"]

to style this philosophy "Egoism," or the "Science of Ego;" a mode of expression which aims at evaporating every particle of hypothesis in selecting a phrase of pure and extreme simplicity; but which, though often highly convenient for purposes of exposition, scarcely compensates by occasional utility for perpetual barbarism.

LECT.
III.

The phrase, Philosophy of the Mind, which has obtained so much celebrity from the victories which the Scottish School have achieved under its banner, is not liable to any strong objection. I would only repeat, that if it be understood as merely including the physiology of the consciousness as a succession of phenomena, it does not cover the amplitude of legitimate human speculation upon the theory of thought. But fortunately, as the term "Philosophy" may comprise any speculation whatever, and as "The Mind" may be regarded as directly concerned in every speculation that is busied with the human nature, or faculties, or fortunes, the phrase can always expand or contract with the purposes of the employer; and this facility, invaluable in a general title for a progressive science, will always make this designation too convenient to be forgotten.

*Philosophy
of the
Mind.*

We have now, Gentlemen, closed our rapid review of the principal titles by which men in different ages have represented to themselves the great speculation as to the constitution and destinies of their spiritual nature. I trust you agree with me that such a *résumé* is not either uninteresting or unprofitable. You observe in the titles chosen the aspects contemplated; you see vagueness and accuracy of conception uttering itself in corresponding vagueness and accuracy of expression; the well-formed figure giving its own symmetry to the dress that clothes it. But more than this, in such a review you catch glimpses of the history itself of philosophy opened in these its varying designations; a few words, when linked with the knowledge of their origin and uses, become the rallying points round which our scattered ideas cluster; and we hear in each no more a few arbitrary syllables, but the disputes and the decisions, the wisdom and the follies, of an age.

Gentlemen, having arrived at this point of progress in our introductory course, it becomes my duty to canvass the question to which I have already slightly alluded, of the importance of the study which I have been endeavouring to describe. In our next Lecture we shall enu-

(1737), where it is attributed to certain Cartesians. Sir W. Hamilton finds the same word in a Scotch author, also of the last century. See his notes on pp. 269 and 293 of the collected edition of Reid's Works. Ed.]

LECT.
III.

rate some of the popular objections which prejudice has advanced against its cultivation; and we shall proceed, in the first instance, to answer them, not so much by any direct reply (which would be a tedious task) as by the more instructive method of establishing the claims of all knowledge, and of this philosophy as a real portion of knowledge. This argument, stated at length, and involving subjects of the highest moment to the welfare of humanity, (would that I could do them adequate justice, but I still rely upon your indulgence,) will form the principal topic of the next (or Monday's) discourse.

LECTURE IV.

GENTLEMEN,

AFTER considering at some length the subject of our present studies in its two great divisions, I closed this preliminary statement in my last Lecture with a brief review of the various appellations which this philosophy has received in different ages, "Wisdom," "Philosophy," "Metaphysics," "Pneumatology," and the rest: and I did so, not only because I was not aware of any antecedent authority to which I could refer you for the information in a combined and succinct form, but also because it appeared to me that in discussing these names we were, in point of fact, obtaining rapid but useful glimpses of the position which the general subject has held in the minds of men in various stages of the history of human reason. From the whole I think you may draw a few valuable deductions; as, first, that the subject itself at a very early period attracted the notice of contemplative minds: again, that, though at first involved with every other in a common mass, it soon detached itself, and that in every successive age this separation became more decisive and complete. Thirdly, that, as it may be viewed in both a speculative and an experimental aspect, so antiquity, and the copyists of antiquity, principally adopted the former, and the present and recent ages have strongly inclined to the latter. And, fourthly, that the complete scheme of philosophical inquiry is that which combines both without impairing either, which does entire justice to the demands of human reason, and while it encourages strenuously the labours of observation, also holds open its portals to every investigation as to the value of our knowledge in the world of realities, and the legitimacy of the conclusions which pure reason can establish with regard to its own position in the universe and the being of its supreme and eternal Author.

LECT.
IV.

*Inferences
from the
foregoing
Lecture.*

I feel it right, however, to state, for the satisfaction of those who suspect the solidity of such speculations, and for the information of others, that as these inquiries are dissimilar in their nature, so should they be presumed

*Psychological
should be
kept distinct
from metaphy-*

LECT.
IV.

sical speculation.

distinct in a methodical delivery of doctrine; or, if they mingle at all, that they should be connected without being confused, and appear in juxtaposition without passing into combination. Thus, those who acknowledge no science of mind but that which simply classes phenomena, will be at liberty to pause in accompanying us whenever we arrive at the close of our psychological inquiries; the supposed mysticism of ulterior disquisitions shall not affect the accuracy of these previous inductions; by keeping the subjects carefully separate we shall prevent the infection from communicating, and, adopting Lord Bacon's justification of his aphoristic method, "*res nudas et apertas exhibemus, ut errores nostri notari et separari possint.*"

Objections to the study of Mind considered.

But is the study of Mind, whether relative or absolute, actually worth the labour? This is, doubtless, a question of importance at the threshold of every science. It is unworthy of the independence and authority of reason to enter upon any proposed inquiry without having some preconception of its utility or its dignity. And the question becomes still more important in entering upon mental philosophy, which, from a variety of causes, has failed in obtaining the distinction so abundantly and so justly bestowed upon the cultivation of the physical sciences of the material world. In defence of the claims of the philosophy of mind much, both of argument and eloquence, has already been displayed by writers, with whom, I suppose, I may safely count many of you familiar. The subject, however, demands its place; it is far from being exhausted; and it is my duty not to forget in consulting for the erudite tastes of some of my hearers, the equal claims of the least practised intellect among them.

The objections which are commonly professed—still more commonly insinuated—more commonly than either, felt—against the Philosophy of Man under all its many aspects, I will not now directly undertake either to canvass or refute. To establish the truth is to destroy by replacing them. I allude to those weak prejudices which regard all such discussions as in their nature either nugatory or unintelligible,—either not worth understanding, or impossible to be understood: those which discourage every appeal to the theory of the faculties by general declarations that man if he be the boast is also the riddle of the world, that the mystery of the soul is not to be solved by itself, that every inquiry into such matters, far from deserving the proud title of science, scarcely escapes the charge of presumptuous folly. Again, that the vaunted discoveries of the psychologists of modern times are obviously capable of no useful practical application; that if they be truth, which

is questionable, they are at least sterile truth; that no arts are facilitated, no conveniences multiplied, no "fortunes made," by these unprofitable truths; that while a fortunate chemical analysis detecting some undiscovered metal may secure the fame and the wealth of the humblest compounder of medicines, no one has yet heard of any analysis of complex feelings which has ever wrought the same charm; that much as we may say of the force of impressions and the balance of the passions, and how theory can state and arrange them, we can scarcely compare these "dynamics" of the mind with those mightier sciences of force and motion which at one time tell you how much an ounce of silver would weigh upon one of Jupiter's invisible satellites, at another, new-modelling the world by its own detected energies, drive the hugest and densest masses across the ocean in the face of the winds by a vapour lighter than the wind itself! Others, again, reiterate that our business is not to examine but to act; that we must take truth as we find it, and feelings as we find them; that precision is not to be sought or expected in matters of mere practice; that a creature so volatile as man is not really subject to any general laws whatsoever. While another party, fearing for the effects upon the manners and dispositions, lament that metaphysicians are proverbially dreamers; that habits of mental inquiry are a misfortune to their owner; that their victim, if he be not made unhappy by his gift, escapes it only by becoming, under their influence, cold, callous, and unfeeling—regarding the beauty of emotion as the anatomist does the symmetry of person, not as a theme of admiration, but as a subject of dissection; that, in short, these botanists among the feelings destroy the flower in investigating its structure, and sacrifice the colour and the odour in seeking to determine the class and the order. Others, finally, reversing the charge, declare with calm conviction that there is no difficulty whatever in the science of man, that it is too simple to require discussion or admit of hesitation. Ah, Gentlemen, there is no folly so hopeless as that which finds no difficulty in philosophy and penetrates all nature with a glance!

Such are some of the objections which appear to me still to float in the atmosphere of the public mind. These opposing forces are not, you perceive, very consistent with each other, and in truth suffer so much from civil dissension as almost to excuse external hostility. Let us proceed to silence them all by the simplicity of truth.

We claim then a place for the science of thought, first, because it is a science. In professing to communicate

*Answers to
objections.*

LECT.
IV.

*Psychology
is a science,
and no sci-
ence is un-
important.*

knowledge, that is, to disclose either new facts or new relations of old facts, it advances a claim which, properly understood, is perfectly free from all conceivable exception. The argument here, if methodically considered—and we cannot be too exact upon a point of so much moment—resolves itself into a syllogism of which the major proposition, or principle, states the universal value of knowledge, and the minor, or application, the claims of this philosophy to be considered as a portion of knowledge. Confused notions about both abounding in society, it would be difficult to say which of the two propositions is oftener contested, because oftener misunderstood. Let us dwell for a while upon the former. As long as the highest happiness is attainable, and made by the laws of the universe dependent upon exertion, knowledge (except in the case of a being incapable of exertion) must in itself be a blessing. Were that monstrous inconsistency possible, that the grave can be the actual termination of a being capable of entertaining the conception of an infinite God, a tenet not less absurd than it would be to maintain that the mechanism of a watch, marking as it does the progress of time, was never intended for any purpose higher than belongs to the structure of the pebble on the shore—were this the case, it would not, perhaps, be impossible to establish that ignorance might, in some cases, or in all cases, be a positive advantage in the game of happiness. But constituted as man is, a real clement in an immense scheme of perfection, with his rational felicity made proportional to his dignity in this scheme, and his dignity proportional to his conscious voluntary efforts in the right direction (inversely as the opposite), and (in a world where the principles of imitation and respect are so often injurious or at least uncertain) these efforts susceptible of being safely and securely directed only in obedience to a previous knowledge of the course in which they ought to ply—in such a system of things, knowledge (whencesoever obtained) must ever be a true and genuine benefit. That is to say, if we are made to appreciate truth and to seek it, and if the universe be founded not on delusion but on truth,—the same truth which we are formed to seek,—it may then be stated as a general principle, that no scientific truth can actually be discovered by the human mind which it is not, on the whole, better should be known than not known. To suppose the contrary would be to suppose that the acquired knowledge impairs some previously received, and venerated principle, or is applicable to some unlawful end. Now if the previous “principle” be intuitively or demonstratively certain, this is impossible; and if it be not, it

may be false; it may therefore legitimately be summoned to descend into the arena to vindicate its prerogatives against the invader; and whichever succumb, or whether both be reconciled, human reason is the real winner: and therefore the happiness which is built upon the right employment of that reason. And as to the application of scientific truth to the cultivation of arts injurious to the peace and happiness of mankind, surely it must be obvious that the evil in this instance is not in the possession, but the application; that the crime is not in the new-discovered relation, but in the old malice that misemploys it. The same quantity of heat which, duly disposed, warms the face of nature into all the fertile beauty of a summer noon, may be condensed into the means of boundless destruction and of indescribable torture; but who lays the evil to the charge of the element thus perverted?

It is because this general objection to the claims of all knowledge is more constantly (for reasons which I shall just now notice) advanced as a prejudice against the philosophy of mind than against any other intellectual pursuit, that I have troubled you to consider it thus far, or that I request you to continue your attention to it a few minutes longer.

The exceptions, then, to this principle of the universal value of Truth in all its provinces, are only apparent. Truths, however, differ in degrees of value, and should, if possible, be possessed in proportion to their degrees of value,—placing, of course, at the culminating point of importance those which express the relation of man to his Author, and which intimately affect the reception and influence of all others. These primary articles of knowledge, I may add, are so evidently demonstrable as to admit of being *a priori* pronounced incapable of subversion by any subsequent discoveries. This being granted, it will, I think, be found that wherever the communication of knowledge appears to result in evil, the evil is always attributable to the communication being incomplete; partial truth being sometimes equivalent to absolute falsehood, and often as dangerous in its results. If you draw upon paper a figure nearly approaching a circle, and tell a child that such is the figure of the world he stands on, without telling him that you have only drawn the visible projection of the real sphere, it is obvious you may communicate an impression almost as false as if you had sketched a pentagon or a square. To inform a savage that flame applied to the touch-hole of a piece of ordnance will cause its charge to be projected with enormous force, is to tell him a true and a useful fact; to neglect to add

*Exceptions
to the uni-
versal value
of Truth
are only
apparent.*

LECT.
IV.

that the gun will recoil in proportion to the violence of the explosion, is to endanger his life by the very truth you have told him. Were it possible (that I may apply the principle to one of its most interesting cases) to acquaint the peasantry of a country with the science of Newton and the poetry of Milton and all the other splendid triumphs of the cultivated human mind, the gift would render them hopelessly disqualified for a life of humble labour: add to your splendid present a knowledge as profound and assured of the truths and precepts of Christianity, and without one scientific proposition or noble conception losing its real value, the ambition they might generate becomes contemptible, the labour they might supplant is welcomed as a duty.

*Objection.
Knowledge
can never
be complete,
and igno-*

*be better
a par-
tial enlight-
enment.*

But it may be retorted, that as all human knowledge is necessarily incomplete, this statement will only prove the danger, or the uselessness, of every acquisition of information whatever in the present state: and that according to our own argument, it might be better that man should be wholly ignorant, or decline prosecuting his progress in enlightenment, than arrive at a greater degree of knowledge, which, since it can never be absolutely complete, may produce an impression as false, and practical results as pernicious, as ignorance itself. That in the spirit of our own reasoning all is peril, and equal peril, from the lowest stage to the highest, from absolute nescience to absolute omniscience; and that if the danger be in the imperfection, the ploughman will not escape it by exchanging his own partial knowledge for the partial knowledge of a Newton or a Locke.

*Reply to
objection.*

To this form of the objection it may be replied, that, when we assert that the danger is in the imperfection, we not only do not deny, but emphatically assert, that the danger will diminish with the diminution of the imperfection; that, on the lowest ground, the danger of partial knowledge (though, as we have insisted, it be a real danger) is probably, on the whole, not so great as that of total ignorance, while, on the other hand, it carries in its very nature a principle of improvement; that both instinct (in the affection of curiosity) and reason urge us to acknowledge that the true remedy for the evils of limited information is to widen its boundaries; and that (as, with a view to such objections, we before laid down) the nature of the primary moral truths is such as to govern all subsequent acquisitions, and (something like the unshaken confidence a natural philosopher has in the great laws of matter and motion) to be substantially independent of apparent discrepancies, while from all corroborating facts or disco-

veries they willingly consent to receive strength and elucidation.

Let me conclude the discussion by condensing its principles. Knowledge is speculative, whose object is truth, or practical, whose object is the application of truth. As to speculative knowledge, its pursuit is recommended by four distinct advantages—innocence, dignity, pleasure, and possible utility. As to practical knowledge, it is either moral, as the conduct of life, or not moral, as the arts in general. The latter species is recommended by obvious actual utility. For the former there are two supposable substitutes—the principle of imitation, and the principle of habit. Both (though invaluable when regulated) are, as independent and solitary guides, liable to the fatal objection, that, while they are equally powerful for evil and for good, they possess within themselves no internal principle of right direction. This principle of direction, under whatever aspect it be considered—natural or supernatural—must be essentially a principle of knowledge. In granting, then, that it is the highest species of knowledge, we assume that it *is* knowledge; differing from all others not in kind, but in importance, and to be maintained in its supremacy not by superseding all its brethren, but by accompanying them all. The real lesson, then, to be derived from the objection is, not that any species of logically admissible scientific inquiry is to be discountenanced as dangerous or forbidden ground; not that the conscience, or the sense of interest, can ever justifiably pull back where the reason is anxious and able to go forward; not that truth, or the reality of God's material and moral universe, has any blemish that it is ashamed or afraid to shew the most inquisitive examiner; none of these conclusions, whose absurdity eclipses even their cowardice, but another most momentous conclusion, that it is the duty of every man who undertakes to convey knowledge, as far as he can, to convey it complete: that is to say, to infuse into the immediate elements of his communication those additional principles which direct its partial operation, to impart along with all truth the highest truth, along with every knowledge the knowledge of man's self. Here, then, Gentlemen, the path of the argument crosses into our own domain, and the objection itself only fortifies the claims of the philosophy of the human mind. The evils of misguided learning owe their origin to errors respecting the relation which human nature bears to the objects of its knowledge, and still more to errors regarding the source and nature of its real happiness. These errors can only be neutralized by opposing truths—truths which shall rectify alike its follies

LECT.
IV.

as to speculation and its follies as to practice. The theory of these truths, if such a theory exist, is included in the philosophy we propose to discuss.

But this is to borrow from the future. As far as we have yet advanced, we merely claim for this philosophy the rights which belong to every science which professes to investigate and deliver truth. Holding that man possesses the same faculty of perceiving the relations of things in whatever sphere of his knowledge they exist,—holding with Cicero¹ that “*Natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri inveniendi*,”—that “*Omnia vera diligimus, id est fidelia simplicia constantia*,”—we ask for the theory of all which most concerns us, the consideration which is readily conceded to the theory of Saturn’s satellites, or to hypotheses as to the secret of the fructification of a fungus!

But, conceding the general principle, can we establish under the shelter of this important major proposition the claims of this philosophy? High as its objects and pretensions are, does it indeed deserve the name of Science; and is that which is proved of science universally proved implicitly of this? Here, then, as the claim is to a title, the title must be ascertained; and hence we are reduced to the necessity of more accurate definition. If we may justly define all science to be the investigation of the relations established between beings (a definition which will include the two great divisions of science—hypothetical and real); and if we can shew that in the case under consideration there ARE relations “established,” and relations “admitting of investigation,” our “minor” proposition will be satisfactorily proved. No great expenditure of reasoning is absolutely required for either of these affirmations; yet the subject opens views of such importance that the proof and illustration of them both will occupy the remainder of this, and probably the entire of the following Lecture. To commence with the former. The mind, we assert, is subject to laws.

The existence of any science implies the possibility of a science of the mind.

It will not be denied that science exists. The existence of science in any region whatsoever presupposes constancy of relations. Relations are states of a conscious mind. Therefore constancy of relations supposes constancy of states of mind. That is to say, the existence of any science of any description implies that the mind is subject to established laws; and therefore, so far, the mere existence of science implies the possibility of a science of the mind.

Constancy of mental laws.

“But this establishes the constancy of mental laws only so far as these admitted sciences extend; leaving us in uncertainty as to the stability of the rest.” The con-

¹ [*De Fin.* II. 15, 46. ED.]

clusion, even with this limitation, might be shewn to extend much farther than appears obvious to a cursory observer; for in the detection and belief of truth how vast a portion of the human mind is brought into action, and in admitting the reality of discovered truths how much of the mind is, therefore, inclusively, conceded to be superior to caprice, or uncertainty, or chance! But it is safer, because simpler, to recur for this further portion to experience, and to those convictions which give its chief value to experience. The course of active human life is distributable into two great divisions, as guided by reflection, or as obedient to instinct, passion, habit and accident. First, then, how far does reflective agency infer the immutability of the mental constitution? We answer, that the whole conduct of life proceeds upon the supposition of mental laws; life is but the evolution of consciousness; and in every case where man acts with a purpose, his acts are but the expression of his knowledge that what has been will be. The detection of sameness under difference, as it is the essence of scientific sagacity, so it is the essence of practical sagacity also; but of what value would be the perception of substantial sameness under circumstantial difference, if the facts which were perceived to be the same could not be trusted to as producing continually the same results? that is, if there were not, beyond a perception of identity, a conviction of law? Now this is just as true in conscious life as in unconscious matter. Of what value would it be to have beheld (by the gifted vision of genius) the same fact of gravity appearing under different circumstances, in the elevation of the mercury in the tube and in the descent of a stone from the hand,—to have caught the one Protean fact concealing itself, at this time under the outward garb of rusted iron, at another in the phenomena of respiration,—to have found the substance of the diamond in the animal breath, so that the story of the Eastern princess whose mouth dropped diamonds as she spoke, became no longer a fiction—to have seen the prismatic spectrum and the rainbow owing allegiance to the same sovereign law—or (as is probable) the lightning of the heavens and the beating of the human heart as two results of one agent,—of what value would be these and a thousand such discoveries, if the sameness thus apprehended were only a momentary, and accidental recurrence, and not known to be a permanent arrangement, arising out of original properties—that is mutual relations—with which the elements of things were at first invested by Providence, and of which properties all the course of nature is only the combination or the separation, but never the alteration? And if, passing

*Uniformity
of sequence,
sameness
in differ-
ence.*

LECT.
IV.

*Constancy
of natural
laws im-
plied in the
existence of
the Arts.*

from speculative truth to practical application, you convert Science into Art, if the theory of latent heat takes active existence in the steam-engine, or the theory of Dioptrics in the common telescope, or the discovery of the cooling power of a metallic tissue in the safety-lamp of Davy,—it is equally, or even more, evident that the construction of the machine supposes a previous conviction of the constancy of the law. In this great traffic with nature, by which we may be said to enrich her with arts as she enriches us with materials, we embark (as in all other commerces) our industry upon the faith of her promise; and the machine or manufacture is at once the monument of our confidence and of her fidelity. Here, then, again, is the same principle of experimental science,—for a machine is nothing more than a permanent experiment; the difference not being in the thing or the process, but in their object, which in the one case is discovery, and in the other case is use. But in every case, the observation and experiment that go before discovery, the rule or the machine that come after it, there is still the conviction—unchangeable as its object is unchangeable—that the laws of Nature (like those Eastern laws of which we read in Scripture) are laws “that alter not.”

*The art of
life follows
the same
analogy.*

Now, Gentlemen, there is an Art of more importance than any of the arts that “recreate life”—the art of life itself. “Life,”—of course I use the popular sense of the term,—is the constant exercise of practical rules similar in their discovery to those of which we have just been speaking; that is to say, it is literally the exertion and the product of an art; and to contemplate a life at its close is, in a manner, to inspect a “machine” whose parts are not coexistent but successive. The object and use of the machine thus completed is indeed hidden among the secret purposes of God, who, constituting us the mechanists of our own conduct, reserves among the deep counsels of His mighty administration the final causes which assuredly exist for the life and trial of every single being of all His creatures. There is a direct object, and there is an ultimate object. The direct object of Life is Duty; the ultimate object is that reason of existence which extends to man in common with every created thing; the former is often missed, for it is to be attained by man; the latter never, for it is the purpose of God. Our ignorance of the ultimate object of the complicated machinery of each existence does not, it must be remem-

[Athenæ

Et recreaverunt vitam legesque rogarunt.

LUCRET. VI. 3.—ED.]

bered, diminish either the importance of that object, or the fitness of the machinery to attain it, or our certainty of that fitness; on the contrary, we are to conclude that the ignorance is part of the fitness, since it exists. Voluntary agents, we yet work for a purpose beyond our contemplation; each is the conscious architect of a separate chamber of an edifice whose general effect, internal dependencies, extent, and purpose, can only be known to the one Reason which can comprehend infinity. Leaving, then, the object of the mechanism, let us return to its formation.

Man is an artist, and constructs his rational life upon observation. His operations in the pursuit of happiness are experimental forms of previous knowledge, of knowledge at first obtained instinctively or accidentally, and afterwards abridged and generalized into practical rules. It is obvious, therefore, that the same confidence as to the stability of fixed laws which originated the steam-engine, the microscope, the air-pump, the thermometer, must exist to give value to all the maxims of civil and of personal prudence. Indeed so truly is this the case, that the very word which is now technically employed to signify the ground of all scientific physical knowledge—the word “experience”—is much more frequently employed to denote the foundation of all practical knowledge in the affairs of life; and, in common usage, is seldom applied to the former purpose, except, perhaps, in the sense of professional skill, where it holds a kind of middle place between the ground of scientific induction and the ground of practical wisdom.

As far then as the reflective agent is concerned, there can be no doubt that his rules, whether right or wrong, in being rules, proceed on the tacit or expressed conviction that the mind manifests itself under unalterable laws. The expressions of these laws are the formulas of psychological science. The “man of the world,” who would blush—if he could blush—to be thought a sage, runs through the whole gamut of mental philosophy in an hour, without knowing it, just as the equilibrist, who balances himself upon a cord, and a dozen other things upon himself, exemplifies half the laws of Statics without ever having heard of the existence of Galileo or Newton.

But man does not merely reflect; his experience includes other and apparently more uncertain elements. Can we ascribe this stability to passions, which are the proverbial types of instability? can we give laws to caprice itself, or chain that “fine frenzy” of imagination which

The Emotions subject to uniform Laws.

Æstuat infelix angusto limite mundi,

within the narrow pinfold of a metaphysical theory?

LECT.
IV.

To this we reply, in the first place, that the former reasoning involves the regularity of this portion of the mental constitution. For the very experience of which we spoke is in a great measure a tacit theory of the passions. Iago excites the jealousy of the Moor with as accurate an application of means to ends as that with which an experimentalist excites the dormant electricity of his glass plate or cylinder; and an orator arranges his topics to inflame the passions of his auditors to frenzy, with the same calm reliance upon general rules of previous experience as when he aims at the nobler end of securing rational conviction. The tempest is as truly a result of atmospheric laws as the calm; and, properly understood, there is a "method" in all "madness" as well as in Hamlet's, though the thread that links its follies be sometimes difficult to trace. Indeed, so far is the stability of the laws of passion admitted, that their changes are usually better understood than those of the reason; and for one who can judge the propriety of an argument, there are fifty who can criticise the proprieties of Shakespeare.

Of the other phenomena whose apparent irregularity exempts them from control, the real regularity is equally attested by practical experience. That there are laws of Imagination is obvious in (what Bacon would call) the "prerogative instance" of dreaming; where the modifying influence of circumstances is matter of universal remark. "Habit" is itself the name of a law. And instinctive principles of belief, though from their nature being simple and unanalysable, they are irreducible to more general laws, are yet felt above all others to be permanent in their nature, and are not less matters of science than the ultimate elements of bodies to the chemist. Strictly speaking, the whole mass of reason and action is reducible to such principles; and in this point of view the instinctive principles are not subject to law, only because they are the laws themselves.

Were these laws undiscovered, we should be entitled to believe that they exist.

But secondly, even though the laws of emotion, and the rest, were undiscoverable, or undiscovered, we should be entitled to conclude that they exist. We may assume higher ground than we have yet approached. Our argument is no longer experimental or analogical, but profound as human reason itself. To this point (on account of its importance, which extends far beyond our immediate subject) I request your special attention. There is a principle in the rational nature which renders it impossible not to believe that every phenomenon whatsoever has a reason for its existence and for every circumstance of its existence. To possess reason is to possess this conviction. It

*For Law is
presupposed
in the exist-
ence of
Reason.*

*Rational
conviction of
Law anti-
cipates by
Instinct.*

*Rational
idea of
Causation
determined*

is possible that higher intelligences may possess principles similar to this, but of greater compass, of which we have no conception; but they can have none that contradicts it; just as the man gifted with sight can direct his course better than the blind man by touch; yet the sight cannot contradict the touch, or make that quality not to exist which the touch feels to exist. But however the higher orders of nature may be gifted, with us the conviction of which I speak is the deepest element of the intellectual being; and though it grows in prominence as the reason is cultivated, being fullest and clearest in the scientific mind, it is truly perceptible in every mind whatsoever. I have long been in the habit of considering that the law of the stability of nature, and our confident expectation of that stability—a law which has attracted since Hume's time so great a proportion of the attention of metaphysicians—may be considered to rational and intelligent beings as truly an inferior and sensible form of the primary principle which I am now considering. I am stating an instance of a principle of (as appears to me) vast importance, namely, that instincts which under their sensible, practical, occasional form, actuate the lower animals, and man also (who really belongs to that lower stage before the birth of reason) in his infantine state, are apprehended by the reason, (that is, by the faculty in this world exclusively human) under the form of necessity and universality. A reason arising from the original nature of things is, in its essence, irrelative to time and space; and to suppose that every succession of phenomena will be invariably successive, that is, will for ever recur the same if it recur at all, is only to suppose what surely is no very mysterious assumption, that what has been reason will continue reason for ever; that if in the nature of any being there be a fitness for connexion with other beings, as long as the being exist the fitness will exist, and therefore the sequence which is, as it were, the active and outward manifestation of that fitness. The antecedent then to the rational reflector as distinguished from the lower animals, and from his own state before the birth of reason, is neither an efficient cause, nor is it a mere antecedent expected to be invariable. Our reason, refusing productive efficacy to matter, denies the one; the same reason, with as unequivocal an evidence, attests something beyond the other. A physical antecedent, as contemplated by reason, is a being in whose nature there is a fitness for being connected with its consequent, which fitness was the ground of the original arrangement, and could not have admitted of any other; and which fitness having in its essence no

LECT.
IV.

The a priori conviction of Law transcends experience,

relation to time or space, and therefore being of course as permanent as the being itself, produces in rational intelligences the infallible conviction that the sequence will last as long as the beings composing it exist; reason thus corroborating and justifying the persuasions of instinct. Nor is there any Necessarianism in such a doctrine farther than the Necessarianism to which I shall never refuse to subscribe—the impossibility of the Divine Power ever acting otherwise than in consonance with, and as the development of, the Divine Wisdom. It is this fitness, instinctively recognized, which is the true source of that supposed confusion of efficient and physical causation, which has so much perplexed our modern philosophers; and, perhaps, of that equally puzzling, because universal, conviction of a connexion, in some sense “necessary,” between the successions of causes and effects. You perceive then that we extend with assurance the dominion of law and regularity not only far beyond our actual experience of its sway, but over every portion of the universe where there exists any element for it to govern. It is not merely a contingent principle of experience, but a necessary principle of reason; and, I must add, it is on this ground, and this ground alone, that we call God the God not of the visible universe, but of infinity itself; a conclusion wholly unattainable by the popular argument of “design”—for the very simple reason that no inference can overpass its premises. The revelation of reason tells us, that wherever there is being, there must be law; and wherever there is law there must be God. It empowers us to assert that if, as poets have dreamed, there be beyond the visible harmonies of the world a realm such as their “Chaos,” Chaos itself, whatever we understand by the term, is but a form of order; and as directly relative to its object as the harmonious structure of an eye or an ear: and the poet who has so wondrously described it has still not left it uncontrolled, when, in words which painting never rivalled, he has depicted

“the throne
Of Chaos and his dark pavilion spread
Wide on our wasteful deep!”

but by no means unpersuaded of, either in physical

Such is our irresistible conviction of the nature of the universe. I shall only add, that your decision of this point leaves the logic of physical inquiry untouched; as, whatever be the foundation of the conviction of the permanence of nature, the conviction instinctively exists; and, whatever be the ground of the connexion of events, the connexions themselves (which are the object of physical inquiry) can only be ascertained by observation. You are

not, therefore, to imagine that, in doubting the completeness and accuracy of the modern metaphysic, you are at all questioning the accuracy of the admirable logical views with which it is connected. Leaving the general principle to future discussion, I now return to its immediate application in the subject before us.

In common with every other phenomenon of nature the successions of mental states must have their reason in the mutual suitability of the elements that compose them, *or in psychological inquiry.*

therefore, their perpetual samenesses of recurrence: the succession being wholly independent of our knowledge of the actual law of succession. And, just as the chemist is aware that the results of innumerable combinations which he has never tried—perhaps which have never yet come together—form part of the whole extent of nature—are yet as fixed and settled in nature's counsels as those which he is every day witnessing or producing, and will show themselves so when they do occur,—so the metaphysician is assured that the boundaries of his classifications are the boundaries of his knowledge,—not those of the assumed universal, and invariable order, which pervades the world of mind. Of the millions of intermingling waves that ripple the surface of a bay, there is not one which is more truly the creature of chance than the great tide-wave of the ocean itself. Of the innumerable modifications of feeling, which, passing rapidly over its surface, make the history of an hour in any human mind, there is not one which does not appear,—disappear in introducing its successor,—reappear to give place again—by laws as fixed and stable as that which, during the whole succession of these superficial changes, was, probably, urging on the main current of the mind in the desire and pursuit of happiness.

Gentlemen, it thus appears that the history of Consciousness is a part of the history of nature; that, like all conceivable existences, it is subject to order regulating its successions; and that that which discovers law in everything is itself subject to law. The mind which detects a creative intelligence in every disposition of successive facts, does not refuse to add its own testimony to that great truth. The transcendent Artist who has formed this wonderful mechanism of thought, and who has purposed to direct its energies to Himself, has enabled it to do so by enabling it to recognize its own structure.

This conducts us to the not less important question—The other element of our argument—are these laws of the conscious principle, thus assuredly existing, capable of being discovered? The reply is, that, in proving them to *Are the Laws of Consciousness discoverable?*

LECT.
IV.*Proofs of
the affirm-
ative.**Evidence of
Language.*

exist, we have in a considerable degree established their amenability to inquiry; for a part of our proof arose from the fact that they had actually been made matter of habitual analysis. Action and conduct imply not merely the existence of laws, but the knowledge of them... Another proof is derived from the evidence of language; a medium of investigation to which I may often have occasion to invite your attention. Language, Gentlemen, is the sensible portraiture of thought, the dial-plate of the mind, and every fact, whether of change or constancy in the outward indication, marks a corresponding fact in the inward machinery. We are not without physical analogies sufficiently illustrative of this relation which the observation of language bears to the analysis of the mind. It was of importance to the theory of acoustics that the vibratory motions in sonorous masses should be accurately determined. The vibrations themselves elude the keenest eyes; and from their rapidity, as well as minuteness, are beyond the reach of direct instrumental observation. How were these invisible *data* to be gained? The happy thought occurred (to Chladni, I think) of strewing fine sand over the vibrating plates; the sand of course assumed forms directly dependent on, and thence indicative of, the vibrations; and thus one of the most secret and exquisite operations of nature became the subject of easy ocular inspection. Now this device exactly illustrates the metaphysical uses of language. It is the sensible form of almost imperceptible facts, and snatches from the secrecy of the invisible world of mind a constant report of its processes: while in the combined investigation of different languages the indications may be compared and corrected; much as in the ingenious "principle of repetition," by which Borda has taught astronomical observers to rectify the imperfections of their instruments. Language is often indeed the embodiment of prejudices; but you are to remember that there is not a single error or prejudice which does not arise according to laws as real as truth itself, and whose analysis may not, therefore, expose these laws to view. The misletoe is as true a result of the laws of vegetation as the oak it disfigures; and the "perturbations" of the planetary bodies are themselves elements in the stability of the system.

*Terms of
mental
science con-
tained in
popular
discourse.*

In every civilized language, then, there are words to be found expressive of certain familiar properties of the mind, as well as phrases expressive of many of their minuter relations and more striking manifestations. Such are sense, reason, imagination, habit, genius, dulness, memory, contemplation, and the rest. The invention of such terms

supposes a previous observation of the great general facts which they convey; and the constant use of them in the same, or nearly the same sense, shews that that observation is currently admitted to be correct, or nearly so. The object therefore, of psychology is not to reclaim to cultivation a field suffered till now to lie fallow, but to correct and assort the produce of a field whose cultivation is as old as reason itself:—and the opposition, so often complained of between (what is termed) the vulgar and the philosopher, arises not because the one is exclusively vulgar, and the other exclusively philosophic, but because they are both philosophers, though in very different degrees; and therefore, of course, with very different results.

Our next Lecture (on Thursday) will continue, and, I hope conclude, this part of our general argument for the reality and importance of mental philosophy.

LECT.
IV.

The difference between the philosopher and the vulgar a difference of degree.

LECTURE V.

LECT.
V.

GENTLEMEN,

I RESUME our discussion of the susceptibility which the mind possesses of becoming the object of physical discovery. In the argument, as far as it has yet proceeded, you will easily perceive that I prolong it less for purposes of conviction than for those of illustration. The argument, as a mere argument, could be comprised in a small compass. But I am anxious that you should not only recognize the truth, but recognize the value of the truth; that, in admitting its cogency, you should feel it enlighten, as well as compel; and that the fiery darts, *ignea tela*, of truth's defensive warfare—like other fires—in the very process of destroying what directly opposes them, should reflect illumination on all around. It is with this intention that I have interspersed the simplicity of these reasonings with intimations of other and more remote doctrines,—intimations which the rigour of a strict method would scarcely permit, but which the sagacity of a reflective audience welcomes as its appropriate stimulant; and, however I may seem to deviate from the direct road of demonstration, it is not impossible that these deviations may be themselves the directest road to a higher goal,—that of making you familiar with the true nature and bearings of the great subject which engages our attention.

Recapitulation.

We have seen, then, that an Inductive Science of the Mind, the immediate subject of our present consideration, is demonstrably possible, from the very existence of science of any kind, and the very conception of regularity and law as applied to any subject whatsoever, which necessarily supposes a regularity of mental relations, without which the conception could never have had being. We have seen it proved from the existence of such a thing as a practical conduct of life; which has been shewn to be precisely analogous to any ordinary art, and equally to suppose the influence of laws in that region with which the art is engaged, that is to say, in the mind of man; and we have seen that the inference embraces states of mind wholly independent of reason and proverbially capricious,—nay, includes them with peculiar force, inasmuch as it is

with these and their laws that the art of life is especially concerned. The force of these proofs from experience has been corroborated by an appeal to that great instinct of reason which assigns intuitively to every phenomenon an adequate cause and reason of existence, and thence a certainty of recurrence unaffected by changes of time or space. The reality of the laws being shewn, we proceeded to establish their liability to discovery, partly from the same train of reasoning which established their existence, and partly from the indications afforded by language, in which the invention of mental terms proves the attempt to classify the properties of mind, and their perpetuation the general admission of the classification as correct, or at least as an approximation sufficiently convenient for all practical purposes. Now, where the subject, and the instruments, of investigation remain unchanged, a less perfect knowledge is a guarantee of a better, because its existence proves that there is at least no radical characteristic in the nature of the subject and of our relation to it, which would seclude it from the dominion of science, and therefore from the influence of that glorious attribute of all legitimate science, its capabilities of indefinite and perpetual improvement. Indeed, without leaving the boundaries of language itself, we may recognize striking proofs of this process of amelioration. If, as we have been maintaining, language exhibits the visible surface produced by a perpetual undercurrent of analytic thought, and in its rudest form is the rudest form of science; so, the nomenclature of any subject often may be said to give us in a condensed and portable form the main elements of its actual condition, and always rises in precision as that condition improves in scientific accuracy. So that the improvement of language is itself the constant witness of the progress of thought. And in the general intelligence of our own subject, as manifested in the use of language, you may perceive at once the testimony of this progress, and the means of furthering it:—the testimony to this progress, in the unquestionably greater precision which marks the use of terms denoting intellectual powers and processes in general society—the means of increasing this precision, in the certain though insensible influence of accurate expression. If language be the creature of mind, it is also its guide; the child of thought supplies the blindness and supports the feebleness of its parent. One of the great benefits of metaphysical studies upon the mass of society is to be found in this very diffusion of exact phraseology, inevitably productive of exact thinking, perhaps indeed the greatest, certainly the most universal, though

*Argument
from the
phenomena
of Lan-
guage fur-
ther pur-
sued.*

*Diffusion
of exact
phraseology
one great
benefit of
metaphysi-
cal studies.*

LECT.
V.

the most neglected, advantage to be obtained from the vigilant supervision of a great school of metaphysicians in any country. Terms expressive of the great subjects of reasoning are at first refined and purified in the alembics of accurate science. Thus definite they descend among the vulgar; and though perhaps these distinctly moulded types of thought may at first be clumsily handled in colloquial usage, yet if they lose the sharpness of their outline, they preserve at least the general correctness of their shape. The justness infused into the public language leavens by degrees the public mind. Thus it is that the terms of philosophy become the instructors of the people; founded upon accurate distinctions they insinuate the distinctions which occasioned them; they are the deputies and apostles of truth among the crowd; and, as language has been called the mirror of the mind, so the mind in its turn may be said to dress itself in this correct mirror of a perfect language.

Thus, the existence of language is itself the monument of an unfinished science; its improvement, the constant proof and instrument of a more complete one. Every expression which conveys an act or faculty of the mind is an indication that that act or faculty has been the object of reflective thought, and that, even in the earliest period of the history of reason, the wonderful machinery which recognizes all, has not been left unrecognized by itself. You are to remember how much this proof may be made to include. It is not merely the names of faculties, and the various designations which denote habits and characters, that establish how universally man has been (in some respect) his own object, and how much more deeply he might be so. There is not a single term expressive of action which does not attest a direct reference to mental consciousness; and I need not remind you that some of the most difficult researches of our science are those which propose to discover the nature of the reference which *was* made in the formation of some of these signs. The terms, or inflexions, which we translate by the personal pronouns, I, Thou, He,—the verb To Be,—the common auxiliaries, may, must, ought, would, &c., (expressive of contingency, necessity, duty, will), how close and searching was the metaphysic which governed their creation. Every one of them is a theory in miniature: and universal grammar is not more truly a science of language than language is a science of mind; the genus "pronoun" does not more truly classify the words in a language that are suppletory of nouns, than the particular pronouns themselves involve and suppose an observation of the particular postures of

Metaphysical distinctions implied in the commonest as well as in confessedly abstract terms.

mind they are employed to represent. And, in truth, this universal grammar, which must always rest rather on ideas than on words, is just a higher form of the very same philosophy which constructed the languages it methodizes; and the peasant who invents an idiom for his purpose, the particular grammarian who investigates the rules of the peasants' vernacular tongue, and the philosophical grammarian who reduces to common laws the rules of all languages, occupy positions of progressive dignity not unlike those which the historian of astronomy would allot respectively to Tycho Brahé, to Kepler, and to Newton.

I.E.C.T.

A further, and very simple argument in proof that the mind is not placed beyond the scope of discovery, is to be found in the fact that the physical survey of the mind is in a state of actual and rapid progress. A true Inductive Psychology is a modern science; and surely its infancy is the infancy of a Hercules. Censure and criticise individual theorists as we may, it cannot be denied that Newton had not views as just of this division of our philosophy as the mass of advanced students in our colleges possess at this day; a proposition which it would not be very difficult to establish by citations from many parts of the writings of that wondrous man. Occasional retrogressions, occasional failures may occur, but no candid man can contemplate the later metaphysical history of Europe, and not perceive that, though the waves may alternately retreat to the eye, the great tide itself of improvement is really gaining ground. The physics of the consciousness have taken this place among the sciences; and, though this be not all, it is much. It is universally felt that mind is logically a part of nature; it is not so universally felt that it is the noblest part: but the former step is so vast and momentous that it may palliate the deficiency of the latter, to which it is the safest preliminary, and of which, in logical method, it ought to be the antecedent. But I pass from this argument to another which better secures my great object of illustrating the general subject while proving the particular question.

Argument from the actual progress of Psychological inquiry.

The most instructive argument in proof that the mind is liable to a discovery of its laws, is derived from the unquestionable fact, that, as there is a field for discovery (before established), so there is an adequate organ for effecting it. The astronomer has his stars and his telescope, the naturalist his insect and his microscope, the optician his light and his prism, the crystallographer his crystal and his reflector to measure its angles, the chemist his earthen and his electric pile, the *metaphysician* his mind and his faculty of attention. In before explaining that the mind is subject to arrangements of law and order, you will

Organ of Psychological discovery.

LECT.
V.

remember that, among other arguments, I proved this point from the existence of science of any kind;—I return to that argument to corroborate the present one. For, that this provision of instrumental apparatus is sufficient for all the purposes of mental observation and science, you will agree when you remember that, in point of fact, every other subject of observation must be reflected upon this mirror of consciousness before it is capable of being known. If the composition of air or water can be an object of human science, it can be so only by observations of a series of human sensations; and this observation itself, as well as these sensations themselves, are but phenomena of the conscious mind. Thus every material science is, in a manner, a science of mind, by being a science of successive sensations; and it will scarcely be denied that attention may observe the phenomena of mind, and convert them into science, when it is remembered that everything which professes to be science is built on this very supposition.

Facility of using this organ varies in different departments of the subject.

The facility with which we can apply this instrument varies, however, very considerably according to the portion of the subject investigated. In all cases equally it supposes a subject of inquiry and a process of inquiry; that is, it supposes the reproduction by the suggestive principle of a certain state of mind, and a continuous secondary process by which we keep comparing and examining it, as well as weighing its value and meaning. The facility then will vary as these operations vary, both or either of them; it will rise exactly as it is easier to reproduce, or as it is easier to examine. The processes of sensation or of voluntary effort are usually the easiest to reproduce, but they are by no means the easiest to examine. The processes of emotion, on the contrary, are exceedingly difficult accurately to reproduce; while they will probably be found not peculiarly difficult to examine. The processes of reasoning offer about the same facility or difficulty to both operations. The power of reproduction, it is obvious, depends on the power of commanding the antecedent state or states with which the required one is connected: and the power of examination will depend on the complication or the simplicity of the phenomenon examined, in relation to the examiner. It is precisely so that the naturalist's chances of discovery of the structure of some novel insect will be determined by his chances of obtaining the insect for observation, and the powers of the microscope he can employ in observing. Now in the phenomena of sensation, of voluntary effort, of reasoning, demonstrative or contingent, there is certainly no mental difficulty in securing the antecedent requisite to produce them: I say no "mental" diffi-

culty, because any other casual and external difficulties are plainly irrelevant to the scope of our discussion. By presenting the eye to the landscape, the ear to the concert, the hand to the flame, the sensations attached to these requisites are certain to arise. Again, the unparalysed limb is certain to obey the exertion of muscular effort. And in like manner, by presenting (no longer the mere bodily organ to its material co-agent but), in a metaphorical sense, the mind to any subject of speculation, trains of reasoning will arise, which may be fixed in written signs, and which will always be certain to arise as often as the attention is directed to the signs. In all these cases, then, reproduction is easy, because not only are the laws of succession known, but these laws are available for practical purposes. But in the case of the emotions we have a very different task. Here we may indeed know, in a wide and general manner, the laws of sequence, but these laws are ill available for practical occasions. We cannot summon love, and fear, and hate, and hope, and ambition, into our closets for inspection, in all their original energy of life. At best we must be contented with dissecting their inanimate remains, as presented in the sepulchral crypts and dim recesses of memory. These wayward recusants acknowledge no allegiance to the requisitions of philosophy. Tyrants when we would reject, they are rebels when we require them. To examine fear or anger, in the ordinary sense of examination, involves a contradiction; for to be calm enough to examine the emotion would no longer be to experience it. In these cases, then, of immediate emotions, the true materials of inquiry will be, partly remembrances of our own, and partly direct observations of their workings and results in others.

*Difficulty
of ana-
lysing the
Emotions.*

I am here, perhaps, unduly anticipating a subsequent topic, yet, as I have commenced, I ought not to conclude without completing, at least, this branch of it. Passing, then, from the facility of reproduction to the facility of examination, we shall find that these qualities are not at all governed by the same law of change, that they do not increase or diminish in mutual correspondence. Examination is either analysis or pure reflection; it either simplifies phenomena or it weighs them. "Analysis" (in the science of mind) is the resolution of associations into their simple elements. It is difficult, therefore, according as the elements sought are minute, are in a state of complicated union, are presented in such a disguise as that the result of the combination assumes a form unlike the components. The next question is, of course, Where will this close and

*Analysis
disting-
uished
from pure
Reflection.*

LECT.
V.

elusive complication of minute elements occur? It will occur wherever the association has been formed at a period antecedent to observation, or to which the scope of memory does not extend; wherever the association has been constant and unbroken; wherever it has entangled in this constant union a great number of elements, *i.e.* as the association has been early, constant, complex. Now in some of the phenomena of sensation, or, to speak more accurately, in some phenomena of the information derived through the medium of the senses, these qualities are all eminently combined. All sensitive natures seem to have in some degree—rational natures in a very high degree—the tendency to convert things which appear into signs of things beyond them, to pass from the unimportant to the important: and you know that the great law of connexion or association forms a perpetual basis upon which this tendency can act. Language being the capital instance of this invaluable principle, we say, by a convenient metaphor, that the mind has a perpetual tendency to convert every thing into a language. Now, of all the dialects of this perpetual language, the simple sensations are the most obvious and striking. The sensations may, you will remember, be regarded under two very different aspects; positively, in themselves, as states pleasurable, or painful, or indifferent; relatively, as signs of things ulterior. It is in this latter office that the intricate combination of which I am speaking exists. The mind, conceiving the thing signified while perceiving the sign, assumes habitually that it perceives the signified; and the office of analysis is, by revealing the real process, to exhibit to the mind the history of the prejudice. Let us advance another step, and inquire, In what department of the diversified field of sensation will the language-making tendency become most observable? I answer, first, in whatever case the direct objects of the organ are discovered in the most constant and general association with subjects of importance to the mind that constructs the language, and, secondly, in whatever case the organic affections are most easily distinguishable from each other, so as to render the language unerring and precise. Now these two requisites meet very conspicuously in the instance of Vision. Its object—light in all its varieties—is usually present to us during two-thirds of our existence, and, by being reflected or otherwise modified by all kinds of solid matter in due proportion to their magnitude, shape, and distance, becomes a universal intelligencer between the conscious being and the tangible world around him. While, in addition to this property, its minutest distinctions of place and colour are exquisitely appre-

*Analysis of
simple sen-
sation.*

*Involun-
tary asso-
ciation of
the sign
with the
thing sig-
nified;*

*in the case
of Vision in
particular.*

cial; the spot of the organ upon which it falls and the shadowings of the colour, being, both of them, impressions sufficiently definite to be never mistaken as long as the mind, and the organ which ministers to it, are soundly constituted—*mens sana in corpore sano*. Hence the eye is, of all organs of sense, the richest depository of signs; a privilege which becomes peculiarly conspicuous from the fact that of all the organs it possesses perhaps the least claim to be considered under the other aspect of the sensitive frame—that is, as a medium of direct pleasure. Indeed it is worth noting that the mere pleasure of light is most observable in extreme infancy—exactly when it is most required in order to urge and stimulate the organ into such activity as may form a basis for its higher subsequent destinies as the great channel of external knowledge. In this latter office its agency is so prominent as to have made “seeing” a metaphor for “understanding” in almost every language, and the principal terms for the degrees, and varieties, and means, of knowledge to have been everywhere derived from the processes of vision—such terms as “demonstration,” “intuition,” “evidence,” and the rest. And when to this process of constant interpretation, which makes all the value of vision, is added a parallel course of purely mental association, the case becomes sometimes one of astonishing rapidity of combination. Take the instance of a linguist writing a translation of a written document,—a performance which we know is continually accomplished with almost the velocity of thought itself. Yet there are here no less than four successive connexions preliminary to each word of the version. There is the perception of a written mark, and, first, the connexion of a sound with that sign; secondly, the connexion of an idea with that sound; thirdly, the connexion of a sound (in the new language) with that idea; and fourthly, the connexion of a written sign with that sound. In this series, however, we have set out from the acquired perception of the shape, &c. of the original written sign, and pursued the mind through merely its own admitted conceptions. To commence the history, therefore, we must trace the genealogy of the written version from that primitive chaos of the mind, in which, uninformed of distance or figure, the eye could only convey to the conscious being a vague impression of colour. We must strip it of its borrowed attributes, and contemplate it still presenting this sensation alone, in order to behold the mind clothing that dead element with life, and, by a train of rapid association, converting an indefinite impression of colour into that perception of a written sign from which we commenced our former series.

LECT.
V.

When you cast up the heap of associations which thus gather upon a single impression, you will easily recognize the fact, and the cause, of the difficulty which attends the analysis of the phenomena attributed to sensation.

*No region
of the mind
beyond the
reach of
observation
and discovery.*

I shall leave this instance as an illustration of a subject which it would be premature to discuss at greater length. The consideration of the difficulties which accompany the analysis of volitions, emotions, reasonings—as well as those which attend that pure contemplation of a thought apart from all analytical purposes, to which I have referred—we shall resume hereafter. I trust that you perceive, what alone for the present I was anxious you should perceive, that though different portions of our subject are differently circumstanced as to facility of reproduction and examination, yet this difficulty does not at all amount to an exclusion of any portion from liability to these processes of observation; at least, that we cannot assume that it does, prior to actual trial. Far less, from these vague assertions of the difficulty or obscurity of the subject, unfairly generalized from the fact of a few real obscurities, can suspicions be justly entertained of its total impracticability. And the dissolution of this prejudice leaves the ground open for the plain and unanswerable statement, that of all species of observation, the observation, of which attention is the instrument and consciousness the object, is in its own nature the most legitimate and warrantable, and that, so far from being essentially unsusceptible of philosophical investigation, the difficulties which attend this subject, however discouraging, are purely incidental, and therefore capable of continual diminution as practical skill increases. To discover the living inhabitants of the sun, if such there be, may be pronounced essentially impossible; to determine its rotation was scarcely to have been deemed so, because the inquiry demanded great care in the use of the organ which inspected, and a patient protracted course of observation from the inquirer.

*Opinion of
Lord Bacon
in favour of the
possibility
of Mental
Science.*

Upon this whole argument—the liability of the mind to a discovery of its laws—the opinion of Lord Bacon, as the oracle of inductive science, will of course be received with respect. Lord Bacon, then, answers decidedly in the affirmative. He saw plainly enough that wherever the mind could reach there it could observe, and wherever it could observe there it could induct, and wherever it could induct there it could discover; and he knew that there was nothing in the conscious intelligence to seclude its successions from the same influences which were capable of classifying every other attainable succession in the universe. Whenever the true meaning of discovery was firmly grasped,

LECT.
V

the application was universal. The stars of heaven, the flowers at your feet, the soul that scans both—observe, induct, and you know them equally. Translate a geometrical proposition to any portion of space, and it is equally true; apply the Baconian formula to any region of experience, and it remains unimpeachable. It is with regret I have to remark that the excessive spirit of system, and, I fear, the national prejudices of M. Victor Cousin, have betrayed him into a very unjustifiable misrepresentation of our great English philosopher. In order by contrast to exalt the rival glory of Descartes (which M. Cousin, as his editor and a Frenchman, is naturally solicitous to support), he asserts that the tendency of the counsels of Bacon was in such a sense and manner exclusively material, as to blight the growth of mental philosophy. So unfounded is this charge, that Bacon himself expressly declares the applicability of his method of inquiry to the construction of metaphysical, ethical, and political theories. (*Nov. Org.* Lib. I. Aph. 127, and *De Augm.* Lib. VII. cap. 3)*. And in the *Nov. Org.* II. 26, you will find an actual analysis of the phenomena of memory, in exemplification of the method of induction†. Nor need I cite to you his many ingenious

Cousin's
critique of
Bacon exam-
ined.His parti-
ality to De-
cartes.

* "Jam enim Historiam et Tabulas Inveniendi conficimus de Irâ, Metu, et Verecundiâ, et similibus; et etiam de exemplis rerum Civilium; nec minus de motibus mentalibus Memoria, Compositionis et Divisionis, Judicii, et reliquorum, quam de Calido et Frigido, aut Luce, aut Vegetatione, aut similibus." *N. O.* I. 127. And, speaking of moral investigations, (*De Aug. Sc.* VII. 3,) he assumes both the importance and the legitimacy of the inductive inquiry of mental phenomena. For instance in one place, "Quâ in parte debuerant Philosophi strenue et graviter inquirere de viribus et energiâ Consuetudinis, Exercitationis, Habitûs, Educationis, Imitationis, Âmulatiônis, Convictus, Amicitiae, Laudis, Reprehensionis, Exhortationis, Famae, Legum, Lulrorum, Studiorum, et si quæ alia. Hæc enim sunt illa quæ regnant in Morâkhus."

[The 127th Aphorism commences thus: "Etiam dubitabit quispiam potius quam objiciet; utrum nos de naturali tantum philosophia, an etiam de scientiis reliquis, logicis, ethicis, politicis, secundum viam nostram perficiendis, loquamur. At nos certe de universis hæc, quæ dicta sunt, intelligimus; atque quemadmodum vulgaris logica, quæ regit res per syllogismum, non tantum ad naturales, sed ad omnes scientias pertinet; ita et nostra, quæ procedit per inductionem, omnia complectitur." In the chapter from which the second passage is cited occurs the following true and refined criticism: "Subiit admiratio Aristotelem, qui tot libros de ethicis conscripsit, affectus, ut membrum ethicæ principale, in illis non tractasse; in rhetoricis autem (quatenus scilicet oratione cieri aut commoveri possint) locum illis reperisse (in quo tamen loco de iis, quantum tam paucis fieri potuit, acute et bene disseruit) nam disceptationes ejus de voluptate et dolore huic tractatui nullo modo satisfaciunt; non magis quam qui de luce et lumine tantum scriberet, de particularium colorum natura scripsisse diceretur: siquidem voluptas et dolor erga affectus particulares ita se habent, ut lux erga colores." ED.]

† His object is to determine, as an example of what he calls Constitutive Instances, the circumstances that are found to assist that faculty. After a lengthened investigation, he concludes with six specimens of these aids. I will not presume to translate them out of his own inimitable language. They are "abscissio infiniti; deductio intellectualis ad sensibile; impressio in affectu forti; impressio in mente purâ; multitudo ansarum; præexpectatio."

LECT.
V.

suggestions as to the *doctrina de fœdere*, or doctrine of the laws which govern the connexion of mind and body; a curious and important subject, in which, except the labours of the phrenologists be received as science, little progress has been made since his age. I might refer to his other writings, more particularly to the wonderful little volume, his *Essays*, for testimonies to the existence of the very same spirit of mental investigation, though in these more popular performances no longer confined within the strait bonds of logical formularies. This is indeed only what might be expected from a thinker, who, setting utility as the great aim of philosophy, must have felt how important is that science which teaches man to combine and arrange his own experience, and out of its theorems to collect so many rules whose utility is infinitely more extensive than that of any material art whatever. What indeed is that whole mass of writings, of which the *Novum Organum* presents the result, but a series of contributions of the highest value to those very sciences which their illustrious author is accused of neglecting or despising? That a secret but urgent determination to exalt, at any expense of precision, his favourite philosopher, was at the bottom of this misstatement, I can scarcely doubt when I follow a little further the brilliant course of this most eloquent professor, and find him (*Cours de l'Histoire de la Phil. du XVIII. Siècle*, Vol. I. p. 94, edit. 12mo.) discovering, in the plain and unpretending rules which Descartes presents in his *Tract. de Methodo* (general practical rules in the study of nature), the whole substance of the minute and exquisite directions which Bacon has so elaborately composed for the construction of a theory. Descartes tells us that he proposed to himself as invariable rules—as his entire code of logical legislation—the following practical principles. Their substance is this; 1st, to admit nothing as true which the mind could hesitate about receiving; 2dly, to resolve complicated difficulties into convenient parts; 3dly, to begin with the simplest and easiest, and proceed to the more difficult and composite; 4thly, to make a perfect enumeration of every single particular concerned in the question, and be sure to omit none. These are the famous *Regulæ Cartesianæ* which his Port Royal followers so highly eulogize. That they are correct in a general sense, no one will deny; that in the inventive mind of their great author they were pregnant with speculations and discoveries, I shall never question; but that, as presented to ordinary thinkers, they contain anything either very novel in theory or very useful in practice, I must take the liberty of doubting. Far less can I admit that they include all that is of

Comparison
of the
Cartesian
rules with
the Bacon-
ian.

value in the logical institutions of Bacon. How M. Cousin establishes the point you may judge when I inform you, that, after stating that Descartes's "*ut difficultates quas essem examinaturus, in tot partes dividerem, quot expediret ad illas commodius resolvendas*" (Rule 2), (which you at once see is a mere general rule in the investigation of any question), is the same with the Baconian Physical Analysis, the "*dissectio et anatomia mundi*"—he next instructs us that the 3rd Rule of Descartes (which he terms the 4th), which counsels the progress in inquiry from the simple to the complex—"incipiendo a rebus simplicissimis et cognitū facillimis, ut per gradus ad difficiliorum et magis compositarum cognitionem ascenderem"—that this, expressly stated by the author himself to be a rule in inquiry, is really the same with the Baconian synthesis, that art which, as M. Cousin truly defines it, "out of all the parts divided and successively examined and exhausted by analysis, reconstructs and forms a whole, a system;"—that the rule directing the mere pursuit of truth is the same with the rules that guide the now successful analyser as to the mode in which he should convert his analysis into theory. But, says M. Cousin, Bacon declares "*mens humana si agat in materiem, naturam rerum et opera Dei contemplando pro modo naturæ operatur et ab eadem determinatur; si ipsa in se vertatur, tanquam aranea texens telam, tum demum indeterminata est et parit telas quasdam doctrinæ tenuitate fili operisque mirabiles, sed quoad usum frivolas et inanes*." Cousin translates the latter part of this admirable passage, "*quand elle s'applique à l'âme elle n'aboutit qu'à des rêveries frivoles*:" and this makes our great philosopher declare that observation applied to the mind can never lead to any but frivolous reveries. I suppose I need scarcely tell you that this version is a gross perversion of Bacon's purport; which was simply to discourage the preposterous efforts of the philosophy then popular to construct the physics of the external universe from ideal and arbitrary hypotheses¹.

¹ [It may be interesting to compare the opinion of another critic with the judgment passed by Cousin. Dugald Stewart observes, "The merits of Bacon, as the Father of Experimental Philosophy, are so universally acknowledged, that it would be superfluous to touch upon them here. The lights which he has struck out in various branches of the Philosophy of Mind have been much less attended to; although the whole scope and tenor of his speculations shew, that to *this* study his genius was far more strongly and happily turned, than to that of the Material World. In the extent and accuracy of his *physical* knowledge he was far inferior to many of his predecessors; but he surpassed them all in his knowledge of the laws, the resources, and the limits of the human understanding. It would be difficult to name another writer prior to Locke whose works are enriched with so many just observations on the intellectual phenomena. Among these, the most valuable relate to Memory and

LECT.
V.

The brilliant reputation of M. Cousin can bear these spots, as well as the great name of Descartes could have stood without these exaggerated encomiums, and therefore I need not apologize for noticing them. Indeed, the powerful influence which M. Cousin must ever exercise over his readers obliges me the more strenuously to warn you that the usual catholicity of his philosophical spirit almost invariably narrows in estimating the merits and influence of Lord Bacon.

Actual influence of Bacon.

The great Englishman, then, was unquestionably a psychologist; and it is unjust to deny that his own comprehensive mind fully recognized the fertility and value of this province of inquiry. Nor surely has the influence of his views departed. The present improved state of psychology is indirectly his creation; for unquestionably it is due to the irresistible influence of the vast triumphs achieved by inductive observation in the external world. Hobbes sat by the side of Bacon himself; but, still more, Locke breathed the atmosphere of Newton. While "hypotheses non fingo" was echoing from every side of Europe, the psychologist grew ashamed of assuming passions and powers. Experience was questioned, classification began, and systems followed, which, differing abundantly from one another and from the truth, agreed, all of them, in the great principle that hearsay was no evidence in the courts of philosophy; and that nothing was to be admitted as a faculty which could not be proved as a fact.

Speculative side of his philosophy imperfect, and why.

That the speculative side of the Philosophy of Man was equally revealed to Lord Bacon, it would not be easy to establish. But neither was it discountenanced. Mere verbal subtleties indeed he abhorred and despised. Nor was it much to be wondered at, with a thousand barren years of them before him. But in his own statements of his philosophy truth of every kind is equally welcome. And he has not forgotten the metaphysical principles of nature and of the soul, either in his treatment of the subject of

Imagination, &c." Dissertation, I. p. 49. Of Descartes, Mr Stewart says: "The glory of having pointed out to his successors the true method of studying the theory of Mind, is almost all that can be claimed by Descartes in logical and metaphysical science. Many important hints, indeed, may be gleaned from his works; but on the whole he has added very little to our knowledge of Human Nature." "Les mathématiques," says D'Alembert, quoted by Stewart, "font aujourd'hui la partie la plus solide et la moins contestée de la gloire de Descartes." The influence of Descartes on the Cambridge thinkers of the Restoration has not escaped Mr Stewart, who instances John Smith, one of the "Cambridge Platonists" of that era. The Latin Orations of Barrow furnish testimony to the same effect and may have suggested Sir W. Hamilton's ill-natured and very untrue statement that Newton's discoveries were not appreciated by his Cambridge contemporaries and successors, who clung to Descartes in preference. After Newton it would be difficult to find a Cambridge Cartesian. Ed.]

natural theology, or in the physical and logical compartments which he has assigned to discussing the transcendent qualities and adventitious conditions of being. Circumstances however urged him to concentrate his energies where they were most demanded; and if his principal object was that of combining facts into theory, and if he did not fully penetrate the importance of vindicating the divinity of Reason³, of Morality, of Love, we cannot perhaps censure him more than for not anticipating the *Principia*.

But though Bacon himself be acquitted, the philosophical revolution occasioned mainly by his writings may not be equally guiltless. Wisdom was not justified of her children. The great spirit of the master was confined and warped by his disciples. And from the habitual contemplation of material nature, where all facts are *in themselves* of equal dignity, the mind, in passing to itself, learned unconsciously to transfer the same undistinguishing level to this new and peculiar set of phenomena; and thus gradually sunk into the perilous error of seeing only a succession of appearances—sensitive, reasoning, moral, emotional—in the internal world of man; a succession of differing phenomena, indeed, for we can only recognize "succession" by difference; but a succession of phenomena not distinguished by any measure of relative importance, but the importance of mere duration and intensity. To express the same in the picture-language of imagination—as Bacon himself might have chosen to do—the student of material nature contemplates a vast and level plain, where, though there be compartments many and various, yet the only measure of distinction he recognizes is, as it were, the comparative value of the soils for purposes of utility,

Bacon not responsible for the errors of his followers.

Causes of the narrowness of modern psychology.

³ [Bacon's views of the relation of Religion to Philosophy (*de Augm.* Lib. III. 1, 2) are peculiar, and, as might have been anticipated, have called forth the censures of German historians of Philosophy (see Ritter, *Gesch. d. Phil.* x. p. 310, seq.). A passage which has been generally overlooked, throws an important light on this subject: "Neque enim a theologia mutuaemur, nisi etiam cum principiis philosophiæ conveniet." (Lib. IV. c. 3). Of this "borrowing from theology" a very brilliant instance is furnished in the critique, from a Christian point of view, of the ancient theories of the *Summum Bonum*. (*Ib.* Lib. VII. c. 1). Ritter has the good sense to reject the preposterous opinion, revived by some recent writers, that Bacon's Christianity was a mask assumed for the purpose of conciliating the theologians. But the profound theological views opened out in divers places by Bacon he has not found it within his scope to notice. How much, for instance, of the so-called "internal evidence" is condensed in the following pregnant sentence of the chapter last cited: "Nulla, omnibus seculis, reperta est vel lex vel disciplina, quæ in tantum communione bonum exaltavit, bonum vero individuale depressit, quantum fides Christiana: unde liquido pateat, unum eundemque Deum fuisse, qui creaturis leges illas naturæ, hominibus vero legem Christianam dedisset." On this text, the sequel, to the end of the chapter, is an exhaustive commentary. Ed.]

LECT.
V.

the different amounts of rent which art can exact from each;—the student of man, if he understand his task aright, should contemplate a widely diversified landscape, where, if there be some expanses of level ground, and much that yields a rich return to interest, there are also heights which join with heaven, and whose altitude must itself be included as an essential element in every scientific survey of the country. To transfer to this latter region habits derived from familiarity with the former, is obviously to render your report mutilated and imperfect. This transference *has* in some measure been produced by the successes of inductive science. It has created the impulse of a true psychology, but it has tended to stunt the offspring it produced. But is this the error of Bacon? is this the fault of the induction with which his name is immortally linked? No, it is the weakness of his followers,—or rather, the weakness of human nature itself, which cannot bear success without urging it to extravagance.

In vindicating to the cause of the mental philosophy the name and influence of this great authority, I may fittingly terminate this long argument. When “the god” was brought upon the ancient stage, it was a sign that the drama was closing.

Recapitulation.

Permit me to recall to you the simple basis upon which I have constructed the observations which have now occupied us for nearly two lectures. The argument, which began from the foundation of the subject, was this:—that all knowledge is valuable, and that the mental philosophy is a real portion of knowledge. The *major* proposition was vindicated from objections; and the more zealously, because those objections are peculiarly directed against this very species of inquiry. The proof of the *minor* we rested upon two propositions,—that the mind is subject to laws, and that its laws are subject to discovery. The arguments for the former proposition I recapitulated when commencing the present lecture. The arguments for the latter were partly the same with those for the former (as might be expected,—for it is by the discovery of the laws, in some measure, that we know them to exist); partly derived from the phenomena of language, partly from the fact of actual progress in the pursuit; but chiefly from the very nature of the case, which exhibits the mind as possessing adequate means for effecting a series of observations of its own phenomena, and for reducing their multiplicity into the harmonious unity of science. From these premisses thus based upon undeniable observation, the required conclusion seems irresistibly to flow,—that the Philosophy which has for its objects the ascertainment of the principles of the human

mind, and the statement of their value, is (in its simplest character) deserving of the attention of intelligent men. It offers itself as a contribution to the mass of knowledge; that claim is shewn to be legitimate; and such a claim, supposed legitimate, involves a title to universal reception.

LECTURE VI.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
VI.

WERE I to confine myself to the argument which has been stated and enforced in the last two lectures, I should do but scanty justice to my subject. It is an argument of weight, and properly preliminary to all others. But the advocate of mental philosophy is not content with establishing, that, as a genuine portion of science, it deserves the cultivation which is deserved by *all* science. Were the astronomer to vindicate his sublime and interesting pursuits by an argument which was equally applicable to the laborious classifier of animalcules, you would consider that he had coldly defended his cause; were the Philosopher of Man to share arguments with the astronomer himself, perhaps he would vindicate his calling as inadequately!

The Science of Mind surpasses all other sciences in dignity.

It is with this view that I proceed to assert, not only that this Science prefers claims in common with all, but that in the dignity of its object it surpasses all.

Evidence of this superiority drawn from the writings even of those who deny it;

I might, upon this topic, without assuming the responsibility of a single statement of my own, and with the slight trouble which the consultation of indexes requires, enrich this hour's discourse with testimonies the most varied and brilliant from writers of every age. You cannot be ignorant how unbroken is the chain of evidence which attests the universal conviction of man, that in the Principle of Thought there lives a something essentially superior to all which in this scene of existence is connected with it. So elevating is the influence of the habitual use of the intellectual powers, that this conviction discovers itself interwoven with systems whose professed object is to discountenance it; and the secret tendency of reasoning habits continually counteracts the conclusions themselves of the reasoning. I scarcely except from this remark even that tissue of degrading sophistry which in the last century polluted a Christian age with corruptions which the worst forms of heathen speculation never equalled. By a striking coincidence of opposite tendencies, at the very moment that the French philosophers were straining every nerve to annul the distinctions of man and brute, they were en-

e. g. of the French materialists.

gaged in continual vindications of the independence and authority of reason; and the same page which argued that the watchmaker and his watch are equally mechanical arrangements and equally perishable dust, was enlivened by violent reclamations against those fanatics who would dare to bar the free intelligence of man from winging its glorious ascent through all the spheres of truth. A few ounces of cerebral matter which prejudice baptizes as "the Soul," at one time, at another this marvellous dust claims the universe as its inheritance. As long as scepticism is unpopular, or at least resisted, these contradictory results are indeed inevitable; the sceptic having to flourish the sword of reason's independence with the one hand, while the other is on the throat of this infant of the skies to choke its holy breathings for the better world.

who assert the paramount authority of reason, while resolving reason into a function of matter.

But even apart from this necessity of position, the very tendency of philosophical habits is indirectly to increase the philosopher's exalted estimate of the mind. In fact his own interests are embarked in the intellectual vessel which he charters for the voyage of discovery. He cannot but feel that if the mind be worthless his own labours must participate in its worthlessness; few reasoners will thus (except for the poor prize of eccentricity) abandon to contempt the chosen occupation of years; and I strongly suspect that no philosopher ever depreciated the human soul who did not reserve a secret exception for his own! These are not high motives; they are, however, human ones. But it would be unfair to assert that they stand alone, even in that lowest form of the sceptical philosophy which we are now regarding. The uniformity of the testimony which reflective science in all—even its most unworthy—modifications is found to bear to the essential dignity of the soul of man, is interwoven in the very nature of the reflective process itself. The habit of speculation, what is it but the purest form of internal freedom, and the most definite type of progress? In almost everything else subordinated to laws which we feel an incumbrance, here alone we are governed by laws which, if we perceive them at all, we perceive only as the guides and perfecters of liberty. It is true that obscurities shadow the path of progress, it is true that in this vast enigma of the Moral and Physical World truth hides itself under every form of perplexity; yet even the very defeats of the mind are triumphs; for this "reaction infers action," and to have failed in the attempt supposes the power of attempting. To him who contemplates philosophical history as the revelation of the powers and destinies of the Human Intellect—the Human Intellect which for some thirty centuries back has been the One

Additional evidence.

The habit of speculation is manifestation of inward freedom.

LECT.
VI.

Hero of all that wondrous story—to his view there is nothing but victory, and repulse itself is progress! Now, I say, that in the mind of the speculator himself, this peculiar character of intellectual activity—its superiority to bondage or subjection, and its felt capability of constant and growing development—cannot but separate itself from every other part of the thinker's experience, whatever be the strain or tendency of his thoughts. And though his aim be to write himself down to the brute, still, if he pursue that aim in the melancholy sincerity of conviction, he cannot but feel that in the very process of pursuing the unhappy conclusion he seeks, he is wandering among the high grounds of nature; that the man is there eminently man; and that, disguise or distort it as he may, to every habitual speculator the distinguishing essence of his being is to be found in his mind!

As I understand it, then, it is from motives and convictions of these various kinds, that the almost invariable attestation of reasoners of every cast to the essential dignity of the reasoning mind arises. And though in some of these cases the value of the testimony is considerably impaired by tracing its motive, yet in the last-mentioned, which is far the most important, we certainly have no right to think so. For here the rights and privileges of mind are disclosed in the practice of its faculties; the discovery is no illegitimate result of collateral prejudices; it is a conviction carrying its own evidence, and no more a prejudice than the confident belief of an eye-witness can be termed a "prejudice of sense." And I repeat, that these convictions are altogether irrespective of the express philosophical views of those who have avowedly professed or unconsciously betrayed them; except indeed as far as the opposition may be regarded as heightening the value of a conviction which thus subsists in defiance of every effort to destroy it.

That this argument of universal attestation can be derived with even greater force from the cultivators of moral excellence, I suppose it is unnecessary to remind you. If even perverted intellect is forced to recognize its own dignity, how much more completely does the noble bondsman of duty feel that his "service" is indeed "perfect freedom," and that the essence, whatever it be, in which the principle of virtue inheres is that on earth from which the next step is to heaven.

I trust you will not imagine that this question of the supreme value of the mental portion of our complex nature is one too trite to engage you. Believe me it is only very superficial thinkers who fail to perceive the fundamental

*Importance
of forming
a just esti-
mate of the
subject un-
der review.*

importance of correct and definite notions upon such points as these. Your views upon the very question with which I am now endeavouring to interest you, are in fact the views which will determine, or have already perhaps unconsciously determined, the side you assume in the great contest which, subsisting since the fall and to endure till the restoration, pervades every sphere of life—individual, social, political—the side of faith or of disbelief, of hope or of distrust, of charity or of selfishness. Your practical theory—from whatever source derived, and on whatever considerations founded—as to the nature, dignity, and importance of the mind you bear, is the determining element of every other practical theory whatever.

A great question here occurs, for a great authority has not yet been cited.

We are arguing a case of evidence—the uniform testimony of mental labourers to the peculiar dignity of their labour. Now, in searching for such evidences, I suppose there are few inquirers whose first impulse would not be rather to approach the oracles of ancient than of modern philosophy, or, if at all the latter, those only or eminently who have drunk deepest of these primal fountains of thought. Are we then to conclude that these high conceptions of the mind belong chiefly to antiquity, and that the mighty event, which, revolutionizing the civilized world, created the distinction of modern and ancient, fails to encourage or to justify these great convictions? If so, with whatever reluctance, it is our duty, and I trust our determination, to relinquish or to modify them. But is it so?

*Are the
virtues hi-
therto ad-
vocated en-
couraged
by the
Christian
religion?*

I will concede, then, that at first view the influences of Christianity do not appear favourable to this exalted estimate; and that it is even possible that they have indirectly tended to remove the splendour of such views from our general philosophical literature. The spirit of Christianity, so far as it is depressive and humiliating, cannot certainly be said to present lofty portraiture of man in those very same words and sentences in which it is engaged convicting or condemning him. And if there be any speculator who descends into his laboratory of speculation, from an exclusive study of these words and sentences, it is not only possible, but probable, or certain, that impressions thus received will manifest themselves among his subsequent processes of thought. And in this way the effects complained of as discoverable in general literature may be granted as true; and accounted for as natural; and this, without any slight to either Religion or Philosophy; with some censure, perhaps, of those who contemplate both too narrowly.

*Spirit of
Christianity
humiliat-
ing; appar-
ently, there-
fore, un-
favourable
to faith in
the greatness
of man.*

LECT.
VI.

*But Christianity has
a double
aspect:*

Christianity, however, possesses a double aspect, and Literature is a word of wide significancy; and contemplating both in their fulness, I have no doubt you will perceive how real is the testimony which the highest of all authorities lends to the conclusion I have been so anxious to establish as to the peculiar dignity of the Mind—the subject of our studies. But it asks a little thought, and perhaps a little candour also.

Observe, then, that it would be unreasonable to expect from Christianity a species of attestation wholly foreign to the range and purpose of the revelation. But if this would be unreasonable to expect, it is one degree more unreasonable to build an argument on the absence of that which it *was* unreasonable to expect. This is the simplest general reply (and the best where it is inconvenient to descend to special inquiry) to the objection to our conclusion derived from the absence in the Christian revelation of testimonies to the dignity of the INTELLECTUAL powers of man. Granting the assumption, whether true or false, to be true, I reply, that it would be strange indeed if a revelation expressly, and (for all we can see) exclusively, concerned with the moral and spiritual man, were to waste its momentous influences in supplying those intellectual excitements which were beyond its aim, and which nature will always be found of itself adequate to supply. . . . Turn then to the objection derived from the spirit of its MORAL views of humanity as a lowly and dependent nature. Can we derive, it is asked, any support to an assertion of mental dignity out of elements so unpromising as these? Gentlemen, they form its *strongest* support. In truth, to what a height does this marvellous system elevate the nature to which it proffers these lowly counsels! How inapplicable would they be to any but the most exalted! How majestic is the dependence which is dependence on a God! how lofty the humility which bows only to Heaven!

But further,—you are to remember, that beyond the moral man of antiquity, this Faith proposes itself as creating another, a SPIRITUAL man. Now, though it be true that most discussions concerning this spiritual nature, by habitually excluding from their own sacred region every inferior topic, separate their spiritual philosophy from all the other departments of mental speculation or science; yet, as, whatever be the process of this supernatural agency, the mind is certainly its subject, so all which is believed and established of the former should really be set to the account of the privileges and dignities of the latter. In this high and mysterious point of view, which realizes the expression of St Peter, and makes a portion of mankind

*it lowers in
"order" . . .
alt;*

*rendering
man "par-*

literally "partakers of the divine nature," I suppose it will scarcely be denied that Christianity justifies the loftiest conceptions which philosophy can form as to the essential or acquired greatness of the human mind.

LECT.
VI.

*akers of
the Divine
nature."*

*Doctrine of
the Incarna-
tion;*

But why should I pause upon this? The fundamental doctrine of Christianity is one which exalts human nature to a degree even more prodigious. The assumption of that nature by the Creator of it brings us to a point where conception absolutely fails—where the light of imagination goes out—where language moves without ideas—where all is lost in one vast and vague emotion of awe at the contemplation of ourselves! awe at the glimpse this amazing story gives us of the immeasurable importance of our human nature in the system and counsels of the universe! This doctrine, and all it brings with it, are exclusively Christian.

*the perfec-
tion of rea-
son;*

Though it seems to me, the more I consider it as a subject of speculation, to be the very perfection of reason, and to take its position with the most symmetrical beauty at the head of all religious truth, it does not appear to have been ever anticipated as a tenet among the imaginary creeds of antiquity—at least (for we must not forget a sort of monstrous caricature-resemblance in some of the follies of the Indian mythology) in any sense or purpose at all similar to those of the revealed doctrine. The common mythology

*and pecu-
liar to
Christian-
ity.*

of Paganism and Christianity, indeed, exhibits an apparent and momentary agreement in this union of the divine and human natures; for the gods of Greece and Rome were exaggerated forms of humanity; and it may perhaps be asked, whether, if we reject the testimony which pagan deifications offer to the dignity of the human spirit, we have any right to seize with such earnestness the similar testimony afforded by this article of the Christian faith? We reply (even apart from the very different value of the two authorities,—the inspiration of God revealing His mighty purposes, and the folly of man pursuing his poor delusions), that there is no real similarity in the cases as to that point which alone concerns the argument. The argument is, that Christianity attests the priceless value of the human nature in publishing the assumed manhood of a God. The case alleged to be similar must therefore be found to propose as a doctrine the two members of the union, respectively real and complete. But, properly understood, there is no God in the Pagan incarnation. The divine element is wanting. The idolatrous worshipper of deified humanity did not unite deity to man, but substituted man in the place of deity. Now, to degrade the conception of God is not to elevate that of man; and hence, even if the anthropomorphism of Paganism had been true, it would have

*Pagan
counterfeits
of this doc-
trine.*

*Anthropo-
morphism
of Pagan-
ism de-*

LECT.
VI.

*grades deity
without ex-
alting hu-
manity.*

*The con-
verse holds
true of
Christi-
anity,*

*which con-
sequently
supplies
fresh incen-
tives to the
study of
its na-*

*Considera-
tion of im-
mortality.*

failed in adding a particle of testimony to our assertion of the dignity of the human spirit. While on the contrary, Christianity, incorporating in the history and fortunes of humanity the genuine God undefrauded of one ray of his attributes, lifts the manhood thus consecrated by the presence and inhabitancy of the Godhead; and, as a consequence of this communion of the natures, actually exalts the human essence by every lineament of grandeur which it adds to the divine!

The evidence, then, which the faith bears to this point, instead of being doubtful, or hostile, is express and favourable: instead of clouding, it illuminates the prospect of humanity, and thence allows us to give to our cultivation of the Science of Mind every motive that can be derived from believing our subject to be of the highest importance, and believing it on the highest conceivable authority.

I have now concluded, I hope so as to satisfy your convictions, such comments as I thought it useful to offer upon the evidence borne by systems inspired and uninspired, to the dignity of the essence whose laws you are to study. And with this appeal to authority I should content myself, were there not one peculiar attribute of mind which from its character of surpassing greatness it would be impossible to omit in any review of its claims. You of course anticipate that I allude to its immortality. Upon this subject the decisive information of revealed religion has reversed the course of argument. Antiquity argued the immortality of Spirit from its dignity; I, on the contrary, have to remind you of the dignity on the assumption of the immortality.

The general proposition, that that which is immortal in its nature, and immortally conscious, must to itself and in itself possess the highest rank in a world of perishables, is too obvious for detailed proof. This day, indeed, I have been chiefly engaged in endeavouring to shew you the depth and value of truths which we commonly neglect as too trite for consideration, attempting that most difficult task for writer or lecturer, to interest you with views whose real importance we are constantly so apt to forget, while we are familiar to weariness with the words expressing them—the husk and shell of thought; but this portion of our argument, its great premiss once granted, no effort at explaining or impressing it, can, I believe, confirm. “Elucidation” here can only obscure; like those modifications of light which, as opticians shew us, result in absolute darkness.

*“Forma
mentis
æterna.”*

It is of more consequence to observe how this great truth operates to heighten the value of our own science. It

is a weighty consideration, that there is no just conclusion here formed which is not formed to last for ever. Some of the truths of this science are in their essence eternal; others share the immortality of the soul to which they belong. We deal here with an imperishable material. That the physics of the conscious being are destined to be wholly unalterable, we do not indeed assert; but surely in some of its chief laws and principles we may fairly assume it so. And in that case reflect that a discovery now ascertained may be considered as ascertained for eternity. The laws of all the visible elements of the universe may vanish; the discoveries of science, as far as they are experimental discoveries, may yet be superseded by laws and relations of a different character, if a reason should exist to command the alteration; but, from the nature of the system to which he belongs, the principal laws of the conscious being may be presumed to be inwoven in its permanent identity, and thence to be its laws for ever. But however this may be—and I admit that certainty is not attainable upon such a point—there assuredly *is* a view in which the present constituents of our immortal nature are themselves immortal. They are immortal in their consequences. Upon the moral aspect of these elements eternal results are suspended; and thus a character of eternal moment is impressed upon all scientific conclusions as to their nature and authority. Judge then with what reverential caution they should be examined! However high may be your estimate of the discovery of wisdom in the physical creation, you must not forget that in this peculiar study you traverse the selected theatre of God's divinest operating. The special gift which is termed the Freedom of the Human Will comes to increase the unique importance of the subject, and to individualize it from all others. In the physical arrangements of inanimate nature the Divine Governor orders simply; in this alone He orders *if*—here only He establishes a conditional legislation and in a manner suspends Himself upon us!...All these things may teach you to acknowledge the dignity of the Human Mind, and the corresponding dignity of the science which investigates it. And with these remarks I conclude an argument, in which, if I have not been able to interest you, I implore you to attribute the defect to my weakness and not to the subject itself, which is incomparably the noblest that can occupy the thoughts of man. I earnestly hope that the minds of many here, self-evidencing their own dignity, have anticipated me, if not in the letter, at least in the spirit, of these reasonings.

Observe the position of our argument. We have now shewn that the Mental Philosophy is a science, and that it

Laws of consciousness probably share the immortality of the conscious subject.

Moral aspect of the question.

Freedom of the Will.

The Divine legislation unconditional in regard to nature: conditional in respect of a free agent.

LECT. VI. is the science of the greatest of earthly subjects. Properly speaking, this is to have completed the discussion of the question; yet a few additional details may serve to adorn or illustrate our case.

*Dignity of
Mental
Science
further il-
lustrated.
Its supre-
macy,*

*and super-
vision of all
particular
depart-
ments of
science.*

You may remember that in the first Lecture which I had the honour of presenting to you, I stated the position of universal supremacy which the Science of Mind (in its most comprehensive form) occupies in relation to all other sciences. In order to assist the arrangement of your thoughts, I must remind you that everything which was then laid down belongs directly to this division of our subject; and was then introduced rather to arrest your attention from the outset, by shewing you at once the benefits of the study, than with any very precise adherence to methodical order. The supervision which the General Philosophy exercises over all the particular departments of inquiry in encouraging, restraining, directing them, was intimated; and I may add, that in many of the scientific reports of our own day its harmonizing and systematic spirit is eminently conspicuous. The miner of mathematical and chemical truth may for a long period work in the dark of a particular problem, because he knows he is in the right place for the discovery of treasure; but if new veins are to be sought and worked, the head-engineers will come above ground and survey the aspect and indications of the country.

*Objection.
Scientific
experience
anterior to
logical
rules.*

*Answers to
objection.*

But it may be objected to this statement, that these practical principles in the logic of inquiry are oftener collected out of the experience of discoverers than independently invented as guides to discovery. In the first place it may be answered, that as long as the objection is stated in only this comparative form (and it cannot be otherwise stated with truth), it really advances nothing which we are called upon to deny. Further, it cannot be disputed that, *whenever* it may have been *formally* stated, the logical principle itself must have *tacitly* existed in the mind of the first discoverer who obeyed it. In the very act of abandoning a false science for the path of just inquiry, he was himself guided by that latent logic which after ages were to extract and condense from his writings or example. But besides this, it is, upon other grounds, of eminent utility that the methods of inquiry should, however discovered, be reduced to rules. These rules, succinctly stated and constantly enforced, preserve in the minds of investigators a definite test to which appeal can rapidly be made, and impress as first principles what without such remembrances could only be derived, incidentally and precariously, from a crowd of examples and a long previous scien-

*Utility of
general
rules of
inquiry.*

tific experience. No one, surely, who is at all conversant with the history of modern science, can doubt that the purely logical writings which have illustrated and defended the method of induction, have powerfully aided in securing to it that happy supremacy which renders at this day the philosophic public justly intolerant of any physical inquiry of facts in which it is forsaken. Still less can any judicious inquirer doubt the influence of the purely logical treatises in which it was first adequately proposed and vindicated.

The position, origin, utility of Poetical Criticism may serve to illustrate these views of this part of logic, which is indeed the criticism of inquiry. It is most true that the rules of poetical criticism are usually collected from the examples which genius has spontaneously offered; yet it is most certain that the silent criticism of taste operated in the poet's original performance, and still more manifest, that it is of utility, that the direction of his splendid course should be mapped down in its principal points as a guiding chart to subsequent voyagers; that what in him was the almost unconscious instinct of taste should become to future ages the definite rules and decisions of judgment. If this be of unquestionable advantage in the case of criticism, I suppose the same or greater value can scarcely be refused to the analogous systems of logic. It is true that both this logic and this criticism are in some measure framed as the "physical" conclusions of a wide induction; but surely their practical utility as lights to guide the path of future invention is not diminished by a circumstance which only adds strength and certainty to their declarations.

Illustration.—Analogy of poetical criticism,

which, originating in feeling and taste, ripens into theory.

Besides these considerations, which both answer objections and illustrate the subject itself, there is one additional characteristic belonging to the logic, and to the criticism, and indeed to all the practical maxims whatever, that are deduced from our science; it is this, that the student continually receives the maxims in connexion with their reasons. They come as the last inferences from a long train of preceding proofs; a position which, whether they be maxims of reasoning, taste, action, or manners, is peculiarly calculated to ensure not merely correct principles but permanent and comprehensive ones. The rules are premised to be as permanent as their causes, and at the same time to receive all modifications which their causes justify. By being rooted deep among the first laws of the mind, they acquire a strength which secures them from being shaken by the blasts of passion or prejudice; at the same time that by being constantly referred to their causes they vary as these vary; and are thus at once resolute

The General Philosophy connects maxims with their reasons.

LECT. VI. against every wrong impulse and flexible to every right one, a combination of qualities unattainable by any means but this scientific analysis of practice. How beautiful is it to see the maxims of daily life, like so many isolated physical laws, reduced under the sovereignty of a few mental principles,—the Newton of the market-place finding facts for his philosophy in every transitory attitude of our human nature!

Digression concerning the use and abuse of Aphoristic writing.

Maxims, and other such aphoristic principles, of speculation or practice, when *not* thus systematically deduced, are liable, though true, to two evils, either to be received with suspicion, or to be received with an exaggerated and unmerited approbation. 1st, Aphorisms are peculiarly liable, though true, to be rejected by accidental prejudices, and this for the simple reason, that they contain nothing calculated to meet the prejudice. Stray truths of this form, cast in among a heap of unwelcoming prejudices, fall upon an unprepared soil, and have nothing in them capable of tempering it; being unable, therefore, to grapple with this ungenial mould, they wither at once; or, to change the comparison, they are like those hypertrophic masses that sometimes grow into connexion with the animal body, but which being unvisited by the circulation, and having little or no dependence upon the general system of the frame, gradually loosen their feeble hold, and detach themselves almost unnoticed from the limb they but encumbered. I have said, 2ndly, that maxims separated from their metaphysical proofs, are apt to impose on the reader by an undue appearance of depth and importance. This may be accounted for without much difficulty. Truths are valued in proportion to their universality and their novelty; that is to say, of truths equally universal the value is as the novelty, and of truths equally novel the value is in proportion to the universality of their application. The appearance of both is possessed by the maxim. For as to novelty, if the various premisses were given (that is, if the maxim were changed into the inference) we should at once perceive how much we had really known of the matter in hand,—“really known,” I say, for it is certain that these premisses must have been all actually under our observation and knowledge, or we could not have instantaneously acknowledged the force of the conclusion. The conclusion (which is the maxim) is the only part of the whole which we did not know before; instead of being (as we are apt to imagine in its detached state on the page of Swift or La Rochefoucauld) a proposition as wholly novel as the qualities of some new-found metal, we find it (in its inferential position) only the

condensed form of familiar truths. On the other hand, as to the illusive universality of maxims: this form of boundless applicability which they affect, and which causes so much of our admiration of them, is really in few or no cases strictly admissible. Now this delusion would be impossible, and the admiration which is founded on it therefore suspended, if the maxim were introduced at the close of the reasoning which justified it; for then the conclusion would be qualified and limited by the extent of the premisses. I do not know whether you have ever observed that the most prolific maxim-makers in the world are men in a passion. Nothing short of universal propositions satisfy them. This is not merely that the mind has no time to pause upon exceptions, but that anger refuses to admit them. Rochefoucauld, anatomising mankind's poor virtues, in his study commences his terrible catalogue with the dexterous salvo of a "souvent;" La Rochefoucauld in a rage would have sternly refused quarter to any fraction of humanity, and found the vices of a world little enough to supply fuel for his frenzy.

I ought to add to these explanations of the illusive excellences of aphoristic writing, the deception produced by reading a number of them successively. The mind usually estimates the depth of any remark by the distance of that remark (supposed true) from its own conclusions on the same subject: and therefore the less it can discover its own depth, the greater will appear the depth of the author studied. Now in the rapid and dazzling succession of thoughts wholly detached from each other, the reader has not time to form or settle his own conclusions; the waters of the intellect are too disturbed to allow of his seeing their natural depth; and all which is lost to his own powers is transferred to those of his author. I need not remind you that writers of great systematic clearness and continuity flatter the intellect of a reader into the opposite delusion, and lose a portion of their fame as thinkers from their excellence as expositors. What confirms this explanation of the illusory value produced by the rapidity of the succession is this, that a maxim-writer who perpetually changes his subject impresses us with a higher estimate of the profundity of his observations than one who divides his book into chapters and heads,—La Rochefoucauld, for instance, than La Bruyère; or than La Rochefoucauld himself in that edition (of *Amélot de la Houssaye*, I think,) in which his maxims are classified by subjects. The deception, I may observe, is not at all unlike that produced by the rapid manœuvres of *legerdemain*, in which the power of evading the detec-

LECT.
VI.

tion of the spectator depends on the incapability of the mind to pursue as fast as the practised organs of the juggler move.

*Use of the
aphoristic
method in
Philoso-
phy.
Instance of
Newton,
and of Ba-
con.*

From the remarks before made it will be evident that aphoristic writing is employed with greatest advantage on subjects of manners, because there the suppressed proofs are remembered rapidly, being usually matter of common observation, and because in that field no one expects or requires more than a general and customary truth; this being, indeed, all which we have to guide us in our own rules of experience. In philosophy this aphoristic method is best used in stating queries and conjectures (as Newton has employed it), or in any other office preliminary to new enterprises of science. Lord Bacon's peculiar reason for selecting it, which I quoted in a former lecture—though modest indeed for him—is eminently adapted to all inferior discoverers. With him, however, to write in aphorism arose, I would say, from the predominating spirit of his inductive habits; he stated universal propositions as he stated particular facts—in lists and tables for separate rejection or separate acceptance,—strung together like a chain of experiments, where each rests on its own exclusive merits.

To a person, then, whose sole or principal object is the simple possession of truth, whether attractive or unattractive,—or rather, to whom truth can never be unattractive,—there can be little doubt that the habit of constantly descending from the great general principles of the mind to the explanation of all the practical rules of life and conduct as instances, must be peculiarly satisfactory. He must feel that every special case receives dignity when it enshrines a general principle, and that every general principle receives interest when it is capable of constantly embodying itself in actual practice.

*Popular
objection to
Moral Sci-
ence, that it
weakens
salutary il-
lusions.*

To this most valuable attribute of Moral Science one popular objection still remains,—the everlasting burden of cursory and feeble thinkers. It is urged that the habit of investigating the reasons and origin of practice weakens the supremacy of beautiful, and happy, and beneficial illusions. The metaphysician is declared to be the iconoclast of a religion in which, though the deities be phantoms, the pleasure of the worship is at least no phantom. We reject, they cry, that wisdom where to be wise is to be miserable; the only truth we recognize is happiness! and the sovereign logic for us is that logic of the heart which shews the way to it!

*Reply to
objection.*

To all this the simplest answer would, of course, be contained in an honest appeal to the whole Nature of

Man, which includes an element of obligation; which obligatory principle imperatively commands the pursuit of all that is right; which right must in many cases turn upon the nature of ourselves, and the scene around us,—the investigation of which, and their relations, is the investigation of Moral Truth. But a lower ground may be a more persuasive one. We affirm, then, that the mere calculator of happinesses must remember that the human being has indissoluble connexions with the past and future as well as the present; and that the great drama which exhibits the spousals of Truth and Happiness should really be contemplated as occupying a theatre far more extensive than these reasoners conceive of. In the criticism of this great work, is it fair to judge of the author's style, or of his intended *dénouement*, by the glance of a minute at a single scene in the midst of the intricacies of the plot? But an answer more intelligible still is found in denying the assumption made. We allege that Truth, in its discovery and its possession, conveys pleasures both nobler and more permanent than those of the illusions it banishes. Let Poetry itself declare; for Poetry is of course the recognized expression of these emotions. When the poet Campbell, in one of the most popular utterances of these childish pleasures of ignorance, contemplates the rainbow, he exclaims—

“I ask not proud philosophy
To tell me what thou art!”

Observe now whether the same object may not minister to a very opposite source of poetic pleasure.

“Nor ever yet”

says Akenside—

“The melting rainbow’s vermeil-tinctured hues
To me have shone so pleasing, as when first
The hand of Science pointed out the path
In which the sunbeams, gleaming from the west,
Fall on the watery cloud.”

Such is the versatility of the poetic faculty, that it can attach itself to every form of thought; and the imagination of man has the same peculiar endowment as that which exalts his bodily constitution among animals—that of living undestroyed in every climate. Nor are harmless illusions dissolved by analysing them. We seem to see distance after a thousand perusals of Berkeley; and the illusive connexion of happiness with the past (one of the most interesting of psychological facts) remains as powerful as ever on the evening of a day spent in speculating on the cause of it. “What then,” it will be asked, “is the benefit

LECT.
VI.

of the speculation whose result seems so abortive? This,—that we disarm the prejudice of any power of evil, while we retain its power of soothing and enchanting; we preserve the opiate that tranquillizes, while we neutralize the poison that kills. Besides this, illusions will still be plenty for those who love them. We widen indeed our circle of vision as we rise in science above the surface of facts; but for those who delight in contemplating them, clouds will still wrap the distant, as truly as the more contracted horizon; shaping themselves no less promptly into every form which the breath of Fancy can mould, and receiving as before every gorgeous hue which the light of Genius can pour down to illumine them. But, above all, remember that in Truth itself is beauty, and in the perception of it pleasure. What spectator is not animated with delight at the contemplation of the order and proportion of a noble specimen of architecture? Yet all this order and proportion are purely intellectual conceptions of the spectator's mind, and as invisible to the brute as to the blind. And such conceptions as these, coming midway between mind and matter, may form a stepping-stone to that pleasure still more exclusively mental which arises from contemplating the noble architecture of truths symmetrically ordered, each supported by its antecedent and supporting its successor, the remotest parts connected by reciprocal correspondences, and all uniting into the grand single and finished harmony which is called a science.

LECTURE VII.

GENTLEMEN,

AS (contrary to my original expectation) this is the last time that I can hope for the pleasure of addressing you, it will be my object to make the present Lecture as much as possible supplementary to those which have preceded it, a receptacle for observations collateral to the principal argument; in short to make it serve the purpose of those resting-places upon a military march where stragglers are collected that have incidentally detached themselves from the steady progress of the main line. As even here, however, some regularity will tend both to my own and to your prompt intelligence of the subjects noticed, I may premise, that we shall consider, in the first place, some additional topics illustrative of the value of our present pursuits—topics derived both from the peculiar character of the age in which we live, and from the operation of metaphysical studies upon the mind independently of ages or æras. In the second place, we shall pass, by an easy transition, from the utility of this philosophy as a discipline to a cursory consideration of those difficulties which make a principal part of that utility. And, in the last place, we shall glance at the moral spirit which should direct and colour all inquiries into the nature and destinies of man. I do not offer these views as complete; my time permits me to do little more than hint and insinuate the truth. Indeed, an attempt at completeness would be vain under any circumstances. Every hour that I consider these topics—and I mention this not from personal motives, but sincerely to encourage your pursuit of them—I find the prospect they open to widen until it is almost lost in infinity.

In continuation, then, of the topic on which we were engaged for the last few lectures, the importance of the study of Universal Metaphysics, of metaphysics in each of its divisions, whether simply as the inductive physics of the consciousness, or more profoundly, as the science of the reality, extent, and value of human knowledge, (let me rather say, the value of humanity itself in all its varieties of

LECT.
VII.

*The present
Lecture
supplement-
ary.*

*Plan of the
Lecture.*

*Importance
of Meta-
physical
Study in-
ferred from
the circum-
stances of
the present
age.*

LECT.
VII.

reasoning, emotion, action, as the great problem of the universe)—I would call your attention to the peculiar force of its claims in the circumstances of the age into which you are born, and the spirit of which you are all destined either to perpetuate or to obstruct, by your example in espousing or opposing it. It is no flattery to tell you this; the omnipotence of example is wielded by the humblest of your fellow-creatures. Every atom, even those beyond the grasp of the microscope, contributes to the force of a mass of matter in motion; and that great aggregate which we call an age or æra of history is but the enormous compound of a multitude of elements individually almost invisible. If, then, you wish to join in the spirit of the age, you must understand it in order to contribute to it; if you prefer to counteract it, you must equally understand it in order to do so effectually. Now I say that one of the dominant, perhaps indeed the dominant, characteristic of the existing age is the tendency to restless examination of the principles of all things. What are the popular subjects of discussion? In politics, the ground and origin of subordination; discussing of national wealth, the nature of wealth itself and of value ("Political Economy," as a theory, being indeed the direct growth of this spirit of analysis applied to finance); in theology, the fundamental rule of all faith and the privileges of the church as an interpreter; in logic, the final authority of reason itself; in morals, the essence of duty. Nay, we might advance into regions of thought less liable to external or accidental influences. In physics, the ultimacy of the laws of motion has been lately made the subject of disquisition (by Prof. Powell); and in pure mathematics themselves (the most remote of all studies from the operation of outward and social tendencies), inquiries into the nature of the different species of quantity which make the subject of its different branches, have attracted much interest. However you determine about cases like *these*, considered as instances of a common principle, cases where the chain of dependencies would seem so attenuated as to be almost imperceptible, about the former; the instances derived from the moral and political sciences, I believe you can have little difficulty in perceiving that the analytic tendency is truly the great characteristic of the public mind. How this marked and prominent character has arisen, I cannot at present pause to discuss at any length; the admission of the fact is all I require. When you reflect upon the pervading influence of all revolutions in political opinion, you will probably agree with me that in the growth of democratic principles may be found at least a leading

Examination of principles characteristic of this age.

Growth of democratic principles a cause of this tendency.

cause. The specific character of the polemics of republicanism is the tendency to publicity, inquiry, censure; in short, to that which, transported into the sphere of philosophy, becomes the spirit of bold examination into the principles of all things, the spirit of audacious and indefatigable analysis. Commencing in political discussion, its very spirit, that of pursuing inquiry to the utmost, must urge it through every topic with which political opinions are connected; while again, the philosophical habits in their turn powerfully react upon the practical. With how intimate a bond these opposite regions are united, it cannot be necessary to suggest either to those who honoured a former lecture with their attention, or indeed to those who are at all conversant with the writings or the history of speculations to which the present age has given birth. Such must have seen that the philosophy of human nature in any age is usually the condensed expression of that age; that it is the refined and sublimated spirit which, diluted and diffused, takes shape as the habits and manners of the people. It is the logic of the public practice; the grounds and reasons which each generation presents to the tribunal of time as its memorial and justification. The history is the philosophy in action; the philosophy, the history in speculation; they are (to borrow a scholastic metaphor) the matter and the form (or idea) of the times. The reciprocal action of these elements is powerful and perpetual; and has been more and more evidently so ever since the press has given an almost instantaneous ubiquity to thought.

Philosophy is to History as Form to Matter.

From that time in popular convulsions rival principles have begun to lead parties where rival passions led before; and men have sought to maintain not only beliefs, but opinions. It was so in the great Reformation, where Christianity indeed was made the external scene of conflict, and supplied the weapons and the uniform, but where the human mind itself, panting for free thought, and the principle of authority that would perpetuate its fetters, were the real combatants. It was so in the terrible century of religious war that followed, down to the Treaty of Westphalia. It was the same contest of principles that, just as religious toleration was secured abroad, broke out on questions of government in the great civil war of England; and that was happily suspended by our Revolution. It was the same secret but burning zeal for theoretic perfection against practical deficiencies that exploded at last in the terrific volcano of the French Revolution; the most tremendous battle of principles the world ever saw, and certainly the most misguided; but still in its essence a battle of principles. I need not tell you that a similar

Influence of the press in converting the conflict of passions into a conflict of opinions. Examples. Reformation.

Religious wars of the seventeenth century.

Civil War in England.

First French Revolution.

LECT.
VII.

contest of rival principles subsists to this day; and that now, as for the last 300 years, the passions and the party-feelings are the body to which principles—be they right or wrong—are still the soul. And though the “contest for opinions” is commonly decried as the worst form of human folly, I confess I have eyes sharp enough in the detection of good, to find in even this folly an element of hope and indications prophetic of a happy future. Before I pass to reminding you of the conclusion I am drawing from these facts, I pause for a moment to shew you the nature of the influence which the press has had in producing them; and I trust that the vast importance of the subject, and its frequency as a topic of discussion, will justify the momentary digression. The easy and rapid dissemination of thoughts is the usual, the true, and in its form the most general, solution of the question; but in being thus general it is also, perhaps, somewhat vague and indistinct. It is quite obvious that rapid dissemination is, in itself, unimportant for either good or evil. A series of unmeaning combinations of the twenty-six letters of the alphabet would work no change upon mankind, though the copies were multiplied by all the presses of Europe, and transmitted by all its posts. Now, remembering that our question is founded upon a very important change—namely, the spread of contests in which great theoretical principles are involved, as contrasted with contests arising out of pure caprice or passion—we must look beyond that which in itself is inadequate to produce any change; that is, we must look to the other element of the press—the nature of the thoughts disseminated, in order to understand the influence of the dissemination. Consider then that the two modes of communicating mental influences are Writing and Speech. What is the character of written dissertation as contrasted with oratorical appeals? This, that all the accessory arts by which oratory succeeds in persuading through the feelings being excluded, a more habitual appeal to the reasoning powers becomes inevitable. Written matter tends (I speak only of tendencies on the whole) towards discussion of principles, and spoken matter towards vivid picturing of details. Thus—to draw an illustration from the combination of both—a nation governed by written speeches invariably inclines (we know the instance of a neighbouring country) towards speculative politics. The real force of the press, therefore, in raising principles, into the vanguard of action, and making the Reason of things the great rallying-point in public consideration, is to be traced immediately to its power of rapid dissemination, but ultimately and chiefly to that inevitable tendency of writ-

*Comparison
Writing
and Speech
as modes of
communicating
thought.*

*Oratory
speaks more
to the Emotions: writing,
to the Reason.*

ten thought to dwell more upon reasons and principles than upon habits and passions.

LECT.
VII.

I return to the conclusion which I am anxious to impress upon your minds. If (from whatever cause) the analysis of principles both in action and speculation be the predominating character of modern times, and more peculiarly the character of the present age, an acquaintance with the ultimate laws of the mind, and with that master science which holds in its hand the last link of every chain of thought, rises from the dignity of a fine accomplishment to the intrinsic authority of a necessary and fundamental attainment. In such an age—not to be habituated to the analysis of thought, and to the investigation of the elements of political and private duty—is really as great a deficiency in general education as it would be to live as a chemist among chemists without cultivating a knowledge of the commonest processes of decomposition, or as a mechanic among mechanicians without a familiarity with the ordinary principles and instruments of dynamical effects.

Hence in modern times an increasing tendency to analysis,

hence, too, an increasing necessity for an acquaintance with the ultimate laws of thought.

The illustration which I have casually employed suggests to my recollection another cause, which I have often thought has not been without its efficacy in promoting the analytic spirit on the existence of which these remarks have been founded. I allude to the growth of the science of *chemistry*. It would certainly be a striking instance of the reciprocal influence of studies, and even of the influence of philosophy upon action, if it could be shewn that this science (which you will remember has the advantage of being the most familiar and popular of all) has exercised a power of this universal and pervading extent over the general mind. It seems to me that it has done so, by exemplifying and encouraging habits of indefatigable analysis; by supplying a very convenient phrascology¹ for

Influence of the study of chemistry on mental science.

¹ [As an instance of the felicitous use of chemical phrases and ideas in illustrating mental science, may be cited a passage from Sir J. Mackintosh's Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy. "Defects of the same sort" (as that of Brown, who substitutes the term 'Suggestion' in place of the hitherto received 'Association,' in explaining the origin of the complex emotions) "may indeed be found in the parallel phrases of most, if not all, philosophers; and all of these proceed from the erroneous but prevalent notion, that the law of Association produces only such a close union of a thought and a feeling, as gives one the power of reviving the other; the truth being, that it forms them into a new compound, in which the properties of the component parts are no longer discoverable, and which may itself become a substantive part of human nature. They supposed the condition, produced by the power of that law, to resemble that of material substances in a state of mechanical separation; whereas in reality it may be better likened to a chemical combination of the same substances, from which a totally new product arises." *Diss.* Sect. VII. The term "Fusion" has accordingly been suggested as a convenient substitute for "Association," in describing the growth of the more complex out of the simpler desires and emotions. *Ed.*]

LECT.
VII.

these purposes (a matter in itself of no slight importance); and thus, by both stimulating and assisting the constant search for elementary principles, and the solicitude to detect in all subjects, under outward and palpable manifestations, inward and invisible constituents.

*Further
uses of men-
tal science.*

Another argument in proof of the value of these mental speculations it would be improper to pass without notice, although I may presume that your text-books have already

*Study of the
faculties as
the instru-
ments of
discovery.*

made you familiar with it; I mean the beneficial results upon the powers of investigation and discovery which must be produced by the study of the mind as a bundle of tools, or a system of machinery, for that purpose. These advan-

*Locke's
Essay.*

tageous results such a study may produce in two principal ways; first, by defining the limits of the faculties, and thus exhibiting in general outlines what they can and cannot attain. Locke, whose great work originated in difficulties on the subject, seems to have been peculiarly impressed with this ground of importance. I may add to his homely but most profound remarks, that as there is a general and final limitation of the faculties, within which is possible knowledge, and beyond which is certain ignorance, so there is also a relative and mutual limitation of the faculties with respect to each other, as well as to the chief subjects upon which each can be exerted. Of both these latter distribu-

*Bacon de
Augmentis.*

tions you find a magnificent example in the great work of Lord Bacon, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*; an example whose defects may perhaps be best excused by observing that no subsequent attempt to reform it has been pronounced more

*A apology for
Bacon's
division of
the faculties
into me-
mory, ima-
gination,
reason.*

faultless. The objection on which the Comte Destutt de Tracy enlarges, that his introductory division of the faculties into the Memory, the Imagination, and the Reason, is not elementary or ultimate, may be granted as true, and yet not injure its claims as a division both distinct and adequate. Our division of Great Britain into England, Wales, and Scotland is not less true, and for many practical purposes may be more convenient, than if we had subdivided it into all its multitude of counties or of parishes. Another objection of the same author is more important, that which denies the distinctness of the division, and urges that "there is no one branch of our knowledge—not even a single one of our judgments—to which all our intellectual faculties have not co-operated." The assertion in this form is, if these names of the faculties be used in their ordinary sense, perhaps too bold; but the principle is undeniable. It is indeed obvious that the simplest deduction of reason cannot be effected without the aid of memory; and that the operations of imagination in the production of poetry

would be equally impossible without the aid of that faculty. Memory, again, without the deductive power of reason would be nearly useless; and imagination almost as much so; while Reason itself in its march of discovery can scarcely operate without the imagination of hypotheses. Against this charge, therefore, the best answer on behalf of Lord Bacon is, I presume, to be found in appealing to his aim; which being merely practical, admitted of being attained by classifying the departments of human thought under the faculties which, in popular apprehension, seemed principally, though in metaphysical strictness they were not exclusively, engaged in them. It is true that for purely scientific purposes the animal system of Linnæus, which includes the Man and the Bat in the same division, may be highly valuable; yet, as a basis for popular instruction in natural history, it may be doubted whether more interest may not be excited, and thence (which was Lord Bacon's direct purpose) more stimulus to increased knowledge created, by a division founded on circumstances somewhat more obvious to common observation.

The second advantage which I would specify as afforded by our science to the reasoning faculties, does not regard their limitation but their use, their improvement to the highest pitch of power within the range determined by the former considerations. Valuable comments upon this most important subject are to be found scattered in a variety of authors both ancient and modern. The "technical memory" of Grey, Feinagle, and others; the copious rhetorical counsels of Aristotle, Cicero, and Bacon, for the improvement of memory and the aid of judgment; the elementary systems of Pestalozzi and other methodizers of intellectual education,—all these and such like plans and advices are founded upon those elementary laws of the mind which you are here to consider, and follow as directly from them as the structure of a telescope to augment the powers of the eye, from the laws of light and vision. It is not unlikely that if the mind were strictly subjected to an intellectual regimen, like the body and its muscular system, results as far beyond ordinary calculation might be produced. The extraordinary power sometimes generated by constant practice in particular pursuits, may assist us to some conception of the energies which are dormant in human minds only because they are not aroused by cultivation. It is true that in these cases the power greatly depends on the exclusiveness of the pursuit; for different habits of the same faculty interfere with each other's influence, and neutralize, like interfering rays of light, producing darkness; but to this I would reply, in the first

*Use of mental
faculties
in regulat-
ing the ex-
ercise of the
faculties.*

Examples.

LECT.
VII.

place, that this truly demonstrates the importance of turning the habit upon noble pursuits, in which case the exclusiveness would become a blessing; and in the second place, which is very important, that there are habits of so general a nature as to be universally applicable,—habits of the faculties themselves, as contrasted with habits of any special exercise of the faculties. Of these I will mention, as the most important intellectual habit I know of, the habit of attending exclusively to the matter in hand. This habit of exclusive attention I believe to be attainable in such a manner as to act altogether irrespectively of the immediate subject of attention, to fit equally to every occasion for which it is demanded. It is commonly said that genius cannot be infused by education; yet this power of concentrated attention, which belongs as a part of his gift to every great discoverer, is unquestionably capable of almost indefinite augmentation by resolute practice. It is certain indeed that it is only a *part* of genius. One of the most interesting of the few but precious relics of Newton's conversation is an expression imputed to him relative to his own intellectual powers. You probably know that on one occasion he is reported^a to have modestly said, that in all he had ever discovered he was only conscious to himself of patient contemplation, that in his perseverance lay all his power. Coming from such a man, nothing could be more beautifully characteristic of his unassuming spirit; yet I am disposed to think that Newton's experience is, so far, the experience of every discoverer. For analyse the fact. The genius that discovers unknown truths consists of two elements, a process of close attention to the point examined, and a constant supply from the hand of nature of ideas connected with it. The latter is a wholly involuntary process, the former is a voluntary effort. Newton, therefore, in common, as I think, with every inventor, could only retain a distinct consciousness of the voluntary part of the process as his own personal act; here alone he was agent; all else was executed for him by the independent revelations of nature. But though attention be only one element of scientific genius—the ear, as it were with which it listens to the harmonies of the universe,—yet you are not to forget that it is truly an indispensable element; nor that the chances of discovery increase in proportion to the strength and concentration of this faculty. For every idea is vivid in proportion to attention; and every idea suggests a greater number of related ideas in proportion to its vividness. One of the chief uses of writing, in the pro-

^a [He says so at the commencement of his first Letter to Dr Bentley. See Bentley's Sermons, ed. Dyce, p. 203. Ed.]

cess of inquiry, is that it arrests the ideas at pleasure under the direct inspection of the intellect; and a geometrical diagram assists the investigation of a problem not more by its concise collection of the conditions of the question, than by the efficacy of the sensible object in preventing the wanderings of the mind. This, then, I think a fair instance of an intellectual habit of immense importance, conducting to the most splendid results, capable of raising inferior minds to achievements for which without it the most gifted intellect must depend on chance; and unquestionably attainable to every man by determined practice. And, surely, the science which develops such truths and rules as these is not unworthy your notice.

From this subject the transition is natural to another very important instance of the utility of your studies in this place: I mean their peculiar and invaluable efficacy in sharpening the intellect. This efficacy seems to turn upon two principal circumstances—upon the necessity which above all other pursuits they involve, of that intense contemplation of the point at issue, to the exclusion of all others, to which I have just been adverting; and upon the very nature of the subjects of metaphysical reflection and analysis, which continually exhibit instances of differences and resemblances so important, yet so minute, as to exercise the mind in the constant detection of the subtlest relations of analogy and discrepancy. The peculiar degree in which metaphysical studies possess both these characteristics, so precious in every discipline of the intellect, will perhaps be best illustrated by a brief comparison of them with the only pursuits which can, I suppose, be placed in competition—the mathematical sciences. My remarks shall be concise, as I cannot now afford time to enter at any length into the late controversy on the subject.

The first object of discipline which I have noted—the habit and power of intense exclusive contemplation,—will be of course conferred by any study in proportion as that study requires it. Now it appears to me that the very improvements of mathematical science are constantly diminishing its value as a discipline for contemplative power^{*}. Its perfection is the perfection of a language, a language of arbitrary signs or figures which so completely detains the subject in the easy grasp of the mind or recalls it so promptly at pleasure, as to relieve the investigator from the strong necessity of intense exertion in

*Educational
uses of me-
taphysical
studies.*

*Compari-
son of me-
taphysical
with ma-
thematical
studies.*

*Improve-
ments in
mathemati-
cal sciences
tend to di-
minish its
educational
efficacy;*

^{*} [This opinion was strongly maintained by the late Dr Whewell. An able defence of mathematical analysis in its educational aspect will be found in the evidence addressed to the Cambridge University Commission by the lamented Mr R. L. Ellis. See *Cambridge University Report, Evidence*, p. 224. Ed.]

LECT.
VII.

while the imperfections of the language of metaphysics improve it as a discipline.

Perception of minute resemblances and minute differences promoted by metaphysical in a much higher degree than by mathematical studies. Minute not less real than broad distinctions.

The most valuable disciplinary parts of mathematics are those which border on metaphysics.

apprehending or retaining it. Now, exactly as the excellency of mathematics (its perfect language) enfeebls it as a discipline, so the misfortune of metaphysics (its imperfect language) improves it as a discipline. With respect to their comparative efficacy in producing the habit of detecting subtle resemblances or differences, I cannot but conceive in this point also the Mathematical Sciences to yield the supremacy. In the consideration of lines and numbers the smallest difference is as distinct as the vastest; the equation of one right line is as different, and perceived to be as different, from the equation of that whose conditions approach it nearest, as it is from the equation of a curve. Now in subjects of metaphysical consideration, though the differences may in point of fact be as real (for all difference is equally difference), yet the instantaneous impression may not be that of difference at all, and the perception of difference, when it does occur, may be by no means equally clear and complete. That is, we may apprehend that there *is* a difference, and yet not be able to pronounce in what circumstance the difference lies, until after painful and prolonged reflection. For example, between the phenomenon called a "volition" (or exertion of Will) and the phenomenon called a "desire," between the state of mind which immediately precedes the motion of a limb or is said to move it, and the state of mind which constitutes the *wish* to move it, there are few reflectors who will not at first declare that there is a difference; and yet there are probably few who can enumerate and define the circumstances that establish the difference. This, indeed, is an inferiority of mathematics as a discipline to all physical sciences; for in all these alike the detection of minute differences must be more difficult than in the science of space and number; but to the metaphysical sciences the inferiority becomes peculiarly striking, because the discrepancies there are so peculiarly elusive. Hence the most valuable disciplinary parts of mathematics are those which contain the new notions and principles introductory to each new branch; for example, the opening conceptions of geometry and of algebra, and of the application of these sciences to each other, and the vast and profound principles upon which the more modern calculus is erected; and I have no doubt that a student has gained more advantage to the faculties of thought from one hour of those which he passed in thus exploring and measuring the basis of each new structure of mathematical science at which he arrived, than from a much greater expenditure of time and labour consumed in subsequently traversing some of its inner intricacies. Now

these very introductory principles are the metaphysics of the mathematics. Finally, observe upon this question, that though (as I have before remarked) general intellectual habits of attention, precision, perseverance, acuteness, are indeed truly valuable, and capable of being acquired apart from exclusive connection with a special subject of them, so as to be in a considerable degree transferable to any at pleasure, yet, as the subject upon which they are acquired will always be that upon which they are most promptly available, it is of importance that that subject should be selected from those which are of the highest and most constant utility. In this point of view I presume there can be little hesitation in our choice between, the Mathematical Sciences, which, admirable as they are, are restricted to a narrow circle of pure speculation, and beyond that magic circle of their wonders are powerless, and the science which, in being the Science of Man, contains in it the subjects, the principles, and the proper discipline, for every possible department of thought or practice.

LECT.
VII.

Principle which should regulate the choice of a special disciplinary study.

In what has been thus argued we have shewn the superior utility of the Science of Mind as an indirect education of the intellect, altogether independently of its actual discoveries of truth. In this latter aspect, I freely admit that its rival might enjoy an apparent triumph; for assuredly the harvest of new and various truths which the mathematics have yielded is, if we number the produce, far beyond anything which moral speculation can display. But metaphysical conclusions compensate for their fewness by their vast generality of application. Indeed in this point of view, mathematics themselves might be regarded as the result of a few convictions of the kind which metaphysics contemplate; and all real physical science as the result and creation of the first logical principles which led to it. Such principles, like heat or electricity, are more known in their consequences than in themselves; we cannot see them till they are embodied in practice, and then we give the practice all the credit which is theirs of right. Besides this, from other reasons, on these subjects above all others, we are unjust to our teachers; in the sciences of matter and relation discoveries are easily traced to their owners, but here discoveries (and those general impulses to juster thought which are better than positive discoveries), though no less real, no less perceptible, and no less valuable, are appropriated with difficulty to their respective authors. Great writers are lost in the very light they diffuse; they create a general illumination which at length destroys the solitude or the pre-eminence of their own particular glory. One principal object, indeed, of just

Paucity of metaphysical results compensated by their generality of application.

LECT.
VII.

philosophical history is, by abstracting us from this dazzling illusion of subsequent and present time, to restore their true magnitude and splendour to the mighty spirits, whom we are forgetting while we profit by them. The sun, splendid as he appears to us, would appear still more intensely brilliant if we could contemplate him from a point beyond our atmosphere, and thus behold him burning in the midst of a firmament as black as midnight, than as we see him from our position, encompassed by those nearer masses of reflected light, whose splendour, though derived from his own, almost competes with its great original.

I shall only add (to prevent misconception) that you are not to consider that in what I have said I am regarding mathematics in themselves, but mathematics as a discipline; nor even this positively (for I do not at all question the value of their influence to a certain high degree), but comparatively, as contrasted with the speculations which form the subject of our present studies.

*Difficulties
of metaphysical science
entail*

*lectu-
ciple*

You perceive, then, that the very difficulties of metaphysical science constitute a chief element in its value as an intellectual discipline. This, however, must not be permitted to prevent our efforts to diminish these difficulties; for we may expect greater advantages from the improvement of our actual knowledge of man and his faculties than could ever be derived indirectly from the mere intellectual exertion to attain it: besides that we may confidently calculate that the human mind will never in this world arrive at such a pitch of knowledge as to want new and sufficient subjects on which to exercise and strengthen its powers. Indeed the matter compensates itself; for the attainment of such a stage of knowledge would render the discipline for future effort no longer necessary. You will perceive that the greatest cause of perplexity which you may expect in these studies (and the same reason explains that long continuance, frequent recurrence, and difficult removal of errors on the subject, so often charged against metaphysical philosophy, and certainly so comparatively unusual in the exacter sciences, and in the physics of the external world when once they had become sciences of observation; for there a discovery once made is a discovery for ever, *there* nature once conquered never rebels against her chain,) arises from the difficulty of subjecting these things to instantaneous attention and experiment, and when you have succeeded in obtaining a firm grasp of the point, the equal, or nearly equal difficulty of conveying your conviction to others in language which will speak neither more nor less

*Nature and
causes of
these diffi-
culties.
Obscurity of*

*Imperfection of lan-
guage.*

than you wish. This double difficulty—of subject and of language—belongs, it is manifest, in a far higher degree to mental than to material science; and seems to me to explain (prejudices apart) almost the whole history of metaphysical error. The imperfection of metaphysical language arising from its constant suggestion of unwarrantable material analogies (of which, I may observe, that the controversy on "Free Will" is a very striking example), has been noted by all our more modern writers; I shall only add (for I cannot now pause upon any subject) that in Bacon's day an error precisely opposite, or rather an opposite development of the same error, appears to have existed—a singular case of philosophical revolutions. We complain of the illegitimacy of explaining mental processes by material similitudes; *he* notices, as a principal *idolum tribus*, the "*naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum reductio*"⁴. From both these difficulties—that of subject and that of language—arises another very remarkable evil; it is this, that unwarrantable deference to the authority of names is far more prevalent in the field of human than of natural philosophy. I say it arises directly from these difficulties. It does so, just because in consequence of these imperfections of mental grasp and of language—more especially of the latter—we are always obliged in perusing an author to take so much upon trust. We naturally prefer concluding that we have not perfectly understood him, to concluding that his account of his consciousness or his convictions is erroneous. This indolent subjection of the mind (so different from our reception of a geometrical process or a chemical experiment), when exaggerated by collateral prejudices, begets that vast accumulation of traditionary folly, swelling on from generation to generation, which has so peculiarly encumbered and degraded the science of human nature. But language not only produces this deception by its imperfections, but it perpetuates it by its authority. After terms of great apparent weight have been invented and authenticated, they give a fictitious reality to imaginary entities; we cannot endure to think, after a long and arduous course of labour in mastering a complicated phraseology, that we have "toiled" so much and "caught nothing;" and, therefore, in determined self-consolation, we persuade ourselves to respect these modifications of idle breath, as if they were indeed the eternal substances of truth and nature. Hence, by degrees, a new human mind is framed, overcharged with attributes and characters that nature never recognized. It is no longer the conscious being of a certain

Deference to
authority.Tendency to
realism.⁴ [*De Augm.* v. cap. iii. En.]

LECT.
VII.

Impossibility of direct experiment in metaphysical science. Imaginary case.

limited number of faculties and passions that thinks and feels in our daily experience, but an intricate and complicated being framed out of essences, accidents, positive and primitive qualities, intrinsic and extrinsic causes, actual and potential faculties, and so forth; in short, the unmingled product of that most arid of all the soils of fancy, the logical imagination! In illustration of the cause of the prevalence of these errors, I will ask you to conceive how valuable would be the supply of that which our science wants, namely, the appeal to direct and unequivocal experiment. Conceive a philosophical Frankenstein gifted with the power of creating, or of modifying, minds according to his theories; enabled, just as a mechanic takes asunder the parts of his machine, to strip his creation of its attributes, so as to fit it to all the various philosophies of knowledge, and, by examining the living result, to reduce to experimental evidence the deficiencies or the superfluities of these accounts. Is it quite certain that the human mind—the *man* that we know and feel—would be perfectly evolved in any one change in the succession? Much as we admire and reverence the great authors of these mighty theories, the Aristotles, Platos, Zenos, Descarteses, Lockes, Kants, &c., and great as have been their unquestionable services to the freedom and progress of thought; yet, in the darkness and difficulty of the subject, is it not sadly possible that every apparition in the series of theoretic men—thus built *secundum artem*—might prove an idiot? Differing as they do, and supplying each other, is it not probable that the real man, if he exist among them, can only be constructed by extracts from them all? Or, as a less ambitious speculation, imagine how rapid would be the progress of psychology in a single month, if I could introduce into this place (as the Anatomical Professor can accomplish in his lecture-room) a metaphysical “subject” to demonstrate on, with the power of appealing to its manifest structure in as perfect a security as that which the anatomist can enjoy, of neither omitting what is there, nor supposing what is *not*. ...Such then are the imperfections of our minds in relation to this great object of thought—ourselves; and such are some of the intellectual prejudices which obstruct the rapid and steady progress of the science. I hope I may trust to your own sagacity and interest in the subject, for maturing, enlarging, and enforcing topics which here and now I can but transiently notice.

Ethics of metaphysical study.

The last subject upon which I wish to address you, and the last because I wish it to leave a deep and clear impression, has reference to the moral tone and spirit in which it becomes you to pursue the science of man. The

great principles here are, the fearless pursuit of truth, in the bright and holy confidence that all truth will ultimately right itself; the careful expulsion of all counteracting influences in study which can be traced to undue prepossession of any kind, or by whatever title consecrated; and the cultivation of a spirit of candour towards all who, whether, as you think, in truth or in error, have given, or are giving, their days in sincerity to advancing the growth of human knowledge.

These things are not to be taught by logical reasonings. I trust that, as far as my humble influence can reach, I shall know how to teach them by my example.

As to the first, the unswerving pursuit of truth, I have before now endeavoured to shew you how little the principle is restricted by the precepts of either morals or religion, if these precepts be but rightly understood. I have remarked, how poor is the compliment which mistaken zeal pays to the economy of the universe, when it commands us to resign the occupation of penetrating or contemplating it. I cannot but pronounce that Science is indeed one part of the great Praxis of the imitation of God; for the great object of science is to gain harmonies, and He is the framer and perceiver of the final harmony of all. It may be that there is but one Law in the universe, of which all the laws of possible science are developments; but it can scarcely be denied that there is a oneness, in some sense, in the structure of the whole—for if creation have a purpose, the means must partake in the unity of the purpose—that the Creator alone contemplates this transcendent singleness and simplicity of nature from its summit; that human minds stand at various heights of elevation, and in proportion to their elevation take in less or more of the great and ultimate unity of all. The religious or moral scruple which would deny this essential holiness of science is real infidelity; because it proceeds on a tacit separation (I fear more common than we imagine) of the Physical and the Moral God of the world. Though it be not precisely perhaps the "knowledge" with which science deals, yet it is worth your while to remember the union of "knowing" and "loving" God so constant in the loftiest of the Evangelists; and to remember that when Christ himself sought a title, he declared himself "the Truth."

The second point was the exclusion of prepossessions: The great philosophical division of these moral prejudices in relation to our present subject, is into those which arise from habits of scepticism and habits of dogmatism. The one cannot tolerate any discussions of first principles, through fear of leading to sceptical conclusions; and the

*First point.
Love of
Truth for
its own
sake. The
pursuit of
truth is un-
restricted
by religion.*

*Science is a
part of the
imitation of
God.*

*Expressions
in the Grep-
tel.*

*Second point
in the ethics
of metaphy-
sical study.
Exclusion
of prepos-
sions,
whether
sceptical or
dogmatical.*

LECT.
VII.

other cannot endure any discussion which would seem to establish lofty ones, and is perpetually working at the elementary principles. And on points (such as the controversy of Necessarianism) where there are two classes of facts, neither will bear the statement of the opposite; the fact, doubtless, being that both are mysteriously true; that we see the extremes, while the middle, where they unite, is involved in clouds. Here, again, the great office of a perfect science is to produce a reconciling harmony. Two persons at opposite sides of the base of a pyramid can perceive clearly enough that they are opposite; but as they ascend they approach; and could they but scale the summit they would find opposition to disappear, and sides to vanish in a single point.

*Third point.
Universal
candour and
tolerance.*

As to the last point, the necessity of universal candour, and of the habitual distribution of this merit to all men, in these speculations above all, this great qualification is perpetually talked of, and perpetually forgotten. Men have proposed theories of benevolence in terms of "polemical scorn; and, in descanting on the nature and remedies of prejudice, have ingeniously contrived to make the doctrine its own example. Is it not a sufficient proof of this perversity, that the word "Polemics," originally significant of hostility of any kind, should have become exclusively devoted to religious and moral disputation? But on this subject time will not permit me to enlarge. I can scarcely speak with impartiality upon it; for I have myself required from you, and shall still require, so much of this benevolence of criticism, as to be too interested a witness in favour of its merits. If I may judge from the past, however, I shall not be without hopes of preserving your candid consideration of my future efforts; nor without hopes—though our meetings for this term have, I confess, been small to a degree, which has disappointed my expectations,—yet of contributing some aid towards eventually creating in our University an interest in subjects which in most others are considered the noblest that can occupy and ornament the mind of man.

The next term at which my many and weighty duties of another kind may permit me to meet you, I hope to introduce you, as a further preliminary to detailed investigations, to the History of the Progress of Philosophy through ancient and modern times.

FIRST SERIES.

LECTURE I.

ON HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY, ANCIENT AND MODERN.

GENTLEMEN,

A CONSIDERABLE period has elapsed since I last had the honour of meeting you in this place. Many circumstances have combined to lengthen that interval, circumstances which I anxiously trust may not again unite. I know not how far I can count upon you as being even partially the same audience as I last addressed; still less can I flatter myself that you retain any very distinct impression of the views which I then proposed to your acceptance. This is, on my own part, the more to be regretted, as these views differed in many respects from the doctrines—at least, from the method and order of doctrines—popularly adopted in the philosophical literature of these countries; and were, besides, in a great degree intended as preparatory to the wider developments which I hope, if spared for this work, in my future labours to offer you. There is indeed, I believe, in the words of even the humblest labourers in the field of general philosophy, if their labours be but honest and truthful, a characteristic unity of style and thought, which, while it has the advantage of making all the efforts of the same mind mutually illustrative, often has also the disadvantage of making them mutually dependent, and of giving to each the position, not merely of a useful confirmation but of a necessary supplement, to all the rest. This is a principle which, in various degrees, extends over even the most dissimilar regions of mental exertion. The poetical, the historical, the political, the rhetorical efforts of the same intellect will almost invariably be found to bear the family-likeness of a common parentage. Thus (to take one striking example), the seventy volumes of the writings of Voltaire will be found to embrace almost every species of literary workmanship, yet there is scarcely a page of

LECT.
I.

Introductory remarks.

LECT.
I.

these multiform productions which a judge of even moderate discrimination in the flavour of intellectual growths could not almost unerringly identify. How much closer this interdependence must be when the productions are of the same kind, how much closer still when they belong to a single subject—to a single course of instruction—I need not remind you. This it is which makes the *solutio continui* so dangerous to the general effectiveness of any progressive series of instruction. It is hard to perpetuate a common vitality in such disjointed members of an organized system. The only remedy, or palliative, for this disadvantage—which is in some degree inseparable from every course broken into fragments as our academic lectures are—will be to multiply the centres of vitality by as much as possible giving to each its own internal completeness; so that (to carry on the figure) the whole may resemble those animal systems, which, while partaking of a common organization, are also independent of section, each minute portion possessing its separate faculty of life and motion. And this it is my desire to attempt, as far as it may seem practicable to realize it.

Of the HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, the subject to which I formerly dedicated our present discussions, it now becomes my duty to present you with some outlines. I would not be understood to offer anything more. I do not pretend to give you more than the etching of a reduced engraving, which if swelled to a size at all proportionate to the real vastness of the object, and filled up with the elaborate minuteness of touch which an object so delicate in its lights and shadowings requires for its finished portraiture, would far surpass the time and the attention which I can reasonably expect from my hearers. My end is attained if I can so far disclose to you some of the attractions of the subject as to induce you to have recourse to the original sources of information. And let me suggest to all of you who feel an interest in this history of speculation, that the more constantly you penetrate to these originals, and the less you are habituated to depend on secondary representations of their force and spirit, the more beneficial will be the intellectual exercise, and far the more secure your own convictions. To your estimation of my own labours I most freely extend the principle. It may be the usual object with literary enterprise to content its judges; I should be very sorry to imagine that I sent you away contented with what you can here obtain.

*Histories
of Philosophy
are
very numerous.*

The History of Philosophy has been attempted by many hands. Indeed so extensive has been on this subject the mass of learned labour that it has given birth

to a distinct article of inquiry, with which some historians have prefaced their recitals, under the title of the "History of the History of Philosophy;" and, indeed, from the rapid daily increase of contributions to the subject in both these branches (especially among our German contemporaries) I am half inclined to apprehend that before the close of the century our sons shall find even this last history capable of producing another reflection of its own. Understood in the most general sense of the phrase, no age which has possessed philosophy has been without a history of it. In those first and feeble hours when men depended almost wholly, as in the infancy of all civilizations, upon traditional authority for the validity of their principles and the direction of their researches, philosophy itself was little more than a history of inherited beliefs. Wherever the scope of inquiry is rather the interpretation of doctrines than the interpretation of nature, the preliminary research must of course turn less upon things than tenets. This condition of mind is sometimes found to be prolonged into stages far advanced in civilization. It exists in almost every country of the East in a greater or less degree; and indeed must be discernible in all countries where the claims of Revelation and Inquiry are not understood and defined. Yet such is the unconquerable strength of the impulse to reflective inquiry when once aroused, that, as we shall see, in India, Philosophy has really manifested herself under the prudent veil of Interpretation; and systems, analogous in many respects to our own philosophic theories, conceal their daring proportions in the mystical mantle of theological commentary.

Philosophy itself originally a professed history;

as at this day in the East.

As men advance in the path of speculation, the history of doctrines becomes of less consequence. The ardour of philosophic youth, like that of the youth of nature, undervalues lessons transmitted from the past. The two great instances of such an awakening of the genuine spirit of speculation, must to us ever be the dawn of science in Greece, and its regeneration in modern Europe. These great experiments, however, differ widely and obviously in their circumstances, spirit, and history. The movement of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was essentially a "revival of letters;" its life was in the spirit which antiquity breathed into it across a thousand years; it was a revolution of imitation, collation, erudition, in which (the great religious change apart) the discovery of manuscripts held it above the discovery of systems. Accordingly, to this second birth of philosophy the remark which I have made is not at all so applicable as to its first wondrous apparition in Greece. There was little time for historical

Two great eras in the history of speculation: the dawn of science in Greece, and its revival in modern Europe. The two movements.

LECT.
I.

Independence and boldness of Grecian thought.

The first recorder of systems is Plato, who however is not, strictly speaking, an historian of philosophy.

researches, little patience for them, little regard for them, among the first bold explainers of the universe, in the islands and colonies of Greece. Among these active teachers the exercise of thought was preferred to the investigation of its previous exercise; and the field of antecedent experience was itself too narrow to be worth the trouble of cultivation. The age of the Sophists seems to have brought with it some attempts towards the systematic collection of opinions, if the work of Damastes¹, "*Of Sophists*," (of which no more than the title remains to us,) was of the historical kind. But, though subsequent ages of declining Greek literature were affluent in these digests and biographies* (most of them unhappily only preserved to us by name in the pages of Diogenes Laertius, Suidas, Athenæus, and the more learned of the Christian fathers), I do not know that we can point to any certain traces of the record of systems and the criticisms of their mutual bearing, before the time of Plato. But Plato, if he be something higher than an historian, is not an historian. His scattered notices of previous philosophers, valuable indeed as materials, are themselves, with few exceptions, too occasional and incomplete to rise to the dignity of historical detail. I am not satisfied that he can always be fully trusted; nor indeed can I easily believe that speculative tenets can have been filtered through a soil so racy and peculiar as his extraordinary mind, and arrived without a tinge from their passage. Of one illustrious person he has indeed presented us with the noblest series of memorials that the world has ever seen from any uninspired source. It is now pretty generally understood that the remark I have just made is abundantly applicable in this instance; and the exquisite art, no less than dramatic, with which the additions are incorporated into the composition of the Platonic Socrates, the skill with which the simplicity of the original character is preserved and yet the tone of the doctrines exalted, the features accurate though the complexion be heightened, may serve to make us distrust the same gifted reporter when he undertakes to tell us of Parmenides and Timæus. The true Socratic gospel is the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon.

The great rival of Plato also comes before us as a

¹ [*Περὶ σοφιστῶν καὶ σοφιστῶν* is the title of the work, according to Suidas, who makes Damastes "a pupil of Hellanicus," and places him "before the Peloponnesian war." He is also mentioned by Strabo and others. See the *Cambridge Museum Criticum*, II. p. 108. Ed.]

* Generally styled "Successions of Philosophers;" "of Sects;" "of Opinions," &c.—or else professing to be distinct individual lives of eminent masters.

detailer of the history of doctrines. On Aristotle's claims to veracity and candour the traditions of antiquity so vary that it is exceedingly difficult to pronounce any positive decision. By some critics and biographers whose remains have reached us, he is charged, as with many other gross immoralities, so with unfair suppressing and deliberate perversion. Some of these assailants have been thought to have gone so far* as to charge him with the literary incendiarism of collecting and burning all the attainable writings of his predecessors, partly in order to distort them at his ease, and partly to construct his own edifice out of their ruins. His defenders would not have much difficulty if all the charges against his historical justice were as chimerical as this preposterous falsehood. Aristotle speaks copiously of his predecessors; a modern writer has even termed him the true "father of the history of philosophy;" but he always cites as one who is anxiously pressing on to establish his own conclusions, and he introduces his opponents, less to partake the triumph as equals, than to grace it as captives¹. I will translate a few lines from the close of his first book of *Metaphysics*, as containing the spirit of his views of the labourers who had preceded him. They may be regarded as an abstract of his usual habits of criticism. "Thus," says he, after a long discussion of the views of Plato, Pythagoras, Empedocles, and others, "it is evident from all we have said, that the researches of all philosophers are reducible to the four principles established by us in the *Physics*; and that beyond these no other exists; but these researches have been carried on inaccurately; and if in one view they have anticipated us in all these principles, in another, they have not yet mentioned them....The defects of the researches of our predecessors have been sufficiently displayed, &c." You observe the two objects here proposed; first, to prove that little has been done, and then, that that little is provided for on better principles in the new system. These indeed are the objects of all systematizers, as well as of this great master of system; but this only suggests that the warning should be generalized, and that you never can receive without precautions the statements of a theorist who can march to conquest only

LECT.
I.*Aristotle.**His character as a historian of system.*

* Reported by *Stanley* as "a common report," in his day.

¹ [The spirited and perhaps exaggerated censure of Bacon is well-known: "*Arimotelis confidentiam proinde subit mirari; qui impetu quodam percitus contradictionis, et bellum universæ antiquitati indicens, non solum nova artium vocabula pro libitu cudendi licentiam usurpavit; sed etiam præcam omnem sapientiam extinguere et delere annis est. Adeo ut neque nominet uspiam auctores antiquos, neque dogmatum eorum mentionem ullam faciat, nisi quo aut homines perstringeret aut placita redargueret.* *De Augm.* III. c. 4. Ed.]

LECT. I. over the ruins of the prostrate theories of his rivals. Yet, I confess, the vastly superior sagacity of criticism, as well as the superior proximity to their predecessors, which belonged to both Plato and Aristotle, as compared with the critics and compilers of the Western and Eastern empire, attach to their reports such a weight of authority, as ought perhaps to counterbalance objections as great as those I have insinuated. At all events, to those who will, and can, constantly apply due precautions, and allow judiciously for occasional purposes, prepossessions, and haste (a task unquestionably demanding much patience and practical shrewdness), to such the notices of these great masters become the most valuable historical records in the compass of ancient philosophy. I do not even except Cicero, a name which in a review of this kind cannot be omitted. Far superior to Aristotle in all the graces of style—as superior also as a finished painting to a hard dry etching, superior also in his greater comparative freedom from the prepossessions of a system (though in this respect you know Cicero is far from blameless)—the difference of date between these two reporters, as counted from the first school of Greek philosophy, can never be forgotten when we speak of an age in which the invention of printing had not yet secured, almost beyond the possibilities of extinction, the genuine tenets of a master. I cannot also but express the dissatisfaction which I have always felt in perusing Cicero's statements of the doctrines of the elder Grecian schools. I cannot but persuade myself that in these criticisms there is either an absence of that patient sagacity which is essential to a well-qualified judge of the works and processes of pure thought, or else, that captious desire to exhibit, under their most uninviting aspect, all possible forms of solution to the ultimate inquiries of human reason, which is so apt to be fostered by the habits of the academic philosophy, itself an imperious master even while it disavows all mastery. At all events, there is a want of that without which our present study can never be effectively carried on, or happily, or instructively; and that is, a boundless reverence for all the sincere efforts of every honest human reason.

[To any of you who are anxious to collate Cicero's accounts of his predecessors, I may mention that I am instructed by Professor Tennemann of the publication of a work by "Gedike," a German *littérateur*, containing, in Latin, a well-digested collection of all the passages in his writings relative to ancient Philosophy², 2nd edit. Berlin, 1801.]

² [A sufficient substitute for this work is furnished in the copious Onomasticon appended to Orelli's Cicero. Opinions differ greatly as to Cicero's

Another ancient writer, in whose remaining works (though still more deeply tinctured by his system) valuable accounts are to be found of the Grecian schools, is the celebrated sceptic Sextus Empiricus. In order to confute the dogmatists, he exposes them, and thus incidentally supplies useful confirmations or explanations to other and more direct authorities. The writings of this able assailant of reason are in other respects highly curious; and it will surprise a student who is familiar only with the sophists of his own age or language, to discover how very few of the logical difficulties of modern sceptics are at all as modern as themselves.

LECT.
I.*Sextus
Empiricus.*

In considering the views of *Epicurus*, which fill so large a space in the chart of ancient philosophy, you will naturally have recourse to the magnificent poetical essay of Lucretius. This great poet, however, who himself possessed independent powers of philosophical speculation, cannot always be adopted as an accurate transcriber of the actual opinions of Epicurus, though perhaps, for this very reason, a safer and more impressive indicator of the views to which, by strict necessity of reason and of *events*, these opinions will everlastingly be found to lead.

Lucretius.

Among the writers who, carrying on their own processes of thought, occasionally inform us of the views of antecedent inquirers, Seneca and Plutarch are not to be overlooked. Seneca, the most elaborate of all the interpreters of the Stoical institutes, often throws the strong light of contrast upon the Epicurean school, as well as reprobates the "Academicorum nova scientia, nihil scire." His books of Natural Questions (an amusing study to a modern Newtonian!) illustrate a vast variety of points in the history of

Seneca.

merits as an historian of Philosophy. Some recent writers of eminence have formed a low estimate of his learning, as in particular Madvig. It is well to bear in mind that Cicero was not a mere professor, but a statesman living in the stormiest times, and an advocate in high request. This is too little remembered by the Doctores umbratici who sit in judgment upon him. Considered as a philosophical *amateur* he must surely take very high rank. His acumen and power of exposition can hardly be denied, at least by those who have read the Academic Questions. At the same time it must be acknowledged that his notices of the classic age of Greek philosophy come mostly from writers of the Macedonian period, whose traditions it is his merit to have preserved. His obligations to his own teacher Antiochus are very fully investigated in Madvig's 7th Excursus to his 2nd edition of *Cicero de Finibus*. Of Plato Cicero's knowledge was limited, but, so far as it went, by no means second-hand. He had read the *Phaedrus*, and apparently much of the *Republic* and *Laws*; and left translations, of which fragments remain, of the *Timaeus* and *Protagoras*; but of many of the most important dialogues he makes no mention—not even, for instance, of the *Theaetetus*, the true fountain of the Academic scepticism. His good faith (*simplicitas*) in acknowledging his obligations is praised by Pliny (*Praef. ad Hist. Nat.*), and contrasted with the disingenuousness of other Roman writers, by whom he had found the ancients 'transcriptos ad verbum, nec nominatos.' Ed.]

LECT.
I.

ancient physics; the least interesting to my mind, however, because far the least rational, of all the efforts of the science of antiquity. In the science of mind, the subjects of investigation are either logical, where little is left for mere observation, or psychological, where observation is to a certain considerable degree inevitable, and always feasible, even to a single individual; but in the physical investigation of the material world (especially that part of it with which the ancients chiefly busied themselves, astronomy, and the extensive department which they termed meteorology), to theorize without vast and combined and registered observation will infallibly lead astray; the first aspect of the phenomena to an observer who does not vary his position, or multiply and diversify his trials, being usually some intricate complication in which the original laws are wrapped up under a thousand disguises,—disguises which, in most cases, no effort of individual sagacity has the smallest chance of penetrating by the exercise of mere reflection. Hence it is, that while the physical conjectures of antiquity are seldom of value, except as illustrating (which they do very strikingly) the successive forms under which the imagination accommodates itself to facts, and facts to itself,—the relics of the genuine reflective science of the ancients are always deserving of reverent inspection, and even in their very errors will generally be found to present an aspect of truth.

Plutarch.

Plutarch comes before us both as a direct and indirect recorder of the theories and sentiments of philosophic antiquity. His indirect or occasional references are principally to be met scattered through those most delightful treasures of the gossip of Greece and Rome, his biographies. Far less generally known than these universally-popular remains, his moral writings—highly valuable for their own sake—are also of much value in an historical light. His principal direct contribution to the history of philosophy is the treatise *De Placitis Philosophorum*, if indeed that treatise be Plutarch's. It is a lively, superficial sketch, strongly reminding the reader—except in its moral tone, which is somewhat higher—of the graceful, unsubstantial, forms in which Philosophy was accustomed to reveal herself in the France of the last century. It cannot be omitted, however in any collection of our few ancient authorities. You will add to it the philosophic physician *Galen's*

Galen.

* [Interesting notices are to be found in Plutarch's controversial tracts against the Stoics and Epicureans, especially in that *adv. Colotem*. Also in the treatise on the Delphian *Et*, and in the *Questiones Platonicae*, &c. Both the *Placita Philosophorum*, and the tract attributed to Galen, are now acknowledged to be spurious. ED.]

tract on the history of philosophy; which indeed seems to be little more than a republication of the other, or a continuation of it. LECT.
I.

The largest collection of these details, transmitted to us in a classical language, is the well-known work of Diogenes Laertius, who probably^a lived about the time of the Antonines. A voluminous and very miscellaneous collection, the reader of it must bring at least as much light as he receives, in order to study it with advantage. It would be ungrateful, however, to dispatch with only this negligent criticism, a collector to whom we are indebted for a vast assemblage of facts, anecdotes, and sentiments, which, but for the humble industry of Diogenes Laertius, would have been for ever lost to modern times. It has been the laborious task of many modern critics to investigate the authenticity of his narratives, and to correct his occasional precipitancy. The erudite commentary of Menage is the principal performance of this kind.

The commentary of Menage upon the biographies of Diogenes Laertius recalls naturally the beautiful treatise attributed to Origen^b, under the title of *Philosophumena*; for it was in this commentary that the world of letters was first made acquainted with some portions of that valuable relic. The anxiety which these extracts stimulated, for a completer publication, was gratified by Gronovius in the eleventh volume of his magnificent *Thesaurus of Greek Antiquities* (published separately in 1706 by Chr. Wolff). This composition consists of a remarkably clear compendium of the doctrines and successions of Grecian philosophy; and though written, as the introduction declares, as preliminary to a confutation of some of the more philosophical heresies of the time, is free from exaggeration

^a [More probably in the first half of the *third* century. Laertius mentions both Sextus Empiricus and his successor Saturninus. The former but not the latter is mentioned by Galen, Opp. xiv. p. 683, Kühn, who died A.D. 200, and who would probably have mentioned Saturninus had he been a contemporary. This consideration has led Menage to place Laertius later than Galen. See his notes on D. I. IX. § 116. Ed.]

^b [It may seem superfluous to inform the reader that Origen's claim to the authorship of this treatise is now waived in favour of his contemporary, Hippolytus, bishop of Portus. The *Philosophumena* is the introductory book of a larger work in ten books, entitled *Against all Heresies* (usually quoted under the title *Confutatio Haresium*). Of these ten the last seven were discovered nearly entire in 1842, and were not very skilfully edited in 1851 by a Frenchman, M. Miller, under the auspices of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press. The newly-discovered books are rich in quotations, and contain some new and interesting fragments of the earlier philosophers. The fidelity with which such passages are cited often contrasts somewhat ludicrously with the forced interpretation put upon them by the author, the object of whose treatise is to shew that the Christian heretics were indebted for their doctrines to Pagan authors. See Bernays's *Epistola Critica*, appended to the 4th volume of Bunsen's *Hippolytus and his Age*. Ed.]

LECT.
I.

and misstatement to a degree not always observable in the references to Pagan philosophy by the champions of our early Christianity. The ascription of it to Origen is attended with many difficulties. In the outset the author seems to claim the honours of the episcopal office, which we know Origen never possessed. Speaking of the Apostolic spirit, he says, *ὅν ἡμεῖς διάδοχοι τυγχάνοντες τῆς τε αὐτῆς χάριτος μετέχοντες, ἀρχιερατείας⁷ τε καὶ διδασκαλίας, καὶ φρουροὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας λελογισμένοι, κ.τ.λ.* It is, however, barely possible, that (as Gronovius, who, as well as our own Pearson, advocates its Origenian descent, holds) the author may not have meant the highest order of the Christian ministry by these expressions; and certainly no other candidate has been shewn—Epiphanius, Ætius, Didymus, &c.—whose claims are at all more plausible than those of the learned catechist of Alexandria, to whom the manuscripts collated by Gronovius were unanimous in ascribing it.

Epipha-
nius.The Chris-
tian Fa-
thers.

The Epiphanius who has just been mentioned, has himself presented us with an abridged view of the Greek philosophy; and I may add, that the Christian Fathers in general (due allowance being made for their own strong prejudices against the theories they undertook to state) will be found an opulent source of information on many points connected with the subject of our present researches, more particularly the Alexandrian Clement, Eusebius, Lactantius, Origen, and Augustine.

Philostra-
tus and
Eunapius.

I have now nearly exhausted the scanty store of our ancient authorities. Philostratus and Eunapius consecrated their labours to the Neo-platonic school; and the latter⁸ wrote a work still extant, under the title of *Lives of the Sophists*. A very beautiful edition of this collection was published in 1822 by Boissonade (at Amsterdam), with vast critical aids and illustrations. Eunapius belonged to the latter period of the school, and furnishes some curious specimens of its extravagances. Athenæus, though a libeller in whom confidence can scarcely be placed, will deserve to be consulted, as well as the fragmentary notices of Aulus Gellius and Macrobius. The fifth century gives us the physical and ethical selections of Stobæus, of which, themselves fragments, we possess but fragments. The edition of Prof. Heeren, published at Göttingen in 1792

Athenæus,
Aulus Gel-
lius, and
Macrobius.

Stobæus.

⁷ [The meaning of this word is fixed by Tertullian, as quoted by Dr Wordsworth in his well-reasoned treatise on this subject: "Dandi baptismum jus habet Summus sacerdos, qui est Episcopus." *De Bapt.* c. 17. Ed.]

⁸ [Philostratus also wrote *Lives of the Sophists*. This book, which is valuable to the historian of Literature, and also, though in a less degree, to the historian of Philosophy, is best read in Kayser's edition, Heidelb. 1838. Ed.]

and 1801, though I have not myself seen it, I have heard from high authority so abundantly praised that I cannot hesitate to direct to it your notice^{8a}. In earlier times the prison-hours of the illustrious Grotius were consoled by critical labours upon the same precious text. Beyond these I know not that I can offer you any further material guidance except Hesychius's treatise of the sixth⁹, the *Myriobiblion* of Photius, of the ninth, and the Lexicon of Suidas belonging to the tenth century¹⁰. That confused, though with all its faults valuable, repertory may be considered as the last¹¹ existing depository of genuine and original classical learning; in that gloomy age the primal light expires, and the next generation arises in the dim reflected beams of exposition, criticism, and collation of the past¹².

LECT.
I.

Hesychius,
Photius,
Suidas.

From this slight sketch of the amount of our ancient originals (the primary materials for our researches) you will easily perceive that their real extent is not great. Probably to many of you this conclusion will come with some surprise. When these authorities meet you repeatedly cited in their diversity of editions on the crowded margins of learned treatises of various kinds, they acquire an illusive multiplicity. They seem to increase in actual quantity and number, as light appears to do by repeated reflections. It will at least be some compensation for the regret we feel at remembering the irreparable loss of so many interesting sources of thought as time, and war, and accident, and barbarism, and bigotry, have destroyed, if a knowledge of the limited extent of our real possessions lead you to contemplate the prospect of surveying them without the vulgar dread of being wholly lost in the labyrinth.

You will have observed, that in this list I have almost exclusively confined myself to classical authorities. My

This enumeration
does not

^{8a} [Heeren's edition is now superseded by Gaisford's. Ed.]

⁹ [Hesychius of *Miletus* (temp. Justinian) wrote a short treatise *περί τῶν ἐν ταῖς διαλαμπάνων σοφῶν*, which has been edited by Orelli, Leipz. 1820. The work is in great part a mere abridgement of Laertius, and has, in its turn, been largely used by Suidas. Some notices it contains which, according to Orelli, are not to be found elsewhere. Ed.]

¹⁰ [The date of Suidas is uncertain. Many additions seem to have been made to the original Lexicon, some of which refer to events in the *eleventh* century. Ed.]

¹¹ [We must except the Commentary of Eustathius, who lived late in the 12th century. Ed.]

¹² [If this enumeration of ancient sources, the Greek commentators on Aristotle should have been mentioned. Some of them, as Alexander Aphrodisiensis, who lived in the second and third, and Simplicius, who died in the sixth century of the Christian era, take very high rank among secondary authorities. Ed.]

LECT. reason has been, not at all that these are our *only* means of attaining a conception of some of those philosophies which the Greeks termed Barbaric, but that the native authorities are of so wholly distinct a character, that to have enumerated them in a common catalogue would only tend to confusion. You will easily separate the general body of authorities into the natural division which sets on one side the works themselves of the philosophers, and on the other the details regarding them or their doctrines, preserved in the writings of others. Now it is with the latter I have principally engaged you (the former being too obvious to require specification), and of the latter it may be said with almost equal truth, that *all* eastern philosophy belongs to it (as professing principally to record traditional dogmas), or that *none* does. In either case, these Oriental sources are separated from the purpose and matter of our late enumeration; in the former view of their position, as being only apparently not really historical, in the latter, as being neither one nor the other." We shall therefore reserve them for brief notice when the philosophy, whose condition we are to trace by them, shall come under inspection.

comprise
the sources
of Oriental
Philosophy.

Reason of
this.

Defects of
the ancient
histories of
Philosophy.

You will also perceive, from the nature of the works we have cited, that the idea of a *philosophical* history of philosophy does not appear to have ever come before the mind of the ancient speculatists with anything of the distinctness and force it has assumed of late years. A mere abstract of tenets, without connexion or order, without any enlightened attempt to harmonize apparent contradictions, by detecting the secret unity that reconciles them (or, what is scarcely less valuable, by detecting the principle of the error), without any comparison of analogous doctrines in different systems, without any investigation of the occasional influences of external circumstances, as political constitutions and crises, climates, habits of life,—and still more, without any attempt to trace the march of reason itself amid all the variety of its forms and dresses,—this detached unorganized enumeration seems to have been the highest conception which the ancients possessed of a history of philosophy. And yet, it would be unjust to the memory of one great man to omit the following striking passage from Hippocrates. "It is a useful study," says that acute and comprehensive thinker, "to contemplate with attention the progress of arts and sciences, and to seek carefully why it was that certain views and experiments have not succeeded in public estimation when they really deserved success, and why others have obtained celebrity without any genuine claim to it. Was it chance? Then *such* a chance would

deserve deep investigation*." In this suggestion you recognize the spirit which should animate a general history of opinions, and a direct annunciation of one important branch of it. We shall presently see how these conceptions of the illustrious physician were revived in a form still more substantial and definite among the *desideranda* of Lord Bacon. As to the great leaders of the Grecian mind who have exercised so vast an empire over subsequent ages—the Platos and Aristotles—they were too busy in fortifying their own edifices of speculation to bestow any real attention upon the laws of progressive advancement before and around them, even if a mass of experience had been collected adequate to justify positive conclusions. I should rather have expected this class of inquiries to have originated among the erudite professors of Alexandria; and is it quite certain that in this respect time has not robbed us of some portion of our literary inheritance? However this may be, the great revolution of that age must have soon occupied and absorbed the attention of all speculative men; and it did, we know, ultimately exercise on pagan philosophy an influence that hurried it off into a strange supramundane region, which afforded indeed some of its most striking experiences to the history of philosophy, but was exceedingly unfavourable to the cultivation of that study itself.

It becomes now my duty to present you with some notices of the bibliography of our subject as cultivated by the erudition of modern ages. I confess, however, that I altogether despair of communicating an idea at once clear and copious of the literature of this vast department, within the limits of time to which a lecture, to retain any hold on the memory, must necessarily be restricted. I am not ashamed to add, that for a *complete* account of this enormous aggregate of learning (itself no small library, and every day gathering new contributions) I cannot pretend to be qualified. Many of these voluminous performances of the last fifty or sixty years I have never seen and never expect to see; many more I have now and then found occasion to refer to, and can only estimate from the degree of familiarity such transitory acquaintanceship permits. Notwithstanding this, I think I may venture to promise that I can make you acquainted, without much danger of material error, with at least the principal stages and monuments of the progress of the study. The occasion requires, no more.

* I owe this quotation to M. Dégérando (in his pretty, not profound, *Histoire Comparée*,) [T. I. p. 118, where, however, no reference is given. Ed.]

LECT.
I.

*Period of the
revival of
letters pro-
duced no
histories of
Philosophy.*

In that great reformation of the direction of thought, which will for ever make the fifteenth century one of the most interesting in the history of humanity, the rediscovery of classical literature performed a leading part. It is of course unnecessary to dwell upon the immediate historical causes of this event: they are familiarly known to you all. While the scholastic doctors of the West were proud to devote their labours to illustrate the dark dogmas of a spurious or disguised Aristotle, consecrating their inexhaustible perseverance to the embellishment of an image whose faint and false copy of the great original came to them through the double and distorting medium of Hebrew translated from Arabic translations,—the literati of the Grecian empire,—such men as Michael Psellus the historian, Eustratius, Metochites, were still enabled to study, along with the other remains of classical literature, the profound and pregnant purport of the Stagyrte in his, and their, native tongue. But the Ottoman cloud long impending over the city of Constantine at length discharged its thunders; and the new occupant of the throne of the Comneni and Palæologi had little value for a knowledge which had not enabled its possessors to preserve their freedom, and which he found to be in them but too consistent with such habits of servility as his ruder barbarian philosophy had dignity enough to despise. Accordingly, the men of letters fled the beautiful capital of the East, ever since lost to Christendom; and brought with them the precious deposit of ages to the shores of Italy. The desolation of the East forced on the civilization of the West. Venice, Milan, above all, the brilliant commercial democracy of Florence with its Medici, received and welcomed them. I have not time to enlarge. Suffice it to say, the interpretation of antiquity became the passion of the time. Above all, its philosophy attracted attention, and the conciliation of its doctrines with the tenets of the Church became the chosen task of the chief writers of the South of Europe. This might be deemed a probable period for the prosecution of the history of Philosophy. Far from it. This was but the infancy of the modern European mind—a mighty infancy indeed, but still an infancy, and dependent. And the conception of the History of Philosophy belongs not to such a state, but to the highest and most practised vigour of the adult intellect. Besides, these venerated relics (like those of their sanctuaries) were for a time too profoundly revered to be subjected to the rude grasp of the historical dissector. But towards preparing at a distance the materials for future edifices, much, doubtless, was done. Detached dissertations, abstracts, enumerations, analyses, soon abounded.

The struggle which necessarily arose between the disciples of the recovered Aristotle and the recovered Plato, added earnestness, and therefore vigour and value, to these labours. As this active warfare, proceeded, among other critics of the progress of past and present thought, the learned Spaniard Ludovicus Vives—from the year of the discovery of America—held a distinguished place. His treatise *De Causis Corruptarum Artium* (1531), contains thoughts which three centuries have not deprived of freshness. Another of his writings, *De Initiiis, Sectis, et laudibus Philosophorum*, is more directly connected with our subject. Nothing of the kind in that age is, I believe, beyond it, but it is not beyond its age. Books on the same subject I have seen cited under the names of Chytræus and Frisius, and dating in this 16th century; but as I have never seen the originals I cannot venture any judgment regarding them. It is quite certain however that nothing was directly contributed to the real history of Philosophy, as a systematic study, in the 15th and 16th centuries, worthy to delay its pupils in the nineteenth. The labours of this period were distinct, detached, preparatory*. Philosophy was not yet ripe for her own history: she had too vast a part to play in the coming age to find time or inclination as yet for reflecting on the laws of her own movements.

Sixteenth
century.
Ludovicus
Vives, &c.

We arrive at the 17th century;—the century whose earlier years were illumined by Bacon and Descartes, whose later period was filled with the fame of Malebranche, Leibnitz, Newton, and Locke. Bacon, whose comprehensive and creative intelligence let few of the possibilities of human science pass, has marked with great force and beauty the proper characters of a history of this kind,—not perhaps its highest characters, but characters such as sufficiently separate his *prospectus* from anything that had been realized before his age. I allude to the description of the History of Letters which you will find in the 4th chapter of the 2nd book of his treatise *De Augmentis*†, and to another important passage in the 4th chapter of the 3rd book of the same work, on the construction of a proper collection of the *Placita*, or Cosmological Determinations of the Ancient Philosophy. I must now be content with a mere reference; but I hope hereafter to draw your attention to the passages themselves.

Seventeenth
century.

Bacon's idea
of a History
of Philo-
sophy.

I will now proceed to enumerate, for your direction and

* Such (for example) as Telesius's account of the philosophy of Parmenides; Patricius's *Dissensiones Peripateticae*, still considered of high authority; Melancthon's *Physics of Aristotle*, Lipsius's Stoical treatises, &c.

† See Dégérando, Tome I. p. xii. &c.

LECT.
I.

assistance, the writers upon this extensive subject who appear most to deserve your notice; beginning about the middle of the 17th century. To those who are not really interested in the attainment of accurate knowledge, such a catalogue must appear insufferably tedious, even though abbreviated to the compass which my present time necessitates: but as I will not presume that any of my auditory are of these superficial habits, I make no apology for descending to being useful. 'I can only say that such a sketch would have been to myself invaluable at the outset of my boyish studies; and I can easily believe there are others similarly circumstanced. The object here is, not to find authors, for they are innumerable; but to select a few whose value can be warranted, and which are not very difficult of attainment.

The great philosophical movement of the 17th century acted upon minds according to their previous intellectual habits and constitution. While it urged the more ambitious and less laborious to attempt achieving for themselves a name in the records of the history of reason, it turned the labours of the critic into the construction of such a history; philosophy now being, each day more and more, forcibly vindicating to itself a right equal to that of military or imperial glory, to the possession of its Livys and its Tacituses. However as the Livys and the Tacituses must be preceded by the humbler diligence of chroniclers and annalists, you most not be surprised if we commence by the collectanea of our own Stanley (the first edition dates 1655, the second edition dates 1687), under the title of a *History of Philosophy*. But Stanley's miscellany is rather a common-place book of anecdotes and extracts than a history. It was translated long after, in 1711, into Latin, and illustrated with notes and other additions, which render the translated form (as I understand) much superior to the original*. The book, regarded in the light in which I have presented it to you, is of real value; bringing together an immense assemblage of detached materials, and not the less valuable, doubtless, for being totally without connexion or system—a task for which in its perfection, perhaps, the age was not adequate—assuredly not the author; and the attempt to effect which would only have led to perversion, suppression, or distortion. In the year 1658 the work of Gerard John Vossius *De Philosophia et Philosophorum sectis*, was published by his son. It bears many marks of the great learning and ability of its compiler, many marks also of being a posthumous perform-

* Let us not, however, refuse to our countryman the honour of being the first extensive collector of the stores of antiquity.

ance. Its author's name has added more celebrity to it than it has added to the name of its author. The treatise of Duhamel, the predecessor of Fontenelle, *De Consensu Veteris et Novæ Philosophiæ*, belongs to the year 1663. The writings of De Launoy, of the Sorbonne, which are many and various, will be found valuable for occasional reference, especially to those who are anxious to investigate the literary history of the middle ages. A very learned but very fanciful work of the same period may be read with some advantage if read with great caution—Theophilus Gale's¹³ *Court of the Gentiles*, 1677. It was the fashion of his age and school to discover in the law and history of Moses the primal fountains of all speculative knowledge; a project which, however well intended, has ever seemed to me (apart from its actual fallacy) exceedingly ill-judged. Its practical result will ever be, not at all so much to exalt the majesty of the Jewish revelation as to elevate uninspired writings to an equality with it in point of authority; and thus, while increasing its absolute, to diminish its comparative, dignity. And such precisely was the result in the similar attempts upon Platonism by Mirandula and others, at the revival of letters. Christianity was the apparent, but Plato was the real, gainer by the alliance. Very different in its value and authority is the great work of Cudworth¹⁴, which was published in the following year, 1678. *The Intellectual System* (waving a few peculiarities which detach without much difficulty from the body of the work) is of inestimable value to the careful student of philosophical doctrines. "He launched out," says one whose learning was worthy to praise Cudworth, "into the immensity of the Intellectual System, and at his first essay penetrated the very darkest recesses of antiquity, to strip atheism of its disguises, and drag up the lurking monster into day." (Warburton, *Div. Leg.*, Pref. to Books IV. V. VI.) You will, if possible, accompany Cudworth with the learned notes of Mosheim. To pass from the English to the Gallican Church,—the *Evangelical Demonstration* of Huet, 1679 (which is easily attainable), contains a vast treasury of ancient learning in this department. Huet is to be read with much the same precautions as that Eusebius whose title perhaps he affected to imitate; that is to say, with due

LECT.
I.
Duhamel.

De Launoy.

Gale, Court
of the Gen-
tiles.

Cudworth.

Intellectual
System.

Huet.

¹³ [Not to be confounded with Thomas Gale of Trinity College, Cambridge, a scholar of great eminence in his day, and the editor of *Opuscula Mythologica*, &c. Theophilus hardly deserves the recommendation in the text. Ed.]

¹⁴ [Cudworth, though an exceedingly learned and thoughtful writer, is not to be relied on as a critic; nor indeed, until Bentley arose, was the importance of a discriminating criticism fully understood by the learned. The *testimonia veterum*, in which the Intellectual System is so rich, were rather counted by its author than weighed. Ed.]

LECT.
I.

Bayle.

Eighteenth
century.

Thomasius.

Heineccius.

Fabricius.

Brucker.

Character
of his his-
tory.

and constant allowance for the writer's own opinions and prejudices. The subtle historical scepticism, and the research equally extensive and minute, of the Dictionary of Bayle (1697), gave a powerful impulse to all inquiries into the history of opinions. It has many faults, some repulsive and some dangerous; but it will ever occupy a prominent place in the history of letters, as first exemplifying on a vast scale that union of positive learning and keen inquiry, which, if it has sometimes led to consequences unhappy and unjustifiable, is also the source of everything practically valuable in the knowledge of the past.

In 1705 was published (a posthumous work too) the *History of the Various Fortunes of Metaphysics*, of James Thomasius,—a performance which judges of some weight seem to consider as forming almost an epoch in this study. Many important and pregnant remarks scattered through the writings of Leibnitz were gradually leading to notions more profound of the *science* of philosophical history; though the time was not yet arrived for attempting the realization of such views. Can we say that our own age has seen more than the attempt?...I must not suffer the brief *Elementa Historiæ Philosophiæ* of Heineccius, 1743, nor even the invaluable *Bibliotheca Græca* of Fabricius, 1705—1728¹⁰ (to which all subsequent writers, without exception, gratefully acknowledge their obligations), nor the History, now forgotten, of Des Landes (1730—6), to detain me from introducing you at once to the vast achievement of Brucker, a work which alone is a library, and which must ever be the groundwork of all histories of Philosophy. The first volume appeared in 1742, having been preceded (as in most of the historians of Philosophy) by many detached dissertations; among the rest an *Historia philosophica Doctrinæ de Idæis*, of great research and value, which appeared in 1723. It would be impossible to exaggerate the patience, the care, and the unaffected honesty, with which Brucker has executed his immense task. His own maxim he undeviatingly followed, "Quærendi sunt fontes, ubi haberi possunt, proximi." With a diligence truly German he has explored the biography of philosophers as well as their doctrines; and it would be difficult to name a circumstance concerning either transmitted to us from antiquity, which the indefatigable industry of Brucker has not gathered into the vast granary of his six quartos. But the results of this industry are too vast for ordinary appetites or ordinary digestion; and Brucker will ever be regarded rather as

¹⁰ [The best edition of Fabricius is Harles's, 1790. The *Bibliotheca Græca* is a book which can never lose its value. ED.]

the encyclopedist than the historian of philosophy. He is referred to by all who cultivate an accurate knowledge of ancient reason; he is revered as the true father of the critical history of philosophy; he is, I can truly affirm, plundered unmercifully by the dealers in borrowed erudition (witness the *Encyclopédie*, whose articles on ancient philosophy are simply Brucker served up in epigrams); but it is probable that the author himself of this great digest is the only person who has ever read his work consecutively. To trace the subtle influences of ages and climes, to reduce to their laws the complicated efforts of intelligence, if destined for *any* age, was certainly not for Brucker's; and, perhaps, even after his learned, comprehensive, and most admirable performance, the world did not still possess more than the materials for the History of Philosophy.

To the well-known work of Montesquieu it is probable that the higher conceptions of this study which have since arisen may trace, if not their origin, at least their growth and vigour. The *Spirit of Laws* was a work prolific of works to come¹⁶. The main ideas—the influence of circumstances upon development, and the possibility of classifying the startling varieties of political history under the simpler laws of human nature—admitted so natural an application to the kindred varieties presented in the history of reason, that we might feel surprise if such essays had *not* been suggested and attempted. It was for a Frenchman to generalize the external relations of humanity; to the German mind we should look for the transference of the design to its internal development. And yet, though many detached works were produced which manifested the commencement of the fermentation—innumerable dissertations on the Idea of the History of Philosophy, on its rules, design, utility,—a long period intervened before a vigorous attempt was made to realize these exalted conceptions. Meanwhile, in France the writings and the influence of Condillac, the most arbitrary and exclusive of all speculatists, were little calculated to foster the catholicity of philosophical spirit which alone can qualify for the honest and temperate survey of the long story of human reason. His own *Traité de Systèmes*, and similar sketches, are not histories, but arguments, not the statements of a judge, but of an advocate. The school of which Condillac was the metaphysical oracle was still less qualified for this work. To an exclusive philosophy they added the bigotry

Montesquieu: indirect influence of his *Spirit of Laws*.

Condillac. Anti-historical spirit of his opinions.

¹⁶ [Without any desire to depreciate this or any other work of Montesquieu, I may observe that the chief value of the *Esprit des Loix* to the student of ancient philosophy lies in the comparison of its method of handling the subject with those of Plato, of Aristotle in the *Politics*, and of Cicero in his *Republic and Laws*. Ed.]

LECT.
I.

of irreligion; accepting miscellaneous all historical conclusions, however mutually destructive, from which arguments could be extorted unfavourable to the Jewish and Christian revelations; and, with the arrogance of ignorance, affecting to despise every other. The *Esquisse* of Condorcet, which Dégérando praises, seems to me to be deficient in every requisite which could confer value upon such a work. I have, however, pleasure in recommending the learned treatise of the President Goguet, on the *Origin of Laws, Arts, and Sciences*. It first appeared in 1758.

D'Alembert. The beautifully written dissertation of d'Alembert prefixed to the French *Encyclopédie*, will, like almost everything from the pen of that exquisite artist of style, reward perusal; but in it, as in all the writings of that period, the ambition of the writer injures the precision of the investigator; and a brilliant epigram is often the Procrustes' bed to which truth must submit to fit herself or be rejected.

Tiedemann. After many preliminary labours—those for instance of Meiners and Gurliitt—the great work of Tiedemann appeared in Germany. It was published from 1791 to 1797. The title, *The Spirit of Speculative Philosophy*, sufficiently indicates the superiority of its historical design to the performances we have been considering. Tiedemann was a disciple of the philosophy of Locke¹⁷; and his views, it is admitted, strongly colour his historical conclusions.

Tennemann, a Kantian. Tennemann, who was a Kantian, soon followed. Superior perhaps to Tiedemann in learning, he was also like him encumbered by exclusive loyalty to his philosophical master. His voluminous history was published in detached volumes from 1798 to 1820. Dégérando's *Comparative History* appeared in 1804, and was republished under a much improved form in 1821. It is easily accessible, and, if not very profound, is always pleasing, amiable, equitable, and unaffected. You do not require to be reminded of the admirable *Fragments* of the immortal Adam Smith, edited by our late and lamented Dugald Stewart; nor of that excellent philosopher's own Dissertation, which no one will neglect who cultivates the modern history of European reason. Finally, we arrive at Ritter and V. Cousin. Ritter is always learned, often original, often also capricious: Cousin, whose history of *ancient* philosophy is only brief and introductory, is vivid, systematic, sweeping, and eloquent. But the long period I have now detained you warns me to cease. Detailed criticism upon these latter writers is indeed the less necessary, as their general views of the method and object

¹⁷ [He was at least an Empiricist, and a strenuous opponent of Kant. Ed.]

of scientific history will appear in some degree represented in my next Lecture, when I shall endeavour to lay before you my views of the ideal and the prospects of the genuine History of Philosophy¹⁸. LECT.
I.

¹⁸ [The favourite *History of Greek Philosophy* is at present E. Zeller's, the 2nd edition of which was completed 1868. Some portions of this have been translated into English. Among English histories of Philosophy may be named those of Mr G. H. Lewes, Professor Ferrier, and Professor Maurice (*Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, ed. 2); all these shewing great ability, though written from different or opposite points of view. E.D.]

LECTURE II.

ON DEFINITIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, &c.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
II.

*Definition
of "Philoso-
phy."
The Science
of Princi-
ples.*

*Questionable
value of
such preli-
minary
definitions.*

*They are
frequently
found inade-
quate, and
so trans-
gressed.*

*Wide mean-
ing of "Phi-
losophy"
among the
ancients.*

IN commencing to speak of the History of Philosophy, we may be asked what we mean by "Philosophy." Let us say then that Philosophy is the science of principles — of the principles eminently of knowledge and action. This will probably serve for a definition as precise and comprehensive as any other, to those who require or value one. A logical definition is not, however, of much consequence in opening our present subject, or any subject which explains and limits itself in the course of detail. Students of the History of Philosophy will be sure to form their own definition, ideal or verbal, in the presence of facts. They will insensibly add, subtract, modify, as circumstances direct. It is thus indeed that, child and man, we gather all our ideas of the significance of our own language; experience is our prompter; and what living experience does for us, history will not fail to do, which is the image of experience. Indeed, if I were to govern myself by those who have already treated this subject at large, I should be warned to beware of definitions. The majority of their performances commence with these formal designations of the nature and limits of the subject; and I have generally observed that either the definition is inadequate, and afterwards fortunately transgressed, or that this prefatory outline is so vast, not to say indistinct, as never to be filled up in the execution of the work. Among the ancients, as Philosophy signified the pursuit of knowledge in all its forms (for in the infancy of science, as in that of art, the division of labour is not known), the history of philosophy would have been the history of every effort after the attainment of information. Among modern authors, although there is little fear of this confusion, although philosophy stands clearly apart from the brilliant array of her subject sciences, yet this very remoteness and loftiness of separation seems to leave the great object scarcely defined in the distance; each speculator is ena-

bled to see it, not as it is, but as he would have it; and the shadowy form of "Philosophy" resembles that magical apparition in the *Faust* of Goethe, in which each of a thousand beholders recognizes only the image of his own beloved. The excellent Brucker, whose habits of intellect were simple, straightforward, and practical, finds in philosophy the science of happiness. It is, says he, at the opening of his great repository of learning, "Studium sapientiæ;" and "sapientia" is "solida cognitio veritatis circa eas res quæ ad veram hominis felicitatem faciunt, et ad usum et praxin applicari possunt." This partial and limited view of philosophy could scarcely have been expected from a pupil of either of *his* masters, Descartes or Leibnitz. But if Brucker leans too much to the practical purposes of philosophical inquiry, his more modern countrymen seem to incline with an equally undue bias to the speculative. Philosophy is defined by Tennemann, "the efforts of reason to realize the idea of Science according to the primary laws of nature and liberty." With Jacobi* it is "the science of determinate connexion independent of experience." And with all the creative and profound thinkers who have risen out of the fragments of the Kantian school, the same tendency is more or less manifested. Possessed, absorbed, by the great question of the value of human reason, they can scarcely admit the title of any philosophical discussion which does not ultimately flow into these depths of thought. Restlessly agitated by the desire to penetrate these august sanctuaries of man, of nature, and of Deity, they coldly turn aside from the slow and scanty conclusions of mere experience¹;—they have no real sympathy but with those who, like themselves, would prefer winging their dim way for ever over an illimitable ocean, to taking shelter in the ark of a more timid philosophy, though it could shew in its little compass a specimen of all that the daily world possessed. Better, they think it, to hope for those things than to possess these!

Historians of Philosophy, however, must have no predilections, and therefore no exclusive definitions. The world of thought is vaster than any system, and no school that the world has yet seen is fitted to constitute itself the arbitrary judge of all. When Buffon styled himself a mind equal to the majesty of nature, he assumed a title which

LECT.
II.*Modern attempts at definition.**That of Brucker;**of Tennemann;**of Jacobi.**The historian of philosophy has no right to adapt its definition to the peculiarities of a system.*

* I take this (of Jacobi) *not* from actual perusal.

¹ [The Germans are certainly inferior, as psychologists, to the English, Scotch, and even the French. The strange materialistic mania with which some later Germans are infected seems to me as injurious to the study of pure psychology as the most high-flying idealism of a past generation. ED.]

LECT.
II.

not only no individual, but no class of individuals, is competent to arrogate. And in this study, as one of the most valuable of its practical advantages is the liberation from exclusive prejudices, it would be peculiarly unfortunate to commence by sacrificing to one which would vitiate the entire course of investigation.

*Conditions
of a perfect
History of
Philosophy
investi-
gated.*

Considering, then, "Philosophy" in its widest significance, as the "Science of Principles;" and freely allowing you to interpret the definition in proportion to your knowledge of the subject, I shall proceed to consider the nature, plan, and requisitions, of a perfect history of its progress. My subsequent Lectures will be far, indeed, from realizing the ideal thus sketched; but they may occasionally assist you towards conceiving how it *might* be realized. And I am not without hopes that hereafter, when the plan of these courses shall allow me to descend into minuter details, I may, by extending the History of Philosophy over several successive terms, present you with labours less unworthy so great an object.

The Phenomena of the Intellectual World at first sight seem to defy analysis.

When an ordinary observer first contemplates the vast mass of thought regarding the great problems of nature, humanity, and God—which exists either actually in the mouths and minds of living men, or in the state of written record,—there is (we may conceive) scarcely any perception of distinction, either in source or aspect, between any of its mingled materials. He perceives, indeed, plainly enough, the diversity of subjects and solutions that lie before him. He sees that there is scarcely a corner of the human mind or its concerns which the light of inquiry has not visited; and on which some verdict, or a variety of verdicts, may not be discovered. He sees that the same verdict reappears in different ages, and in different forms, and in different countries; and he remembers that many important practical developments have been contemporary with these various opinions, and contemporary too with their recurrence; and he suspects, perhaps, a relation deeper than any accidental synchronism between these two orders of phenomena. He cannot also fail to remark at any given age the difference in the rate of progress of co-existing nations, all nevertheless pursuing the same path with different velocities, and in a kind of successive order; so that the state of the intellectual world reminds him of that of the physical, where at the same instant one country is at its midnight, another in its opening morn, another, in that noon beyond which it ceases to ascend, another, again, in its evening decline, and all succeeding all. In some quarters too, he sees, or seems

to see, isolated fragments of speculation or belief, that appear wholly disconnected from all around them in space or time; for which he cannot discover any origin or any posterity, which seem, like the mystical patriarch, "without father, without mother, without descent." Here, by slow gradations, a people climb from stage to stage, to opinions which seem to satisfy their intellectual wants; there, a single powerful and comprehensive thinker seems to hold in himself the philosophic destinies of centuries, yet even *he* often as much creature as creator, often rather the gifted interpreter of the vague conjectures and unformed conceptions of his age, than the sole explorer of the truths on which—their editor even more than their author—his name is inseparably inscribed. He sees beneath him a mighty and fluctuating mass, the collected result of an enormous expenditure of human thought, or the product of some external influence, or the combination of both. But a mist rests upon the scene; and as yet he discerns little farther: except, indeed, it may be the prominence of a few stately structures which in various points of the intellectual landscape out-top the misty cloud that hangs upon the rest. In their outward form, too, how various is the aspect of these myriad tribes of sentiment and opinion! Sometimes they stand in panoply of proof at the close of a long file of deductions; armed at all points and defying all assailants; sometimes they meet us in august but broken fragments, the *torsos* of gigantic systems, all whose other members have for ever perished (thus the relics of the *Eleatic* doctrine); sometimes in vague aspirations where reasoning seems to have as it were evaporated in desires, fears, hopes;—sometimes, again, in the form of dogmas imperative and decided, not condescending to acknowledge the support of a reason on which they profess their right of enforcing terms and prescribing limitations. In their style and temper, the same diversity. In one teacher, the calmness of self-assured superiority; in another, the calmness of humble conviction; in a third, the restless energy of anxious proselytism; in a fourth, the absence of all character, in the cold strength of simple argument; in a fifth, a sixth, a seventh, severe and caustic bitterness—that most melancholy of all spectacles—the comrades who are embarked in the common vessel of human destiny, and under the common pressure of the tempest of human affliction, wasting the few hours allotted to each in contests, not for the priority of service, but for the reputation of it, for the name of strength where none are strong.

Now the true object of a true philosophical history is

LECT.
II.

to reduce this vast aggregate to the methodical unity of system; to classify its varieties, and to detect (as far as may be possible) the laws of their manifestation and their recurrence. It is in a manner the psychology of the human race; and undertakes to do that for the principles that lie hid in the stores of the universal mind, which ordinary psychology undertakes to do for those which regulate the development of an individual. In this aspect alone it rises to the dignity of a science; and if completely realized, would assuredly assume rank among the highest of all.

First approximation to a classification.

And as a first (and remote) approximation to the great work of system, we shall distribute that vast course of human thought which I have described into *three distinct* streams, which in *fact* are constantly united, but which philosophical analysis will easily separate. However blended be these currents of thought, you will have no difficulty in considering that all meditations, beliefs, convictions, manifest themselves under the distinct forms, first, of *irreflective* conceptions, the unlaboured product of the mind, without any definite act of attention or clear notion of the object in view; secondly, of *reflective* conceptions, the produce of a direct search for truth, accompanied by a perfect act of attention, and a notion more or less determinate, of the object of inquiry; and thirdly, of *revealed* conceptions, coming altogether from an external source, and in which the mind of man is, and knows itself to be, merely recipient. These classes, especially the first and second, it is not always easy to separate in real history, so as at once to reduce any intellectual phenomenon to its proper place; but in conception they are not less individually distinct from each other, than together inclusive of the whole extent of human thought.

and Revealed conceptions.

Now to which of these divisions belongs Philosophy and its History? The question is of some importance, because much confusion has arisen from misunderstanding, or not permanently preserving in force, the proper answer. In the history (as far as we can penetrate it) of those ancient movements of national intellect which have eventuated in Philosophy, reason rises into action, as generally from some external impulse, so without, for a considerable period, any distinct conception of the objects of its inquiry or the limitations of its powers. Now with this period the History of Philosophy, properly conceived, has no more direct concern than the physiology of human motion, in its perfect gracefulness, could have with the vague gropings of a wanderer in the dark. Again, these movements of mind in almost all the early distributions of the human family are found con-

With the first and third class Philosophy and its history are not concerned.

nected with professed revelations from heaven (a strong presumption, I may observe, in favour of some original reality); and with the web of these revelations it is that the first vague conceptions of the independent mind are found to be inextricably interwoven. That is to say, the first and third of our distributions, either apart or together, are those out of which the philosophical history of every country, in its primal development, is found to emerge. But these stages, though preliminary to philosophy, are not philosophy. Now, our men of erudition, whose tendency is always to estimate every element of learning in the compound proportion of its antiquity and its difficulty of access, by constantly including this species of undefined contemplation in their notion of Philosophy, have consequently been led to include it in their histories of Philosophy; and thus have detained and perplexed their readers with speculations not only unprofitable, but absolutely irrelevant to their true subject, respecting the "Philosophy" (as they term it) of ages in which we have no reason to believe that any conception of systematic inquiry, or even of systematic hypothesis, was ever attained.

Philosophy, then, belongs (and solely belongs) to the *second* division of human thought. It *can* commence only when reflection has commenced; as a conscious and independent exercise of the faculties: more particularly regarded, it begins when men, in any age or country, have for the first time proposed to themselves (by analysing the principles of their own reason and their past experience, whatever that may have been) to render a satisfactory account, of themselves, of the universe around them, of that great Being who governs both, and of the precise relations in which these terms are connected with each other. The first beginnings of these studies will of course be feeble, partial, and changeable; but wherever the independent use of reason upon them exists, there "Philosophy" exists, and not except there.

Philosophy then lies in the exercise of the *reflective* faculties in the investigation of first principles; and the history of Philosophy is the history of that exercise. A clear conception of this at once abridges our labour, and renders it more substantially profitable. In all cases (both of individuals and of communities, which have so many striking analogies with them) instinctive action precedes reflective analysis; and in some instances the former has been carried to extraordinary perfection, and at length raised to the height of exquisite Art, where the latter has scarcely been ever manifested. Temples are built before architecture is theorized, diseases are healed before physio-

Philosophy begins where reflection begins,

and consequently its history is the history of reflective thought only. Reflection always preceded by spontaneous action.

Examples

LECT.
II.

logy is understood, sculpture is perfected before the muscular anatomy is systematized, drawing exists before perspective, poetry before criticism, music before acoustics; and in like manner, both reason and the moral nature are long in operation before the effort to comprehend them or their objects has truly arisen. There is an instinctive logic, as there is an instinctive gratitude or a natural conscience; but the history of Philosophy should as little commence with these spontaneous developments as the history of Criticism should commence with the poems of Homer. On the other hand, the reason (previous to all philosophical development) may be externally and accidentally directed to objects (especially through the channel of religious doctrines) which long afterwards become the objects of genuine speculation; but the sameness of the object no more warrants us in identifying the mental movements towards it, than it would justify us in classing the gaze of the peasant at a planet with the telescopic examination of the same body by the astronomer. It is true, the change from the irreflective or merely recipient to the reflective state may not always be immediately discernible; a portion of every detailed history of Philosophy will always be justly occupied in fixing the transition; it may be unsuccessful in detecting it, and altogether undecided as to where in this border-land the boundaries of these rival districts should be accurately drawn:—the distinction, however, is not the less real between casual and dependent opinion and independent reflective effort, and must in aim and substance be preserved as our only security from confusion and embarrassment.

Subject approached.

Having thus, by a general analysis of the mass of human thought, cleared the particular notion of our subject from those adventitious encumbrances with which mistaken diligence has overloaded it, and endeavoured to intimate more precisely its proper scope (the efforts of self-dependent reason to define its own principles—those of the moral activity—those of the universe as a whole); we may proceed with a better chance of utility and success to a further analysis—that of the subject itself—of Philosophy considered as susceptible of a History.

In order to obtain a more comprehensive grasp of the subject we shall do well to approach it gradually and from a distance; first considering (though briefly) the conditions under which all things become appreciable, become matter of historical detail; and then passing into the peculiarities of our immediate question. For in studying the History of Philosophy, we may fairly involve the Philosophy of History. Let us begin from the depths of the purely

mathematical and purely logical sciences, and rise to the historical or contingent; thus, in their resemblances and contrasts, illustrating each by each.

LECT.
II.

(a) In all human conceptions of real existences there are two elements logically separable, the substantial and the circumstantial; the thing itself, and the relations under which it is apprehended. We speak (for example) of That which resists compression and whose points of resistance are spread through space, as of something which really exists, though we can only know of it in that relation to ourselves which is expressed in such a definition. We speak in like manner of That which thinks and feels, as of another distinct substance; though that thinking nature can only apprehend directly what it does, not what it is, and can know what it does, not what it is, and can know what it does only under similar relative or subjective conditions. In the same way, on a grander scale of thought, we may contemplate the whole universe as a vast phenomenon; under which the reason of man, by an inevitable deduction, recognizes the absolute necessity of some substantial Being, without the presupposition of which the notion of existence itself involved in every rational assertion, would be impossible. This distinction, then, of the substantial and the circumstantial,—the absolute and the relative,—seems to be involved in the very foundations of human reason.

Preliminary distinctions.

Substance and relation.

(b) Now of the circumstantial or relative conditions under which this absolute essence manifests itself to human apprehension, some, it is plain, are mentally necessary, others mentally contingent: that is to say, some are such that to perceive at all we must perceive subject to them; others such, that to suppose them altered would involve no contradiction. Of the former are such conditions as these, that every particular existence must be referred to a definite period of time, that every particular existence must be referred to something which *makes it to exist*, &c.: of the latter are such as these, that events should be experienced to exist at one part of time rather than another, that events should be experienced to follow under particular orders of succession rather than any other. The former are known to be certain from mental necessity; the latter are discovered to exist from actual experience. These two orders of coexisting beliefs, wholly distinct in their nature and origin, are harmonized to each other in the complexity of the human mind by the adapting skill of the great Author of our Being.

The necessary and the contingent.

To the second of these classes—events in their nature contingent but known to be stable, which forms the domain

Subdivision of contingent exist.

LECT.
II.

*ence into
determined
and unde-
termined.*

*Conscious-
ness is the
aggregate
of all these
classes of
apprehen-
sions.*

of the Natural or Inductive Sciences—must be added a third. As we have passed from apprehensions of truth felt to be necessary and immutable, to apprehensions of truths felt to be contingent but fixed; so we now pass from these events contingent but fixed, to events conceived as contingent but unfixed. This third department includes all events, on whatever laws dependent, which are (and so long as they are) considered as casual or accidental influences and connexions. In this class are, then, involved all facts whose laws of occurrence are either themselves unknown, or are though partially known, yet suspended upon conditions which are undetermined or indeterminable.

That all the course of human perception consists of apprehensions of these three kinds, it is, I suppose, unnecessary to delay you in establishing. But that which the mind does for nature, the history of knowledge does for the mind itself. It converts the knowledge of truth into itself a new truth, and registers the story of knowledge as a series of phenomena rich with the most valuable materials for the observation and classification of the inductive inquirer. And this it does under exactly the same circumstantial conditions as we have just seen to be applicable to every other mode of investigation and degree of knowledge. It regards the apprehension, or successive apprehensions of truth, as themselves manifestations (like all else) of that absolute will which as First Cause, that absolute existence which as Prime Substance, sustains the universe; it perceives them as produced in time and through space; it states their ordered succession; and finally, it notes those accompanying circumstances which, not as yet reduced under definite law, it leaves to future inquirers to methodize and arrange. All history, to be true, must be based upon facts; to be profitable, must be systematized by induction. Let us then briefly examine both, with reference to our subject. Let us no longer speak of history in general, or of the history of knowledge in particular; but of the History of Philosophy especially, as concerns the collection of its facts, and the establishment of its laws.

*Application
of these
distinctions.
First duty
of the his-
torian of
Philosophy:
to trace the
facts inter-
nal as well
as external
of the history
of opinion.*

(a) As regards, then, the History of Philosophy, properly so called, what will be the elements of inquiry in the collection of its facts? The first and most natural distribution should be this twofold arrangement. It should, on the one hand, collect and combine the scattered rudiments of pure reflective truth or error in every age, expounding (as far as is at once discernible) their *internal* connexion; it should, on the other, trace the interwoven order of circumstantial events which may illustrate their *external* fortunes. That this double line of inquiry is really

necessary, as regards the origin and propagation of error, will perhaps be readily conceded; but as concerns the history of truth, men are not so promptly inclined to admit its necessity. If truth, when presented to man, must as truth command his assent, from the universal identity of the mental constitution, it is conceived to derogate from the reality and the dignity of truth, to represent its success as dependent on circumstances not inherently connected with it. Now it is, indeed, certain that all truths are mutually consistent; that every separate problem, if solvable, has one truth for its solution; and that this truth, if fully and fairly brought before the mind, both as to its grounds and its deductions, must inevitably be known for what it is. But truth, though in itself thus sublimely uniform, does not manifest this uniformity in its apparition among mankind. When it becomes (so to speak) incarnated in human history, it suffers from the weakness of its position; and that which in its nature is one changeless reality, seems to shiver into a thousand-fold diversity. The history of Truth does not suppose truth itself to be multiple; but it supposes the circumstances, degrees, and aspects of its manifestation, to be multiple. It is the office of the science of truth to investigate truth as it is in itself; it is the office of the history of Truth to investigate truth as it appears to man. The one finds real unity in the diversity of things; the other often finds superficial diversity in the unity of truth. And this statement, as it is applicable to all histories of the particular sciences, so is it peculiarly applicable to the history of the science of the first principles of nature and man;—which, indeed, is the reason why I have inserted a representation general in its bearing, in this particular division of the subject.

Though truth is one its human manifestations are diverse.

To illustrate this point (the apparent diversity of real truth), on which the possibility or utility of a history of Philosophy so much depends, let us venture to classify some of its most general cases. Truth, indeed, of all kinds, specially the true theory of man and nature, is one. But this single truth (which of course comprehends an extensive series of propositions) may, 1st, be expressed in a diversity of forms; may, 2ndly, be joined with a variety of other propositions not evident or not true; may, 3dly, be only partially seen as to greater or less degrees of it; may, 4thly, be seen by different observers in different parts exclusively; may, 5thly, (though seen entire as to its actual elements) be yet so apprehended and stated as to destroy the proportion between the parts and to give undue weight to some. If you conceive the constant

Causes of this diversity.

LECT.
II.

application of these formulæ to the fortunes of philosophical truth, you can have no difficulty in perceiving how the actual unity of truth does not at all contradict the possibility of a perpetual diversity of its manifestations.

As to the complete enumeration of facts, then, the history of Philosophy includes the full statement of doctrines held, and the full statement of circumstances influencing their fortunes. And to accomplish this first task of such a history, you will readily perceive, requires no common endowments of industry, of learning, and of critical sagacity. I pass to the second and higher office of the historian of Philosophy,—the establishment of the *laws* that are found to obtain in the reception and diffusion of philosophical opinions.

Secondly, the historian of Philosophy has to determine the laws which regulate the reception and diffusion of opinions.

Now as we have defined for the enunciation of facts the two classes—doctrines and their circumstantial accompaniments—so shall we consider each distinctly in reference to the discovery of the *inductive laws* that (under the ordination of Providence) are found to regulate their successive history and mutual influences.

First,—as to doctrines themselves.

This he accomplishes, first, by classifying the schools of doctrine according to their intrinsic differences:

The first effort of classification is here directed to the reduction of the variety of systems under the smallest attainable number of leading principles. This generalization has been attempted with great boldness and brilliancy by many of the later writers upon this branch of history. An able representation of their views, with many ingenious additions, may be found in the clever work of M. Cousin. It is, after all, little more than an amplification of a single passage in the History of Tennemann, itself the result of preceding and protracted dissensions among the German literati. It is impossible, however, not to observe in these systematic statements, a tendency to the substitution of a *priori* deduction for experimental induction, precisely similar to that which marked the infancy of the physical science of the material world. In this study, moreover, the rapidity of the theorist is peculiarly suspicious; because facts can be disguised with peculiar facility, and thence both the historian and his pupil deceived into fancying an account complete where much is supposed, or much omitted*. These cautions are not, however, to be considered as detracting from the reality or dignity of the study itself; one which, indeed, in some degree forces itself upon the most ordinary readers of philosophical systems. Of empirical, of rational, of sceptical, of syncretistic, of mystical

* A striking instance of this tendency is exhibited in the writings of the celebrated Professor Hegel, of Berlin, who seems to have ventured the conception and execution of an *a priori* history of human knowledge.

schools, all men will speak who read to reflect; it is of only the more importance that they should speak of them with perception of their constituent tenets, and correctness of application to particular instances.

LECT.
II.

The second effort at the establishment of historical laws is directed to the *development* of doctrines in the hands of successive teachers. Of this principle the most general form unquestionably is, that doctrines increase in intensity and exclusiveness in proportion as they are transmitted through a longer series of defenders engaged from conviction or from situation to support them. When the original principles have been altogether exhausted of their consequences, this progression of course ceases; but until then (unless externally affected) it continues, the remotest consequences, which are usually the last deduced, being always the most daring and exclusive. For examples, you may recall, the Socratic hesitancy heightened into the Academic scepticism; Platonism compared with Neoplatonism; Locke and Condillac; Descartes and Fichte.

secondly,
by tracing
their inter-
nal develop-
ments:

The third class of these laws of the history of Philosophy I would refer to the mutual action and reaction of different systems. The effects—which are well worthy of the deepest inquiry—will be found to be of opposite kinds; that is, to result in either limitation or exaggeration, according to circumstances. A very striking instance of the latter efficacy may be found in the Cynic and Cyrenaic, and their successors, the Stoic and Epicurean institutes. Of the former the instances, though less definitely observable, are, perhaps, still more constant and more numerous; especially in those whose minds are not prepossessed by professional interest or the enthusiasm of a party.

thirdly, by
determining
their mutual
action
and reac-
tion.

To these intimations of some of the guiding principles of the scientific history of doctrines considered in themselves, I shall add two or three further remarks to exercise your powers of reflection. One shall be, that in almost all instances of philosophical development, the whole world—its origin and principles and construction and object—has been the *first* subject of human consideration. The reasons are, among others, these: The more constant interest felt in these external objects, on account of their being the great and earliest sources of pleasure and pain. The vast variety of outward objects which stimulates curiosity (minds being nearly the same in all men). Their differences and resemblances are far more easily detected. They appear far more easily modifiable by human effort; and thus the study seems to promise more valuable results. They admit of far greater varieties of explanation and hypothesis. The passage from the outward to the inward

Supplement-
ary obser-
vations.Objective
tendency of
all early
speculations.
its causes.Transition
from the

LECT.
II.

*outward to
the inward
effected in
three ways.*

worlds is usually accomplished by one of three paths: 1st, *Religious belief*; for this in a manner externalizing the mind itself (in the conception of a supreme mind or minds) transforms even the outward tendency into a mental one. 2nd, Logical disputation or scepticism, which forces the examination of the principles of reason. This agent is remarkable in the transition to the Socratic age in Greece. 3rd, The discussion, even though it be only the practical discussion, of general morals. This influence is remarkable in the transition from the Socratic teaching to that which succeeded it.

*Tendency
of early
speculators
to consider
the outward
world in the
aggregate.*

Another remark for your consideration is this, illustrative of the last: that the external world is scarcely ever at first considered in detail but in the mass, as one vast phenomenon. It is usually explained, in this stage of reason, by a mingled solution composed out of a few facts of ordinary experience and vague analogies of man's own organized frame.

*Vastness of
the problems
thus pro-
posed.*

Another observation is, that among the *first* problems proposed to himself by man, are the vastest; the origin, for instance, and subsistence of the world. The reason is, the total absence of scientific method, on the one hand, and of detached experimental knowledge on the other. From the combination of these remarks, you will rightly deduce that the first manifestation of Philosophy is usually in the form of a metaphysical physics. That it is largely tinged with *religious* beliefs, is a fact arising from a distinct origin, circumstantial not essential.

*Philosophy
first mani-
fests itself
in the form
of metaphy-
sical physics.*

*Imaginative
dress of the
early theo-
ries.
Tendency to
personifica-
tion.*

A last remark upon this head relates to the form or dress of doctrines in their early appearance.. This is almost universally more or less *imaginative*. General laws are impersonated, and a strong tendency evinced to place a demon or elemental god over each class of observed phenomena. The tendency of imagination is polytheistic, as of science monotheistic. Even in the human frame itself there is found among savage nations the belief of a multiplicity of souls*; the process leading to "polypsychism" being exactly the same as that which multiplies the directors or animators of the universe. When philosophy advances, it emancipates itself from this servitude to a poetical superstition; but it is long before it attains the notion of a supreme principle other than a divine fire, or air, or light; witness the whole course of the first ages of Greek philosophy.

*Collateral
influences
affecting the
development
of opinions.*

These observations (which I will trust to your own reflection to enlarge into others more refined and more valuable) must for the present suffice as regards the laws of

* Mentioned, I think, by Dégérando.

the rise and propagation of doctrines considered in themselves. I will finally offer a few remarks on the other division,—the influence of collateral associations and events upon the character and fortunes of philosophical systems. Of these the most convenient division would set on one side the influences of personal disposition and habits of life, on the other those of surrounding circumstances in all their variety. That in the former class influence is really exerted upon the formation of individual opinions, I need not pause to establish. For instance, peculiarity of intellectual powers directs to a preference for those reasonings and conclusions in which those powers are called into action. Peculiarity of moral feelings colours the aspect of moral deductions, giving a disproportionate hue and prominence to those feelings as elements of ethical truth. Disposition and temperament are similarly and strongly influential in urging the mind to an exclusive admiration of that side of general truth in which such constitutional peculiarities are either justified in theory, or brought into practical operation. We pass to the operation of *habits of life*. These, whether practical, artistic, literary, political, or religious, exert influences of which the history of philosophy presents many prominent instances; but which have, perhaps, never yet been examined and analyzed with the precision they deserve. I can only offer a hint or two on the less prominent of these secret tendencies. The operation of literary habits (as apart from purely reflective ones) is towards the consideration of human nature principally as it is susceptible of literary representation; that is, of representation under the established forms of received phraseology. The operation of habits of artistic production is towards the statement of human nature in relations of perfect symmetry, and with a view to the attraction of admiration by novelty. The operation of religious habits favours the subordination of all the principles and powers of the mind to a supernatural sphere of influences past, present, and future. Hence the systems produced under these impulses when they arrive at philosophical completeness, and are urged to the last measure of their course, are usually founded on a basis really and fundamentally sceptical; that is, on the utter depreciation of the claims and prerogatives of human reason. Pascal and Huet are examples; the modern mystical school of France still more so.

Of the other class of influences, not personal but external, the field is altogether too vast for our present survey. As in the preceding cases, I shall rather suggest than expound; leaving the subject to fructify in your own subsequent contemplations.

Personal
character.Habits of
life,

literary,

artistic,

religious.

External in-
fluences;

LECT.
II.*political,*

The principal sources of influence in this department are—peculiarities of political position, peculiarities of social connexion, peculiarities of climate and natural scenery. Of the first briefly. DESPOTIC governments are favourable to speculations remote from active practical application; that is, in natural science to mathematical inquiry, in mental science to mystical theories, in moral views to individual discipline rather than social enterprise or regulation—to asceticism and quietism. Of all these you have a prominent example in the state of science in India, where a despotic exclusiveness forms the principle of the whole social fabric. FREE governments are favourable to speculations political and practical, rather than to those of an abstract and internal character. The government of a complete democracy is inevitably accompanied (among a cultivated people) by philosophical theories eloquent and unsolid. Ancient Athens, and revolutionary France, will at once occur to you as corroborating a principle to which indeed I know scarcely an exception.

geographical.

Of the influence of natural position and surrounding scenery upon the complexion of the favourite philosophical doctrine of a country, much has been ingeniously speculated. Whatever be the real amount of this efficacy, it probably belongs almost wholly to the earlier and more imperfect stages of rational development. It is perhaps unwarrantably fanciful to find in the vast features of Hindostan the type at once and motive of its theories, and in the broken and diversified landscapes of Greece the image of its prodigiously varied mental manifestations.

*Difficulties
in the way
of the his-
torian of
Philosophy.*

With regard to the difficulties affecting the branch of inquiry we have been this day discussing, the principal are the scattered position of the facts to be combined; the peril of premature generalization, to which, as we have seen, special facilities are afforded; and the prejudices, which, because the systems of other ages are in many respects the systems of the present day, are apt to reflect the prepossessions of the present day upon the discussions of other ages.

*Practical
uses of the
history of
Philosophy.*

The general uses of such inquiries it is (if I have made myself intelligible) scarcely necessary to recapitulate. Besides the general uses of all knowledge of the highest order, the constant practical applicability of every law investigated in the history of speculation, bestows on this a peculiar value. One detached result I cannot omit. It is that in explaining the general laws which regulate the formation and transmission of thought, these inquiries will be found (as I may hereafter attempt to shew) to furnish a very forcible contribution to the mass of the evidences

of the *Christian faith*; by demonstrating the total improbability of the generation of the Christian system of belief and practice, in consonance with these laws, and through a purely natural process. By this physiology of the history of opinion, it might, I say, be invincibly shewn, that Christianity (under its times and circumstances) was indeed a distinct and peculiar energy thrown into the system of human thought and human events; and not producible by any pre-existent function or organism contained in that system. But this altogether incidentally.

LXCT.
II.

Finally, the history of Philosophy, the history of the Church, the history of Governments, what lesson do they all unite in teaching? Tolerance and candour. This is, above all others, the practical admonition which the story of opinions should have a tendency to impress. Astronomy, by fixing the laws of the heavenly bodies, destroyed one principal field of superstition; the history of Philosophy (cultivated as I have now ventured to represent it) would tend to achieve the same destruction of intolerance, and by means extremely similar. In this case, the effect is produced by the strong arm of science reducing to simple laws and connexions, no longer the revolutions of the skies, but the revolutions and interferences of error and of truth; and while such a labour would tend to lessen the undue power of casual associations by exposing their influence, it would tend also to create in the mind of the philosophical observer that calm and equitable appreciation of the genuine position of man in respect to truth, which is one of the happiest aids that science can lend to the soothing precepts of practical religion. Recognizing everywhere the unity of human nature in the variety of position, it sees or teaches to see, in each honest misconception the misfortune of a brother, not the crime of an enemy: and in harmonizing, if not contradictory opinions yet contradictory prejudices, by referring those opinions to the almost inevitable partiality of views, it finds even in the cold domain of speculation some of that happiness, and may perhaps anticipate some of that reward, which the Divine Author of the great Practical Philosophy of Man promised, when he declared, "*Blessed are the peace-makers; for they shall be called the children of God.*"

*Its tendency
to produce
tolerance.*

On our next day of meeting (*Tuesday*) we shall enter, I hope, upon some discussions of the *Indian* systems of philosophy; on which so much has lately been thought and written, that we can scarcely omit some notices of them,

LECTURE 'III.

ON THE PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA¹.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
III.

*Indian
Philosophies.*

*Sources of
information.*

I PROCEED to endeavour to interest you with some notices of the remains of the *Indian* Speculative and Practical Philosophies. It is a subject upon which, notwithstanding the labours of many illustrious inquirers, our information is still exceedingly ambiguous and defective. It is, likewise, a subject, which in some respects is so widely removed from our western habits and associations, as to require a rare power of identification with new positions and circumstances in order to be thoroughly intelligible;—a sort of metempsychosis of which few are capable without repeated efforts, and long and laborious practice. Towards the elucidation of the literature, both imaginative and philosophical, of India, much has of late, indeed, been contributed; and Britain has fairly occupied that pre-eminence in the investigation which her superior acquaintance with the country, the extent of her resources and the authority of her functionaries, made to be her duty towards the general cause of erudition. The society of Bengal, as well as those of Bombay, Madras, and other British stations in the East, have enjoyed the advantage of investigating the subject in the midst of Indian scenery and associations; while the Royal Asiatic Society has brought to the common store the benefits of retirement from the pressing demands of civil or military offices, and the facility of consulting the parallel or contemporary collections of other literatures preserved in the great libraries of England, and of making those comparisons of the intellectual development of different countries which reflect so strong a mutual illumination upon all. On this head, the connexion of the Indian with the Egyptian and early Grecian systems will be considered the topic most remarkable and attractive. The tradition so universal among at least the later Grecian

¹ [In revising this chapter I have had the valuable assistance of Professor Cowell, whose notes are marked C. Ed. 1872.]

writers, of the travels of Pythagoras in the East, as well as some very striking resemblances between the Hindû systems and the cosmogonies of the Italic school as recorded by Ocellus and Timæus³, if they do not constitute a proof, at least warrant an investigation; and unquestionably it is from the Indian sources (many of which are still unexplored) that the light which may yet clear this interesting question can alone be reasonably anticipated*.

LECT.
III.Possible
connexion of
the Indian
systems with
those of
Greece.

I suppose it unnecessary to inform you, that if we are to believe the records themselves of Indian wisdom, or the affirmations of their modern expositors, the antiquity of their speculations reaches to a period transcending the boldest suppositions of European chronology. The professed revelations on which the great part of the fabric of their philosophy is built, claim a far higher antiquity than even the epochs of their *astronomical* science; and the principal monument of the latter (the *Sûrya Siddhânta*) is revered by the Brahmins as having been issued from heaven precisely 2,164,930 years since. Well aware of the mysterious and indefinite veneration with which extreme antiquity surrounds its objects, and the ready answer which the character of a celestial revelation whose date is placed where no investigation can follow, supplies to the objections of heresy, the Indian teachers proclaim that the basis of their philosophical convictions is a revelation co-eternal with nature herself; that no time has existed when the Vedas have not been; that the universe itself cannot claim a remoter origin than these declarations of the will and the character of its Author. In illustration of this belief the sages of the *Mîmânsâ* (or orthodox) school are wont to affirm that the *language* in which these records are embodied is no human or arbitrary dialect; that the association of words and thoughts is (at least in *this* instance, though the assertion, indeed, seems to be general) no con-

Their sup-
posed anti-
quity.

³ [If the "resemblances" were even more striking than Mr Butler supposes them to be, they would prove nothing as to the obligations of the early Greek philosophers to India. For the treatises of both Ocellus and Timæus are now admitted to be forgeries, possibly of the Macedonian, certainly of no earlier period. Ed.]

* As I have touched on the subject I may, however, be permitted to add, that it is not impossible that the reports of the early Grecian systems may have been coloured by the *subsequent* intercourse with India, in the age of Alexander, by the expedition of Megasthenes, and, still more, during the existence of the Bactrian power, from the 255th to the 126th year before our æra;—to which, indeed, we may add the close connexion between the great commercial city of Alexandria and the merchants of India during the entire reign of the Ptolemies, and under the Roman Empire. Knowing, as we do, the changes which the Alexandrian teachers introduced into the Pythagorean philosophy, it can certainly not be thought improbable that some of these changes may have originated in Indian associations. The writings of Clemens contain an account of Buddhism;—a proof that the philosophy of India had attracted notice in the literary circles of Alexandria. But on this topic I cannot now enlarge.

LECT.
III.

ventional connexion; but, that *sound* (which by one curious tenet of some of these schools is held to be eternal) was from the beginning of all things irrevocably connected with the truth it was to express. The entire constitution of the Indian community, its immutable castes, and the very arts or offices they cultivate and discharge (which are for the most part assumed or alluded to in these writings), are thus stamped with the impress of an unfathomable antiquity; and the astonishing inviolability which has confessedly characterized them in all periods of their history is easily explained by the affirmation, that, formed from, they are formed for, eternity.

Those bold attributions have met with the usual fortune of such claims among inquirers, who, being free from the national prejudices which gave them force, have had leisure for scepticism. The preposterous demands of the Bhattas of Hindostan have produced a reaction of total disbelief, which, if not as absurd in reason, is perhaps as ungrounded in fact. Descending, then, from that platform¹ of eternal and supra-mundane existence on which alone the sages of Agra and Benares will consent to take their stand, and directing our course by the scattered glimpses of historical light, and the indications afforded by the internal state of the books and of the country, let us briefly notice some of the simpler probabilities of the question of Indian antiquity.

*Pretensions
to antiquity
examined.
Argument
from the
apparent
antiquity of
the Indian
astronomy.*

The first and the most imposing of those fortresses in which the advocates of the primitive glories of India entrench themselves, is the argument founded upon their astronomical² remains. This point has been laboured with the sagacity of an accomplished astronomer, and the eloquence of an accomplished writer, by the illustrious French historian of the science, Bailly. The tables of Tirvalore, whose epoch dates 3102 years before our æra, are those on which he principally relies. It will be obvious to you all, that if by theory or observation the true laws of the motions of the heavenly bodies are once discovered, the possession of their configuration at any one epoch will involve the assignment of that configuration at any other. That these (or any other) tables, therefore, commence from any given epoch, is no unequivocal proof that the observation they profess to record really belongs to that epoch; the same principles which allow the astronomer to prophesy the future, will enable him to picture the past. The determination, whether the observation be genuine or fictitious, will, as regards a state of the science less

² [On this subject compare Elphinstone's *History of India*, B. III. c. 1. Ed.]

improved than our own, generally turn upon the actual *accuracy* of the representation of the heavens at the supposed period. Now tried by this searching test, the Indian tables unquestionably cannot stand scrutiny. A pretended conjunction assigned to the epoch in question (the commencement of the Kali-yuga, or present age of the world), is demonstrated to be a mere approximation, such as the present attainments of the Indian astronomers would have enabled them to reach, but which any direct observation must infallibly have transcended. The great name of Laplace gives as much weight to this inference as any human authority can be conceived to do.

But this is a mere negative conclusion. A very happy suggestion was advanced in some papers in the sixth and eighth volumes of the *Astronomical Researches*, towards resolving the interesting question of the actual date of the Indian Tables. Mr Bentley observed that the most likely time when the actual observation was made, would be that at which the errors of the tables would be less than at any other; and that if that time could be computed, we should manifestly detect the epoch from which all other fictitious or predicted notes arose, the error accumulating with the distance. By laborious calculations on this principle he determined the Brahma Gupta tables to the year of our æra 536, and that Sûrya Siddhânta, of whose millions of years I have lately spoken, to about the year 1000. Of the connexion of the Greek and Indian astronomers much has been speculated without any decisive result. There are marks of resemblance, and also marks of difference: one of the latter is worth noticing as an instance of the decisiveness of those historical confirmations which are derived from the immutable truths of mathematical science and the constitution of the physical world. In one of the elementary astronomical calculations the sine of ascensional difference is not employed, but the arc of ascensional difference itself; a difference which could be safely neglected only in a *tropical* climate; and the neglect of which proves that the rule was formed for the latitude in which it is now found. On the other hand are not merely resemblances, but, as it is said, direct references by name to the astronomical skill of the Greeks (or "Yavans") in some of the elder fragments of Indian learning. The diurnal rotation of the earth was held, and exploded, by both. For the further elucidation of the point, we must, I apprehend, await further discoveries in the field of Indian literature itself. Unquestionably the mathematical knowledge of Hindostan is at present possessed less as a productive treasure than as a traditional

*Probable
date of the
Indian
Tables.*

LECT.
III.

deposit; and seems to partake of the character of the country itself, where all is stationary, and the present venerates the past too highly to venture to outshine it.

*Argument
from the
antiquity of
architectural
remains.*

In the enormous buildings and excavations—such as the fortress of Dowlatabád, the cave-temples of Ellora—which are to be met in every part of India, other writers find evidences of a vast, united, and highly cultivated people: while again, the exceeding minuteness of laws (to which remote antiquity cannot be denied) would seem to infer a high degree of civilization in all its departments among the people whose daily life and intercourse these laws were meant to regulate. That institution of castes which is found in all the most ancient records of India presupposes antecedent advancement; and we know that Alexander found beyond the Indus the monarchs of vast, and, it would appear, civilized empires. Of the imaginative literature of India (the Mahábhárata, Sacontalá, &c.) the antiquity is undeniable; and for the principal feats of their skill in the mechanical arts (celebrated in the earliest ages) they themselves know no origin later than the instruction of the gods. I do not speak of the legends of the conquests of Sesostris, as attesting the early existence of Indian empire; because such accounts, even if unquestioned in authenticity, throw little or no light upon the question which immediately concerns us,—the antiquity of Indian civilization as a presumption in favour of the antiquity of its *philosophy*. We are not however to forget the Sanscrit language itself, a language of richness, variety, and strength; and of whose claims to be considered the elder sister of the European dialects, it is, after the labours of Bopp and other philologists, almost impossible to doubt.

*Difficulty of
determining
the date of
Indian Philosophy.*

With these various topics of consideration affording undeniable presumptions in favour of the antiquity of Indian literature in general, the subject of the date of Indian philosophy in particular is as yet encumbered with insurmountable difficulties. The peculiar formation of the text-books themselves is such as to have admitted of interpolation with such facility, as to nullify almost all conclusions from the antiquity of one to that of another portion of the same collection. The works which are transmitted under the highest characters of age, consist almost wholly of *sútras*, or detached aphorisms, with, often, little discernible connexion: and the productions of greatest extent are crowded with episodes which some oriental scholars conceive to be unquestionably assignable to different æras. Under such circumstances it would be wholly impossible, within the limits of a lecture, to enter into any complete discussion of the respective antiquity of the

various relics of the Indian philosophy. I shall therefore substitute the conclusions of those eminent Orientalists who have devoted their almost exclusive attention to the subject—as far as even they have ventured to pronounce. The Vedas, which, as I have said, are the common basis of almost all Indian speculation, are assigned by Colebrooke to 1400, by Sir W. Jones to 1600, years before Christ. The entire collection of the Vedas⁴ has not been achieved by any Western scholar. These famous writings are composed of prayers, of doctrines, and of precepts, miscellaneously collected; and are accompanied by certain summaries or abridgments, called Upanishads⁵. The great centre of Indian legislation—the Laws of Manu—are ascribed by Sir W. Jones to about 800 years before our æra: by Schlegel they are regarded as of much higher antiquity. The Purānas, or Theogonies, are eighteen in number. They are deeply tinged with the speculative beliefs of India; and abound with fables conceived in that fantastical spirit which has always characterized Eastern invention. Their date is quite uncertain; but probability would ascribe them to an epoch later than the former⁶. To the Vedas belongs a practical commentary, all whose precepts are considered of authority equal to that of the Sacred Writ itself. This is the Pūrva (i. e. Prior) Mīmāṃsā. It treats altogether of the nature, occasions, limitations, extensions, of religious observances; that is, of the varieties of *dharma* or duty—a word which, very characteristically, signifies in one gender “moral merit,” and in the other, “an act of ceremonial devotion” (a fact to which a parallel may be found by those intimate with the lower class of Irish in their use of the word *duty*). This collection, which is voluminous, consists of between two and three thousand sutras, and nearly one thousand sections under the title of *Adhikaranas*^{*}. These works—the Vedas, Purānas, and the Mīmāṃsā—form the chief monuments of the theology and moral literature of the Brahmins; and, within the circle of these productions, they would probably be willing that the national mind should for ever move.

The Vedas.

Laws of Manu.

Purānas.

The Mīmāṃsā.

⁴ [The text of the four Vedas has now been printed by European scholars, viz. the Rig, the Yajur (in its two recensions) the Sāma, and the Atharva. C.]

⁵ [These, it is now known, are not “summaries or abridgments,” but rather mystical treatises which teach a pantheistic philosophy as the esoteric doctrine of the Vedas. C.]

⁶ [The Purānas are believed to be all later than the Christian era, most of them by several centuries. C.]

^{*} In its discussions of the circumstances of religious duties it enters into many minute casuistical distinctions, and hence has a character quite as much *logical* as moral. Indeed, almost every investigator of the Mīmāṃsā seems to have been struck with its close resemblance to the elaborate disquisitions of the casuists of the Roman Church.

LECT.
III.

*Constitution
of Indian
society.
The Priest-
hood.*

*Evil influ-
ence of a*

*The Hindû
Philosophy
professes to
be an inter-
pretation of
the sacred
records.*

Of course you do not require to be reminded of the peculiar conformation of society in Hindostan, in its relation to the boundless authority of the priesthood. Upon this subject, as it meets us perpetually in studying the various fortunes of speculation in the nations of antiquity, a remark must be hazarded. An established priesthood (omitting a few occasional advantages in their concentration for purposes of research), vested with peculiar privileges as public instructors, must be injurious to the free growth of knowledge in every case but one—the case in which they are the guardians and expositors of a *true* revelation. This necessitates their existence, and justifies it; but, this one case apart, I know no instance in which it can be fairly affirmed that the exclusive privileges of a sacerdotal class did not operate injuriously upon those nations—Egyptian, Indian, or any other—in which they existed. Subsisting by imposture, they were obliged to cherish public ignorance to prevent its detection; and their very wisdom was converted into a crime by the fact of its concealment. I have made this distinction, with regard to the priesthood of a true and false revelation, because, simple as it is, it has constantly been overlooked by two classes of writers who are equally in error; and because it is necessary to guard against the *unlimited* extent of conclusions to which a candid survey of the history of ancient philosophy must (within its own sphere) inevitably lead.

But even the vigilant guardians of Hindû theology come before us themselves in the light of philosophic investigators. To what precise origin the Vedânta philosophy is to be attributed, on what occasion the interpretation of the Vedas was thus reduced to system, or what impulse first urged the students of the sacred text to theorise its contents in a methodical exposition scarcely less revered than the original itself, it seems now almost hopeless to inquire. But the fact is certain, that by the side of the eternal Vedas, the incarnations of Deity, reposes tranquilly a vast and elaborate system of Man, Nature, and God; a system out of which all the other forms of Indian speculation seem more or less directly to have arisen; and which, if not itself independent, was at least the occasion of independence to others. For the references in the Brahma-Sûtra (the chief monument of Vedântism) to the rival systems of Capila, Kanâda, &c., bear every appearance of having been later interpolations;—redoubts added to meet successive heresies, like the articles of our Athanasian Symbol.

The entire mass, then, of speculation in India bears

this common character, that it all professes to be expositions of ancient revelation. In this Brahmin and Buddhist alike coincide; for even the Buddhist himself, whose daring incredulity laughs at the Vedas, names with reverence a certain Buddha or series of Buddhas, from whom his doctrine declares itself traditionally descended*.....This, then, being the common character of all, the sects of Indian philosophy are best divided not upon *mutual* differences of doctrine, but upon relative distance from the common centre of the old and standard revelation, the awful Vedas themselves. Thus considered, the true parallel for Indian philosophy will at once occur to you,—the *scholastic systems* of modern Europe. Making due allowances for differences of circumstances, it is in Scotus and Albertus and Occam that we find the Western echoes of Gótama and Kanáda, and the rest of the Hindû logical theologists.

If we examine in this light the vast collection of writings, whether original, or expository of originals, or expository of expositions, which compose the Hindû philosophical literature, we shall find eight principal forms of doctrine. Two rigorously orthodox: the Mímánsás, 1st, the Púrva Mímánsá, by Djaimini; and, 2nd, the Vedánta, by Vyása. Of these we have spoken. Two of a much more independent character, yet received with respect: the Nyáya (by Gótama), a philosophical arrangement of all the possible subjects of thought; the Vaisesshika (Kanáda), a system partly logical, and partly physical, embracing the atomic hypothesis. Still more heterodox are the two famous Sánkhyas, the Sánkhyá Capila, and the Sánkhyá Patanjali, the distinctive titles being from the reputed founders. And totally heretical are the tenets of the sects of Jaina and of Buddha. In making this distinction I adopt the learned labours of Colebrooke; the scholar to whom, perhaps above all others of this age, Oriental literature is indebted. I particularly recommend to you the disquisitions from his pen in the *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*. Until the original texts themselves be presented to us in an European form, these memoirs are probably the most authentic reports extant of the tenets of the Indian schools. You may add to these the labours of M. Abel Remusat in the *Journal des Savans*, and the writings of Sir W. Jones. The Bhagavadgítá (one remarkable Indian monument) exists in an English trans-

* In the orthodox systems this reverential notice of their founders is unbounded. Capila (the founder of the Sánkhyá) was no less than a son of Brahma; or, according to other Puránas, an incarnation of Vishnu: and the author of the Káricá (the principal monument of the sect) professed to have received his doctrine by traditional succession from Capila himself.

LECT.
III.

lation by Wilkins. It was also translated by Wm. Schlegel in 1823. The Oupnekhat is also translated by Anquetil-Duperron.

To explain minutely the peculiar views of these sects would be a task requiring volumes; and to the preservation of which no human memory would be competent. Those who are familiar with the powers of minute distinction displayed in the writings of Aristotle and of his commentators, can alone form any conception of the subtlety of logical discrimination which is evinced by these speculators. It presents indeed a fearful contrast, to observe the exquisite refinement to which speculation appears to have been carried in the philosophy of India, and the grossness of the contemporary idolatry paralleled in scarcely any nation of the earth, as well as the degraded condition of the mass of the people, destitute of active energy, and for the most part without a shadow of moral principle to animate the dull routine of a burthensome and scrupulous superstition.

It will be, for our present purposes, more instructive to take a general view of that side of the human mind which appears mainly to be revealed in the Indian speculation; illustrating the subject by references to the systems themselves.

Characteristics common to all the schools of Indian speculation. The liberation of the Soul.

In all the forms of Indian philosophy, whether orthodox or heterodox, one common object is equally professed as the present aim of human wisdom, the liberation of the soul from the evils attending the mortal state. And in all, this object is attempted by means not dissimilar, that is to say, by one modification or other of that intense *abstraction*, which, separating the soul from the bonds of flesh, is supposed capable of liberating it in this life from the unworthy restrictions of earthly existence, and of introducing it in the next to the full enjoyment of undisturbed repose, or even to the glories of a total absorption into the Divine Essence itself. In the unity of this object we may recognize perhaps the lingering traditions of original revelation, still upholding, in the midst of sensuality and degradation, some convictions of the primal dignity of the human nature and destiny: but still more strongly may we detect the secret but continual influences of a climate, which, indisposing the organization for active exertion, naturally cherished those theories which represent the true felicity of man to consist in inward contemplation and complete quiescence. For *some* universal principle can alone account for the unbroken similarity which (in spite of the ingenious disquisitions of some Orientalists,

who would find in their favourite field of inquiries varieties as numerous as those of European philosophers) does, in the great and leading features, characterize the entire series of these systems.

To arrive then at eternal beatitude, and at the promissory foretaste of that fuller consummation which the Yogi in even this life may attain, is the final scope of all Indian speculation, of some, as of the Sāṅkhya Pātañjali, expressly and from the outset; of others, as the Sāṅkhya Capila and the systems Vaiseshika and Nyāya, more remotely and indirectly. But as the attainment of this superhuman condition is supposed to be principally dependent on what the Sāṅkhya Capila calls "a clear knowledge of discriminate truth," the discipline for the blessing is made to include a vast series of preliminary doctrines with regard to the material and immaterial worlds, and a complete apparatus of dialectical distinctions. Generally speaking, I find in the Hindū Institutes two paths specified as leading to the state of perfectibility—religious ceremonial observances, especially sacrifice; and the exercise of absorbed contemplation. The former is ranked highly; the "aswamedha" or immolation of a horse under certain circumstances (to which you may remember the reference in Southey's *Kehama*) is considered to entitle immediately, and *ex opere operato*, to exalted privileges; but even the Vedānta Sūtras themselves do not class these performances with the contemplative knowledge of the Divine Soul of all things. The Sāṅkhya Capila states the matter still more boldly. Sacrifice, the best of all *temporal* means, says the divine son of Brahma, is insufficient for the great object of absolute exemption from all mortal evils; were it merely because it supposes the *slaughter of animals*, and thus violates a higher precept interdicting the shedding of blood; but still more, because in point of fact, Indra and the other subordinate deities who have gained the celestial state by these sacrificial works, are deceived in expecting immortality: a thousand Indras have passed away, and a thousand more shall pass. To arrive at the possession of the prerogatives of the wise, wisdom itself must be sought and possessed. How then shall it be attained?

Two principal means of liberation.

To solve this master-problem, the Indian systems usually commence with copious logical discussions; which, whatever be their origin, and however peculiar their dress, unquestionably leave the Hindū pupil little to learn from Zeno or Aristotle. The Nyāya (of Gótama) is a system of pure dialectic; and coupled with that of Kanāda, includes a complete scheme of categories (Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Particularity, Aggregation); a minute cata-

Indian dialectic.

Categories.

LECT.
III.*Syllogism.**Sources of
knowledge.**Principles of
knowledge.**Theology of
the Orthodox
Schools.*

logue of all the possible subjects of thought; and a sufficient account of the syllogistic form of reasoning, which (by returning back on the question) is made to consist of five members instead of three¹; which is *substantially* the same with our Western syllogism. The Sāṅkhya of Capila declares that (exclusive of Intuition, which belongs to higher natures) there are three species of knowledge, Perception, Inference, and Affirmation or Tradition (which is meant to include the informations of Sacred Writ, and of those gifted beings who retain the recollections of former worlds); and it professes to shew that the other sources contended for are in truth reducible to these. The Nyāya considers that we cannot place knowledge under less than four topics; which it calls Perception, Inference, Analogy, and Revelation. From these fountains (whichever enunciation be adopted), the Sāṅkhya, which seems the most elaborate of all the Eastern schools, proceeds to deduce the certainty of twenty-five principles, out of which the universe is composed; and endeavours to establish from these elementary propositions those views of the total distinction of soul from any material essence, (on the due appreciation of which that high contemplation can alone be founded,) which is to end in raising the soul above the bonds and infirmities of space and time. We shall return to these Sāṅkhya "Principles," in the course of the very brief collective sketch of the chief dogmas of the Indian schools, which it is now the time to present. We have seen the common object; we have seen the common path proposed for its attainment, the knowledge of soul and body; let us now inquire as to the Indian views of that knowledge itself.

We begin with the Supreme Being. The Uttara Mīmāṃsā, "which is to theology what the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is to works and their merit," which is the great depository of the Vedantine beliefs, and whose chief extant memorial is the Brahma Sūtra, attributed to Vyāsa (an avatāra of

¹ [One Hindū syllogism is made up, apparently, of an enthymeme and a regular syllogism: one of which is superfluous. As in the specimen given by Elphinstone, Vol. I. p. 230, note.

1 The hill is fiery,

2 For it smokes.

3 What smokes is fiery (as a hearth).

4 Accordingly the hill is smoking;

5 Therefore it is fiery.

Professor Cowell, however, informs me that this five-membered syllogism is rhetorical rather than logical, and called "inference for the sake of another."

Vishnu himself, the reputed author also of the Mahábhārata, the great Hindû epic),—this, the high orthodox school of philosophy, declares from the Vedas themselves—of God—that he is the Supreme Eternal One, the Emanatory Cause (*i. e.* at once the efficient and material cause) of the universe. From him all proceeds; into him all is to be ultimately resolved; as a spider extends and retracts his thread, or (to use another common Hindû comparison) as the tortoise protrudes and then gathers back his lower limbs. It would not be easy to parallel the sublimity of the descriptions which the Vedas themselves contain of this All-creating Essence; the whole riches of a most opulent language are exhausted upon the infinity of his perfections; and the very title of Godhead (Bhargava) is constructed of three monosyllabic verbs which signify to shine, to delight, and to move. In both the Brahmin and the Buddhist systems a trinity of natures is discoverable; though upon the precise attributes of each divine personage there seem to be many varieties of opinion. In the ordinary expositions of the Vedantine theology they are declared to be Creator, Conservator, and Destroyer: among the atheistical followers of Capila a sort of natural trinity is professed under the title of Goodness, Foulness, and Darkness: and among the Buddhists of Nepaul (according to Mr Hodgson's interesting account) the same notion reappears under the names of Buddha, Dharma, and Sanga—Intelligence, Matter, and Multitude. Such is the Deity of the Vedas. The Deity of the Sâṅkhya of Patanjali seems to be of much the same character. But the Sâṅkhya of Capila (to which I have just referred) denies the existence of a God altogether, in any other sense than that of an intelligence issuing out of primitive nature, and to be resolved hereafter into it. These sages urge that we can derive no proof of a supreme Creator distinct from insensible nature, either from sense, reasoning, or revelation. All things are evolved out of an intelligence which was itself but a secondary formation. Were God detached from nature, he could have no inducement for creation; were he fettered to nature, he could have no ability for such a work. I need not remind you how completely these sophisms anticipate the more modern atheism of Europe. Of course, you may suppose the Capilists are obliged to exert some ingenuity in endeavouring to reconcile their views with the solemn Theism of the Vedas. They argue that the passages in these sacred records really refer either to a liberated soul, or to some of the mythological deities; or by some other such evasion endeavour to escape the fate which drove the followers of Buddha out of the Indian peninsula. I suspect, from

*Theology
of the
Capilists.*

scattered intimations, that while the Capilists attack the foundations of religion, the Buddhists originally were guilty of the darker crime of attacking the authority of the priesthood; a difference which will sufficiently explain the difference of their fortunes. It is certain, that, even to the present day, a genuine Buddhist, from the heights of his ascetic sanctity, is apt to despise the inferior aids of sacerdotal ministration; and is in fact more highly revered by the people; upon the same principle which gave to the mendicant saints of the Roman orders an influence so far above that of the secular clergy.

The Vedānta philosophy does not enlarge upon nature as distinct from its great Author. But this deficiency is fully supplied by the copious dissertations of the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika physics. I before stated that the Sāṅkhya of Capila constitutes twenty-five principles of the universe. At the head of the list stands the venerated name of Nature or Prakṛiti—eternal matter undivided, without parts, not produced, but productive. The next title on this solemn bead-roll of the universal system is Intelligence (Buddhi or Mahat), first production of nature and prolific of all subsequent existence; and for the accommodation of religious associates, it would seem that this very Intelligence divides into a triune Deity: thus conciliating (though awkwardly) the theistic and atheistic hypotheses. Third on the catalogue comes the *Personal Conviction* (Ahankāra), a singular element in a system of nature; but which seems to me to be internally connected with the theory of *Illusion* (Māyā), which this school probably countenanced; and which may seem to base physical existence itself on the transitory belief of it. The Capilist next enumerates five pure elements which themselves produce the grosser and perceptible elements of the external world. The organs of sense and motion are then named, and that *Manas*, or *Mind*, which seems to discharge the same functions as the *communis sensus* of the old psychologists, with additional functions of activity. "The external sense perceives, the internal examines, consciousness makes the self-application, and intellect resolves." Finally is introduced that eternal essence which, though it may transmigrate through innumerable bodies, is made by wisdom capable of final liberation and perpetual repose—the Puruṣa, or Soul. The treatise itself (the Kārikā) sums up the whole: "Nature, root of all, is no production; seven principles including the Great Intellect are productions and productive; sixteen are productions unproductive; soul is neither production nor productive."

In the Vaiśeṣika a physical system more precise and

intelligible is enounced. According to Kanáda (the author of this system), there have been from all eternity simple, incomposite, ultimate atoms: and from the aggregation of these, according to definite numerical proportions, the world has had existence. The Buddhist school seems to contend that these primitive atoms are *indefinitely* aggregated; and adds to the theory, that objects themselves exist only when perceived, not reasoning on any Berkeleian grounds, but holding that at each instant there is a momentary union of atoms which are instantaneously scattered as the perception ceases. It is a remarkable peculiarity in many of the Indian systems, that they incline to supposing the excellent to have been gradually formed out of evil:—"from darkness," says the Káriká, "came foulness; and from this was formed goodness:" and we have seen that the same treatise supposes nature to have generated the Supreme Intelligence.

LECT.
III.*Vaishishika
of Kanáda.
Physical
theories.
Atomism.**Good formed
out of evil.*

But the great object to which (as I have before remarked) all these systems equally tend, is the ultimate realization of that union with the Supreme Nature in which it is conceived that eternal beatitude is to consist. Creation is understood by the Káriká as the union of soul and body; and the soul, invested with a subtle semi-material frame (*linga*), is by all these theorists regarded as passing through perpetual and successive transitions from body to body; a frame which the Káriká likens to the attenuated flame which hovers over the wick of a lamp. According to the Vedántins this life is itself a place of retribution; and all future transmigrations are also of the nature of recompense^a. By the aid of this supposition, protracted into an antecedent eternity, the expositors of the Veda boldly essay to grapple with the question of the existence of evil as consistent with the infinite excellence of the Author and substantial cause of all; and I may, in passing, observe that there is scarcely a controversy in modern theology relative to free-will, grace, the merit of works, or the value of faith, to which you may not find copious allusions in the text of the Vedas, or the Sútras of its commentators. So similar under all systems, whether true or false, must be the main elements of the relations of man to God. The glory of true religion is not to have named these relations (which are obvious and inevitable), but to have illumined their nature and fixed them upon an infallible foundation.

*Union with
the Supreme
Nature.*

A circumstance which adds this resemblance is the representation which the Indian philosophy gives of the estate of man; which it perpetually paints in the gloomiest

*Misery of
man.*

^a [This opinion is not peculiar to them, but common to all Hindús, springing necessarily from their theory of pre-existence and transmigration. C.]

LECT.
III.*Obstacles to
perfection.*

colours. "The gods are happy, animals are dull, but man is the miserable slave of foulness and darkness." The Káriká enumerates no less than sixty-two obstructions, besides the whole tribe of organic disabilities, which prevent the perfectibility of the human soul. For example, *Error* mistakes irrational nature, &c. for the Soul, and imagines "the Deliverance" to be absorption into these. *Illusion* imagines transcendent power to be deliverance, which is only a step to it. Nay, even Content itself is but a negative state, and far removed from the true eminence of the soul. It is folly to consider that this condition will come by luck, or without study, or by the mere act of nature, or by the decree of destiny. These convictions may ease the soul, but they cannot advance it! And from all these lowly postures of thought the wise man will still struggle forth, and exclaim, in the sublime language of the Veda itself, "May that soul of mine, which is a ray of perfect wisdom, pure intelligence, and pure existence,—which is the inextinguishable light fixed within created bodies, and without which no good act is performed,—be united by divine meditation with the spirit supremely blest, supremely intelligent!" Or again, "May that soul of mine which, distributed in other bodies, guides mankind as a skilful charioteer guides his rapid horses,—that soul which is fixed in my breast exempt from old age,—be united," &c. as before. For the possession of this supernatural elevation the cultivators of practical wisdom incessantly labour. Prolonged attitudes, endurance of suffering, unbroken meditations upon the divine nature, accompanied and animated by the frequent solemn repetition of the mystical name, "Om," are the means by which the Yogi, for perhaps 3000 years, has sought the attainment of an ecstatic participation of God; and, half-deceiver, half-deceived, affects to have already soared beyond earthly limitations and achieved hyperphysical power. Towards the complete consummation of this final liberation, the Vedas proclaim (and with slight differences the philosophic schools consent to the statement) that there are three degrees, two preliminary, the possession of transcendent power in this life (that is, of magical endowments), and the passage after death into the courts of Brahma, which are only precursory to that last and glorious reunion with the First Cause himself, which terminates all the changes of life in an identification with the very principle of eternity and of repose.

*Effects of
Hindu spec-
ulation
upon the
learned, and
upon the
vulgar.*

But it is time to release your attention. The effects of such views of God and man may easily be conjectured. Upon the mild sages of the Ganges they probably produce little result beyond the occasional suggestion of elevated

ideas, perhaps more than counterbalanced by the associations of a minute and profitless superstition. But upon

LECT.
III.

the enormous mass of the nation these baseless dreams can only result in the perpetuation of ignorance, and the encouragement of imposture: to both of which they manifestly and directly tend—to the former, by being unfitted for the vulgar mind, to the latter, by countenancing pretences to supernatural power. How can we leave the subject—which must often have recalled your *Christian* associations—without a secret gratitude for that belief which, while it displays in every page of its records more than the casual sublimities of the Hindû Wisdom, is not, like it, degraded by deception, and enfeebled by extravagance; but presents to its members the Indian doctrines of divine communion in such a form as not to dazzle but to enlighten; which, while it encourages man, instructs him also in humility; and never fixes the thoughts upon the ineffable attributes of God in such a sense as to withdraw them from the duties and the charities of daily life?

On next Thursday we shall commence our consideration of the Grecian Philosophy.

LECTURE IV.

ON THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHY IN GREECE.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
IV.

*Passage
from India
to Greece.*

FROM the mysterious forms of the Indian mythological philosophy, from the vast sacerdotal institutions that have produced and protected it, from that petrification of living society in one immutable attitude which contrasts so wonderfully with the changing world of ordinary history,—we pass to-day to a very different scene. We pass to that country, four centuries of whose existence possess a share in the thoughts of every educated man, as extensive, it may truly be affirmed, as all the remaining mass of ancient profane history! We come to that country to which the filial devotion of every cultivator of his own intelligence turns as to the mother-country of the mind; to which every man instinctively points when he would illustrate the indefeasible claims and inherent destinies of human nature. A speck of the globe—a few cities on either side of a narrow sea dotted with isles scarcely discoverable upon the chart of a continent—has been the outward and visible scene for the successive apparition of the whole universe of mind. On that little theatre of mental action, and in the rapid development of a couple of busy ages, performers have played their part, who, even after the vast European movement of our later centuries, still preserve, if not their exclusive authority unquestioned, at least their intellectual eminence unshaken. There poetry still finds in many departments her most exquisite examples, there (and perhaps there alone) sculpture finds her ideal cease to be a dream, there painting, doubtless, may lament that her more perishable materials should have defrauded her of her triumphs, and music, that *her* achievements must be received upon the faith of history; there Philosophy has at least directed her course to every point of the compass of thought, and touched at all its points of access; and there, finally, language, on whose ministrant services reason and imagination are alike so dependent, arrived, even in its infancy, at a perfection which made its

*Services
rendered by
the Greeks
to human-
ity,*

in arts;

proud and conscious possessors to class all who spoke not their own melodious tongue by one indiscriminate appellation characteristic of their vocal inferiority. But great as are these services to civilization, they are not the only ones for which Europe is indebted to that glorious people. Placed as the outpost of that continent which was one day to take the lead in the civilization of mankind, the Greeks fought for the cause of human enlightenment as well as personally advanced it. I well remember in early boy-^{in arms.}hood being laughingly asked my opinion of the relative importance of Marathon and Waterloo; and to me, to whom every thing later than Greece and Rome was at that time a cypher in historical calculation, but one answer was possible. I doubt if I should now remodel my verdict. What was the day of Marathon as an element in the history of man? Was it the brilliant struggle of some mountain-tribe against the wild ravages of some ancient Zenghis or Timour? Gentlemen, it was the cause of the world which was perilled that day. The destinies of ages hung tremblingly upon every blow of these gallant men of Attica. When, as the old historian tells us, the soldier, covered with the dust of that immortal field, rushed into the Athenian assembly with his *Χαίρετε! νικῶμεν!*¹ and fell dead as he gasped the words, he spoke a message to which the civilization of ages was to be the echo or the answer! Had the despot of Western Asia been as successful as his Turkish copyist 2000 years later, had he gained his footing in Greece at that hour, and flooded with his slaves the soil in which were deposited the seeds of the world's advancement, the civilization of Europe had been adjourned for centuries. Homer and the early lightnings of the Lyric Muse would have been perhaps irrecoverably lost; no age of Pericles would have placed Athens where she is in your hearts; her borrowed light would never have taught Romans to think and feel as well as act; and the spirit would not have existed which, evoked from its sepulchre in codex and palimpsest, was in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries once more incarnated in modern form, and became the vivifying principle of the literature of Italy, France, Germany and England.

The historians of Greece have given us few specific accounts of its first intellectual impulses. Those who were the best qualified for such researches continually lament the poverty of materials, the contradiction and uncertainty

Poverty of
early re-
cord.

¹ [So given by Lucian, the only authority for the story, so far as I know. Luc. pro lapsu inter salutandum, § 3, vol. III. p. 289. Ed. Bipont. The soldier's or rather courier's name was Phidippides, the *ἡμεροδρόμος* mentioned as the hero of another legend by Herodotus, vi. 105. Ed.]

LECT.
IV.*Early colonists,**Elements of
future civil-
ization.
Commerce.**Religion and
religious
poetry.**Early wars.*

of traditions. The political and civil story of Greece seems, by transient and shadowy glimpses, to stretch to a thousand years before its intellectual birth. Far in the depths of antiquity we catch the venerated names of the patriarchs of the land—of Ægialeus, and Inachus, and Deucalion, and Ogyges. So remote is the chronological position held by these mythical lords of the Pelasgic and Hellenic tribes, that the very gods begin their dynasty at a later epoch: it is not thirteen centuries before our æra that Saturn is said to have been expelled from Crete by the vengeance of that Jupiter whom a singular and capricious fame subsequently exalted to the loftiest position ever held by deceased mortal. Phœnicia, Phrygia, and Egypt supplied colonists* who mingled with the Hellenic race, and who, it is probable, rapidly lost their national characteristics in their incorporation with another people, and under the powerful influence of new local relations and excitements. As Greece is said to have done at a later period, so doubtless even now "*capta feros victores cepit*:" for few traces of distinctive foreign character are observable in the subsequent history of the united nation. A rude and stormy chivalry arose among tribes separated by the hills and rivers of the most varied country in the world; leaders were at their head whom (magnified through the mists of time) after ages converted into demigods; and perhaps the present condition of the Albanian mountaineers is not very unlike that of the Epirots, and even the more southern clans of Greece, in the *earlier* heroic ages. But Greece had already some elements prophetic of civilization. She was singularly free from the contracting institutions of the East, and by some early essays of maritime communication she had learned to import thought as well as wealth. A religion diversified and practical in its forms already gave occupation to the fancy; the names of Orpheus, Linus, Musæus, belong alike to the religion and the poetry of antiquity. The Argonautic expedition (whatever its duration and extent), the great national movement against Troy, must have increased the stores of thought, though attended, it would seem, with much domestic calamity; and the latter attests the progress of the Grecian states to the great principle of national unity, one of the most fertile sources of civilization. Still the progress itself was slow; the age of Pericles was far distant; and I confess, when I contemplate the subsequent rapidity of Grecian development, I do not see my way through the three or

* [Compare with this statement the third chapter of Bishop Thirlwall's History, where the question of the colonization of Greece by foreign settlers is fully and impartially discussed. ED.]

four centuries of littleness which (accepting the ordinary chronologies) succeeded the war of Troy. The Heracleidan invasion of the Peloponnesus created, doubtless, a temporary unsettlement; yet the children of Hercules were themselves a vigorous race, and not more unlikely, perhaps, than any other Grecian tribe, to further the national reputation. But Homer—or the Homerids—had by this time worked the miracle of the *Iliad*; and this was the proof and the pledge of what the Grecian mind had yet in store for the world.

LECT.
IV.*Homer and
the early
epic poets.*

The period from which we may date the real impulse of intellect and imagination in Greece, I would place about that time, not very distinctly marked perhaps in chronology, when the old kingly institutions sank almost everywhere before the democratic principle³, and Greece assumed the form of an aggregate of small republics connected by a national feeling, reverence for ancestry, unity of religion and oracles, and the universal Amphictyonic Council.

*Subversion
of monarchy.*

Setting aside minuter discussions and regarding the aspect of the whole, the history of Grecian development is, with all its uncertainties and obscurities, a type almost perfect of the ideal representation of such a history. Every stage of progress which reason deduces as probable, investigation will find correspondingly realized; and as in this geology of time we penetrate into the depths of Grecian history, we seem to turn up every successive stratum and deposit, down from the rich luxuriant soil of cultivated reason and fancy to the rude and primitive mass of merely sensible impressions,—exactly as in an individual mind the imagination was the first instrument of advancement from sensible wants and necessities; and you know to what effect this faculty was cultivated, from the age of Homer (or rather of Homer's antecessors, of those to whom he himself traces his poetical lineage)⁴ to the age of Archilochus and Terpander. Now, allowing for other contemporary influences, it is scarcely too much to say that Grecian history grew out of the Grecian epos, and Grecian philosophy out of its lyric and sententious poetry. Herodotus is a Homer without his hexameters, his divine agents, and his similes: the whole texture of his style is interwoven with Homeric phrases, not purposely introduced, but manifestly forming an element in the very substance of the composition. If a chieftain displays extraordinary valour against Persian or Lydian foes, it is still, as in the old Trojan days, *ἐμμένητο*

*Epic poetry
the parent
of history,
lyrical of
philosophy.*

³ [The old kingly institutions sank before the *aristocratic*, not before the democratic principle. See Thirlw. Ib. c. 10. Ed.]

⁴ [See *Odys.* I. 154, 325. Ed.]

LECT.
IV.

ἀλκῆς: the untaught fury of the people still *χειμάρρῳ ποτάμῳ ἵκελος*⁶: the rain still descends, as it did in the verse of Homer, *ἐξαπίνης* and *λαβροτάτῳ ὕδατι*. Even those critics whose organs were practised in such discernment detect in the prose of the chronicler of elder Greece the faint music of secret numbers, like the dim undertone of streams in a forest; "*ipsa διάλεκτος*," says Quintilian, "*latentes etiam numeros complectitur*." Though it be prose it is still the *Musa pedestris*. And doubtless the preceding forms of this transition had still less completely escaped from their brilliant vesture of imagination: poetry, I doubt not, would be found with her wings almost unclipt in the historical writings, had they been preserved, of Hecataeus, Pherecydes, Cadmus of Miletus⁶.

Poetical
origin of
Greek philo-
sophy.

But Philosophy—the habit of hypothesis to harmonize the world, or of inquiry to penetrate its realities, or of rational conceptions to define its origin—did this also issue out of an education of the imaginative faculty? What can more truly evince it than the fact, that all the primitive suppositions and results of Grecian philosophy were themselves expressed in metrical forms? Thales' was a poet, Pythagoras dictated verses, Xenophanes, the originator of the profound Eleatic school, and Parmenides, his still more abstruse successor, delivered their whole system of doctrines in a poem. Empedocles expressed his theory of the world in hexameters of great spirit and fire. Anaximander was specially remarked as having been the first to depart from this practice among the Ionics, as Zeno of Elea among the Italian sages. And even the earliest prose compositions of these writers (when not employed in direct argument or dialogue) seems to have been moulded into the mystical and oracular forms of a measured delivery, bearing much the same relation to poetry that the reci-

⁶ [Herod. III. 81. ED.]

⁶ [This description, exaggerated as regards even Herodotus, is inapplicable to his predecessors, whose style was concise and destitute of poetical ornament, though the matter of their narratives was sufficiently fabulous. See the criticism of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De Thucyd. Judicium*, p. 138, 36) compared with that of the rhetor Hermogenes (*De genere dicendi*, II. 12), who in comparing Hecataeus with Herodotus, expressly says that "he was ἥττον ἐνέκ γε λέξεως ποιητικός. Unfortunately the surviving fragments, which are mere shreds, do not enable us to verify these judgments. ED.]

⁷ [The poem ascribed to Thales is acknowledged even by Diogenes Laertius to be spurious (*Vit. Thalet.* c. 23). He questions the authenticity of *all* the writings which passed under the name of this philosopher. From the manner in which Aristotle records his opinions, it is evident that he knew of no genuine work of Thales. See Brandis, *Gesch. d. Phil.* p. 111, and his article THALES in the *Dictionary of Biography*. What "verses" of Pythagoras are alluded to is not clear. The "Golden Verses" were assuredly not his. See Brucker, I. p. 1017. In regard of certain Orphic Verses attributed by Ion Chius to Pythagoras, see Lobeck's *Aglaophamus*, I. p. 330. Bentl. *Epist. ad Mill.* p. 331, ed. Dyce. ED.]

tative does to the aria in music. And the poetical spirit which animates the style of even Plato at a much later æra, proves to what a period the influence of imaginative forms pervaded the regions of the higher philosophy. In fact, consider the nature and distribution of that wondrous and multiform art to which the imagination gives birth. You will divide it into two master-forms, of which the others are inferior and subordinate varieties. Poetry either details the succession of events, or it expresses individual affections. It is either narrative, continuous, external, historical, *epic*; or it is occasional, detached, internal, *lyric*—supplying vent to the pressure of emotion—whether of admiration, of hate, of sorrow, of joy, of terror, of exultation—and so forth. The early lyrists of Greece were contemporaries and fellow-citizens of its first philosophers. Still, there is a chasm between Xenophanes pronouncing his metrical dogmas on the unity of things, and Simonides or Stesichorus. Let us try if we cannot bridge this abyss. Among those who delivered, either at national and religious festivals or in their more private wanderings, their poetical aliment* to the imaginative Greeks, some, doubtless (as indeed the existing fragments sufficiently establish) appropriated, as their more peculiar province, the great themes of man's circumstances and destinies, and of that vast and complicated system of which he was a part. Religious ceremonies, and the demand for corresponding hymns, would supply constant development to this sublimer and more abstract tendency of thought. The reduction of the elder cosmogonies into forms satisfactory to the imagination, would force the poet into metaphysical and physical contemplation, even though his own mental conclusions, once more invested and disguised in the dress of sense and of mythology, might never appear as philosophy in his verses. The great and universal work of legislation—the labours of the Zaleucuses, the Charondases, the Solons—would demand the voice of poetry, sometimes to express the law, sometimes to aid its efficiency by celebrating its excellence*; and such a task can scarcely be fittingly executed without many a profound meditation on the nature of man and of government—on ethical and political philosophy. If you reflect on these circumstances, I think you will not refuse to admit a passage, not only conceivable but almost inevitable, from the youth of the mind to its manhood, from imagination to reason. Nor will you be surprised to find reason herself emerging deeply marked with the traces of her origin, and poetry for a considerable

*Theory of
the trans-
ition from
poetry to
philosophy.*

* Solon wrote a long Poem on the Athenian commonwealth. (*Pausan. Philo.*, &c.)

LECT.
IV.*Auxiliary
causes of the
development
of specula-
tion.**Freedom,
and conse-
quent pub-
licity.*

period testifying the undue prolongation of her influence in swarms of hypotheses, which are, as it were, the poetry of speculation. But, circumscribed as my time is, we cannot dismiss this subject without glancing at the powerful auxiliaries which fortified the path of the Grecian intellect to speculation.

First and chiefest of all, we are to remember that Greece was a free country, and a country of boundless publicity in all its civil procedures. This advantage—not too common even now—was in the early Grecian æra, as far as we can learn, a blessing solitary in the world. I need not remind you of that India through which you have lately accompanied me, or of those vast Asiatic edifices of empire, of which little more than the king, and the king's murderer and successor, are known in history. Conceive then the influence of this spirit of publicity upon the development of the reason. Every man ran the course of his day, every man delivered his opinion and struggled for it, as a champion at the games; he had all Greece to witness him. The Grecian love of glory in all its forms—physical and intellectual—was so impassioned, and their sympathy with mental energy however manifested, so cordial, that for a long period it supported philosophy even against their superstition; and if a few of the leading teachers were ever and anon banished from Greece, or from the world, how many hundreds of these speculators were suffered to live and die in peace! Now of this emulation and this glory publicity was the parent. Cyrus, as Herodotus tells us⁶, laughed at the Spartans for meeting together to practise on each other in the public squares; “the Persians,” as he says, “being unprovided with any place of public resort.” Does not the historian's simple remark speak volumes?

*Absence of a
sacerdotal
caste.*

To one element of the Grecian liberty of speculation I have before alluded. We must not forget that Greece was unencumbered with an exclusive sacerdotal caste, that is, with an hereditary corporation of priests; for the difference is wide between a priestly order and a priestly caste. Among the Greeks many of the functions of the priesthood were discharged by the heads of families; and though the priest and his office were always regarded with profound respect, yet we have few instances of even an attempt at spiritual tyranny. The priest was venerated on account of the religion, not the religion on account of the priest. Of the mysteries themselves the great body of the educated citizens were participators, and the sacerdotal exhibitors of these performances seem rather to have been regarded as the mechanists, managers, and “showmen” of the rites,

⁶ [Lib. I. c. 153. Ed.]

than as, either in themselves or their office, forming an essential element of the solemnity. Like all historical representations, this is of course to be taken with occasional allowances and exceptions. The priest from interest, the statesman from policy, the people from habit, and the religious affection, which must have some food, and "abhors a vacuum" in its established objects—all parties would conspire to resist a direct assault on the majesty of Olympus (as all so often testified in the "Sacred Wars" of Greece); but in the convenient disguise of metaphysical abstractions the philosopher could usually escape detection, the priests themselves perhaps (in the community of the mysteries) were not unwilling to countenance speculation as long as the popular belief was not endangered, and, as a last resource, philosophy could fly to her own mysteries, her "esoteric doctrine," and there take shelter from the vengeance of the gods.

To those who perceive how in the progress of the human mind all things are connected with all, it will not be chimerical to add, as an antecedent and motive to the essay at philosophical system in Greece, the study of art itself, and the boundless admiration of its performances, which was ever so strong a characteristic of the Grecian people. The study of art has two tendencies corresponding to its two elements. A work of art is the realization in the sensible world of ideas and relations that belong to the world of thought. To a vain and sensual people, or to that class among a people, the works of art will delight the sense and pass no farther than the eye and ear. But it is not so with the higher few who either produce such works, or are critics worthy to appreciate them. To such the visible or the audible is mainly valued as it is the type and symbol of those conceptions of order and of harmony at which the outward work points, if it does not realize them. The sensible object, even the connected associations so manifold and so magical, are to such thinkers only the vestibule and the antechamber that lead the mind to repose in those loftier principles of symmetry which, as they are anterior to the art and to the artist, are by a natural extension held anterior to that great achievement of the greatest of artists—the universe itself, and to form, in truth, its plan, its basis, and its framework. Pythagoras, and his school of music and geometry, will occur to you to illustrate how real was this influence, and to what an extent it could operate to modify the views, and even the language, of its votaries in every department of philosophy.

The diffusion of a taste for Art favourable to speculative habits.

Instance of the Pythagoreans.

These local and internal causes unquestionably pre-

Foreign influences.

LECT.
IV.

disposed to philosophy, but to the actual impulse which first set the reason upon inquiry, it is probable that foreign influences strongly contributed. The latest writer upon this subject (Dr Ritter, of the University of Kiel) maintains at great length the self-organisation of Grecian philosophy; a doctrine to which, assuredly, the great body of ancient testimony is adverse. I know how remotely traditional a large portion of this evidence is; but, even waiving the authority of the Eastern and Alexandrian cities, how much will remain to influence any reasonable belief upon a subject in itself (in spite of all the learned Professor's reasonings) affording scarcely any grounds for conjecture on either side! Habits of commercial intercourse had been established long before the period to which we now refer; and we have direct attestations to an intimate political connexion between Ionia and Egypt at the very time when the earliest Greek philosophers attempted to systematize nature and man. More than the impulse to inquiry, and perhaps a few elementary suggestions, I think it is indeed probable Greece never inherited from Egypt or Phœnicia. The Grecian intellect soon outstripped the boasted "wisdom of the Egyptians." Indeed we know that Thales surprised his Egyptian directors with a geometry more perfect than their own. The story of the measurement of the Pyramids proves (if authentic*) two points. It proves that geometry must have been but very imperfectly cultivated in Egypt, if a conception so obvious and elementary could be received as a valuable accession to the stores of the science; and it proves with what rapidity the earliest seeds of suggested knowledge (for all attest that geometry came from Egypt) germinated in the mind of Thales. Shall we deny the compatibility of the same facts, of foreign and feeble origination,—of Grecian and rapid development,—to the wider "Science of Principles" itself?

On this subject, however, of the foreign or exclusively internal origination of Greek philosophy, I need not, I suppose, tell you that much has been speculated and much

* We owe it to Laetius, and Pliny, and Plutarch—no earlier authority that I know of.

† [The Greeks were singularly anxious to give to others the glory of one of the most solid, if not the most brilliant of their intellectual achievements, the invention of Geometry. Though they profess to have received Geometry from Egypt, it is remarkable that each step in the progress of the science is ascribed to a Greek, not to an Egyptian. The most probable opinion is, that though the Egyptians had carried the art of *mensuration* to a perfection which astonished their Greek visitors, the Science or Theory of Geometry was the exclusive product of the Grecian mind, meditating, it may be, on the empirical precepts of the priestly agri-mensores. The well-known passage in the sixth book of Plato's *Laws* (p. 819) may thus be reconciled with that in the fifth (p. 747, C.), in which he disparages the vaunted Egyptian "wisdom," representing it to be mere "cunning" (*ἡρωσύνην ἀπὸ σοφίας*). ED.]

written. My object, I confess, as a Lecturer, is rather to give you, in their spirit and general connexion, my own results (such as they are), and occasional suggestions and directions for those who have time and inclination for further inquiry, than to enter into an actual statement of the evidence itself upon this, or any other question of pure erudition. This course—perhaps the more arduous and responsible of the two—I adopt for two reasons:—first, my present labours are principally intended not so much for directly historical purposes, as with the simpler view of exhibiting to you the extent, variety, and attractions, of the subject itself: and besides this, I act upon my own experience of the almost total inutility of that kind of oral instruction which consists of lengthened enumeration, and is mainly addressed to the memory. What is merely addressed to the memory, if forgotten, is lost itself—and time lost; what is addressed mainly to the reason, though forgotten (which is far less likely) leaves improved faculties behind it. For in points not too directly affecting temporal and eternal happiness, it is scarcely too much to say, that it is better to seek truth without finding it, than to find it without seeking it.

The common, and the natural division of the history of Greek philosophy makes it consist of three great periods,—the first embracing its varied movement, from its dawn in the speculations of Thales and Pythagoras, to the great epoch of the teaching of Socrates; the second, the successions of the schools which grew out of the Socratic reformation, and which may be considered as having run through their entire development (to have given out all that was *in* them) by the time of the fifth academy, about half a century before our æra; and the third, the attempts at revival, overwhelmed by the irresistible infusion of foreign elements, and carried on under various names, and with various fortunes, until the death-warrant of Grecian philosophy was signed in Justinian's decree for closing the schools of Athens in the year 529. This triple division includes a period not very far below 1200 years,—a period of prodigious mental activity; a period, for many reasons, immortal in the recollections of man, and which no multitude, violence, or extent of future revolutions in his history, is ever likely to obliterate, or even obscure. The visible scenery of classical philosophy may assist your remembrance of its distinctions; countries serving the purpose of the mnemonic chambers of which old rhetoricians speak, in our recollection of a continuous and diversified history, as well as in this case exercising many and obvious influences on the complexion of the history itself. The first

Three great periods in the history of Greek philosophical development:
 1. From Thales to Socrates.
 2. From Socrates to the late Academy.
 3. From the revival of philosophy under the Roman Empire, to the closing of the schools of Athens by Justinian.

LECT.
IV.

act of the drama of Grecian speculation was performed upon the varied theatre of the Grecian colonies—Asiatic, insular, and Italian—of even Thrace itself—verging at length (in Anaxagoras) to Athens: the second, the most brilliant and effective of all, belongs almost exclusively to that famous city; in the third, Philosophy opens her career in Alexandria, extends in a new form to Rome—to the Syrian cities—and at length returns, weak and faltering, as a pilgrim to his birth-place, to expire among the ruins of the old glories at Athens.

*First period
character-
ized.*

Let us now (without indulging in excessive or fanciful generalisations, and yet without confining ourselves to the mere letter of the ancient records) endeavour to combine in rational connexion the successive results, and the actual progress, of the Grecian intellect in the first of these periods. We have facts—often only detached and unconnected facts—delivered to the memory in the history of philosophy as to the senses in the history of nature: let us essay to interpret these facts into the higher language of law and principle. In some cases the separations and combinations are so obvious as to have occurred even to the least philosophic of the old recorders; in others, much light has been introduced into the darkness by later analysers:—wherever I shall have seen reason to coincide with them I will freely adopt their conclusions; wherever I disagree, advance such as I think more likely to represent the reality;—in both cases without often troubling you, for the present, with the fact, or the reasons, of assent or dissent.

*Its boldness
and total
want of cir-
cumspicion.*

I will only observe, in attempting thus to extract the subtle spirit from the miscellaneous fruits and products of thought in these primitive schools, that, if in one respect their antiquity brings us difficulty, in another it simplifies the labour. The main difficulty it brings is the rarity, the vagueness, and the very doubtful genuineness of our materials; the alleviation is to be found in a mental peculiarity which belongs to all early efforts of thought. That peculiarity is *its fearless straightforwardness*. Not discussing remote conclusions, it is not afraid of them, and does not provide against them. It sees no finger-posts erected by old experience to warn the wanderer among the abstruser bye-paths of speculation to beware of adjacent precipices. Accordingly, wherever thought would carry, the first disciples of thought would go. Their solution might be false or partial, but they worked out their problem as far as their intellectual calculus would enable. Now (accidental circumstances apart) the more natural the operations of reason the more symmetrical. Where a crystallization is

undisturbed we soon detect its process and its law. Thus it is that we can calculate—transferring the principle to moral natures—the conduct in any given crisis of an honest man with more certainty than that of a rogue; rectitude is one and invariable, obliquity manifold and mutable; and if we can but be certified that a character tells itself out with sincerity, we may make its former the counterpart and prophecy of its future actions.

This fearless prosecution of dogmas, as well as another peculiarity of a similar nature (the power of a leading principle to modify every division of the speculations of the same mind), is a characteristic of all the schools of philosophy in Greece, and eminently of those now before us,—precisely because they were to so great a degree self-originated and unpossessed of antecedent experience. And from this property, as I have said, their laws of progress and connexion are the more easily calculable. They took views originally limited induced (hence their mutual oppositions and exclusions), but they seldom limited the consequences of them; and if one generation of a school did not reach the last term of the hereditary philosophy, that term was sure to be evolved among the conclusions of some successor. Thus, the Ionic tendency is traceable in an almost unbroken line of descent from Thales, through Leucippus and Democritus, to Epicurus: the Pythagorean, from Pythagoras, through Timæus, &c., to Plato: the Academic, from the more Socratic elements of Plato's mind, through Xenocrates, &c., to Arcesilaus: the Stoic, from Zeno to Chrysippus:—and so of others, in more or less degrees.

Principles pushed fearlessly to their results.

Onæ more, let me recall you to the first stage of this vast Grecian development. I need scarcely tell you that I do not purpose to discuss or enumerate the special conjectures as to particular physical facts—the nature and constitution of the sun, moon, and stars, &c.—which are scattered among the relics of the early sages. Of these things they could form no judgment worth the regards of an age like ours. They were without our artificial senses,—our telescopes, our microscopes, our magnetic needles;—and before we indulge in triumph over the childishness of some of their conjectures, let us remember how much of modern physics is primarily due to these inventions, and how much of these inventions is due to accident. Besides, there is, I confess, to me something irreverent towards these venerable men in eagerly exhibiting what Providence has allowed us now to call their weaknesses; we forget the courage and depth of their abstract views of nature and man, in smiling over Anaximander's hypothesis of eclipses

Defects of the Ionic physics accounted for,

LECT.
IV.

as produced by the stoppage of apertures in the sun and moon, or Xenophanes's notion of the stars as condensations of the clouds. At the same time, happier views, where they occur, and seem to have been at all legitimately arrived at, would deserve, of course, to be recorded with honour.

*Distinction
of "subject"
and "ob-
ject,"*

The division of "subject" and "object" is obvious. If not in all languages, it is assumptively in all minds. Metaphysicians may fix and define it; but they only shape and polish the precious mineral of reason which, in its rude and primitive state, is buried deep in every intellectual soil. Now science may occupy itself with either of these provinces. The reason may forget itself for the universe, or forget the universe for itself. It may inquire into the facts and the relations of the outward order, and may even dare to pronounce certain principles regarding them to be true by an *a priori* necessity;—or it may (remembering that all these principles are but the prescripts of its own nature imposed upon that which is not itself) drop back upon its own essence, and, neglecting for a time all practical applications, examine, first, the principles of its own constitution; and, secondly, the legitimacy of their transference to the world around it. Similarly in morals;—the mind, with its boundless faculties of conception and combination, may declare, may illustrate, may systematize, the rule of right; may exhibit its various applications in all the variety of human conjunctures; may pronounce the high probabilities of its future corroboration in a world which is to contain the solution of this; may even imagine ideal constitutions of society in which the rule would be maintained without fear of infringement: or, it may once more fall back upon itself, and question its own reason and consciousness as to the true nature, the certain existence, the authority of such a rule. Now, of the first period of Greek philosophy, it

*First period
objective.*

may be remarked that it was, with scarcely an exception, the philosophy of the object, not of the subject—of the universe, not of man. It was the rebound of baffled reason from the impenetrable bulwarks of the universe that at length drove it back upon itself; and perhaps deeper into itself in proportion to the strength of the shock. The mightiest of all problems was the very first it essayed in the very inexperience of its childhood; as infants (ignorant of the signs of distance, and the limits of their power) are said, when presented to such objects, to stretch vaguely towards the sun or the stars! We shall soon see how reason was finally forced to return upon itself through the inevitable paths of dialectical disputation and the scepticism of the first "sophists."

Of this great body of investigators of the universe, all antiquity has coincided in constituting two classes; which, from their first and chief localities, have been termed the "Ionic," and the "Italic." But their distinction was of a deeper character than can be presented by geographical position; a distinction reaching to the very foundation of their entire habits of speculation. We have already assigned to the ante-Socratic sages the study of the impersonal or objective in general; we must now divide *this* also, and classify them by the double aspect in which it can be beheld. In doing so I only comment and develop the views of Aristotle himself, in the able but rapid *résumé* which he inserts in the first book of the *Metaphysics*. The world consists of facts and relations of facts, of things and the laws of things, of matter and the harmony of matter, of (to borrow an analogy often too seductive) a body and a soul. The combination makes the universe. We should now smile at any teacher who claimed exclusive honours for purely physical or purely mathematical science: we know that the physiology of the world demands them both, the one to surprise with all the boundless variety of compositions and decompositions which experiment detects, or produces, in the material substratum of the world; the other, from a few of these elementary physical laws (perceived, or conceived, to operate uniformly) to pronounce all the effects of their combinations, to express in a line the harmony of ages, to be the true gamut or "notation" of the ideal music of the spheres. It is the oriental story of the lame mendicant who was sharp-sighted, and his strong-limbed neighbour who was blind; separated, each was powerless to stir—united, they advanced with ease and rapidity. But it is the calmer *age* of philosophy that allows these serene reconciliations; its youth is ardent and exclusive. Thales and Pythagoras, who possessed all, and more than, the knowledge of their times, both saw this double aspect of nature; Thales was a mathematician, Pythagoras was, doubtless, a naturalist; but the temper and taste of each was more powerfully attracted by opposite views; however in the course of nature they might both acknowledge these potent principles to be alike engaged in the complexity of the effect, when they came to characterizing the entire product, the contrasted points from which they contemplated the majestic scenery of the universe obviously affected their decision. In the Ionic school the direction impressed by Thales is much more observable in the progress of the school than in the teaching of the master; in the Italic, from the very commencement, the personal influence of Pythagoras infused into

LECT.
IV.*The distinction of Ionic and Italic is not merely geographical.**Double aspect of objective thought.**Facts and laws of Facts.**Physics and Mathematics.*

LECT.
IV.*Thales and
Pythagoras.*

the entire succession the strong peculiarities of his own intellectual and moral character. Moreover, you are to remember, that, properly speaking, Thales himself had no school or special sect; he was (so to speak) a "gentleman of private fortune" at Miletus, who travelled to gratify a curiosity for universal information, and to feed the energies of a working and creative intellect; his "disciples" were friends, united by taste and character: Pythagoras, on the contrary, was essentially a sectarian leader; for many years the oracle and high-priest of one of the most exclusive societies of antiquity; the legislator of mystic purifications, ablutions, initiations; in his personal nature regarded as little less than a god (or an actual God, if we believe Iamblichus, whose Pythagorean gospel, however, I advise you to study in a most sceptical spirit), and of influence sufficient to make the most trying sacrifices the price willingly paid for admission to his *συστήμα*.

*Were the
early philo-
sophers
Theists?*

Gentlemen, the philosophers of both these divisions were not believers in a God, in any sense which a Christian reasoner would assign to that great proposition. The innumerable attempts to attach the glory of such a conception to the names of Thales, Pythagoras, and the rest, have always appeared to me completely unsuccessful.

*Reasons for
the
the nega-
tive.*

Before entering upon a sketch of the connexion of their systems, it may be well to speak of this point, as unfounded notions respecting ancient theology (arising, I suspect, from inexperience in the original documents, few as they are) have ever been a source of hesitation, obscurity, and misconception in the popular expositions of the earliest Grecian theories of nature. In the Ionian school (until the publication of the opinions of Anaxagoras, who, as I believe, was himself very far from a clear and comprehensive mastery of the conception) there assuredly appears nothing worthy of the name of Theism¹⁰: in the system of Pythagoras (whose religious tendency is often celebrated) Deity is indeed named, and many expressions employed which, seen through a modern medium, might appear fraught with singular sublimity; but a closer inspection of the system, not as it was remodelled in the pompous pages of Porphyry and Iamblichus, but as it came from the venerable founder himself, discovers a deity with scarcely a character of distinct or personal subsistence, a mystical unit in a universal harmony, a pervading fire of which our own souls are parcels. The moral attributes which he attached to deity seem to me (most creditable as they are

*Examina-
tion of the
theological
dicta of Py-
thagoras.*

¹⁰ [A partial exception must be made in favour of Xenophanes, as I shall endeavour to shew in a subsequent note. ED.]

to their illustrious designer) to belong, in his own conceptions, less to God than to the gods; or, if viewed in any higher light, to be so inextricably confused with that mystical arithmetic, of which he considered the universe a sensible representation, as to become, by their place in the system, rather harmonic laws than moral essences. So completely was this the case that, before he could thus sublimate Justice, he was obliged to call it a square-number, &c.¹¹ If, however, a deity were personally and distinctly avowed as separate from his creation, such notions as these would not be wholly inapplicable, symbolically regarded; indeed they are, as it were, the mathematical dress of the modern ethical school of Clarke. But you may observe, as a general scholium upon this subject, that ancient philosophy, even in its subsequent and highest flights, on this side of mysticism, dreaded to transfer to pure Deity the attribution of human excellences, except in a form, as in Plato, abstract, unpractical, and irrelative to individuals; while, on the other hand, ancient religion overlaid its deity with human weaknesses, low, contracted, and debasing,—two parallel experiments on a vast scale, performed in the two great provinces of human nature, to testify the profound want in the complex system of the reason and affections of man, of some yet unuttered representation, which, by uniting the objects of both, could give to mankind all that was best in humanity without compromising Deity, and all that is awful in the divine, without sacrificing the tenderness, intimacy, and sympathy of the human nature! But to return to the primitive schools, and their conceptions of the prime agent of the physical world.

Opposite defects of the popular and philosophical theology.

One of the most difficult tasks, but one of the most necessary, for the inquirer into the true spirit of a remote philosophy, is, a total abstraction of all local and modern ideas. Unless you can close your eyes for a moment to the blaze of evidence with which Christianity, and the writings consequent on Christianity, have surrounded the belief of a Supreme Agent separate from the world he has called into existence; unless you can conceive your affections disengaged from the hold with which the Christian Revelation has fastened this truth around the heart; nay, unless you can even remove the fainter light of the Platonic and Ciceronian theology, you cannot apprehend the true position and difficulties in which the first rational explorers of the universe were placed. We may think that, by a strong effort of imagination, we can adequately conceive

Difficulty and necessity of laying aside modern ideas in judging of the early philosophers.

¹¹ See the *Magna Moralia* attributed to Aristotle, p. 1182 A, Bk. I., cap. 1.

LECT.
IV.

The religion of antiquity was unfavourable to right conceptions of Deity.

Anxiety of early speculators to accommodate their opinions to the Homeric theology.

this state of human reason in its first awful interview with nature ; but we are still like those who, after looking at the sun, pass suddenly into darkness : for a time there remains upon the eye the involuntary image of the brightness we have left. The conception of the free production of a universe by an Infinite Essence altogether above and beyond it is not elementary in human reason ; it is not the step of the child, but the stride of the man. The religion of antiquity was so far from aiding the progress to this conviction that it perpetually counteracted it ; polytheism, far from bringing light into the obscurity, filled it with phantoms, and taught men to be contented with them ! It presented a catalogue of divinities whose tombs were scattered through Greece : even the sepulchre of the Father of Gods and Men, which was the special boast of Crete, and the heaven, which these immortalised benefactors gladdened with their presence, was only, as it were, the “upper-story” of this world. To all beyond religion could only give the name of “Fate ;” and philosophy too often was content to follow in its footsteps*. In fact (and the remark is worth your notice), Homer was to antiquity not at all unlike what (on very different grounds of authority) the Bible is to us ; and you will find through almost all of ancient philosophy the same anxiety to confirm a philosophical dogma by the high traditional evidence of Homer that among us a daring speculatist often evinces to confirm his notions by their supposed consonance with the Scriptures. Homer was the public document of polytheism ; the popular repository of the national beliefs. Entangled among these fancies, the efforts of the reason were constantly hampered and misled ; its theological tendency was downward to be popular ; and, when struggling out of these fantastic illusions, it strove at length to meet the immensity of nature, untaught, and unassisted, it grew bewildered with the vastness,—made one wild, though sublime effort,—conceived an ἀρχή, or principle, which might be to nature what the life or soul is to the body—an inherent, inseparable, energy—and fell exhausted, still outside the threshold of truth !

The early philosophers are nevertheless not to be styled Atheists.

We are not to call these early labourers of reason “Atheists,” for all, or almost all, admitted a governing principle in some sense ; they were Pantheists, in that higher form of Pantheism, which, though it associates the

* The trace of this wretched labour to accommodate speculation and superstition, to match each prodigy in Olympus with a hypothesis in philosophy (or, as degrading a task, to justify the latter by the former), is observable through most of the history of Grecian reason ; and perhaps was never wholly got rid of, though its results were pretty much what Lord Bacon stigmatizes in another case—“fantastica philosophia et heretica religio.”

universe necessarily and irrevocably with its principle, yet does not wholly confound them, and even allows to the moving spirit a certain superiority over the mass it pervades. Much has been said of the sublimity of the instantaneous obedience to divine command expressed in the third verse of the book of Genesis; but for a far profounder sublimity of conception you will refer to the first:—and every investigation of the feeble and wavering theology of primitive reason will deepen your reverence for that old and venerable record, which, in the midst of so much uncertainty as even the wisest acknowledged when they approached the relation of nature and its cause, calmly prefaced its story of the world with the declaration, without exception, reservation, or indecision, that “In the beginning God *created* the heaven and the earth.” Nor was this “the wisdom of the Egyptians:” Thales and Pythagoras surely did not leave that country less rich in its ancient learning than the Jewish cosmogonist; yet both found the world to be living, *ἐμψυχον*, and its God to be the *ψύχωσις*, or animating principle of the universe. How convenient are the preferences of sceptical criticism! . It can fall in raptures of admiration before the *νοῦς διακοσμῶν*—the ordering Intelligence—of Anaxagoras, though obscurely and timidly put forth; it turns coldly from that page which, ages before him, without an effort, scaled the full height of the conception, and presented to us the result in all its glory, unweakened by limitation, unalloyed by error, and unclouded by doubt!

LECT.
IV.*In what
sense they
were Pan-
theists.*

That this representation of the elder philosophies is the true one, I might argue from the unanimous tradition of antiquity,—that to the Anaxagoras, whom I have just mentioned, belonged the distinction of first placing Pure Intelligence at the helm of the universe. “When,” says Aristotle (in the 1st *Metaph.*, c. iii.—far our most valuable document for the philosophy of those times as respects these questions)—“When a man said that there was in nature, as in animals, an intelligence which is the cause of the arrangement and of the order of the universe, this man appeared alone to have preserved his reason in the midst of the follies of his predecessors (*οὐκ οὐκ νήφων ἐφάνη παρ’ εἰκῇ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον*). Now we know that Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ first openly maintained these views, though Heraclitus of Clazomenæ has the credit of having anticipated him.” Such attestations as these (with the well-known fact that this Philosophy obtained a characteristic title from his system) surely outweigh the multitude of refinements by which some critics have endeavoured to antedate these views. You will also hereafter perceive how

*Anaxago-
ras the first
Theist.*

even Anaxagoras himself supplies the harmonising intelligence with preexisting materials.

But these representations will become more probable, because more consistent, in the rapid review which I shall attempt of the real spirit and connexion of these systems. By seizing (if we may dare to say we have indeed seized) that spirit and connexion, we shall see with the eyes and hear with the ears which in Ionia contemplated the features, and in Italy caught the harmonies of nature, much more than 2000 years ago. We shall behold our infant reason in its cradle; and (with all its comparative deficiencies) I think I shall induce you to agree that that infancy was yet the infancy of a Hercules! To this subject, then, we will devote our next meeting.

LECTURE V.

ON THE EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY. IONIC AND ATOMIC SCHOOLS.

GENTLEMEN,

IT becomes my duty to endeavour to present to you some account of the first efforts of philosophical inquiry in Greece. In order to excuse any deficiencies you may observe in the sketch I shall present, I must be permitted, for my own defence, as well as your instruction, to refer to some of the obstacles that have at all times impeded the progress of investigators in this field. The extent of these difficulties they only can estimate who sincerely search for truth; those who lightly adopt the easy solutions of theorists on secondary information will, of course, not appreciate the labours of penetrating to sources they have never desired to reach; but they who honestly desire to understand, not the speculations of the modern systematisers of history, but the reality of ancient wisdom, will be at least as anxious to fix the certainty of facts, as to follow the succession of deductions.

LECT.
V.

*Early Greek
Philosophy.*

*Obstacles to
its investi-
gation.*

Among these difficulties in the ascertainment of facts is to be mentioned, in the first place, the lateness of the traditions on which we depend for the principal part of our knowledge of primitive Grecian thought. On Plato and Aristotle we are chiefly dependent for this service; and their distance is such as to oblige even them to contemplate their objects through the dim and distorting medium of two, or more than two, centuries. The accounts transmitted by Aristotle are, in his usual dry and definite style, clearly enough separated from the mass of his own reasonings: but those of Plato are so inextricably entangled in his speculations, that it is almost as difficult to recover the original philosophies from his dialogues as it would be to subtract a particular tint of colour from a painted landscape of a thousand blended hues. His sages are introduced, not with the precision of a report, but as the heroes of a drama; and we as little look for the cold reality of truth in his philosophical representations as we look for the accuracy of history in an historical romance. Plato seems,

*Lateness of
sources of
information.*

*Character of
Aristotle's,*

*and of
Plato's his-
torical ac-
counts.*

LECT.
V.

indeed, destined to spread the influence of his personal character almost as far backward into history as he did forward into the course and fortunes of human thought. The speculations of primitive antiquity are resuscitated in his pages, but the resurrection is in another and a glorified body.

Perversions introduced by the early assailants of Christianity,

and by its apologists.

Misrepresentation and by the oral transmission,

and by the figurative dress of the early doctrines.

At a later period a new source of perversion arose. The early assailants of Christianity in the schools of Alexandria, anxious to match the miracles of Christianity with rival wonders, exalted the first teachers of Grecian wisdom into the apostles of a supernatural revelation. Endeavouring to elevate them to divinity, they loaded them with all the characteristics and the opprobrium of imposture. The fame of Pythagoras has especially suffered by this injudicious advocacy; and the philosopher of Samos, installed as a god, is decorated with the insignia of a juggler and a hypocrite. On the other hand, the Christian teachers, not yet instructed by experience as to the true nature of their argument, were often tempted to retaliate by representations scarcely more justifiable, and to deny to the early sages even a glimpse of those truths in moral science whose exclusive light they conceived that the religion of Christ had claimed as its own.

The circumstance which gave facility to all these misrepresentations was the transmission of doctrines by oral delivery. Passing from teacher to teacher, each added or subtracted according to the tendencies of each; and the ultimate condition of a tenet was the representative, not of the mind of the original framer, but of the complex, and often contradictory, succession of minds through which it had passed. To this was added the uncertainty arising from the very form of these doctrines, which, expressed in the highest strain of figurative language, often admitted of a diversity of interpretations with nearly equal facility, and assumed to each commentator a complexion reflected from his own habits of thought. Had, however, these reasoners commenced their views from elementary grounds by a regulated process, even this rich and ornamental dress could scarcely have perplexed beholders as to the true direction and rate of their progress. But no such methodical march is discoverable in the first essays of inquiry; all is there detached, conjectural, aphoristic, unsettled. The way to discover is seldom learned but by discovery itself; and methods are the last things perfected in philosophy.

The habit of ranging philosophers in "successes"

There is a further cause of confusion which I think necessary to be mentioned, because it assumes the prerogatives of superior accuracy. It is the habit of reducing

all the eminent names of the early philosophers under fixed successions,—making each the inheritor and continuator of the doctrines of a single determinate predecessor. I am inclined to think that this enrolment of philosophers in files is altogether the creation of an age far later than their own; an age in which such successions were established, and in which, consequently, habit had made it difficult to conceive philosophers otherwise propagated and preserved. Pherecydes is made the common teacher of Thales and Pythagoras; yet we know that he was (as well as Anaximander, who is made the pupil of Thales) their mere contemporary. And it cannot be questioned, the radical differences of systematic views of teachers supposed to be successive and dependent, is such as to deprive these hypothetical successions of much claim to probability¹.

LECT.
V.sions a
frequent
cause of con-
fusion.

We saw, at our last meeting, that the universal character of the first age of Grecian speculation was its outwardness,—its tendency to theorise the visible universe in preference to the consciousness or its phenomena. The first impulses of the mind are, as we observed, almost invariably external; it becomes mingled, and even identified, with its objects; and the manner in which colour assumes extension, figure and place, is a type of that wider and more perpetual instinct which leads the soul to diffuse itself upon, and to lose itself in, the material universe. A sufficient indication of this fact in the present case, is to be found in the very titles of the treatises whose fragments, or whose traditions, remain from that age:—they are, almost without exception, discourses *περὶ φύσεως* (*De rerum natura*). The question in debate (for it is well at once to fix this) regarded nothing less than the origin and subsequent revolutions of things:—and the effort, doubtless, of these sages was to supply to the speculative mind something answering to the vague affirmations of the popular creed. Hence they perpetually kept these superstitions in view, and made it a constant object to harmonise their physics with the public theology,—to make their *cosmogonies* an explanation of the *theogonies* of the poetical faith.

Externality
of the first
age of specu-
lation.Its subject
was "the
nature of
things."

The question was, then, What was to be fixed as the "*ἀρχή*" of the surrounding universe? This is a word, which, as then understood, can scarcely be correctly ren-

Search for
an ἀρχή, or
principle

¹ [The remark of a late eminent scholar (Näike) on this point is true, and well expressed: "Solent fere grammatici hominibus inclytis magistros querere quam maxime inclytos, et sine magistro vix ullum patiuntur; adeo ut nonnumquam claris scriptoribus affinxerint ejusmodi præceptores, quorum aut ob ætatis distantiam aut aliam quamvis ob causam discipuli illi esse omnino non potuere." Ed.]

LECT.
V.*Gradual
refinement
of this con-
ception.**Aristotle's
distinction
adopted.**Ionic and
Italic, or
Physical
and Mathe-
matical
Schools.**The Ionic
philosophers.*

dered into any term in our language. It was not the *cause* of the world, nor yet the final element, but rather that thing which should be assumed to give a rational explanation of the rest. The word "Principle" is, perhaps, nearest to its significancy, because almost equally indefinite. The *ἀρχή* was the last term to which the inquirer's analysis brought him,—whether it resulted as water, or fire, or harmony, or unity, or mind. The word is reported to have been first employed by Anaximander, who made the Unbounded his *ἀρχή*; and to Plato is ascribed the useful labour of distinguishing between it and the kindred term *στοιχείον*, with which it was often confounded. The word slowly limited itself; but, in the earlier stages of its use (more especially in its application to the first principle of the air and fire philosophies), its uncertainty has for ever left the true scope of its employers in a great measure undecided. We can, however, plainly enough detect the gradual progress of these schools, in all their divisions, towards the conception of the Infinite and Absolute Being—a process wonderfully instructive. The elemental *ἀρχή* rising gradually from its grossly material nature into the finer forms of matter, escaping at length even these subtler bonds, and becoming no longer a fire, or an air, but, as it would seem, a *spiritual* flame and diffusive presence, until at length the element, in even its most attenuated state, seems to have been conceived as little more than the type or symbol of the Supreme Principle.

We agreed, at the last Lecture, to follow as our safest guide the division established by Aristotle, with which internal principle of division the geographical discrimination of the Ionic and Italic schools nearly corresponds. In selecting an *ἀρχή* for the universe you must remember that these speculators were without a revelation, on the one hand, to fix their religious views,—without experimental investigation, on the other, to fix their scientific ones. What then remained? Suppositions more or less approximate to the truth, or reasonings independent altogether of experience; in other words, physical analogies or mathematical deductions. Here, then, lay the point of difference. Both parties sought general laws, but the one, by analogies of phenomena, the other, by the first principles of quantity itself; the one attempted to class the contingent, the other, to fix the necessary and eternal; the one evolved things in time, the other co-ordinated them through space. The one was the remote and shadowy image of our chemistry, the other, perhaps, of our mathematical mechanics.

We shall consider first the fortunes of the Ionic teachers, and of those connected with them in principles. "Let us,"

says a letter attributed to one* of themselves, "Let us begin all discourses with *Thales*." To introduce any light into these obscure recesses we must, however, once more attempt the work of classification. The simplest principle of division will be that which places on one side those philosophers who accounted for the universe by the transformations of a single element, and who, for the most part, conceived the universe as a vital organisation; and, on the other, those who explained it by the combination of atoms, united either fortuitously, or by intelligent agency, or (as Empedocles) operated on by a twofold principle of attraction and repulsion, which, from the analogy of the affections, he styled "love" and "hatred." Now it appears to me that Thales, the common parent of these very opposite theories of the world, actually involved in his own teaching the germs of both; that is, that he, in adopting both water and a moving principle as alternately his ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων, did really include both the purely vital and the purely mechanical interpretations of the universe. But, as I would much rather furnish your minds with thoughts than with names, let us enlarge for a while upon this double aspect of the world as it presented itself to the physical section of the primitive philosophy.

LECT.
V.Vitalists,
Mechanists,
Dualists.

Man explains the universe by *himself*. Whatever be the real value of the laws he imposes on the world, and in imposing seems to detect; whether these relations under which he co-ordinates nature are of the eternal essence of nature herself, independent of human perception, or are merely mental—the laws rather of his own constitution than of external existences,—and thus necessary by a merely subjective necessity: however you decide this question, on which so much thought has of late been exhausted, it will still be the truth, even if not the whole truth, that, in the first instance, man explains the universe by *himself*. He subjects the world to the empire of his own intellectual principles; he projects the shadow of his own reason on a world whose existence is yet felt to be distinct and independent of him. You know that a great portion of every logical investigation of human nature is occupied with defining and classifying these laws of reason (causality, substance, identity, diversity, &c.), under which, to receive the world at all, we are obliged to apprehend it. To accomplish this is a high achievement of advanced reason. And the difficulty is not at all so much to enumerate all

Reflections
on the dif-
ferent aspect
of the world
implied in
these distinctions.Man seeks
to explain
the universe
by himself.

* [Anaximenes, in one of two epistles quoted by Diog. Laertius, II. c. 2, and supposed to be addressed to Pythagoras. They are very paltry forgeries, the production evidently of the same hand to which we owe the epistles of Thales found also in Diogenes. ED.]

LECT.
V.*Tendency to personification in the infancy of philosophy.**The universe a living organized whole.**Physical produce psychological errors.*

these principles, as to enumerate none but the true ones; for though man has no right to make *a priori* application to the world of any principles but those supreme intuitions which possess the universality, necessity, and immediate evidence of pure reason, his early tendencies are constantly leading him to a wide and vague application of his whole nature to the world around him, to see himself in everything, to recognise his will, and even his sensations, in the inanimate universe. This blind analogy is almost the first hypothesis of childhood. The child translates the external world by himself. He perceives, for example, successions under the law of causality, but he adds to this causality his own consciousness of voluntary effort. He perceives objects under the law of extension, but he has little conception of an extension which should overpass his own power of traversing it. The child personifies the stone that hurts him; the childhood of superstition (whose genius is multiplicity) personifies the laws of nature as Gods; the childhood of philosophy (whose genius is unity) made the world itself a living, breathing, animal, "whose body nature was, and God the soul."

Gross as was this conception, it reacted in an error still more unfortunate. When our organised nature had been thus transferred to the universe, as even the faintest inspection of man displayed a superior and inferior principle—a mover and a moved—it was natural, and on the grounds of the application necessary, to constitute such in the external world. But as the feeble psychology of that age had not arrived at a clear and definite separation of the motive power from the animal system, there was no such definite separation made in the great external organisation. Accordingly, whatever seemed the most subtle or pliable, as well as universal element in the mass of the visible world, was marked as the seminal principle whose successive developments and transformations produced all the rest; and then, the *living* principle in this (confused with itself) was called by the same name. Then came the reaction I have intimated. When from the world these theorists once more descended into themselves, they came with all the machinery of their external system about them; and as it would have been preposterous to exalt the spirit of a man above that of the universe, the predominant element in the world became the presiding principle in the human microcosm,—and the soul was now fire, now air, now a mixture or quintessence of the elements. This tendency was, of course, strengthened by the belief, almost universal, that the soul was itself a detached portion of the divine nature, and that, after the completion of its allotted

changes, its destiny was absorption into that vague and unfixed essence to which they were wont to give the title of God:—a striking point of resemblance to those Indian systems in whose examination we were lately engaged.

LFC
V.

But, as there is a motion of organisation, so there is a motion of mere local arrangement and elementary affinity. And the possibility of explaining the universe by this apposition of primitive particles, was also contemplated by these philosophers. Now this may be accomplished on two suppositions; either by mutual affinity, or by intelligent agency: and this was probably the true distinction between the systems of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. However this be, you can easily conceive that the latter, by the very force of his doctrine of Intelligence, might be led to reject the class of analogies I have mentioned, and to consider the universe as the aggregate of particles of infinite smallness, combined and arranged by the presiding agency of a supreme reason.

*Opposite, or
mechanical
theory.*

Having thus attempted to distribute these numerous teachers under two general classes, we may now proceed briefly to note their respective views. As to Thales, I have said that an inspection of the few accounts preserved of his doctrine led me to think that he, without perhaps much precision, embraced a combination of both. I have no intention of entering into minute statements of special tenets, which you can obtain in any of the ordinary sources. But we know that Thales considered Water the primary element, out of whose transformations the material world was formed, for reasons which you may find recorded in Aristotle, and which certainly evince the great Milesian's tendency to the *organic* theory of the world. Other reasons, have, however, been conjectured, and, perhaps, traditional doctrines mingled with the current of the speculations of Thales. We know also that he added to this original element a formative principle of motion (which, indeed, Cicero⁸ pronounces to have been his "god"). Here, then, we seem to perceive a syncretism of both the

*Thales born
B.C. 624, died
B.C. 542 perhaps.
His speculations seem to
involve the
germ of both
the mechanical
and dynamical
theories.
His axi^{on},
"Water."*

⁸ ["Deum autem eam mentem quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret." *Nat. D.* 1. 10, 25. Here however the speaker is the Epicurean Velleius, who in this Dialogue is purposely made to misrepresent the doctrines of the philosophers. "Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur," &c. *Ib.* c. VIII. 18. Whether or not this particular statement was believed by Cicero, it is now agreed that it came from the Epicurean Phædrus, his teacher and contemporary. From the same source proceeded in all probability the apocryphal account of Thales' opinions in Stobæus, *Ecl.* 1. [56]. The hypothesis of a *formative* and a *formal* principle is quite at variance with the testimony of Aristotle, and with the whole spirit of the earliest Ionian Philosophy. It would have been, in effect, an anticipation of Anaxagoras. *ED.*]

LECT.
V.

systems I have noted. But I would further invite your attention to the intimate reciprocal influence of the theology and psychology of that remote age;—an influence, indeed, which is still manifested in the too frequent connexion of atheistic and materialist views in our own times. Thales, as we are well assured, defined the soul as a principle *ἀεικίνητον*⁴. Extending the principle, he attributed separate souls to all moving things—as to the loadstone; and held that “the world was full of gods;” portions, as Aristotle⁵ saw, of the universal soul. You will perceive that this perfectly harmonised with that theology which made the Deity the moving energy of the universe, i.e. the energy which operated those successive transmutations by which the primitive aqueous element was condensed into the harder, or attenuated into the subtler portions of the world. Thus the different fragments of his philosophy illumine each other, and reveal the lineaments of a proportioned system. Certain reports of the Thaletic teaching preserved in Clemens and Laertius are too late to be safe, and seem discordant with the character of these recognised principles of his philosophy.

Reasons for
omitting
Anaximander
in this
place.

Anaximander, who is ordinarily placed next to the founder of the Ionic philosophy, I omit. It has, I think, been very clearly shewn by later⁶ inquirers that his position in the consecutive history of thought is altogether different. The whole character of his views seems unlike those of a pupil of Thales: and we know that Aristotle, in his rapid but precise sketches, is never found to include Anaximander.

⁴ [Pseudo-Plut. *De Placitis Phil.* iv. c. 2. Aristotle's statement is more guarded: “If we can rely on the notices we have of Thales, he too would seem to have conceived the soul as a moving principle; for he is reported to have said that the *loadstone* possessed a soul, because it could move iron.” *De Anima*, i. 2, 17. This passage throws doubt on the *ἀεικίνητον* of the author of the *Placita*, who probably had it from an inferior source. If the fragments of Philolaus are genuine, as Böckh believed them to be, the word *ἀεικίνητος* was probably coined by him. Philolaus, ed. Mullach, frag. 21. But the Aristotelian words and notions contained in this fragment seem incompatible with genuineness; and a question arises whether *ἀεικίν.* may not rather have been borrowed from Plato, *Phædr.* 245, C, as it was by the pseudo-Ocellus, and by Hermes ap. Stobæum. The same question applies to *δαμνογυρῶ* in the same fragment, which may in like manner have been borrowed from the Timæus. Ed.]

⁵ [*De Anima*, i. 5, 20: “ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾤθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. Ed.]

⁶ [Anaximander is placed by Ritter at the head of those philosophers of the Ionian school whom he calls Mechanical, to distinguish them from the Dynamical school, of which he makes Thales the father. This distinction is adopted in substance by the author of these Lectures: I have therefore adopted it in terms in the margin. Anaximander, it should be observed, is frequently mentioned by Aristotle in the *Physics*, though but once in the *Metaphysics*. The statement which occurs shortly afterwards in the text, that he is overlooked by Aristotle, must therefore be understood to refer solely to the “sketch” contained in *Metaph.* i. See below, p. 203, note. Ed.]

We rise, then, from the principle of water to that of *Air*. This element seems happily to unite corporeal and spiritual qualities; and though Anaximenes betrays no indications of direct Theism, we may recognise in his very Pantheism the effort to reconcile, in some intermediate substance, the opposite qualities of the mental and material natures. As before, the soul reflects the ultimate principle of the world; the last element of the world is air, and the soul is air.

LECT.
V.*Anaxime-
nes, u. c. 548.
His apxh
"Air."*

- In Diogenes Apolloniates⁷ we have the commentator and refiner of Anaximenes. The "air" of Diogenes possesses intellectual qualities, precisely as the "fire" of Heraclitus, to whom we shall presently arrive. The deity of Diogenes is a divine air pervading the universe, itself a huge vitalized organism. The *breath* of man is his soul, or the vehicle of his soul.

*Diogenes
Apolloniates
flor. perh.
u. c. 450 to
Pel. War.**His "Air."*

But we have not scaled the ladder of the elementary universe. In the views of Heraclitus (to whom, following the thread of thought, rather than of locality, I now pass,) Fire was the substance of the universe; God, and the soul of man, a subtle and diviner flame. Heraclitus is said to have been instructed both by Hippasus and Xenophanes, but on vague and unsatisfactory authority: from his Ephesian origin, and the complexion of his doctrine, Creuzer⁸ conjectures Oriental associations. In Heraclitus, then, the universe was reducible to an eternal Fire, whose motions in never-ceasing change (*ποιη*) were regulated by the co-eternal ordinances of supreme fate; fire, which seems in the sun and stars to be enthroned in the loftiest chambers of the universe; fire, whose boundless energy is manifested openly in destruction, and secretly, but universally, in the great work of renovation and life, and whose agency in the "caloric" of the modern chemistry is scarcely more confined than the physics of Heraclitus made it. Such an element as this seemed, if any, to claim supremacy over the other materials of the physical world. The tenets of Heraclitus, however, extended into all the recesses of the moral as well as the physical system. Believing all the subject of incessant change, his doctrines tinged his life and

*Heraclitus
flor. u. c. 500.
His apxh
"Fire."**Doctrine of
perpetual
flux.*

⁷ [Diogenes Laertius is very brief in his account of this philosopher, whom however he calls *ἄνθρωπος ἐλλόγιμος*. He quotes Antisthenes for the assertion that Diogenes was the pupil of Anaximenes, which the character of his theory renders probable. A detailed account of his speculations is to be found in Simplicius on the *Physics* of Aristotle, fol. 32, quoted by Ritter and Preller, § 27. He was contemporary with Anaxagoras (Diog. L. ix. 9), and probably survived him. A dissertation by Schleiermacher on "Diogenes of Apollonia" is preserved in the *Transactions of the Berlin Academy*, 1811, and was republished in his *Philosophical Works*, Vol. II. p. 149. The fragments have been edited, together with those of Anaxagoras, by Schorn, Bonn, 1829. Ed.]

⁸ [This theory of Creuzer's is satisfactorily disposed of by Bernays in the *Rhein. Mus.* Vol. VII. p. 93. Ed.]

L^{ECT.} conversation with a melancholy which became proverbial
 -- V. -- through antiquity. But why is it that Heraclitus is found

so eminently *obscure*? 'Ο σκοτεινός was his title even among his contemporaries. It strikes me that the solution is to be found in the *peculiarity* of his position. Of all the physical

His melancholy causes of his obscurity.

Comparative spirituality of his conceptions.

theorists of his time who looked upon the world as a vital organism, Heraclitus, perhaps, arrived nearest at the purely spiritual⁹ conception of its author. Such a state—the *transition-state* from one to another, and distinct view of the principles of the world,—is marked with restlessness, disquietude, uncertainty, and obscurity. Nor will you be surprised to find in such a teacher the germs of much which became subsequently developed in complete system: this is a character which always belongs to these denizens of the border-land of discovery. From Heraclitus's theory of perpetual fluxion Plato derived the necessity of seeking a stable basis for the universal system in his world of ideas, as Aristotle expressly tells us: and this lofty mysticism of his language unquestionably had a pervading influence over that great philosopher's mind¹⁰.

⁹ [Such seems to have been Justin Martyr's opinion, *Apol. 1. c. 46*: "Those who have lived in communion with Reason (*Λόγῳ*) are Christians, though they may have been reputed Atheists; as among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and their like." Compare the citation from Eusebius, &c. in Bentley's *Remarks on Free-thinking*, p. 408, Dyce. The Heraclitean "Fire" is endued with spiritual attributes. Aristotle calls it *ψυχὴ*, and says it is *ἀσωματώτατον* (*De Anima*, 1. 2. 16). It is in effect the common ground of the phenomena both of mind and matter; it is not only the animating but also the intelligent and regulative principle of the universe (*πῶρ δειχθῶν φρόνιμον... πάντα ὁλακίζων κραταιός*), the *ἑνὸς Λόγος*, or universal Word or Reason, which it behoves all men to follow, though the multitude live as if it were not, walking by the light of private judgment (*ἰδίᾳ φρόνησις*). If this theory seem to materialize mind, it may with equal fairness be said to spiritualize matter; and the phrases quoted above, from undoubted sources, appear to justify the assertion in the text; which may be compared with that of a very recent German writer: "Das bewegte Eins des Heraklit, das Werden, ist so immateriell als das ruhende Eins der Eleaten, das Seyn." Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.* 1. p. 57.

Among modern aids to our knowledge of Heraclitus may be mentioned Schlegelmacher's dissertation, published first in Wolf and Buttmann's *Museum*, 1808, and republished in the Second Vol. of his Philosophical Works. It bears the title, "Heraclitus the obscure, of Ephesus, exhibited by the aid of his Fragments and the testimonies of the Ancients." A valuable supplement to this treatise is the *Heraclitica* of Bernays, Bonn, 1848, to which add his two papers in the Rhenish Museum (*Heraclitische Studien*, R. M. Vol. VII. p. 90, and a dissertation on the New Fragments contained in the Pseudo-Origen's Confutation of Heresies. Ib. Vol. IX. p. 241); also his *Epistola Critica* to Mr Bunsen, which appeared in the fourth vol. of Bunsen's *Hippolytus*, and is reprinted in the third vol. of the same author's *Analecta Ante-Nicena*, together with annotations on the recovered Fragments. Lassalle's elaborate work, entitled *Die Philosophie Herakleitos des dunklen* (Berlin, 1858), should not be left unnoticed. It is an ambitious attempt to explain all the difficulties of Heraclitus by the reflected light of Hegel's philosophy. Ed.]

¹⁰ [Heraclitus was perhaps the greatest speculative genius among the forerunners of Plato, who began his philosophical life as a student of this philosopher, and who dedicated his maturer powers to the task of reconciling the Ephesian doctrine of Unrest and Development (*τὸ πλεον, τὸ γινώμενον*) with the Eleatic principle of Permanence (*τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἑστὸς*). The Stoics also built up

We have now seen three of the ordinary elements elevated into the successive honours of supremacy. Pherecydes (the supposed master of Thales) had, long before the age of Heraclitus, declared *Earth* to be the original matter; and nothing now remained but the work of composition. The great compounder of all the past systems of nature was Empedocles; and this I consider the chief character of his doctrine. Empedocles declared that there were four elements equally concerned in the constitution of the world, and that forces which he, in a kind of philosophical mythology, termed "Love and Hate," animated these primary substances into the harmony of motion. In the fragments¹¹

Empedocles
for. B.C. 441.

A. Syncretist
or *Eclect.*
His four elements.

their elaborate physical system with Heraclitean materials; and, to descend to modern times, some of Hegel's most daring paradoxes are conceived by their author to have been anticipated by Heraclitus. (Heg. *Gesch. d. Phil.* i. p. 334; *Wissenschaft der Logik*, B. I. § 1, c. Anm. 1.)

Heraclitus is further known by his Aphorisms, which are among the most brilliant of those

"Jewels five words long
That on the stretch'd fore-finger of all Time
Sparkle for ever."

Among the most famous of these are the following: Πόλεμος πατήρ πάντων: "War is Father of all things." (All things are evolved by the strife of antagonistic forces). "No man can wade twice in the same stream." (Material substances are perpetually losing their identity). "The wisest of men is an ape to the gods." (Hence Pope, "And shew a Newton as men shew an ape"). "Ἀρμονία ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων," explained by Lassalle as the 'weltordnende γνῶσις des Gottes,' compared with its 'sinnliche Darstellung,' or possibly referring to the superiority of vital and organic to merely mechanical arrangements, as indeed Plutarch seems to understand it—ἐν ᾗ τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς ἐτερότητας ὁ μὲν οὖν θεὸς ἔκρυψε καὶ κατέδυσε. "Summa ars celare artem" may be the popular interpretation of this gnome. "Time is a child at his sports" (ever constructing, ever levelling). "Life is the death of gods, death their life" (a dictum reproduced in various forms by the Pythagoreans, Plato, Euripides, &c., as in the well-known exclamation: *τις δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἔστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν*). "Men are mortal gods, gods are immortal men." "Ἦθος ἀνθρώπου δαίμων," "A man's character is his destiny." "Ποιλομαθῆναι νόον οὐ διδάσκει," "The greatest clerks are not the wisest men." *Αὐγὴ ξερὰ ψυχῆ σοφωτάτη*. Hence Bacon, *de Augm.* i. *Orb.* Vol. iv. p. 22, ed. 1778, 4to: "Cum autem conclusiones inde deducuntur, quæ oblique rebus nostris applicatæ, vel infirmos metus gignunt, vel immodicas cupiditates, tum demum nascitur cruciatus ille et perturbatio mentis qua de loquimur; tunc enim scientia non est amplius lumen siccum (ut voluit Heraclitus ille obscurus, *Lumen siccum, optima anima*) sed sit lumen madidum, atque humoribus affectuum maceratum." But this Heraclitean philosopheme takes many shapes: (1) Galen (*Quod anim. mortal.*) *αὐγὴ ξερὰ ψυχῆ σοφωτάτη*. (2) Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* viii. 14 *αὐγὴ ξερὰ ψυχῆ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*. (3) Plutarch *de Orac. Prof.* p. 432 *αὐτὴ γὰρ ξερὰ ψυχῆ καὶ* 'Ἠράκλειτος. Id. *Romul.* c. 28 *αὐτὴ γὰρ ψυχῆ ἀρίστη καὶ* 'Ἠρ. ὡς περ ἀστραπὴ νέφους διαπταμένη τοῦ σώματος. (4) Clemens Alex. *Pædag.* ii. 2 *Αὐγὴ δὲ ψυχῆ ξερὰ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*. (5) In Stob. *Flor.* v. 100 we have simply *αὐγὴ ψυχῆ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*. A comparison of these passages tempts to the conjecture which will probably be thought a rash one, that *αὐγὴ* and *αἶα* may have been interchanged, and that *ξερὰ* is only a gloss on the less usual *αἶα*. In that case *αἶα ψυχῆ ἀρίστη* would be what Heraclitus really wrote. Zeller suggests a different way of accounting for *αὐγὴ*. *Phil. d. Gr.* i. p. 480 note 1. Ed.]

¹¹ [The best collection of these Fragments is that of M. Karsten, Amsterdam, 1838, whose numbers are adopted in the passages quoted in these

LECT.
V.*His miscellaneous philosophical training.*

of Empedocles I seem to recognise the traces of a most miscellaneous philosophic education, in which Ionic and Pythagorean influences are almost equally observable. He speaks of monads¹², of elements, of genii or demons, and of a soul of the world, to which, as I have uniformly noted to you, the soul of man is made the correlative, being itself a

notes. Some additional lines have come to light in the newly-discovered *Confutatio Hæresium*, Book VII. Ed.]

¹² [The doctrine of monads, that is to say ultimate corpuscles or atoms, is attributed to Empedocles by Plutarch (*De Fac. orb. Lun.* p. 926, quoted by Karsten). But neither the word nor the notion occurs in his Fragments: and Aristotle seems to deny that Empedocles was an atomist (*De Gen. et Corr.* I. 8, *de Caelo*, III. 4). False still is the statement of the Pseudo-Origen, who in the *Philosophumena* speaks of a "divine Monad," or "intelligible Fire," as one of the tenets of Empedocles, confounding, as would seem, Pythagorean with Heraclitic or Stoical notions, and making Empedocles responsible for the compound. This author, whom we may venture to call Hippolytus, is to be trusted only when he quotes. By the Monad of Empedocles he probably means what our philosopher styled "the Sphere or Globe," *σφαῖρος*, by which he figured the original uncreated universe (compound, *μίγμα*, is Aristotle's synonym for it), which contains in its bosom the four elements, as yet unsundered, together with two coequal and co-ordinate developing forces, Love and Hate; by the latter of which the elements are separated, being then by Love re-united and combined into the forms of organized nature. The word *σφαῖρος*, a coinage of his own, was suggested by the *εὐκλείου σφαῖρης* *δγκος* of Parmenides; though Empedocles understands by it a physical rather than a metaphysical unity. The motive to this philosophical figment is obvious. Empedocles strove, here as in other parts of his system, to combine, if not to reconcile, the Dynamical and Mechanical theories of Nature, which divided the speculators of the Ionian school. His *σφαῖρος* is a syncretism of the primeval chaos, the *ἀνοὺ πάντα χρήματα*, of Anaxagoras, and the vital forces which, under the names of air, water, or fire, operate, according to Anaximenes, Thales, or Heraclitus, all the varying phenomena of the universe. His *νεῖκος* and *φιλότης* (Love and Hate, Discord and Amity) are evidently suggested by the Eternal Strife, the *πόλεμος πατὴρ πάντων* of Heraclitus; perhaps are intended as an improvement upon it. They, and the elements upon which they act, make up the Totality or *σφαῖρος*, to which Empedocles gives the name of God; herein differing essentially from Anaxagoras, whose Supreme Intelligence is conceived as extraneous to the undigested mass which he "comes to organize" (*ἵστα νῦν ἐλθὼν διέκδομησε*). In modern language, Anaxagoras is a Theist, Empedocles a Pantheist. But the process of creation is the same in both philosophies: consisting not in change of one substance into another, which Empedocles repudiates as decidedly as Anaxagoras, but in the due mixture and juxtaposition of elements in themselves immutable. Empedocles is praised by Aristotle for fixing the number of these elements, which Anaxagoras leaves undetermined: a judgment which might surprise us, did we forget that Aristotle adopted all four into his own scheme of Physics. The "Globe" of Empedocles is a favourite plaything of the later Platonists, who scruple not to identify it with their own *κόσμος νοητός*, or "region of intelligible forms." From these later Platonists, through whatever channel, there can be no doubt that Bacon borrowed his "Globus intellectualis." Compare Proclus in *Tim.* 160, D, *διπλὸν ποιεῖ τὸν σφαῖρον* [*Ἐμπεδοκλήῃς*] *τὸν μὲν ἀλοῦντὸν τὸν δὲ νοητὸν, κ.τ.λ.* (a mistake, however, as regards Empedocles), and Simplicius in *Phys. Arist.* 76 *Ἐμπεδ. περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ ἀλοῦντοῦ διδάσκων, καὶ ἐκείνον τοῦτον παρδειγμα ἀρχέτυπον τιθέμενος κ.τ.λ.* These passages, taken together, afford a solution of the hitherto (by editors) unexplained riddle in the *Advancement of Learning*: It is the perfect Law of Enquiry of truth, that nothing be in the Globe of Matter, which should not likewise be in the Globe of Crystal or Form. Works, III. p. 456, Spedding. Ed.]

*quintessence*¹³ of the elements. The process of communion between man and the world around him is effected, according to Empedocles, by the action of the same element upon the same; according to which tenet he distributes the elements among the senses respectively¹⁴: but the Pythagorean pupil is still manifested in the resolute denial¹⁵ of all knowledge that deserves the name to the feeble grasp of sense, and the restriction of true apperceptions to the eternal verities of reason. The philosopher of Agrigentum

LECT.
V.*Theory of
perception.
Pythagorean
element.*

¹³ [The reader must not infer from these expressions that Empedocles is responsible for the word 'quintessence,' or that he uses any corresponding Greek term. *Quinta essentia* (πέμπτη οὐσία) is of Aristotelian extraction. It denoted the fifth element, out of which the heavenly bodies were supposed by that philosopher to be formed. *De Mundo*, c. 11. 6: στοιχείον οὐραν ἔρεπον τῶν τεττάρων, ἀκράτων τε καὶ θεῶν. Empedocles admits no such fifth element. Ed.]

¹⁴ [A very curious philosopheme of Empedocles deserves notice here. He held the doctrine—cagerly espoused by some of the most considerable physical speculators of antiquity—that from all bodies minute particles are perpetually thrown off, which find their way into other bodies by corresponding minute passages (πόροι, "pores"). This theory of Emanations (ἀπορροαί) he employs to explain the action and reaction of substances upon each other, and in particular the phenomena of sensation and perception. In pursuance of the hypothesis, Empedocles was led to the invention of the plausible principle, which was adopted without inquiry by nearly every ancient school, *similia similibus percipiuntur*, "like is only perceived by like" (v. 321). Earthy particles, he tells us, are known by their impact on the earthy elements in the human frame, "water is felt by contact with the water, fire by attraction to the fire within," &c. This *παῖν* but ingenious fiction was embraced by Democritus, and after him by the Epicureans; with this difference, that *they* hypothesize a *vacuum* through which the emanative particles pass, which Empedocles explicitly denies. (v. 63. See his elegant simile of the *Clepsydra*, v. 282.) Plato, who laughs at the hypothesis of emanations as an explanation of the phenomena of the senses (*Aleno*, p. 76), adopts the general principle (*similia similibus*) in his theory of the Intellect, and of its relation to the cognate Ideas, the intelligible incorporeal objects of an incorporeal intelligent subject. (See *Republ.* p. 508.) Similarly in the *Timaeus*, p. 35, he represents the soul as compounded of two principles, the principle of identity or permanence (ἡ ταύτου φύσις), and the principle of change or diversity (ἡ ἑτέρου), corresponding respectively with the intelligible and the sensible universe, γινώσκεισθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον. (Arist. *de Anima*, 1. 2, § 7, where see Trendelenburg's learned and accurate note). The same principle seems to lie at the root of Bacon's twofold division of the soul into the "spiraculum" and the "anima sensibilis;" "quorum alterum ortum habuerit a Deo, alterum e matricibus elementorum." (*De Augm.* IV. c. 3.) Many other curious philosophical hypotheses are traced to this source by Sir W. Hamilton in his *Discussions on Philosophy*, p. 60. Ed.]

¹⁵ [Cicero places Empedocles in the same category with Socrates, Democritus, and Anaxagoras, "omnes pæne veteres; qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt; angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitæ, et (ut Democritus) in profundo veritatem esse denersam; opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri; nihil veritati relinqui; deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa." *Acad. Post.* 1. c. 12. There are passages in the Fragments of Empedocles which undoubtedly point to the distinction between reason and sense, on which so much stress was laid by Parmenides and the Eleatics; for instance in the lines:

γυῖον πιστὸν ἔρυκε νοεὶ δ' ἢ δῆλον ἕκαστον. v. 53,

and τὴν συ νόφ δέρκευ μῆδ' ὀμμασιν ἥσο τεθηπῶς. v. 108.

LECT.
V.

is, therefore, usually¹⁸ classed as an appendix to the Italic school; I have, however, thought it well to place him with the Ionics in his philosophy of the elements, as an arrangement more conducive to an harmonious view of the progressive development of the entire subject.

Step from
Empedocles
to

When the universe had been thus humanized, and the very affections of the human nature attributed to its attractive and repulsive forces, it is evident that philosophy had but one step further to make in order to reach the completion of the analogy. The world was not merely to be endowed with organisation, and with active principles of desire, but still more, with the regulating energy of an Intellect. That by some such progressive course as this Anaxagoras was led to his conception of the Supreme Intelligence, I cannot but think highly probable. But along with the principle of Intelligence Anaxagoras had coupled a system which totally discriminates him from the teachers

But, as Karsten and others have properly observed, these passages are not to be interpreted too rigorously. If Empedocles had denied *in toto* the credibility of the senses, it would be difficult to account for the estimation in which he was held by Lucretius: difficult also to reconcile such unbelief with the materialism implied in his theory of the universe. This Sextus Empiricus seems to have remarked, for he says: Empedocles represents that "all the senses are trustworthy, if under the control of reason" (τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν ἐπιστατούμενος). *Adv. Math.* VII. 124. Empedocles was in fact not more a rationalist than Democritus and Anaxagoras, in whose company he is placed by Cicero. Complaints of the imbecility of the human faculties, compared with the obscurity and vastness of Nature, are common to all the ancient philosophers. The *σοφία* of the Agrigentine was, in his own case, a vivid and highly inventive fancy: not as in Parmenides, an unequalled power of speculative abstraction. Empedocles is even classed by Aristotle with the philosophers who identified intellect and sense. *Metaph.* III. 5. Ed.]

¹⁶ [As by Brucker, whose account of the philosophy of Empedocles is however not to be relied upon, being derived, in great part, from bad secondary sources. On the question, to what sect or succession Empedocles may most properly be referred, Karsten has the following sound remarks: "Multum autem disceptatum est, in qua philosophorum secta Empedocles sit ponendus: plurimi cum Pythagoreis, alii Ionicis, alii Eleaticis annumerandum opinati sunt. Ex iis vero quæ disputavimus, apparere arbitror, illius rationem cum omnibus his sectis connexam, nullius earum propriam fuisse. Cum Eleaticis in eo consentit, quod unum illud immotum perfectumque, ab illis τὴν οὐρανὴν assignatum, in mundi principia transtulit: cum Ionicis in hoc præsertim, quod res nature perpetuo fluere, et huc illuc agitari censuit; cum Pythagoreis pleraque, quæ ad res divinas, ad animos et religiones pertinent, habet communia; quibus Orphica quædam placita et instituta adjecit. Sic e diversis elementis conflata est Empedoclea ratio, unius tamen ingenii signo et effigie impressa." *De Emped.* pp. 5, 7. The same author thus characterizes his theology: "Physica Empedoclis doctrina cum theologia artissime coheret; est, ut ita dicam, naturæ ἀποθέωσις, summo jure Pantheismus appellandus. Talis autem sentiendi ratio tam temporibus quibus vixit Empedocles, quam ingenio ipsius et moribus consentanea erat. Quippe evanuerant dii, obsoleverant fabulæ, emortua erat religio, a priscis Græciæ vatibus consecrata; ita factum ut eruditiores aut divinum numen plane tollerent, aut, si qui essent acriore religionis sensu, hi converterent se ad naturæ vires, in easque transferrent divinos honores et munera, fabulosæ antiquitatis Diis negata, quorum nisi nomina et umbras retinebant." Ed.]

whom we have as yet contemplated. The architecture of the universe was with him executed on a different plan, and framed out of different materials. But, to understand this, we must retrace a few steps, and recur to that Anaximander whom we before rejected from the ordinary classification.

LECT.
V.

Anaximander (who is said to have been the first of the sages who committed his views to writing) is represented, in the very detached and doubtful reports preserved of his doctrine, to have declared that the principle of the world was a certain *ἄπειρον*, the basis of innumerable changes, of worlds perpetually rising and falling, and of gods, who, if distinct from these worlds in substance, are at least equally liable to the fate of incessant mutability. You may find his theology in Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.* lib. 1.). The word *ἄπειρον*, on which our opinion of his views must rest, has usually been rendered *infinitude*; but when we find Aristotle calling it a *μῖγμα* of elements, we may be inclined to suspect that Anaximander meant a state of being without limitations or divisions, in other words, a state of chaotic combination: a conjecture in which I find myself confirmed by a late learned writer on this branch of learning. So far was Anaximander from sympathising with the theory of universal *vitality*, that he endeavours (as has been well shewn) to solve the phenomena of organisation itself by mechanical theories. Here we observe, then, a decided warfare of principles: the pupil of Thales symbolises ill with his reputed teacher, and not at all with his reputed successor. You will find this point well reasoned out by Ritter¹⁷ in his account of the Ionic philosophy; and, as I think, at least as convincingly established as a question can be on which our information is so defective.

Anaximander flor.
b. c. 573
His "infinite"
*note."**or Chaos.**His mechanical theory.*

In *Anaxagoras*¹⁸ the theory of a mechanical, not vital union of particles, arrived, in its legitimate course, at a far higher perfection. To the philosopher of Clazomenæ matter, ever numerically the same, underwent combination and separation from the energy and dictates of a supreme

Anaxagoras.
b. c. 500 to
b. c. 428.*His theory of matter and of mind.*

¹⁷ [This view of Ritter's (*Gesch. d. Phil.* iii. c. 7), peculiar, if I mistake not, to himself, has not found favour with more recent historians of philosophy, as Brandis and Zeller, who agree in classing Anaximander with his predecessor Thales and his successor Anaximenes, and deny the atomistic tendency attributed to his doctrines by Ritter. (See Brandis, *Handb.* i. p. 133; Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*, i. p. 156.) The classification of the ante-Socratic philosophers proposed by Zeller, is in its principle different from that of Ritter, and seems to me on the whole more natural and more in accordance with Greek, as distinguished from modern ideas. Ed.]

¹⁸ [The Fragments of Anaxagoras have been edited by Schaubach (Leipzig, 1827), who has added a copious Latin commentary. Also, more critically, by Schorn (Bonn, 1829). They are all taken from Simplicius, who quotes them in his invaluable commentary on the *Physics of Aristotle*. Ed.]

LECT.
V.

His influence on subsequent speculation.

Socratic development of the Nous of Anaxagoras.

mind¹⁹. No point of space is unoccupied by particles which, nevertheless, are infinitely small; but the entire is pervaded by the influence of a guiding reason which unites elements in their fitting position, affinity, and proportion. The same Reason which can explore the world must have been exerted to arrange it; and man can see in the work the image of the intelligence of the Artist. This noble conception of the universal frame was, in the philosophy of Anaxagoras, carried into many minuter details; and in the inferior part of his structure he, of course, committed the errors which all must commit who venture upon interpreting nature without duly compelling her to answer the question of reason, and to reveal herself. The harmony, however, which the doctrine of an arranging Intellect bestowed upon the theory of the universe, soon attracted notice, and multiplied converts; and though Anaxagoras suffered from the jealousy of those who dreaded that Deity would supplant the deities, the manifest and happy influence which he exerted upon the subsequent direction of the Grecian philosophy is the sure test of the substantial efficacy of his teaching, and the proudest monument to his memory. At the same time, in our admiration, we must preserve measure and proportion. It was Socrates who made of the *Noûs* a genuine Providence; and who thence fixed on its true basis the study of, and the argument from, final causes. "We know," says he, in one golden sentence of the *Memorabilia*²⁰, "our soul by its operation; and so we know the Deity by his works."

The physical views of the mechanical²¹ philosophy were

¹⁹ [Anaxagoras, unlike the early pantheistic speculators, rigidly separates his Supreme Intelligence from the material universe. His *Nous* is a principle infinite, independent (*αὐτοκράτης*), omnipresent (*ἐν παντί παντός μορφῇ ὂν*), the subtlest and purest of things (*λεπτότατον πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον*), and incapable of commixture with aught besides (*μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρημῶτι*). The *Nous* is also omniscient (*πάντα ἔγνω*), and uniform (*πᾶς ὁμοῖός ἐστι*). Simplicius, in *Arist. Phys.* i. f. 33. The extract from which this account is taken is quoted at length by Ritter and Preller, § 64. But for the accident of its preservation by Simplicius we should have been unable to form an adequate idea either of the purity of Anaxagoras's Theism, or of the justice of Aristotle's remark, that, compared with his predecessors, the philosopher of Clazomenae was like a sober man among raving drunkards. (*Met.* i. 3, 16.) Aristotle, however, as well as Plato (*Phad.* p. 98), complain of the timorous application of this principle by its author. ED.]

²⁰ [B. IV. c. 3, 14. ED.]

²¹ [The systems of Anaxagoras and Democritus, though classed together as "Mechanical," are related rather by contrast than resemblance. Anaxagoras held a *plenum*, Democritus a *vacuum*: Anaxagoras made matter infinitely divisible, Democritus assumed a *minimum* ("atom," *ἄτομος*, *insecabilis*): Anaxagoras taught that different material substances consist of particles differing in kind as the substances themselves differ (*homœomeria*): the atoms of Democritus are homogeneous, differing only in configuration. Again, the atoms are eternally in motion; the chaos of Anaxagoras, essentially inert, requires the agency of a mind to sunder and arrange its co-inherent particles: with Democritus all things are under the controul of Fate, according to Anaxa-

continued in a very different spirit by the *Atomists*, to whom Leucippus is attributed as founder. The excessive and chimerical extravagance of these theorists was mainly produced by the rival extravagance of the Eleatic school. The local history of this succession of philosophers is very obscure and uncertain; it seems to have had some connexion of hostility with the Eleatics, and to have probably arisen in Elea: we know, however, that its champion, Democritus²², was a native of Abdera in Thrace. Its true scope cannot be perfectly comprehended without the contrast of the Eleatic institutes²³: we may, however, in the

LECT.
V.

Leucippus, date uncertain. Father of the Atomic Philosophy version bet. the Atomic and Eleatic Schools. Democritus B.C. 460 to B.C. 357.

goras, under that of Intelligence. As Dr Whewell observes (*Hist. of Ind. Sc.* i. p. 64), the atomistic doctrine "points to the corpuscular theories of modern times," while that of Anaxagoras "may be considered as a dim glimpse of the idea of chemical analysis." The following lines of Lucretius contain a luminous account of the *homœomeria*:

Principio, rerum quom dicit homœomerian,
Ossa, videlicet, e paucillis atque minutis
Ossibus hic et de paucillis atque minutis
Visceribus viscus, gigni sanguineque creati
Sanguinis inter se multos cœuntibus guttis
Ex aurique putat micis consistere posse
Aurum, et de terris terram concrecere parvis,
Ignibus ex ignis, umorem umoribus esse,
Cetera consimili fingit ratione putatque.
Nec tamen esse ulla idem ex parte in rebus inane
Conceclit, neque corporibus finem esse secandis.

Linquat hic quædam latitandi copia tenuis,
Id quod Anaxagoras sibi sumit, ut omnibus omnis
Res putet inmixtas rebus latitare, sed illud
Apparere unum, cuius sint plurima mixta
Et magis in promptu priusque in fronte locata.

Lib. i. vv. 834 seqq., 875 seqq. EN.]

²² [The Fragments of Democritus have been collected and carefully edited by Mullach, in his *Questiones Democritæ* (Berlin, 1843), and in his *Fragmenta Philosophorum*, vol. i. Paris 1860. They are exceedingly well worth reading, and bear for the most part an aspect of genuineness. It does not appear certain that Leucippus left any written record of his opinions. (See Mullach, *Q. D.* p. 374, not. 3.) Diogenes Laertius makes, on the authority of Aristoxenus the Peripatetic, the curious statement that Plato made a collection of the books of Democritus, and would have burnt them, but for the representations of two Pythagorean friends, who pointed out the futility of the proceeding—*παρά πολλοῖς γὰρ εἶναι τὰ βιβλία ἥδη*. This, adds Diog. perhaps after Aristoxenus, will account for the fact that Plato, who refers to all the other philosophers, nowhere mentions Democritus. But Peripatetic notices of Plato are always open to suspicion, and this story may have been invented to explain the fact. Covert allusions to Democritus have been detected, or rather perhaps imagined, in the *Sophistes* of Plato and other dialogues, by Schleiermacher, and others. EN.]

²³ [The Atomic and Eleatic doctrines may seem, at first sight, to have nothing in common. We learn however from Simplicius (*in Phys.* i. fol. 7), that Leucippus studied philosophy under Parmenides (for whom Zeno is falsely substituted by the author of the *Philosophumena*), and a passage in Aristotle (*De Gen. et Corr.* i. 8) explains the relation between the two systems. Accordingly, much of the phraseology and some of the postulates of the Eleatics were adopted by Leucippus and Democritus, who however gave a physical, material meaning to the metaphysical notions of the former school. Thus their *vacuum* is styled *μὴ ὂν* (*Non Ens*), their atoms *ὄντα* (*entia*): and

LECT.
V.

consecution of doctrine, briefly notice these sages as our closing sketch, and as presenting the fullest development of the Ionian mechanists.

*Atheism of
Leucippus.*

In the philosophy of Leucippus all traces of a Supreme Intelligence disappeared. The universe—a dark, unshaped mass—consisted of two principles (if they can so be termed), reality and inanity. Through a boundless void (here differing both from Anaxagoras and the Eleatics) atoms, infinite in number, and diversified in figure, eternally wandered,—their wanderings governed by that dark negation of guiding law to which the title “Necessity” was ascribed. To contemplate the scenery of the universe exists the soul, which (according to the principle so often noted) is itself a subtle combination of atoms.

*Reality and
Void.
Atoms the
only reali-
ties.*

*The soul it-
self a com-
bination of
atoms.*

*Eternity of
Time,
Space, and
Motion.*

Time, Space, and Motion (it was thus Democritus took up the strain) are all eternal. As truth can only contemplate that which really exists, and as atoms and void alone are worthy the name of real existences, they are the only genuine subjects of real knowledge, and all else is but the shadowy diversity of internal impressions which can claim no real archetype. Thus was commenced that species of scepticism which has since, under various forms, been so constantly reiterated. To Democritus, in the pursuit of this his system, belong many anticipations of truths which modern psychology regards as its exclusive discoveries. He affirmed, with great perspicuity and decision, that secondary²⁴ qualities are but the modifications of human

*Sceptical
inferences.*

*Democri-
tus the first
who distin-*

they boldly assert, in defiance of Parmenides, “quod non-Ens est.” (*ἐστὶ τὸ κενόν*, *Phys.* 1. 8; οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ἐν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἶναι, *Metaph.* 1. 4).^{*} Again, the Eleatics denied the possibility of motion, on the ground that motion implies that very contradiction. But Democritus, by his hypothesis of a *vacuum*, was enabled to assert the possibility of motion also. In denying motion, Parmenides denied the possibility of change, or “generation and dissolution.” But motion secured, generation and its opposite can be explained; for they are but motions of atoms to or from each other. The propositions, “atoms are homogeneous,” and, “they possess magnitude,” are proved by Democritus on grounds as purely *a priori* as those on which the Eleatics built their theory. The *first* follows from the assumption that Like can only act on Like; the *second*, from the postulate, that no number of infinitely small parts can constitute a magnitude. These instances are sufficient to shew that the early Atomic theories contained a dogmatic as well as a sceptical, an *a priori* as well as an empirical element. See the following note. ED.]

²⁴ [So Theophrastus informs us, *De Sens.* 69 (ap. Mullach, *Q. D.* p. 216, *Frag. Phil.* 1. p. 362, 24): τὸ μὲν σχῆμα καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ γλυκὺ καὶ ὀνύχον τὸ αἰσθητὸν πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις. “Figure” (according to Democritus) “has an independent,—sweetness and the other sensible qualities have only a relative—existence,” h. e. sunt quatenus percipiuntur. (See also *ibid.* p. 204.) In *Frag.* 2 he places all the senses upon a level in respect of their truth. “Sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, are all alike dark and uncertain.” The idea of figure, then, is *not* derived from the senses. Neither is that of magnitude, which is presumed in figure; nor of weight, which may be resolved into magnitude, for weight depends on the proportion of matter to void in a given substance. These speculations are, however, difficult to reconcile with other

sensibility, and that by touch alone can man discover the external world. But not *this* alone is the result of touch; the gods themselves are known only by material contact, and no new conception can reach the soul (which itself is a compound of round and moving atoms)²⁵ except through the direct proximity of emitted images. Thus, by a total materialism, was laid the basis of that philosophy of which Epicurus soon became the completer; and which, ornamented and enlarged by the progress of science, has been transmitted, without much *substantial* change, to so many of the medical psychologists of the present day²⁶.

LECT.

V.

quashed pri-
macy
and

testimonies which represent Democritus as identifying knowledge and sensation, and even as asserting that all sensible appearances are true. Compare Arist. *Metaph.* III. 4. 10. Mullach, p. 415, supposes that this last was one of those early opinions which Democritus, according to Plutarch, afterwards abandoned. This, however, is improbable, and seems to be contradicted by Theophrastus, who complains that in one of his treatises Democritus sets out by pompously announcing his intention of proving the truth of the senses, which in the sequel of the same treatise he entirely subverts. [Ed.]

²⁵ [Aristot. *De Anima*, I. 2. E.]

²⁶ [The Ethical doctrines of Democritus are not mentioned in the text; but they are certainly not without importance in the history of this branch of Philosophy. The elegance and purity of Democritus' style are justly praised by ancient critics, as the remaining fragments testify. Ed.]

LECTURE VI.

ON THE PYTHAGOREANS AND ELEATICS.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
VI.
*Introductory
remarks.*

AT our last meeting we rapidly traversed the field of philosophical contemplation presented in the labours of the Ionic school, and in those of some other speculators whom congeniality of views, rather than proximity of place, or any immediate historical connexion, associates with them. I endeavoured, with a success, I am afraid, very inferior to my design, to supply to your minds some of those leading ideas in which ordinary histories are apt to be so deficient, but without which the barren chronology of systems and their teachers is nearly as profitless as any other acquisition of mere memory, and not at all, as we are too prone to think, rescued from inutility by either the dignity of the subject, or the rarity of the possession. It is the difference between an anatomical enumeration and a physiological discussion. Facts and dates are as indispensable as a map of the nerves, or of the blood-vessels; but in the physiology of history alone can the student look for the organization, the action, the play, and life, of the whole.

Having been unable to comprise the entire ante-Socratic movement in my last Lecture, we must again prepare to penetrate into this patriarchal age of Greek philosophy, where all is so intermingled, and so incomplete, but where all is likewise promissory of a mighty future. It is like that pre-Adamite world, where dwell, as some Oriental fictions held, the gigantic shadows of men as yet unborn: the outlines of systems to come were dimly traced in enormous proportions, and the mind, yet in the phantom-peopled twilight of an imaginative superstition, wandered, almost unconsciously, through the path it was afterwards to travel in a fuller light, and with a march more assured.

Recapitulation.

We saw, that in the absence of a true experimental philosophy of nature, two paths, and, as far as we can see, two paths alone, lay open to the speculator on the mysteries

of the external world :—the one, that of analogies more or less correct; the other, that of pure *a priori* deduction: the one looking on nature, but looking on her with a careless and shortsighted glance; the other withdrawing the eye almost wholly from the sensible world, and, with introverted glance, contemplating the ideal forms of the mind, in order subsequently to apply, by an arbitrary and vigorous imposition, these mental conceptions to the material structure. The former of these courses, in some degree adopted by all these sages, was ardently, and almost exclusively, embraced by the Ionic and their kindred schools; the latter was the peculiar province of the theorists of the Italic sects. We have already traced the fortunes of the former. A few words will give the moral.

Had the Ionic and Atomic schools, instead of vaguely conjecturing the successive transformations of the world at large, condescended to the task of minute observation and particular experiment, the physical sciences might have been anticipated by many centuries. But the exceeding subtlety of the elementary principles of the material world, or the diversity of nature's disguises, was, as yet, little suspected; experiment was, therefore, slightly, or not at all employed to extort her secrets; while, on the other hand, the real magnitude of the visible creation was so utterly unimagined, that the naturalists of this primitive age could speak of the earth and heavens as of a single mass or system,—vast, indeed, but raised upon a common base, and placed, in all its parts equally, within the easy reach of fair conjecture. Thus, hypothesis followed hypothesis, guess supplanted guess, according as any unobserved fact, or ingenious analogy, gave it currency; until, at length, opposing authorities enfeebled each other; the oracles of physical science became less regarded as more and more numerous and contradictory, and the inquisition of nature, darkened into a hopeless mystery, almost universally made way for moral researches. Such was the fate of the system of physical conjecture; such the moral it furnishes. We must now reverse the picture, and briefly sketch the efforts of the contemporary system of physical demonstration, with its transition into the metaphysical system of the universe...I shall only observe, that you are not to take any of these terms as characterizing *completely*,—they are intended to characterize *eminently*—the views (Ionic and Atomic, Pythagorean, Eleatic) to which they are applied. At no time were the leaders of these schools exclusive contemplators of a single aspect of the external world; they were all, in some degree, metaphysical; all, in some degree, mathematical; all, in a high degree, conjecturers as to the

General reflections on the method of the Ionic and Atomic schools, and the causes of their failure.

LECT.
VI.

The early
systems clas-
sified accord-
ing to the
element pre-
dominant in
each.

process of the physical changes around them. But, to rest upon the prominent features of their habitual speculations, the Ionics were a physical sect, the Pythagoreans a mathematical sect, the Eleatics a metaphysical sect: their attempts to satisfy themselves as to the objects of their thoughts and experience usually lay in the field of these different sciences; it was there they sought the solution of the universe, and there they endeavoured to persuade the world they had found it.

Pythagoras,
date uncer-
tain; flor.
about B.C.
540 to 510.

His wor-
ship of
Order.

Application
of this idea
to civil go-
vernment;

Pythagoras¹, from whom the Italic schools date their origin, whether instructed by foreign teachers, or directed by his own meditations, (for into the voluminous discussions, which have left this matter very much as they found it, I do not now mean to enter,) or, as is more probable, governed by *both*,—had long devoted his intellectual adoration to the lofty idea of Order. This adoration—which seems the perfection, or necessary to the perfection, of all to which it can be applied,—first, it taught men to learn to venerate in the happy adaptation of civil government to which the efforts of the commanding minds of the ancients were

¹ [The reader of this Lecture should bear in mind and allow for the admitted difficulty of ascertaining how much of Pythagorean doctrine derived from Pythagoras himself, and how much was excogitated by his numerous pretended followers. Aristotle only once mentions Pythagoras (*in the Magna Moralia, init.*): οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι is elsewhere his form of citation. Among the genuine "Pythagoreans," Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates, was the most distinguished. His reputed fragments, preserved in Stobæus and elsewhere, have been edited by Boeckh in his celebrated monography *Philolaos des Pythagore's Lehren*, Berlin, 1819. But the notices in Aristotle (*Metaph.* i. 5, 7; *xii.* 4, 8; *Phys.* iv. 6; *Magn. Mor.* i. 1, and elsewhere,) are by far the most authentic sources of information concerning this remarkable school, and enable us to test the genuineness of other documents. The first Pythagorean writer is said to have been Philolaus, *Diog. L.* viii. 15. The treatises attributed to Ocellus Lucanus and Timæus Locrus are undoubtedly spurious. The former is filled with Eleatic rather than Pythagorean matter; the latter has the air of an abstract of its Platonic namesake, containing moreover terms used in a sense unknown in the time of Socrates (as ὕλη, ὁρίων, &c.). Ahrens condemns them on grounds of *dialect* (*de Dial. Dor.* p. 23), including in the same sentence all the supposed Pythagorean fragments, except those of Philolaus. The same is said to be the conclusion of Gruppe, in his treatise *über die Fragmente des Archytas*, &c. Berlin, 1840. But even those of Philolaus are doubtful. His Dorisms, though not so manifestly spurious as those of Timæus Locrus, &c., are alloyed with admixtures of the *lingua vulgaris*, and the presence, still more suspicious, of Aristotelian phrase and matter. This subject is ably handled by Mr Bywater in the *Cambridge Journal of Philology*, i. p. 21. It is certain that a great crop of forged epistles and treatises sprang up in the century preceding our era; watered as it was by the pious zeal of the philosophic Juba, king of Mauritania, who paid highly for additions to his library, especially in its Pythagorean department. Accordingly, the art of literary forgery appears to have attained a degree of perfection in his time which it never afterwards recovered. Those who would know more of this curious subject may consult Ritter and Preller, p. 61 (where the necessary references are given), Mullach's Preface to his edition of Xenophanes, &c. (which contains the work of the false Ocellus); also Ritter's *Geschichte d. Philosophie*, Vol. i. p. 337, 2nd ed., and Bywater, *ubi supra*. Ed.]

so constantly directed, and in which this harmony of reciprocal relations is so prominently manifested, as itself the very essence of that condition of mankind. From this political order the transfusion was natural to the internal republic of the reason and the passions of the individual:—and Pythagoras could not but feel that, however affections more prompt and decisive may be necessary to urge to action, so to fortify in endurance, yet to the calm observer it was the very essence of *virtue*, or one of its leading characteristics, that it involved the perfect proportion² of all the active principles of the soul. With Pythagoras, whose system was, in its ultimate intention, a purely practical system, this was the most impressive consideration of all: but a mind so accomplished, and so thoughtful, was not likely to rest in any single or restricted application of a general principle. When, accordingly, from the sphere of action the Sage of Samos passed into that of speculation, the same harmonious order seemed even more conspicuously to reveal itself as the guiding genius of that serene and silent world. He had, from his youth, dwelt with delight upon the eternal relations of space and number, in which the very idea of proportion seems to find its first and most radiant development, and without the latter of which no order of all proportion is absolutely inconceivable; and to those Pythagoreans whose inventive energies were daily adding new and surprising contributions to the store of discovered relations, it at length began to appear as if the whole secret of the universe was hidden in these mysterious correspondences. The extension—unwarrantable, indeed, but in an age to be experienced in the wiles of hypothetical illusion scarcely to be wondered at—may have, on the known principles of Pythagoras, proceeded thus. The mind of man perceives the relations of an eternal order in the proportions of space and number; that mind is, doubtless, a portion³ of the soul which animates the universe—for on what other supposition shall we account for its internal principle of activity?—the very quality that essentially characterizes the Prime Mover, and can scarcely be attri-

afterwards
to the individual
mind.

Virtue represented
as a proportion or
harmony.

Speculative
application of the same
idea.

Mathematical studies
of Pythagoras.

Extension
of Mathematical
conceptions to the
sources of mind and
nature.

Explanation
of the process.

² [This, though attributed by Laertius, VIII. 33, to Pythagoras, is rather a Platonic than a Pythagorean *placitum*. The notions of the Pythagoreans seem to have been cruder and more fanciful. They defined Justice to be a square number (*ἀριθμὸς ὁδίκος ἑαυτῶν*, *Magn. Mor.* I. 1), identifying all the virtues with numerical relations, and thus (as the author of that treatise observes) intruding alien notions into the region of Ethical science (*τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων* (ὁ Πυθαγόρας) οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τῇ θεωρίᾳ ἐνωσέτω). The dogma that the soul is a Harmony, so ingeniously refuted in Plato's *Phædo*, was probably Pythagorean. See Ritter and Preller, § 102, a. Ed.]

³ ["Pythagoras Pythagoreique...nunquam dubitarunt quin ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus." Cicero, *de Senect.* 21, 78. Compare, *de Nat. D.* I. 11. Ed.]

LECT.
VI.

buted to any inferior nature;—and on what other supposition are we to explain the identity which subsists between the proportions or principles authenticated by the reason, and the proportions or principles that are perceived to exist in the spaces and multiplicities around us, and independent of us? Can this sameness be other than the sameness of the external and internal portions of a common nature? And as that universal soul reflects the symmetry of the universe it vivifies, so do these fragments which are deposited in human clay; even as the same mirror, which presents a vast and single image, if broken into innumerable pieces, will return as many images as there are fragments. The proportions of the world inhere in its divine soul, being themselves its very essence, or, at least, its attributes: what, therefore, the mind of man feels, the mind of the universe cannot but confirm and counter-sign;—and the universe itself answer and acknowledge. Man, then, can boldly assert the necessary harmonies of the world; he possesses within him a revelation which declares that the world in its real structure must be the image and copy of that divine proportion which he internally adores*. Again, the world is assuredly perfect, as being the sensible type of the Divinity, the outward and multiple development of the Eternal Unity; it must, then, when thoroughly known, answer to all which we can conceive of perfect; that is, it must be regulated by a legislation, of whose code *we* have the highest principles (whatever may be the details) in those first and elementary properties of numbers which stand nearest to unity. The world is, then, through all its departments, moral and material, a living arithmetic in its development, a realized geometry in its repose: it is a *κόσμος* (for the word is Pythagorean), the expression of harmony, the manifestation to sense of everlasting order: and he approaches nearest to the eternal fountain of beauty, who, by dwelling with greatest constancy upon proportions and fitnesses, escapes the region of apparent irregularity to reside in that of perpetual symmetry. Hence you at once perceive why it was that to *geometry* Pythagoras first introduced his disciple; in this science he found the representation, and the very language of his philosophy of proportion: and you also see how it happened that the entire school invested mathematical truths with a moral character, and in return clothed morals in the dress of mathematics. This, indeed, forms one source of the difficulty which critics still find in the attempt to penetrate the precise meaning of the expres-

* [See an extract from Philolaus in Stobæus, *Ecl.* I. p. 458, quoted by Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* § 109. Ed.]

sions of the school of Crotona: they pass with such subtlety from the practical to the theoretic—from the arithmetic of virtue to the virtue of arithmetic—that we can pronounce with as little definiteness as, perhaps, they themselves possessed, to *which* department any particular proposition is intended mainly to relate. It is the same difficulty which, in all cases, is found in separating the type and the anti-type in two counterpart languages.

I should weary myself and you if I attempted to recount one half of the conjectures which have been advanced towards giving that "harmony" to the assertions of Pythagoras which they were intended to illustrate. The endeavour is usually fruitless or unsatisfactory when built upon a few detached phrases which may have almost any signification or none: I think it more profitable to offer a few remarks upon the aspect of things which must have presented itself to the mind of Pythagoras, steadying my course by occasional reference to the preserved traditions of his teaching, but scarcely venturing to reduce to the consummate precision of a modern theory a series of views which, in the mind of the master himself, were rather a habit of thought than a regular system of nature.

Though Pythagoras found in geometry the fitting initiative for abstract speculation, it is remarkable that (notwithstanding his acknowledged proficiency in that science which he largely enriched) he himself preferred to constitute the science of *numbers* as the true representative of the laws of the universe. The reason appears to be this: that though geometry speaks indeed of eternal truths, yet, when the notion of symmetry or proportion is introduced, it is absolutely necessary to introduce, and often necessary to insist in preference upon, the properties of Number.

Hence, though the universe displayed the geometry of its Constructor or Animator, yet Nature was eminently defined as the *μίμησις τῶν ἀριθμῶν*⁵. Moreover, in order to represent in a mathematical form the successive developments by which the vast totality was evolved, it is obvious that the production of numbers offered the most immediate example, and the most expressive language. But, besides attaching himself to abstract relations in all the departments of nature, he found in number the most suitable type of these harmonies, because it alone is universally applicable; for, under the law of multiplicity, the world in all its parts is inevitably conceived. But, again, number presented itself in preference from its being a higher reach of abstraction, and thence, apparently, more

Though Pythagoras was a geometrician his explanation of Nature is rather arithmetical than geometrical.

Nature as "imitation of Numbers."

⁵ [Arist. *Metaph.* I. c. 6: Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μετέξει. ED.]

LECT.
VI.

completely mental, and thence, finally, more applicable to the ultimate laws of the universe, and to the identification of these with the mind itself of man. Geometry presupposes space; but number presupposes but the conception of any existence whatsoever more than single. Once more, the relations detected in number reveal themselves under a character more mystical (a reason hinted by Aristotle in his account of Pythagoras), as more remote from merely sensible experiences, than those of the science of space; and thence the imagination would be naturally led to attribute to these relations, and to others, yet undiscovered, powers and properties much more completely transcending the sphere of daily evidence.

"Unity in
Multiplicity" the
leading
idea of Py-
thagorism.

The Primitive Unit,
or Deity.
Discrepancy of
statements.

Probable
reconcilia-
tion.

The key to all the Pythagorean dogmas, then, seems to be the general formula of unity in multiplicity:—unity either evolving itself into multiplicity, or unity discovered as pervading multiplicity (which latter is answerable to what we term harmony or proportion). The principle of all things (the same principle which, in this philosophy, as in others, was customarily called Deity) is the primitive unit from which all proceeds in the according relations of the universal scheme. This primitive nature⁶ seems sometimes spoken of as having nothing in common with the arithmetic of the world, and sometimes as being the ultimate substance of it all:—a discrepancy which has given rise to much discussion, but which, perhaps, is most easily reconciled by observing a peculiarity in the notion of "1," which makes it easily applicable to either view. For it is evident that the unit may be considered at the same time as no number itself, and yet as the element of all. Thus, 1, considered by itself, is assuredly no number in the same sense in which 2 is;—a fact evident from the admission that "1," multiplied by itself, produces no increase, and, in fact, has no proper significance; 1 + 1 (or 2) being the first abstract number—the first conception of addition. And if it be asked how the repetition of that which is no number can produce number, the answer is, that it is the repetition itself which constitutes the number; that in 1 + 1, it is not the 1 on either side of the sign which includes the essence of the number, but the sign—the *plus*—itself. By reflecting on this, it does not seem difficult to conceive how the Pythagoreans, with a very apt and forcible application of this arithmetical language, could perceive in the Eternal Unit that heads the numbers of the universe, at once a nature infinitely removed from all the harmonious multiplicity that surrounds him, and, at the same time, the necessary pre-requisite for its production and existence.

⁶ [See Arist. *Metaph.* XII. c. 6, p. 1080. b. Bkk. Ed.]

But though this All-creative Unit sees in the universe only the redoubled product of itself, it is not, in the fullness of its nature, contented with a mere plurality, however completely dependent on its own everlasting essence as foundation. And this gives rise to the second aspect under which I said that the school of proportion contemplated the world:—one which I conceive to be altogether separable from the former. When, uttering itself abroad, the Eternal “One” became many, it willed not—the very nature of the generation forbid—that a total divorce should for ever exist between the created and the Creator. And yet, if they be sundered with a discrepancy of nature so total as exists between plurality and unity, it seems internally impossible that they can ever be connected. But this is not so. Into the sensible world of multitude the all-pervading Unity has infused his own ineffable nature; he has impressed his image upon that world which is to represent him in the sphere of sense and man. What, then, is that which is at once single and multiple, identical and diversified,—which we perceive as the combination of a thousand elements, yet as the expression of a single spirit,—which is a chaos to the sense, a κόσμος to the reason? What is it but harmony—proportion—the one governing the many, the many lost in the one? The world is, *therefore*, a harmony in innumerable degrees, from the most complicated to the most simple; it is now a Triad, combining the Monad and the Duad, and partaking of both; now a Tetrad, the form of perfection; now a Decad⁷, which, in combining the four former, involves in its mystic nature all the possible accordances of the universe.

*Idea of
Harmony
as the One
in Many,
or the
Many in
One.*

I do not wish you to consider that for every one of the foregoing propositions I have any decisive text; I have endeavoured, combining fragments of tradition, to present a general sketch of the line of march by which the Pythagoreans appear to me to have moved; and if it differs from the accounts of others on the one hand, you are at perfect liberty to differ from *it* on the other. There are certain special interpretations of the Pythagorean numbers, to which, as I conceive them altogether conjectural, I think it unnecessary to direct your attention:—such as those which pronounce the Monad to be God, the Duad matter, the Triad the complex world. I think it likely that such applications may in detail have been made by Pythagoras: once on the highway of *a priori* theory he could scarcely

⁷ [That is, $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10$. Compare the fragment quoted ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i. p. 456, for the mystical virtues of the Decad. The passage is quoted by Ritter and Preller, § 105. Ed.]

LECT.
VI.

have remained in the region of pure abstraction; and we know, from his astronomical speculations, that he did not. For our own instruction, however, I think it more profitable to attempt harmonizing the general principles, which are always curious, and often true, than to follow them into applications, of which the record is uncertain and the benefit inconsiderable.

Pythagorean views of Music, as a link between the ideal and practical.

When, once more descending from these lofty calculations, Pythagoras sought to apply them to his practical philosophy, he looked for a medium of connexion. He found it (where few would have expected) in the theory and practice of Music. This study possesses the advantage of being at once a subject of profound mathematical calculation, and an art productive of the most powerful results on the affections. It linked the mathematical and the moral: and it linked them the more closely that in every case of mental impression the pleasurable result was found mysteriously to correspond with fixed arithmetical proportions. It may easily be imagined how this connexion (which, even in the present advanced state of physical science has attracted so much unavailing curiosity) impressed and charmed the mind of a philosopher in the search for mystic relations between the soul of man and the sensible world. In his mind a single principle was essentially diffusive, and reappeared in every sphere of thought. Accordingly, having once discovered (for the discovery itself is attributed to him) that the changes of sound were indissolubly connected with changes of length and tension, he reversed the proposition, and asserted that sound—that which is essentially “harmony”—perpetually waited on proportion; and that, as the heavens themselves were ordered in consonance with number, they must move amid their own eternal harmony^a,—a harmony to which the soul of man, from familiarity, through all its series of past transmigrations, (for this was the solution of the difficulty,) had become deaf and irresponsible. Indeed this was but one instance (though, perhaps, the most prominent one) of the tendency which the Pythagoreans had, as, on the one hand, to finding proportions in the world of sense, so, on the other, to finding the world of sense in their proportions. As sound was made to accompany the harmonious march of the heavens, so light and fire were exalted to the throne of the elemental world; and, as that throne, in consistence with the laws of geometrical precedence, must be the centre of a perfect, and therefore circular, motion, the great depository of light

“Music of the Spheres.”

^a [Pythagoras ad harmoniam canere mundum existimat. Cicero, *de Nat. D.* III. 17, 27. ED.]

and heat—the sun—must occupy the centre of the universe*, and the planets, in circular orbits, at musical intervals, describe their measured revolutions around him: while (so determined was Pythagoras to construct the world upon his preconceptions of numerical fitness) a tenth body, to us invisible,—the Antichthon¹⁰—exists to consummate the mysterious Decad, which Pythagoras's astronomical knowledge did not allow him otherwise to complete.

LECT.
VI.Astronomi-
cal notions
of the Py-
thagoreans.

The Pythagorean views of *the soul* of man were deeply modified by their physical, and, still more, by their moral tenets. The soul was a moving number¹¹; that is, as we may suppose, a self-moving monad, the copy (as we have seen) of that infinite monad which unfolds from its own incomprehensible essence all the relations of the universe¹². In its physical constitution it was termed fire, exactly as the Deity was also frequently described. It was intellectual¹³ and passionate, *νοῦς* and *θυμός*,—the former portion sempiternal, as being, indeed, but a ray of the Eternal Fire; and Pythagoras encouraged every form of divination and magic by that connexion which seems almost invariable

Their psy-
chology.

⁹ [Something to this effect is found in Pseudo-Origen, *Conf. Hæres.* vi. 28: *φῶς τὸ Πυθαγόρειος λόγος τὸν μέγαν γεωμέτην καὶ ἀριθμητὴν ἦλκον... ἐστρηχῆσθαι ... ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι ψυχὴν, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων.* This is probably a pseudo-Pythagorean, the genuine doctrine being that the "fire in the centre" is quite distinct from the sun: *ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου πῦρ εἶναι φασιν*, Arist. *de Cælo*, ii. 13. *Φιλόλαος πῦρ ἐν μέσῳ περὶ τὸ κέντρον*, Stob. *Ecl.* i. p. 488. This fire they symbolically called the "Watch-tower of Zeus" (*Διὸς φυλακή, πυργός, οἶκος*), and the "Hearth-altar of the universe" (*ἑστία τοῦ παντός*). (Hence probably is to be explained Plat. *Phædr.* p. 247: *Μένει γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνῃ*). Ten bodies revolve round this fiery centre: the Heaven, or firmament of fixed stars, the (five) planets, the Sun and Moon, the Earth, and her counterpart the Antichthon. (Stob. *ibid.* quoting Philolaus, on which fragments, however, consult by all means Bywater, *ubi supra*, p. 37.) Ed.]

¹⁰ [Aristotle's criticism of this Pythagorean fancy is worth translating. "Further," he says, "they construct a second Earth, (opposite to this of ours,) which they call the Antichthon. Thus, instead of seeking out reasons and causes which shall agree with the phenomena, they prefer to force the phenomena into accordance with certain reasonings and notions of their own." Ed.]

¹¹ [*Ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν κινεῖντα*, Pseudo-Plutarch, *de Placitis Phil.* iv. 2; τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν, Arist. *de Anima*, i. 2, 7. Ed.]

¹² [So Pseudo-Origen, *Conf. Hæres.* vi. 28: *πῦρ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἥλιος, ψυχὴ*. Aristotle, *de Anima*, i. 2, 6, relates that "certain of the Pythagoreans maintained that the motes floating in the air were *soul*: while others conceived that it was soul which caused their motion. The reason is, that these motes appear to move perpetually, even when the air is perfectly still." This and other passages imply considerable diversity of views among even the genuine Pythagoreans. Ed.]

¹³ [The triple division of the soul into *νοῦς*, *θυμός* and *φρένες*, (Diog. l. viii. 1, § 30), of which the *last* only is peculiar to man, is more fanciful and therefore probably more authentic than the two-fold distinction in the text, attributed by the Pseudo-Plutarch (*Plac. Phil.* iv. 4) to Pythagoras and Plato. See also Cicero, *Tusc. Quart.* iv. 5. If Plato borrowed largely from the Pythagoreans, later writers have given much that is Plato's to Pythagoras, and this distinction among the rest. This appears clearly from Arist. *Mag. Mor.* i. 1, 7. Ed.]

LECT.
VI.Pythagorean
Ethics.

(we have seen it universal in India) between these superstitions and the doctrine of the identity of the soul and its Deity. But in *morals* the legislator of Crotona found his appropriate sphere. In his usual numerical notation moral good was essentially *unity*, evil essentially plurality or division¹⁴. In the fixed *truth* of mathematical essences he found the exemplar of social and personal virtue; truth was, therefore, a peculiarly Pythagorean virtue, and justice the glory of man. From these elements the Pythagorean neophytes naturally were led to the life of Cenobites¹⁵; their community was secret, silent, and guarded with all the forms of a solemn initiation; and, to manifest the purity of their disinterested association, he who determined to abandon the connexion was suffered to depart, and presented with double his original contribution; but over his seat was erected a sepulchre, and his fall was honoured with all the melancholy ceremonies of a funeral rite.

Radical
defect of
the Pythagorean
scheme,

On such a system as this much might be said, if time allowed us to say it. You have, of course, perceived its radical defect as an explanation of the universe; a defect which it holds in common with every physical demonstration of particular facts by the mere exercise of abstraction. It substituted reason for evidence, and imagined that the soul would find within itself the copy of all outside it. Now, as far as the universe is subject to mathematical laws, this process is unquestionably correct; and in the system of Pythagoras, as in every other hypothetical solution, some truth gave currency to much error. But in order to interpret the universe by calculation, we must first discover what the laws are whose operation, under all their conceived varieties, we are to determine by our calculus. If certain spaces, times, velocities, be given, we may fix all their diversities by the properties of number and space; but no reach of mathematical conception can determine the original elements themselves. In the system of Pythagoras, then, as in all that have ever influenced the world long, the misapplication of a great principle formed and perpetuated his error.

¹⁴ [Pseudo-Plutarch, *Plac. Phil.* I. 7, partially confirmed by Theophrastus, *Mét.* 9, quoted by Ritter and Preller, § 111. Ed.]

¹⁵ [These particulars are taken from Iamblichus, *V.P.* xvii. *al.*, and are to be received with caution. Very early writers, however, testify to the existence of an ascetic rule of life in the Pythagorean societies, as Herod. II. 141, who identifies the Pythagorean with the Orphic discipline. The Pythagorean Life (*τῶν Πυθαγορείων βίωσις*) is referred to by Plato, *Rep.* x. p. 600. The Orphic, *ibid.* II. p. 364; and *Legg.* VI. 782, c. See Grote, *H.G.* IV. c. 37. According to Aristotle, as quoted by Plutarch (*ap. Galium*, 4. 11) the Pythagoreans did not abstain from animal food, but only from specified parts of animals, μήτρας καὶ καρδίας καὶ ἀκαλήφης καὶ τοιούτων ἄλλων, χρῆσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις. *Fragm. Aristotelis*, ed. Bkk. T. v. frag. 189, also frag. 190 *ibid.* Ed.]

In the later Pythagoreans the system appears to have undergone considerable change. Timæus (whose fragment, whether authentic or not, contains some of the noblest passages of human composition) smiles at the metempsychosis, and deliberately declares it, and similar theories, to have been falsehoods justifiable upon grounds of public expediency¹⁶.

LECT.
VI.*The later
Pythagoreans.*

Nearly at the same æra with Pythagoras a travelling sage arrived in Italy from Ionia. He brought with him his Ionian tendencies, and in Italy amalgamated them with Pythagorean views. This distinguished person was Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the celebrated school of Elea¹⁷—a school whose interesting character, as well as deep obscurity, makes me regret that I can afford to it upon this occasion so few moments. For this, as well as other deficiencies, I must throw myself upon the possibilities of the future; as I should, indeed, regret to think that circumstances should prevent me supplying you on some future occasion with details less unworthy of subjects so deeply interesting to every one who feels that, in studying the reason of others, he pursues one main path to the knowledge of his own.

The Eleatic School,

As the Ionics had studied external varieties, so the Pythagoreans had studied mental harmonies, until they saw nothing else in the universe; and as the Pythagoreans externalized mental harmonies, so the Eleatics (under four eminent leaders, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus,) externalized the conclusions of the pure reason

*compared with the
Ionic and
Pythagorean.**Its passage
through
Ontology to
Dialectic.*

¹⁶ [See Tim. Loc. 104, D. This passage is itself an indication of the spuriousness of the treatise referred to, which is surely overpraised by Prof. Butler in the text. See above, note (1). The theory of "convenient falsehoods" would not unnaturally commend itself to "Timæus Locrus." Would that he were not indebted for it to Plato in whom it is unhappily to be found, though in a less "developed" form. (*Rep.* v. p. 459.)

I may remark in passing, that an anonymous biographer of Plato represents the philosopher as having purchased the treatise of Timæus Locrus from the Pythagoreans. This statement however confounds Timæus with Philolaus. Ed.]

¹⁷ [The best recent works on the Eleatic philosophy are, Karsten's *Fragments of Xenophanes and Parmenides*, Amsterdam, 1830-35; Mullach's edition of Aristotle *de Melisso, Xenophane, &c.*, (which includes the Eleatic fragments, &c.), Berlin, 1845; Stallbaum's larger edition of the *Parmenides*, Leipzig, 1839; and Brandis's articles, *Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus*, in the *Dictionary of Biography*. Brandis had paved the way to a more complete knowledge of this very Greek school of speculation in his *Commentationes Eleatica*, published at Altona in 1813, and had been followed by M. Victor Cousin, in the essays on Xenophanes and Zeno, republished in the *Nouveaux Fragments Philosophiques*. Mullach's text of Xenophanes and Parmenides appears to me to be an improvement on Karsten's, who, again, had much surpassed preceding editors. The statements in the text agree with Ritter's, whom Professor Butler evidently consulted. Ed.]

LECT.
VI.

Xenophanes,
B. C. 600 to
B. C. 500,
nearly
(Karsten).
Parmenides, B. C.
520 to B. C.
450, nearly
(Clinton).
Zeno, B. C.
495 to B. C.
435, or
later (Id.)
Melissus,
flor. B. C.
444.

itself¹⁸, and thus may be said to have formally created the metaphysical system of the universe. It is to be observed, that, as the Eleatic philosophers advanced, they appear to have become more and more purely dialectical, until in Zeno the system became almost wholly a logical system; so that they seem to have travelled through ontology into logic—a singular and important fact.

To those who investigate by the mere exercise of reflection the relations of the external world, one main distinction will perpetually present itself. Some of these relations are both single and multiple (as those of arithmetic and geometry); others are in their very essence single (a substance, absoluteness, identity). The former constituted the Pythagorean field of contemplation; the latter, the Eleatic: the one assumed the world, and would harmonize its variety; the other assumed reason, and denied the possibility of real variety. Hence the great maxim of the Eleatic sect, τὰ πάντα ἓν¹⁹. The very tendency of the Pythagorean school was obviously to depreciate the sensible, a principle which pervades all their fragments: and the next step in the march of system was to negative the reality of the sensible altogether, and to declare that reality belongs only to essences—that all essences are *One*. Xenophanes was the Spinoza to whom Pythagoras was the Descartes. Not content with any form of the Dualistic system of the universe, and almost as little with the Emanative, he boldly declared that in the system of things there is truly no plurality; all that so appears being merely presented under a peculiar æsthetic or sensible law²⁰. God (for thus does philosophy adopt this name to

*Sole reality
of the One.*

*Denial of
Plurality.*

¹⁸ [Parmenides *professed* this, as in the remarkable *dictum*, τὸ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι. (Idem est Cogitare atque Esse.) Frag. V. 40. So V. 93:

τῶντ' ὃν ἔστι νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι νῆμα.
οὐ γὰρ ἀνευ τοῦ ἔontos, ἐν ᾧ πεφασισμένον ἔστιν,
εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν.

“Thought, and that for which Thought exists, are one: for thou wilt not find Thought apart from Being, wherein Thought is affirmed.” The reader will be reminded of the Cartesian “Cogito, ergo sum,” of which Parmenides seems to assert the converse. To have become conscious of the antithesis implies a considerable reach of speculative ability, justifying the θαυμαστὸν βᾶθος attributed to this philosopher by Plato. Ed.]

¹⁹ [Plat. *Sophist.* p. 242: τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῶν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθος ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἐπὶ πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἐνός ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων, οὕτω διαφέρεται τοῖς μύθοις. The words ἐπὶ πρόσθεν have puzzled interpreters. Brandis supposes them to refer to the Pythagoreans, who however were hardly so early as Xenophanes. It is Plato’s habit to trace the early systems to a mythic or poetical origin: as in *Theat.* p. 152, where he affects to father the Heraclitean doctrines on Homer, or “yet more ancient authors.” Comp. *Phileb.* p. 30. The greater number of such passages are, in my opinion, mere banter. See however Karsten, *de Xenophanis Philosophia*, p. 93, note (4). Ed.]

²⁰ [It seems to me probable that in asserting the Unity of God, Xenophanes did *not* find himself compelled to deny the existence of a Plurality. If we may

consecrate its conclusions) is the one sole Being of the universe; and all which manifests itself within the sphere of sense is merely the illusive representation of a phenomenal world, which to experience seems diversified, but

LECT.
VI.

*The One
styled by
Xenophanes
God.*

trust the unfavourable and, as some think, unfair critique on Xenophanes in the treatise *De Melisso, Xenophane et Gorgia*, written by Aristotle, or, as Mullach with great probability suggests, by an epitomator of a lost treatise of Aristotle, the Deity of Xenophanes was carefully distinguished from the outward universe (τὰ πολλά) on the one hand, and from the *Non Ens* on the other. (See c. 3, l. 10, ed. Mullach.) It was Parmenides who, in order to complete the reasonings of his master, first perceived or imagined the necessity of identifying Plurality with the *Non Ens*: in other words, of denying reality to the outward, phenomenal world. If this view is correct, there seems no ground for qualifying the theology of Xenophanes with the epithet "pantheistic." For though the term pantheism be sufficiently vague to include theories approximating, on the one hand, to Atheistic materialism, on the other scarcely distinguishable from the purest Theism; it can hardly be made to comprehend a doctrine which assigns to the Divinity moral as well as intellectual supremacy, which acknowledges an outward universe distinct from Him, and which represents Him as causing the changes in that universe by the acts of an intelligent volition. All these characteristics, it appears to me, are found to meet in the simple but sublime description of God with which the father of the Eleatic school commenced his philosophic poem. "There is one God, among gods and men the greatest: unlike to mortals in outward shape, unlike in mind and thought." "He has no parts, no organs as they have (comp. Arist. l. 1. 977, B), being "all sight, all ear, all intelligence" (οὐλος ὅρα οὐλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει); "wholly exempt from toil, he sways all things by thought and will" (νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει); "exempt too from motion, he abides ever in one place (ἐν ταύτῃ); for it ill befits Him to wander hither and thither in space." The epithet *κράτιστος*, which does not occur in the remaining fragments, we learn from the author of the treatise, was applied to the Deity by Xenophanes, and in the sense of "excellent as well as all-powerful" (τοῦτο δυνατότατον καὶ βέλτιστον λέγων). This lofty, however imperfect, Monotheism is placed by its author in glaring contrast with the anthropomorphic follies of the popular religion, which he lashes with a force of sarcasm entitling him to a high place among ethico-satirical poets. We are further informed by the author of the treatise, that the god of Xenophanes was described as "uncreated," or more properly "uncaused" (ἀγένητον). This attribute, necessary in order to distinguish the Deity from the world (τὰ γινόμενα), was supported by arguments which, though used by Xenophanes *only* in relation to the divine nature (τοῦτο λέγων ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ), do virtually prove more than he seems to have designed to prove; striking, in effect, at the root of *all* phenomenal reality. This inference, which escaped the ἀγνοῖα (*Metaph.* l. 5) of Xenophanes, did not elude the acuteness of his pupil and successor, who, accordingly, scruples not to denude the God of Xenophanes, styled henceforth the One, of all attributes but bare existence, and to deny even that to the phenomenal universe, or the Many. We cannot wonder that the great logical coherence—we may add, the paradoxical character—of the system of Parmenides drew upon it the eyes of antiquity; and diverted them from the speculations of the simpler but more devout Xenophanes. Nor is it unnatural to suppose that the utterances of the master would be construed in accordance with the principles of his scholar; the vague by the more definite, the simpler by the more finished and elaborate theory. Accordingly we find that Xenophanes has obtained credit for much that is the exclusive property of Parmenides and Zeno: in particular, for identifying God with the universe, and for denying "plurality."

To support this view fully would exceed the limits of a note, already perhaps too long. I shall therefore only add, that the opinion is founded on a comparison of the remaining fragments of Xenophanes with the testimony of Aristotle (which I have been careful to discriminate from his criticisms), and that I cannot find it inconsistent either with the language of Plato, that the

LECT.
VI.*Change in-
volves a
contradiction.**Parmenides
converts
the "God"
of Xenophanes
into
"Being."**Melissus
denied
Space.*

which reason cannot possibly admit to be other than one unchanged and unchangeable nature. In truth, the very notion of change involves contradiction; for whether the second member of the alteration be like, or unlike the first, it may be irresistibly shewn that there is no adequate cause for a true and genuine change. The "God" of Xenophanes becomes (as has well been noted) in Parmenides purely metaphysical "existence." This philosopher (whose system was expressed in spirited and effective verse) brought the doctrines of the school into a shape more precise and comprehensive, by clearly distinguishing the double worlds²¹ of sense and of reason,—views which in Plato were heightened and completed; and with which you may compare the farther extension of the principle in the philosophy of the once-celebrated Campanella, who establishes *five* separate worlds—(sensual, material, mathematical, mental, and archetypal). By this time the Eleatic philosophers had learned almost wholly to discard every conclusion derivable from experience. Melissus completed the system²² by denying space itself, with all its appendages; and Zeno of Elea was its apostle and warrior through the cities of

Eleatic Unitarianism "originated with Xenophanes, nay, *earlier still*" (*Soph.* p. 242), or with the statements (again distinguished from the *inferences*) of Aristotle in the well-known and important passage in the fifth chapter of the first book of his *Metaphysics*. That it is necessary to draw this distinction between what Aristotle records, and what he infers from the writings or sayings of the earlier thinkers, will be conceded, I apprehend, by most persons conversant with these subjects: and if it were doubted, might be proved *ex abundantia* from instances in the little treatise already so often referred to; as, particularly, from that singular instance of bad faith, the pretence, that because Xenophanes uses the term "spherelike," the God, of whom it is the (evidently metaphorical) epithet, must needs have been "corporeal"—an inference, by the way, at variance with Aristotle's own express testimony in the passage quoted from the *Metaphysics*; and, if true, fatal to those who would identify the theory of Parmenides (who uses the self-same epithet evidently in a *non-material* sense) with that of his predecessor. I have said nothing, in this place, of the account of Xenophanes given by Simplicius, because I believe it, as well as the passage in Cicero's *Academics*, II. 37, 118, to have been taken, mediately or immediately, from the Aristotelian treatise. ED.]

²¹ [This distinction of "worlds" is Platonic, *not* Eleatic. For the Eleatic formula *ἐν τῷ πάντι* forbids any such dualism: as the counter-formula of the Platonists (*ἐν καὶ πολλῶ*) implies it. The "world of sense" was to Parmenides and Zeno the *Non Ens*, a mere blank negation; in Plato it is a real world, because *οὐκ ὄντας μετέχον*, and therefore cognizable by reason, whose office it is to find the One in the Many (Law in Phenomena). It is true that in the latter half of his poem Parmenides indulged in some exceedingly vague cosmical speculations; but he takes especial (one would have thought unnecessary) pains to warn his hearers that these are mere flights of fancy, without any ground in truth and reason. Some physical notions are also attributed to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius, who possibly confounds him with Melissus. For a concise but luminous exposition of Eleatic doctrine see Zeller's *Philosophie d. Griechen*, I. p. 366, 2d ed. ED.]

²² [Melissus rather corrupted than "completed" the Eleatic system. See the critique of Aristotle, *Met.* I. 5, 12. ED.]

Greece. The paradoxes of Zeno are well known: their scope and purpose is not so generally apprehended. It has of late been very clearly developed by the German critics. The advocates of a sensible world, and those of a purely rational world, had at length come to public discussion,—in Athens especially, which was now rapidly becoming the “eye of Greece,” after having been so long its protecting arm. The zealous republican Zeno (who is said to have been himself a martyr to a high spirit of liberty), carrying his independent spirit into logical encounter, undertook to prove, that, for every paradox imputed to the rationalists, a score could be objected to the theory of a real sensible world. Hence his arguments against motion (whose reality, as that of all change, was strenuously denied by the whole Eleatic school); and, still more, his arguments to prove the impossibility of a *sensible* unity. As the Pluralists held that unity was absurd, he determined to shew that Pluralism was absurd; and, for this purpose, the Palamedes of Elea (as Plato terms him²³) was incidentally led to deeper and more systematic views of the nature and distributions of dialectical science. It is from his “Art of Logic²⁴,” composed with this view, and publicly taught by the author, that to Zeno of Elea has been ascribed the high honour of its invention. Into this subject I have not now time to enter; but I have sufficiently accomplished my purpose if I have exhibited to you that the bold logician of Elea was no vender of idle subtleties (as we are in the habit of terming him), but, on the contrary, the active and consistent defender of a vast and profound system of the universe in relation to man—a system since revived in many forms, and on whose true merits and conciliation with other truths, the philosophical

*His dia-
lectic.*

²³ [In the *Phædrus*, p. 261. Palamedes was a great inventive genius, the “sophist” of the heroic ages. Another *locus classicus* concerning Zeno exists in Plato’s *Parmenides*, p. 128, where his philosophical relation to his master is set forth. Cousin infers from the less respectful tone adopted in the *Phædrus*, that Plato was ill acquainted with Zeno’s works when he composed the latter dialogue (*Frag. Phil.* p. 170). But the sophisms of which Zeno was the parent quite justify the epithet in the *Phædrus* (τὸν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην). ED.]

²⁴ [Zeno was the first, or one of the first, who wrote philosophical dialogues (*Diog. L.* III. 47), which bore, perhaps, a rude resemblance to the purely dialectical portions of the Platonic dialogues. Diogenes further styles him “the inventor of dialectic.” This he may have been, if we understand by dialectic the method of question and answer. But no work of Zeno’s is mentioned under the title, “Art of Logic,” as Professor Butler says, if I understand him rightly, in the text. Such a work must have comprised a theory of reasoning, a matter beyond the reach of any præ-Socratic school. The best, if not the only, single treatise on this philosopher is M. Cousin’s *Zénon d’Élée*, already referred to in note (17). It has however too much the character of an *éloge*. The life of Zeno in the *Dictionary of Biography* is from the pen of the late Prof. Brandis. ED.]

world is, I fear, as discordant in this day as it was in the days of Xenophanes or Zeno.

We have now briefly sketched the progress of this remarkable school; that is, we have at least seen that their object was to demonstrate the absolute unity of the universe, and to establish that all variety was, in truth, only the apparent diversity under which it is given to the perishable senses to contemplate it. Among their merits it must not be forgotten that they inspired notions more abstract and exalted regarding the Supreme Author of all; and it is remarkable that the Eleatics were led to employ the *a priori* arguments for the existence and attributes of God (very similar to those of Clarke and others) at the very time that Anaxagoras was bringing to light the teleologic one. And so it has ever since been. The Supreme Author of reason levies his tribute justly from every part of our nature, and in all its principles obliges us equally to recognize his own image and superscription. It is, perhaps, happy for us that we are not wholly dependent upon such proofs, but, even among our higher privileges, it is surely interesting and useful to observe what man has done when unpossessed of them, and a happy task to return thanks to Providence that, while leaving us in light, he never left the world altogether in darkness.

The speculations of the Eleatic school were resumed and continued subsequently to the age of Socrates in the school of Megara (as it was termed—from the city in which it was established—the birth-place also of its principal founder, Euclides). The dialectical tendencies of the Eleatics were here carried to their utmost development; and new subjects for the subtleties of distinction and definition afforded in those *ethical* discussions, which the teaching of Socrates had now made popular. This Eristic school, however,—for such was the title which its disputatious habits obtained for it—was still, through all its departments, manifestly tinged by a strong Parmenidean infusion; and the principle of Unity was the directive light by which it endeavoured to guide its course through every successive region of research. The universe was still one eternal nature; evil was not permitted to exist, as breaking the mighty singleness of the uniform whole; and as good alone was real and invariable, so all that was invariable and real was of the nature of good, ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ. And as the deductions of the pure reason, pursuing a single immutable course, tend to the One and the Unchangeable, the Megarics were led to condemn the value, and even deny the cogency, of all analogical habits of conclusion; while, in the field of practical morality, that which was the same-

ness of unity to the reason became the quiescence of apathy to the conduct or affections; and Stilpo, the chief teacher of practical philosophy among the Megaric succession, declared that the prime felicity of wisdom consisted in total impassibility...But I am anticipating the period which belongs to a future Lecture in my desire to present to you, as much as possible, the complete development of each leading idea.

LECT.
VI.

To the revolution effected by the teaching and authority of Socrates, with its immediate antecedents and consequences, we will pass at our next meeting.

LECTURE VII.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
VII.

HAVING followed with a hurried, but, I trust, not altogether an unfaithful, step, the principal lines on which the Grecian philosophic reason travelled during its first period, we are at length obliged to pause where it pauses. As long as truth is sincerely held in view, the very errors of infant philosophy command respect for their motive, and insinuate admonition in their consequences; they are so many experiences in the youth of science, on which its advanced age has already grown wise, and may, perhaps, still afford to grow wiser; if they betray the weakness, they are also invested with the attractive simplicity of childhood; but as soon as the attainment of truth is degraded into a secondary or incidental end, and the importance of the prize is forgotten in the dexterity of the contest, philosophy not merely cannot be said to have forfeited our respect, but even cannot truly be considered to exist. To such a crisis as this we have now arrived. I am bound to notice its causes: they demand, and will reward, your attention. The materials for the history of this transition-period are not scanty, but they are scattered; they are to be sought in every department of the civil and political, as well as literary, history of the time; for the entire character of the Athenian mind, in the age of Pericles, is revealed in the career and the influence of the Sophists.

*Crisis in
the history
of Philo-
sophy.*

*Transition-
period.*

*The So-
phists.*

*Sophistry
the mimic-
ry of Wis-
dom.*

What is sophistry? It is the *mimicry of wisdom*¹—the *form and attire*, without the substance and body, of well-ordered reason. If then you would seek the causes which

¹ [So Aristotle, *Soph. Elench.* c. 2, who adds, "the sophist is one who trades in this unreal wisdom." Compare Cicero, *Acad.* II. 23: "Sophistæ... qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophantur." The mercenary or self-seeking character, and the absence of scientific method and scientific earnestness, are features which enter into all the portraits of the "sophist," as drawn by the philosophers. See the passages collected in the *Cambridge Journal of Philology*, No. II. "On the Sophists." A significant definition is also that of Philostratus, and the more remarkable as proceeding from an admirer: "The ancient Sophistic may be regarded as a philosophizing Rhetoric." Of the Sophists known to us, some, as Gorgias, have more of the rhetorical, while Protagoras and others shew more of the philosophic element. The vulgar applied the term indiscriminately to all men of science or letters except the poets:

fostered the growth of this evil, you must seek what motives those were which impelled the teachers of philosophy to prefer the form of wisdom to its reality, or to the search for its reality, and their auditors to countenance or flatter the deceit.

Now, to begin with a principle of the highest generality, *its cause.* it is, I am persuaded, not fanciful to observe, that in the Grecian intellect there was in all the regions of thought a tendency to dwell upon the form in preference to the internal reality of objects. This is, in fact, the genius of *art* expressed in its ultimate formula. In religion, the Greek delighted in the temple and the procession more than in the god; in poetry, his joys, his sorrows, his meditations, were moulded in a form essentially picturesque,—such as the eye could contemplate; in the ideal beauty of statuary, his taste inclined to precision of outline even more than to depth of expression; in history (notwithstanding Thucydides, the recency of whose subject necessitated accuracy), he inclined to the perfection of style more than the perfection of veracity; in national policy, wealth and power themselves were scarcely valued in comparison to that floating phantom of “glory” which is their shadow! But it is superfluous to follow the application minutely. It is well known that in other departments of intellectual exertion, subsequent ages have robbed Greece of her supremacy; that in the arts of form—in the perfection of external beauty—she has never been surpassed. To investigate the causes of this remarkable phenomenon is not within my present sphere,—I have but to state and apply it. In such a disposition, then, of the national mind, with so peculiar, predominant, and pervading a genius, it seems fair to conclude, that there must have existed a perpetual tendency to transmute science itself into an art of design, a tendency whose constant and powerful activity could only be resisted by efforts of extraordinary firmness on the part of its cultivators. Now the sophists were the artists of philosophy. They made of the simple and natural process of philosophical discussion a series of practical manœuvres; and taught men to construct by rule and compass disquisitions upon the good and the true, as they had been taught to build a temple, or chisel a statue, or design a picture.

Preference of form to substance, a tendency of the Grecian mind. Instances in Art, Religion, and Literature.

The Sophists were the artists of Philosophy.

generally, however, as a term of reproach. The entire question is too intricate to be satisfactorily dealt with in a note: but the testimonies accumulated by the author of the article referred to, will at least revive the memory of that distinction between “Sophist” and “Philosopher,” which the most brilliant of modern historians is thought by many to have succeeded in obliterating. **ED.]**

LECT.
VII.

*Publicity,
as it had
fostered the
growth, led
also to the
corruption
of Philo-
sophy in
Greece.*

We saw, in a former Lecture, how important were those advantages which Greece had contributed to the development of thought in the perfect publicity of her institutions; we must not now close our eyes to the same fact as a source of its errors and extravagances. As publicity had fostered philosophy, so publicity aided to destroy it; as it had cleared the path and encouraged the race of speculation, so it now beguiled speculation into the oblique and tortuous by-ways of verbal subtlety and dialectical display. The anticipation of general sympathy which at first had fortified (as a powerful and legitimate corroborative) the young energies of Grecian thought, at length usurped the whole mind, and became its only adequate motive for exertion; and men who mainly sought to please the public taste could rise no higher than the public taste permitted. Now, as we just observed, the cordial sympathies of the Athenian public (for it is in Athens that philosophy has now established her seat) never penetrated with undiminished intensity from the form to the substance of reason; and the professors of wisdom who would attract such a people should possess the skill of rhetoricians and the promptitude of oral logic, quite as much as the depth, perseverance, and sincerity, of genuine science. They should be able to confute rather than to convince, and at least as deeply skilled in seeming as in being wise. Nay, upon the principle before laid down, it is scarcely extravagant to say that the Athenian listener preferred (not merely the semblance without the reality, to the reality without the semblance of reason—but even preferred) the semblance without, to the semblance with the reality of truth. The brilliant falsehood, which defied, or seemed to defy, logical detection, was the very triumph of form and colour over weight and solidity; it was eminently the creation of art and of the mind, it was to reason what the work of Apelles or Zeuxis might be to nature—the very perfection of imitation.

*Prevalence
of oral over
written dis-
course, an-
other cause
of corrup-
tion.*

The transition into this unfortunate stage of the Greek philosophy was accelerated by a fact to which it requires some abstraction from present circumstances to assign its adequate amount of influence,—I allude to the want of any engine of diffusion corresponding to our art of printing. The absence of such a mode of publication, forcing the teachers of science almost altogether upon *oral* delivery in their solicitude for fame, inevitably perverted them into *orators*. He who sought public distinction (the perpetual passion of an Athenian) looked for it principally in the number and rank of his immediate disciples and auditors;

and his style and topics of discussion were necessarily regulated by his anxiety to augment them.

LECT
VII.

But besides these distracting influences, so fatal to the serene sincerity of philosophical inquiry, we shall discover another in the new position in which philosophy at this time finds her ministers in Greece. Wisdom was now sold for *money*,—a circumstance almost equally injurious to the buyers, to the sellers, and to the commodity in exchange. The inferior ranks of the Athenian youth might be contented with inferior masters; but the young men who held the great offices of the state in prospect, sought from the most accomplished minds in Greece the knowledge of nature, of man, of his passions, and, above all, of the means of swaying them. Eloquence was the engine of ambition; to eloquence, then, and to truth only so far as it is subservient to eloquence, the pupil, and therefore the master, solicitously and almost exclusively applied himself. To the morality of the rhetorician right and wrong are only indirectly important; right and wrong became, therefore, of inferior moment; the object to the “artificer of persuasion” was not self-conviction, but social influence, and, consequently, the object of a philosophy governed by such motives, must be the discovery of those weaknesses, and those plausibilities on every side of every question, which may enable the student, at the shortest notice, to advocate or oppose any proposition whatever. The genius of professional sophistry, is, therefore, essentially *sceptical*; and, in point of fact, the leading names among the sophists of the Socratic age are enrolled likewise among the philosophers of scepticism.

Philosophy discovered to have a marketable value

It is combined with Rhetoric, an art to which right and wrong are indifferent.

Hence a moral scepticism.

This view presents the Athenian sophists under a darker aspect. But, unhappily, it is only too characteristic of the entire condition of Athenian society at the period in question. The Athenian mind had, for two centuries, been passing under a course of education in which the powers of taste—the perception of the beautiful—had been refined to a degree almost inconceivable to a people of less practised sensibility. It had, to the cultivated class—of which alone I now speak—become their religion, or the garment which alone made their religion of interest; and everything which could minister to this emotion was welcomed in proportion to its efficacy. Along with painters, and statuary, and architects, and minstrels, came the sage with his portraits of the beauty of virtue, and the order of the world; and he had his place with the rest, and for the same reason. But as he had no claim to attention when his power of charming the imagination was past, he, too, had to give way when rival

Picture of the state of Athenian society.

LECT.
VII.

magicians in speculation appeared who could artfully fascinate the soul with a still more pleasing terror, who could invest with a certain dark and stern beauty the fiends of disorder and dismay; could call the world a lovely chance, and human life a dream, and preach that it was the whole canon of its duty, the whole perfection of its virtue, to recline, crowned with flowers, and hear the songs of Anacreon¹. Such a system has a double aspect; its gayer side will, assuredly, be popular,—its gloomier pictures perhaps even more so. I know not whether you will fully enter into the thought when I observe, that, in the excess of luxurious refinement, there appears to be, in the more sensitive order of minds, a singular tendency to melancholy more especially to the melancholy of unbelief;—a feeling transient, it may be, but often recurring, which can thoroughly sympathize, from the midst of its satiety of enjoyment, with those gloomy teachers who deplore the nothingness of life, and which, forced to recall how visionary is all which once promised to be happiness, cannot bear to think that there is any happiness in promise which is not a vision also.

Protagoras,
born B. C.
480, *perh.*;
died 11 c.
411, *prob.*

His maxim,
"Man the measure
of all."

In such a state of society—alternately careless in luxury and ambitious in effort—it is not difficult to conceive what success might attend an active and eloquent disputant, who, as PROTAGORAS of Abdera, equally suited all its tendencies, by declaring that there is no criterion whatever of truth, that "man is himself the measure of all²," and that, consequently, the reality of things was as manifold as the variations of human feelings,—a principle which it seems he fearlessly applied to even the existence of the

¹ [I would fain have expunged this passage, had it been possible to do so without deranging the context. It probably would not have survived its author's revisionary criticism. As a description of the Sophists and their disciples it is thoroughly inappropriate. The effeminate Epicureanism indicated by it was the vice, as the "songs of Anacreon" were the production of a later age. The strains of the *true* Anacreon are not those of a voluptuous trifler; nor were the lusts to which the Sophists were accused of pandering those of the senses. ED.]

² [See Plato's *Theætetus*. It is difficult to determine how much of the acute argumentation and subtle mental analysis to be found in this dialogue existed in the work of Protagoras which it professes to review. But until this point is settled, it is impossible to measure aright the speculative powers of the greatest of the Sophists. The *practical* tendency of the dogma, that "the Individual" (for that and that only is the meaning of *ἄνθρωπος*) "is the measure of all things" is unmistakably immoral; but we are not entitled to assume that Protagoras consistently carried out his principle: indeed, the contrary seems to follow from the distinction he sets up in the *Theætetus*, between the Good and the True, as regards their comparative cognizability. But though Protagoras may not be open to the charge of teaching immorality, it is shown by Socrates that his principle ought, in consistency, to have been extended to moral as well as metaphysical distinctions, and that it is virtually as subversive of the one as it professedly is of the other. ED.]

gods⁴, which, without honouring the problem with a definite decision, he pronounced to be altogether doubtful; or who, as GORGIAS, though receiving (as we are told) 100 minæ for his lessons in rhetoric, taught a philosophy which upheld the impossibility of transmitting real truth by words; or who, as HIPPIAS, boasted himself master of all the arts, from the loftiest to the least; or, as DIAGORAS⁵ professed open Atheism; or, as Euthydemus⁶, and others, declared justice the creature of human policy, and man destitute of every principle of obligation beyond instinct and compulsion. Protagoras, indeed, was banished, and Prodicus is said to have been put to death as a public corrupter⁷, (a charge which certainly his beautiful apologue⁸ does *not* corroborate); but the estimation in which these public declaimers were held is abundantly manifest from the writings of Plato, especially the "Protagoras," in which a most vivid and dramatic sketch is presented of the pompous pretences of the genuine sophist of the Athenian porticoes. For instance—to borrow a picture better than a hundred dissertations—"Entering, we found Protagoras walking up and down in the portico, and with him, walking on one side, Callias, son of Hipponicus, Paralus, and Charmides; on the other side, Xanthippus, son of Pericles, &c., and

LECT.
VII.Gorgias,
born bef.
480 B. C.;
died about
380 B. C.Diagoras,
flor. about
424 B. C.Prodicus,
date un-
certain, but
died later
than B. C.
399. Plat.
Apol. 192.Passage of
the Prota-
goras illus-
trative of
the estima-
tion in
which the
Sophists
were held.

⁴ [According to Eusebius, this doctrine was broached at the beginning of Protagoras's "Treatise concerning the Gods," possibly a different work from that *Ἐπεὶ τοῦ Ὀυροῦ*, which, according to the same authority, Porphyry had read. (Compare Euseb. *Evang. Præp.* pp. 468 and 720.) The latter is not improbably the work reviewed in the *Theætetus*, and from passages in that dialogue it seems to have been called by its author *Ἀληθεία*, to which the addition *ἡ ἐπεὶ τοῦ Ὀυροῦ* may have been made subsequently. Concerning the writings of Protagoras, see Frei's *Questiones Protagoræ*, p. 178 seq. The treatise "Concerning the Gods" may have been filled with speculations resembling those of Critias, in his tragedy called *Sisyphus*, of which a considerable fragment is preserved. (See Wagner, *Fragm. Trag.* III. p. 102.) It may be remarked in passing, that Mr Grote's attempt to justify Protagoras by the example of Xenophanes (*H. G.* VIII. p. 499) leaves out of sight the important fact, that while Xenophanes denied and ridiculed the gods of the popular Pantheon, he was a devout believer in one supreme Deity: a faith which can hardly be attributed to Protagoras. ED.]

⁵ [Diagoras is not usually classed with the "Sophists," nor is the statement that he "openly professed Atheism" capable of proof. See Professor Stahr's life of Diagoras, in Smith's *Dictionary of Biography*, Vol. I. ED.]

⁶ [Perhaps Thrasy machus is intended. No such opinions are attributed, so far as I know, to Euthydemus, of whom extremely little is known. ED.]

⁷ [This incredible statement is found only in the Scholiast on Plato (*Rep.* x. 600), and in Suidas. Prodicus was described as a corrupter of youth by *Aristophanes* (Suid. in *vit. Prod.*). All that is known of this Sophist has been collected by Professor Welcker in two interesting articles which first appeared in the *Rhenish Museum*, 1833, and have been republished in his *Kleine Schriften*, Vol. II. The reader may also consult the life of Prodicus in Smith's *Dictionary of Biography and Mythology*, written by Prof. Brandis, who has drawn largely from Welcker, correcting him, however, in some particulars. ED.]

⁸ [Recited by Socrates in Xen. *Mem.* II. 2. ED.]

LECT.
VII.

Antimærus of Mende, who bears the highest reputation of all the disciples of Protagoras, and is studying with a view to hereafter being a sophist himself. Others followed behind to catch what was said, seeming chiefly to be foreigners whom Protagoras brings about with him from every city through which he travels, charming them (*κηλῶν*) with his voice, as Orpheus of old, while they under the fascination follow the voice; some also of our countrymen were in the train. As I viewed the band (*χορὸν*) I was delighted to observe with what caution they took care never to be in front of Protagoras, but whenever he turned, those who were behind, dividing on either side in a circle, fell back so as still to remain in the rear. 'Him past, I saw' (to speak in Homeric phrase) Hippias of Elis enthroned beneath the opposite portico; around whom, on benches, sat Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, Phædrus, and Andron, and others—alike Athenian and foreigners. They seemed to question Hippias concerning the sublimities of nature and the revolutions of the stars; while he, reposing upon his throne, resolved each successive difficulty. Presently I came upon Prodicus of Ceos, who sat retired in a chamber, which Hipponicus had been wont to employ as his store-room; but, in order to receive the stream of gathering guests, Callias had removed the provision-stores, and resigned even that corner to their use. There Prodicus, who was not yet risen, lay cushioned among the bed-clothes, and around him several—as Pausanias, Agathon, Adimantus, and others. But the subjects of their discussion I could not gather from without, though extremely anxious to hear Prodicus; for I hold him to be a man of wisdom more than human; but the perpetual reiteration of his voice—an extremely deep one—confused the words in their echoes."

Socrates
born B. C.
468; died
B. C. 399.

And who is it, Gentlemen, that the graphic pen of Plato has here introduced to us as describing (with his own calm inimitable humour) his adventures in that Athenian mansion,—confounding the learned pride of Protagoras, and crushing his tissue of declamation in the iron grasp of close and manly reason? It is THAT MAN whom the simplest and most hurried narrative cannot approach without emotion,—that man, whom all ages have united to acknowledge as almost the ideal of humanity itself. When in the midst of these philosophic hirelings, when even in the midst of the honest conjecturers of the material world, the historian comes upon the form of Socrates—of the calm teacher and martyr of moral wisdom—though he be the dullest chronologist of facts and dates, he owns a thrill he cannot repress; and it is, perhaps, to the honour

of themselves, and of their subject, that of the philosophy of Socrates his biographers have left little definite analysis: every writer seems lost in the theme, and unconsciously to assume admiration for inquiry! LECT.
VII.

For the personal history, and the customary manners of Socrates, I need not inform you that you are to refer to Plato and to Xenophon, and to form your estimate from both. Plato was by his own contemporaries accused of "Pythagorizing" the Socratic doctrine; but the sagacious critic will, nevertheless, find unquestionable marks of genuineness in a great portion—though assuredly not in the entire—of the Platonic records. To the style and manner of the illustrious teacher they bear the manifest testimony which the representations of a consummate copyist of externals cannot fail to afford. My present object shall be to note the purposes, the influence, and more prominent articles of the actual philosophy, of this great master of practical reason. *His history and manners known from Plato and Xenophon.*

We have seen in what condition Socrates found the philosophy of his country. The material world had been assailed by two great parties of explorers with almost equal ill-success. Many curious and valuable truths had indeed been incidentally discovered; but they lost their value in being confounded with the general chaos of conjecture; and no test existed by which they could be separated from the error that surrounded them. In the field of moral investigation the enterprizes of philosophy had been still more profitless. Ranked as little more than ancillary to rhetoric, the ethical philosophy of man was degraded into the theory of "the colours of good and evil" (to adopt a Baconian phrase), and the object of search was seldom the true, but the effective; while, among the disciples of the Italic school, it was usually absorbed in a dreamy and unpractical mysticism. Physical conjecture was, however, the philosophic passion of the time; and Socrates himself began his studies under the Ionic Archelaus in that field. In the *Phædo*⁹ he alludes to his early interest in physical research, in order to illustrate his subsequent discontent with such pursuits; and in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (exhibited twenty-three years before the death of Socrates) it is as a natural philosopher—the speculator in astronomy, the measurer of flea-leaps—that the moralist is introduced. Now this is highly important, as illustrating the true position of Socrates as a philosophical reformer. I have been accustomed to compare him with the oracle of the revolution of the *Condition of Philosophy when Socrates appeared.*

Socrates and Archelaus compared.

⁹ [p. 96 A. seqq. Ed.]

LECT.
VII.

seventeenth century; and, by mutual resemblances and contrasts, the results of Socrates and Bacon will illumine each other.

Both aimed
at utility

Neither
founded a
positive sys-
tem, but
each in-
vented a
method.

Bacon's
physical
theories
were intended
as ex-
amples of
his method;
and the
same may
be said of
of the
Socratic
dia-

Let us then observe that the purposes of each were alike directed to *utility*, to the profitable as distinguished from the merely formal, and the practically inapplicable. This was equally the leading idea of the Athenian and the Englishman. Observe further, that neither left behind him any definite system upon specific articles of philosophy, that each rather shewed the way to think than the results of thought; and that, though to minds so energetic and creative, it was impossible not sometimes to conjecture and to theorize, yet even theories themselves were intended rather as examples of the general formula of inquiry than as individually self-supported, or as claiming attention upon their own grounds. This is obvious to all readers of the physical speculations of Bacon, who expressly declares it in the arrangement of his own writings: in the recorded conversations of Socrates it seems to me to be scarcely less exhibited. Thus every discourse exhibits the *mode of inquiry*¹⁰ and the sincerity of truth; yet scarcely a

¹⁰ [The Socratic Method deserves to be more precisely described. Aristotle informs us that in the sphere of general philosophy two discoveries are justly attributed to Socrates, the inductive mode of inquiry, and the practice of seeking general definitions, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ δρῆσθαι καθόλου (*Metaph.* XIII. 4). Of these the former was ancillary to the latter, as Bacon perceived, *Nov. Org.* I. 105. "At inductio, quæ ad inventionem et demonstrationem scientiarum et artium erit utilis, naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; ac deinde post negativas tot quot sufficient, super affirmativas concludere; quod adhuc factum non est, nec tentatum certe, nisi tantummodo a Platone, qui ad excutiendas definitiones et ideas, hac certe forma inductionis aliquatenus utitur." It might be rash to assume that the method of Socrates is faithfully represented in *Plato*: but the Socrates of Xenophon proceeds on the same plan, though the comparative want of precision in some of the Xenophontic conversations may lead us to suppose that Plato had improved upon his master. Against this supposition, however, may be set the testimony of Xenophon himself, IV. 5, 12: ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι δομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντος κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι, διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. Where, faulty as is the etymology, the dialectic process is described with great felicity. Elsewhere (c. VI. 1) we are told that Socrates was never weary of investigating τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, in other words, of seeking the right conception or definition. So Aristotle, *I. I.* εὐλόγως εἰρηγεί τὸ τί ἐστίν. It is clear, therefore, that Socrates possessed, consciously to himself, an idea of scientific method, and that his repeated asseveration that he "knew nothing," was grounded on the comparison of his own attainments with that idea. See *Plato*, *Apol.* 21 D, and compare Schleiermacher "On the worth of Socrates as a philosopher" in the *Philological Museum*, II. p. 549; Zeller, *Philos. d. Griech.* II. p. 50. Induction was the bridge by which Socrates led his hearers from the "common notion" to the right conception implied in a term, proceeding by the rejection and exclusion of that which was irrelevant or proper to the individual or the subordinate species, "per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas." See the dialogue with Euthydemus, *Men.* IV. 2, where the steps in the argument are traced with a precision worthy of Plato. The two counter-processes of the dialectician, Induction and Division, are described with great elegance in the *Phædrus*, 265 D. fol. Ed.]

single dialogue is found to terminate in *any direct conclusion*; a peculiarity which in fact has in all ages perplexed the expositors of Plato, but which surely could not have had place without a secret purpose. And from this peculiarity it likewise followed that each of these teachers left *no school* to wear their livery and minister to their fame; naturally, for the very object of each was to shew all men how to *think for themselves*. Socrates, indeed, bequeathed his general principles of ethical philosophy to a few disciples who were content to copy and record him—as Xenophon, Æschines, Simo, Cebes, Simmias, Crito; but these lasted only for a generation, and left no living succession to champion their tenets. In these respects then we see the similarity of these two legislators of philosophy: let us now, with equal rapidity, characterize the difference. Bacon wearied of ineffective logical speculation, Socrates of ineffective physical, the former resigned in a great measure the internal world for the external, the latter, the external world for the internal. The physical theorists of the Ionic succession¹¹ were to Socrates precisely what the schoolmen and the imaginers of hypothetical worlds were to Bacon: and as the folly reigned in *different* regions, the path of the reformers lay in contrary directions, and Bacon conducted science into the world of matter, while Socrates had led her into the heart and actions of man.

To speak more specially of the features of this reformation. The merits of the indefatigable converser, who, among the groves and public walks of Athens, fought his calm victorious way through all the hosts of sophistry in the later half of the fifth century before Christ, were mainly these. In the first place, he recalled philosophy from eloquence and verbal subtlety by the exercise of the most singular combination of acuteness with practical good sense perhaps ever presented. As a reasoner he manifestly overmatched the sophists themselves, whom he purposely fought with their own arms, and whom, indeed, on some occasions in the dialogues of Plato he seems to copy (doubtless in order to overthrow) to a degree not altogether acceptable to a modern reader, who forgets the national predilection for these contests, which made it impossible to present truth attractively except in the form

LECT.
VII.

Neither
founded a
school.

Bacon di-
verted in-
quiry from
logic to
physics:
Socrates,
from phy-
sics to lo-
gic and
ethics:
each refor-
mation
being that
which the
times de-
manded.

Socratic
reforma-
tion further
described.

Recall of
philosophy
from rheto-
ric, and
from loga-
macy.

¹¹ [This clause stands thus in the author's MS.: "The dreaming disciples of Pythagoras and Thales at length sunk into the puerility of sophistical disputants," &c. This is not true of the disciples of Pythagoras, the greatest of whom were contemporary with Socrates; nor is it clear who are the "dreaming disciples of Thales" referred to. I have therefore ventured to substitute words of my own, justified by *Phædo*, p. 96. ED.]

LECT.
VII.

Socrates considered the reform of physical science impossible.

His "scepticism" contrasted with that of other professed sceptics.

Socrates represents the transition from objective to subjective in speculation.

His Ethics founded on a theory of human nature.

of regular dialectical disputation. Again, by Socrates the mind of Athens was, in a great measure, withdrawn from studies, of which, without some fundamental reform, two centuries had exemplified the hopelessness¹². Such a reform of *physical* science the tastes and habits of Socrates do not seem to have even led him to contemplate; but even had he seen it with the prophetic eye of that great man to whom I have already compared him, it is doubtful whether he would not have resolutely preferred, when he inspected the manners of his countrymen, as a higher and holier office, the almost exclusive dissemination of the principles of moral truth, and of the way to explore and establish them. Again, for the dogmatical assertion of suppositions as unquestionable truths, Socrates, with a reach of logical sagacity peculiarly his own, taught the great principle of humble inquiry, the commencement with *doubt*¹³:—a principle which subsequently degenerated into a scepticism for which Socrates is not to answer. He made doubt the first step—"scepticism" makes it the entire process and result—of philosophy... But among all the great maxims which the authority of Socrates fixed and fortified in the world of speculation, none should justly rank higher than the principle of *internal meditation*, as the true outset of legitimate inquiry. I promised, as you may remember, that in the person of Socrates would be found that transition from the external to the internal which separates the first and second periods of Greek philosophy. In this maxim, and its consequences, we find the passage effected. For in the principle, comprehensively considered, there is a double aspect—intellectual and moral. Regarded morally, it declares that the foundations of ethical science can only be laid in a diligent investigation of the actual phenomena of the moral constitution¹⁴; and that if sophisticated scepticism has ques-

¹² [Aristotle says, "In the time of Socrates definition took the place of inquiry into nature, which philosophers deserted in favour of moral and political speculation." τὸ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἐληξε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρησίμωσιν ἀρετῆν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀπέκλιναν οἱ φιλοσοφούντες. *De Part. Anim.* I. 1, 44. *Ed.*]

¹³ [As Meno tells him: "I had heard, Socrates, that you are always doubting and causing others to doubt; and now I find it by experience to be so; for you have so bewitched me by your spells, that I am in a state of utter doubt and confusion." *Meno*. p. 80. For the *moral* aspect of the Socratic scepticism, see the conclusion of the *Theætetus*. *Ed.*]

¹⁴ [This at least was the interpretation Plato put upon the Socratic "know thyself." But it can hardly be said that Socrates himself clearly perceived the connexion between Ethics and Psychology; at least there are no traces of such knowledge in the Xenophontic reports, nor are his somewhat arbitrary and superficial definitions of the virtues altogether compatible with it. See the well-known passage in the *Magna Moralia*, I. 1, where the superiority of the Platonic to the Socratic Ethics is traced to Plato's clearer views of the constitution of man's nature. I have said elsewhere that the "self-knowledge of

tioned the existence of morality as distinct from physical enjoyment or suffering, a genuine philosophy must establish it in that region where alone it can be found,—the world of the human heart,—where, disentangled of all incidental accessories, it lives a pure and primitive formation... Regarded intellectually, it declares that in the principles of the mind of man must be sought the principles of inquiry and of advancement. And it is observable, that Socrates appears to have combined both these views into one formula when he professes to call virtue itself a "science," and yet (as he so often demonstrates) a science "that cannot be taught"¹⁵. Accordingly, in compliance with these master-conceptions of the position of man in regard to truth, the method of Socrates is (as he himself humorously styled it, in playful allusion to his maternal descent) essentially a "maieutic" or obstetric¹⁶ method: a constant effort (that is) to "deliver" minds of that secret truth which lay concealed in their own constitution; and hence, perhaps, from the practical method of his master, Plato in part derived his own theory of knowledge as "*reminiscence*."

LECT.
VII.

His dogma,
"Virtue is
science."

His "Maieutic."

In the statement of his views and inquiries Socrates employed a peculiar vein of *irony*¹⁷,—partly, as I suppose,

His irony,
its nature
and causes.

Socrates consisted in the rigorous examination of the *notions* of his own mind, rather than of its operations and faculties, and chiefly of those notions which relate to moral distinctions," and this I still think a substantially correct view of the matter. ED.]

¹⁵ ["Whether Virtue can be taught" was a question much agitated in the time of Socrates, who appears to give contradictory decisions on different occasions. Compare Plat. *Meno*, pp. 96, 98, with *Protagoras*, p. 361, in the latter of which passages he censures his own inconsistency in first denying that Virtue can be taught, and then maintaining that Virtue is Science; and the inconsistency of his opponent in affirming the first, while he rejected the second proposition. According to Xenophon, *Mem.* I. 2, 19, Socrates seems to have adopted the common-sense view that Virtue is partly matter of teaching, partly of practice (*ἀσκησις*), and partly of natural disposition. But Xenophon appears unconscious of the logical difficulty of reconciling this with that identification of Virtue with Science or Wisdom which he elsewhere distinctly attributes to his master. The Cynics and Megarics who accepted this identification consistently asserted that Virtue is *διδασκόν*. ED.]

¹⁶ [Plat. *Theat.* p. 149. ED.]

¹⁷ [This doctrine is developed in the *Meno*, p. 81, and more fully in the *Phædo*, p. 72. The conjecture that it was suggested by the teaching of Socrates is highly probable, but the doctrine itself is too speculative and fanciful to have found favour with Plato's master. ED.]

¹⁸ [Schleiermacher (*Philosoph. Werke*, III. 4, 9) ingeniously remarks, that "the irony of Socrates is nothing else than the co-existence in him of the Idea of Knowledge, with the absence of positive acquirement; literally, the knowledge that he knew nothing." It is somewhat remarkable that the term *εἰσπρηγία* never occurs in Xenophon. Of the thing, however, we have examples in the dialogues with Theodote, the hetæra, *Mem.* III. 11, and in that with Euthydemus, *Id.* IV. 2. The Latin equivalent to the word is *dissimulatio*, Cic. *Acad. Qu.* II. 5, 15. Its Greek antitheton is *ἀλαφρολογία*, vanity or self-glorification. Comp. Arist. *Eth.* N. IV. 13, 2. Whether Socrates really used this weapon so unsparringly as Plato represents is a curious question. Perhaps the fact may have lain somewhere between his representations and those of Xeno-

LECT.
VII.

to evade the bigotry of the times, and partly, doubtless, to pique and irritate into self-inquisition those with whom he conversed. In many points, unquestionably, his own convictions were not settled; and by the use of this veil (which none ever interposed more dexterously) he at once gained, and gave, the benefits of discussion, and yet preserved his own doubts from inconvenient disclosure. This seems to me the true account of the famous Socratic irony... But in the course of these discussions, and of all the principal circumstances of his life, he professed to be guided by a *warning voice*—a *δαίμων*, or genius¹⁹—seldom directing indeed to action, but constantly restricting from evil. Of this remarkable attribute, what shall we say? Much has indeed been written and speculated as to this singular accompaniment, which to many minds has invested with the dignity of supernatural inspiration the deeds and words of Socrates: especially when they remember that it was just about the period when the Hebrew prophets were ceasing, that this celestial light rose in another land. Without entering into the probabilities of such a supposition, I may state my own opinion;—that this restrictive voice was originally meant by Socrates himself as only the emphatic title of Conscience regarded (as his philosophy invariably taught) as the voice of God in the heart of man; but that, in all probability, as his destinies became more and more remarkable, and as he felt himself manifestly the selected instrument of moral benefit to a thoughtless and corrupt people, his own secret enthusiasm (by a process frequent among men of singular history) began at length to whisper to him that he walked under the special guidance of heaven. Harmless—let me rather say, noble and truthful—illusion! which represented as servant of truth him who surely did the work of truth, and taught to believe himself directed by heaven, him who assuredly did *not* walk with-

is so-
called
emon.

phon, who, however, would be deterred by the apologetic purpose of his principal work from giving great prominence to so unpopular a feature in his master's character. Possibly it was a quality for which he himself had no especial relish. ED.]

¹⁹ [In using the terms "*δαίμων*, or genius," Prof. Butler appears to have fallen into an exploded error. Socrates always speaks of τὸ δαιμόνιον, or δαιμόνιον τι, "*a divine or supernatural somewhat*" ("*divinum quiddam*," as Cicero has it), the nature of which he does not attempt to define, and to which he never attributes distinct personality; speaking of it, now as a "*sign*," σημεῖον, *Phadr.* p. 242 B, now as a *power*, or "*voice*," *Apol. S.* p. 31 D. This voice or premonitory sign he undoubtedly referred to a divine original." See *Xen. Mem.* IV. 3, 12, 13; but he nowhere indicates the particular deity from whom he believed it to emanate. According to Schleiermacher this δαιμόνιον "*denotes the province of such rapid moral judgments as cannot be referred to distinct grounds, which accordingly Socrates did not attribute to his proper self; for instance, presentiment of the issue of an undertaking; attraction and repulsion in reference to particular individuals.*" Plutarch's treatise is well

out a divine superintendence, who "did by nature the things contained in the law,"—who, an ordained minister of that natural code, "shewed" to others "the work of the law written in their hearts," and taught their "conscience to bear witness," and their "thoughts" to "accuse or excuse one another." (Rom. ii. 14, 15).

In the science of God, Socrates taught (as we know by unquestionable contemporary evidence, that of Xenophon) that the Supreme Being is the immaterial infinite Governor of all (*Mém.* I. 4, 17, 18), that the world bears the stamp of his intelligence, and attests it by an irrefragable evidence (*Mém.* I. 1, 19); and that he is the author and vindicator of all moral laws. It is undoubted that to these high and holy principles our illustrious philosopher added much subservience to occasional superstitions. Demons and divination clouded and perplexed the serene simplicity of his theology; and Socrates carried into morals and religion the spectres of old errors, exactly as Bacon (with his magic and witchcraft) polluted with them his physics. In each case alike we justly attribute the excellence to the man, the error to the time. For one maxim of practical religion Socrates has been severely, and I think unjustly, censured. He countenanced, as we are told, the adoption in each country of its customary deities. But to me, I confess, this counsel has always appeared rather to manifest the superiority than the inferiority of Socrates to the delusions of polytheism. He knew that such deities were on a level as to authority, that if worshipped at all they could have no claim beyond that local veneration which prescription had given them; and when unable, or perhaps (for he was not infallible) unwilling, to question their existence, he at least endeavoured that these subordinate agents should as little as possible intercept the view of the supreme Artist, that they should remain in their provincial governments, lest the attempt to extend

Religious convictions of Socrates God the contriver and upholder of nature,

and the moral governor of man.

The religion of Socrates tainted with superstition.

His toleration of Polytheism explained.

known. Its Latin title, *De Genio Socratis*, is simply a mis-translation of the Greek περί τοῦ Σωκράτους δαίμονιος; and is not countenanced by any words of the author. He never speaks of a δαίμων, nor does Clemens Alexandrinus; who however in one passage conjectures that the δαίμονιον of Socrates may have been a familiar genius, *Strom.* v. p. 592. This conjecture becomes an assertion in Lactantius, *Inst.* D. II. 14, who converts the *dæmonium* into a *demon*: "Et Socrates esse circa se assiduum dæmonia loquebatur, qui puero sibi adhæsisset, cujus nutu et arbitrio sua vita regeretur." Apuleius, it is true, had already led the way to this error in his treatise *de Deo Socratis*. It is adopted without scruple by Augustine and other Christian writers; and, as might have been expected, by Ficinus and the earlier moderns, as Stanley and Dacier, in whose writings the *dæmonium* appears full fledged as an "attendant spirit" or "good angel." Brucker (*H. C. P.* II. c. 2, § 9), with more affectation of criticism, fails however to point out the origin of the mistake. The classical passages bearing on this curious subject are collected and quoted at length by Kühner in his preface to the *Memorabilia*, p. 18. ED.]

LECT.
VII.

the authority of any might lead to his universal recognition.

Socrates drew the first lines of Political Science.

In *Political Philosophy* Socrates laid down the cardinal principle of Justice as the foundation of government, and the true hinge upon which the solution of social difficulties should be made to turn. The systematic resolution of all the theory of society into the elementary principles of natural law²⁰ appears, so far as I can collect, to have almost wholly originated with the comprehensive mind of Socrates.

His just views of personal morality.

But in the sphere of personal morals, the science of life, the philosopher was eminently himself. The principles which he here established were of the most universal application, and constantly contemplated practice. But I confess I do not think it easy to condense into any systematic series of deductions the Socratic ethics; and, indeed, the fact which has always struck me as peculiarly admirable in his moral reasonings, is, their unfettered variety, and the exquisite calmness and perfect equilibrium with which he allies together all the diversity of motives. The word *Σοφία* includes in it all human excellence²¹, whether

His ethical distinctions.

²⁰ [See the discussion between Hippias and Socrates recorded in *Xen. Mem.* IV. c. 4, esp. § 19, fol. Other detached political precepts occur in the *Memorabilia*; among the most striking of which are, (1) "Kings and rulers are neither those who hold the sceptre, nor those elected by the vulgar, or singled out by lot, nor those who owe their position to force or fraud; but those, and those only, who are acquainted with the science of Government," III. 9, 10. Compare the definition of the Art regal (*βασιλική*), *Ib.* c. 2, 11. (2) "There are five principal polities: monarchy, or the government according to the laws of willing subjects; tyranny, which is an illegal and arbitrary rule exercised against the will of the governed; aristocracy, plutocracy, and democracy" (the last being somewhat loosely defined, possibly by the fault of the narrator.) Other passages lead to the conclusion that Socrates drew the first lineaments of that Political Science which was afterwards fully developed by Plato and Aristotle. The conversation with Euthydemus (*Mem.* IV. 2, 14—19) upon Justice and Injustice, which resembles the discussions in the first book of Plato's *Republic*, may be mentioned as an instance in point. *Ed.*]

²¹ [The identification of Virtue with Wisdom or Science is the most characteristic feature of the Socratic Ethics. Of the four "cardinal virtues," Socrates seems to have acknowledged three: Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude or Valour. Wisdom he held to be the collective term, to which all these are subordinated. For he denied the possibility of a man's acting counter to his judgment of that which is best, and therefore referred all vicious action to ignorance (*Xen. Mem.* III. 9, 4, 5). *Σοφία* or *ἐπιστήμη* consisted, according to Socrates, in the foresight of the consequences of actions, not, as in Plato, in the apprehension of Ideas. Socrates was, consequently, a Utilitarian in Morals, maintaining that Good and Beautiful were relative terms, identical with Useful (*χρήσιμον* or *ὠφέλιμον*), *Ib.* c. 8. He held, however, that of all the consequences of our actions, their effects upon our own spiritual nature are by far the most momentous, *Ib.* I. 6, 9; IV. 8, 6, *ἀριστα μὲν οἶμαι εἶναι τοὺς ἀριστα ἐκμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δὲ τοὺς μάλιστα αἰσθανομένους ὅτι βελτίους γίγνονται.* Hence his repeated exhortations to self-reflection, as the means towards self-knowledge. Though, as Mr Grote points out, Socrates nowhere formally recognizes benevolence as a duty, his principles

as manifested (reflectively) in the conduct of one's self, or (socially) towards others. Happiness in its true purity and perfection is only to be found in virtue²²; a proposition which he perpetually upheld, and from the misunderstanding of which (as we shall hereafter see) two opposite schools soon arose under the very eye of Socrates. For morality in general, Socrates lays three solid foundations,—religion, practical knowledge, and virtuous habits; and with equal force insists upon the three. But in the conception of the Supreme Governor, and of morality as his law, he sought the consummation of his views and of his hopes. And those who (as perhaps you know) have endeavoured to distort the example of Socrates into a support for their views of the natural powers of man, and the independence of practical morals upon supernatural aid, ought surely to remember that *his* scheme of morals was itself constantly referred to religious considerations and divine help; and that his great mind, deeply versed as it was in the practical knowledge of human nature, saw and owned the necessity of assistances beyond human, craved them, sighed after them, and, as we have already seen, seems to have at length imagined them present from the very force of desire. To a reformation thus extending through the entire field of practical knowledge, Socrates saw the obstacles, and he was prepared to meet them. The humble son of the sculptor had received his mission, he discharged it, and he was willing to be its victim. In each of the accusers of Socrates, as the *Apology* of Plato expressly tells us, a specific party was represented,—the poets, the politicians, and the orators²³. They consummated their work of vengeance, but they immortalized Socrates. He must necessarily have soon died; but his enemies alone could have procured us the day of the Phædo!

We must now surrender, for a time, Socrates and his age. He left, as we have before observed, nothing behind

would lead in practice to the highest form of benevolence, the endeavour to elevate and purify the minds of others. Hence the spirit of moral proselytism so apparent both in Socrates and the best of his followers; a spirit, by the way, of which we discover no traces in the Sophists. His analysis of Virtue was undoubtedly defective, as Aristotle has pointed out (*Magna Moral.* I. 1, 5), for it takes no account of passion (*πάθος*), nor of moral sentiment (*ἦθος*). This analysis is however most interesting to the student of ancient philosophy, as it was the first step towards a systematic morality, the previous theory of the Pythagoreans being justly stigmatized as irrelevant to the subject (*οὐκ οἰκείαν*). Compare *Eth. Nic.* VI. 13, 3, 4. ED.]

²² [See *Xen. Mem.* III. 9, 14, where happiness (*εὖ πράττειν*) is identified with virtuous action (*εὖ ποιεῖν*). ED.]

²³ ["Sophists" in author's MS. The passage of the *Apology* runs thus: *ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων.* p. 23 E. ED.]

LECT.
VII.

him that could deserve the name of a school, could take his place, or represent the murdered sage in the circles of Athens. But, vast as nature, all minds could find their systems in him! and accordingly, from his teaching, with new and regulated energies, we find Philosophy once more starting into her innumerable and diverging courses. To classify, to inspect, to analyse them, will probably be occupation sufficient for our next series of meetings here. The minor schools of the Cynosarges, Cyrene, or Elis, will detain us but briefly; in the vast and proportioned edifices of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies we shall find subjects to which a more protracted attention must be devoted, but which it must be the fault of your Professor if he fail to make deserving of that attention. You will accept my thanks for your attendance; our assemblies have not indeed been large, but I would hope that they have not been altogether without mutual profit and instruction.

SECOND SERIES.

LECTURE I.

SOCRATES AND THE MINOR SOCRATICS. SCHOOL OF MEGARA.

GENTLEMEN,

IT was one of the last observations which I took
occasion to offer to you, in commenting on the fortunes of
Grecian speculation ;—that in the comprehensive mind of
that eminent man with whom our inquiries then ceased
were contained the latent germs of innumerable subsequent
growths. It was not merely the inventive sagacity of
Socrates which placed him in this prominent historic
position ; though that sagacity was equally vast in its
compass and penetrating in its power. It was even more
than this, the freedom, candour, popularity, and variety of
his intellectual pursuits ; his unrivalled skill in the tactics
of conversation, which provoked and managed inquiry ; his
almost patriarchal amenity of manners, which encouraged
and guided it. The soil should indeed be worthless in
which the dexterous husbandry of Socrates could deposit
no seed that promised future development. We speak
of the school of Socrates, but in the technical sense of the
term he had *no* school. The Academy, the Lyceum, the
Stoa, the Cynosarges, were the chosen localities of special
sects ; Athens itself (and in it as type or miniature—
Greece—the world)—was the scene of the instruction, as
of the studies, of Socrates. He might truly say with La
Bruyère : “ Je rends au public ce qu’il m’a prêté : j’ai
emprunté de lui la matière de mes ouvrages : il est juste
que l’ayant achevé, &c. je lui en fasse la restitution.” His
predilection for Athens was, it is true, exclusive. In one
of the most eloquent passages of the *Crito*¹ he represents
the Republic as addressing himself : “ None of the solemnities
of Greece has ever induced you to quit Athens, except on one
occasion, to attend the Isthmian games at Corinth ; war alone
could attract you from it : you have

LECT.
I.

*Socrates re-
sumed.*

*The causes
and extent
of his phi-
losophical
influence.*

¹ [p. 52 B. ED.]

LECT.
I.

not been a traveller, as others; you have never felt a curiosity to see foreign nations and to study their laws; you were contented with us and our government." But in every region of that manifold Athenian world he was at home. He found the human heart there, and found it under every modification of social influence; and to all he addressed a lesson suitable to all. "I respect and love you, Athenians!" he exclaims, in the Apology recorded by Plato; "but I will obey the voice of the deity rather than yours; and, while I live and am able to do it, I will never abandon the office of philosophy, the office of giving you warning and advice, the office of addressing in such fashion as this every man I meet: 'Oh, my friend! how can you, a citizen of Athens (the city most famous of the earth for civilization and resources), not blush to think only of amassing riches and gaining honours, without once occupying yourself with truth and wisdom—the soul and its perfection?' And if any of you pretend that he *is* so engaged, I will not take his word for it, I will not leave him—I will question, examine, convict him." In such a spirit as this, we can well credit his declaration that he believed "a man's greatest happiness consisted in *rational discourse of virtue* all the days of his life."

Accordingly, within the limits of Attica the influence of this voluntary philosophic missionary was pervading and powerful. His pupils were as various as the occasions of his teaching. Derived indifferently from every quarter of Athenian society, they carried into all their respective departments of life a tincture of the character of the master; his extraordinary powers and prompt willingness to display them attracting round him, as hearers more or less constant, not merely all that was excellent in the youthful mind of Athens, but many also (as the founder of the Cynic school) already advanced in age and matured in experience. His very skill as a dialectician dazzled those who could not pass from the form of knowledge to its reality, and who considered as the highest of intellectual attainments that quick and glittering play of weapons which the great philosopher only valued as enabling him to disarm the honest adversary without wounding him, or to strike the blow home and sure upon captious and unprincipled arrogance.

*The mixed
character
of his audi-
ence.*

Accordingly, among the constant or occasional auditors of Socrates were seen many whose views had little apparent connexion with philosophical contemplation. The future leaders of armies, the aspirants after public distinction, the rivals of the popular assembly, were observed in earnest

conference with this indefatigable teacher; whose versatility of mind was evinced in his prompt adaptation of his topics to the temper and circumstances of each, and in the employment of a style proverbially attractive. "De Græcis," says Cicero in exemplifying the various models of discourse (*Off.* I. 30), "dulcem et facetum, festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem *ἐρῶνα* Græci nominaverunt, Socratem accepimus." *This* qualification was indeed transmitted to the subsequent inheritors of his philosophy. It is the precept of Cicero in another passage of the same work, "Sit igitur hic sermo, in quo *Socratici* maxime excellunt, lenis minimeque pertinax; insit in eo lepos." (*Ib.* 37.) The simplicity of Xenophon, the richness and variety of Plato, form our principal examples of this rare excellence; in the time of Cicero it is probable that many others existed, as there is scarcely a disciple of Socrates to whom the composition of numerous treatises in the form of dialogue is not ascribed.

*Charms of
the Socratic
style.*

Of such auditors of Socrates as Alcibiades and Critias it is of course unnecessary here to speak; nor are the *philosophical* labours of Lysias, or even of Isocrates, of a character sufficiently marked to detain the student of the history of theoretical philosophy. The intellectual characteristics (as far as a brief sketch can effectually arrest them) of those disciples who themselves became masters, are here our only subject. A natural division offers itself. Some of these pupils of Socrates adhered, without much deviation, to the general principles of their Teacher; others, receiving their impulse from him and from the times, originated schools distinct from each other as from their common source, and strongly marked with decisive individuality.

*The followers
of So-
crates may
be divided
into two
classes:*

I. Not possessed of his force of reason or weight of character, the former class yet saw that in the moral elevation of their fellow-citizens lay the great aim of conscientious inquiry; and they seem to have endeavoured, as far as they could, to fulfil this high function. As professed followers of Socrates, they strenuously exhibited his principles. With him they held that God exists, and through his works reveals himself; as an author in his volume:—that He is the providential cause and governor of the world, and (above all portions of his creation) the special guardian of *man*; that He is, moreover, the legislator of rational beings, having given them laws whose evident universality forbids the supposition of a partial or accidental origin; and that these laws are accompanied with sanctions of reward or punishment to which the fact of conscience bears perpetual attestation. To this rational

*First, the
pure Socratic,
Second, the
eclectic.*

LECT.
I.as *Xenophon*,*Simo*,
Crito,*Cebes*.*Reasons for
and against
the genuine-
ness of the
Tabula of
Cebes.*

scheme of theology thus bound up with morals, they probably added the same series of incidental confirmations which are so constantly found in the records of the Socratic discussions, the evidence of authentic presages, and the palpable agency of the subordinate ministers of divine vengeance in the terrors of thunder and lightning; topics which Socrates was wont to advance, though it is now not easy to determine how far he purposely adapted himself in such statements to a popular and not injurious prejudice. The divinity of the human soul (whether in reality of essence or analogy of properties), and its immortality in a future state, were the natural, and one of them the necessary, supplement to this lofty theology. Like Socrates too, they spoke of "knowledge" in a peculiar and elevated sense of that term (doubtless, similar to the inspired use of "Wisdom"), as being the great object and chief blessing of man; and of vice principally under the character of a gross ignorance and stupidity. Such were the leading ideas of the philosophy of these writers, enforced with much simplicity of style, and purity of language; yet perhaps with no great depth of personal investigation or force of original thought. They came to their illustrious Teacher from all ranks of society. Æschines had to declare to Socrates that "having nothing else to give him, he gave him himself;" and Simo's reports of his teaching were designated *σκιτικοὶ* from the trade of the reporter... To *Xenophon* (distinguished in so many departments of action) the reputation of Socrates, and the world, are indebted for an invaluable series of notes of his master's discourses, and a sketch of his final defence corroborating that of Plato, though inferior in force and spirit; and the accomplished disciple of Socrates is discovered in the elevated morality of the *Cyropædia*. Two dialogues of very uncertain genuineness³ are attributed to *Simo*, the only remaining fragments of three and thirty. Of *Crito*, who was the author of seventeen, no relic is extant. The *Πινὰξ*, or Picture, of *Cebes*, is of all the writings ascribed to this body of philosophers perhaps the most popularly known. Of even this performance, however, which has been since translated into nearly every modern language, the genuineness is questioned; and the Stoical cast of the sentiments, along with references involving apparent anachronisms, has induced many critics to attribute it to a philosopher of Cyzicus who taught in the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Wolf, whose critical scepticism has been evinced in so many other instances, is the principal champion of this opinion;

³ [Not two 'dialogues,' but two fabricated *epistles* are attributed to this philosophic cobbler. See Fabricius, *Bibl.* II. p. 719, ed. Harkes. Ed.]

but the arguments, though advanced with great ingenuity, are not, as I think, sufficient to counterbalance the almost universal testimony of antiquity⁴. We can scarcely believe, for example, that Laertius, who was nearly a contemporary of the Cyzicene Cebes, could be mistaken in ascribing the *Tabula* to the disciple of Socrates if it were really the work of the later hand. But criticism has almost unequivocally refused to admit the claim of three dialogues (usually printed in the editions of Plato) entitled, "of Virtue," "Eryxias," and "Axiochus," and formerly attributed to the Socratic Æschines, as the only relics of a voluminous writer of dialogues, orations, and epistles. Of Glauco nine, of Simmias the Theban, twenty-three, dialogues are said to have perished. The relics of the Socratic philosophy, as held by its most authentic interpreters, are thus reduced to a scanty and uncertain number; nor can the high probability which we possess as to the true doctrines of the sage and his intellectual offspring, in the pages of Xenophon, Cebes, and the simpler dialogues of Plato, coupled with the traditions of antiquity, altogether console us for this loss. The fate of these writings and of their authors, in the general chances of fame, impresses upon us how rapidly the lessons of a merely practical morality, however useful, disappear before the commanding and attractive presence of vast and proportional systems. A scheme of moral teaching, whose excellence lies in its equilibrium, requires extraordinary talents to rescue it from the reputation of sameness and insipidity; and the simplicity of truth, which in Socrates was dignity and power, might easily sink, in the hands of his less gifted pupils, into frigidity and languor. Uniformity without prominence fatigues the attention; truth itself in morals, being but the image of a familiar reality, can scarcely carry the charm of novelty; and our own experience will sufficiently remind us that in religion and philosophy it is seldom strongly popular when not in *some* point urged to

LECT.
I.

The dialogues attributed to Æschines are spurious.

Glauco and Simmias.

⁴ [It is impossible to believe that the *Ilvaß* which we possess was the work of a contemporary of Socrates and Plato. Besides the "Stoical cast of the sentiments," arguments against its genuineness may be drawn from the diction, which bears the marks *cadentis Græcilitatis*, both in the use of late words, and of solecistic and Latinizing constructions. The question is apparently set at rest by a reference we find in Chap. 33 to a passage in the *Laws*, the latest work of Plato, which was probably not published until after the death of Cebes. Of bad Greek the formula, c. 26: *Ἡ δὲ Δία οὐδὲν* is a glaring instance. In c. 15, *κρητικὸς* occurs in the sense of *critics*, as in the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*, 366 E. *Ῥαψῳδοί* would have been used by a contemporary of Socrates. *Πεπρωτοί* (= *Πεπρωτογῆνοί*) in the same sentence is also conclusive. With Wolf's arguments I am not acquainted: but the counter authority of Laertius is of little weight. ED.]

LECT.
I.

Second class of followers of Socrates: those who carried out his supposed principles in a spirit of original speculation, or combined them with the tenets of other teachers.

II. But there was little probability that the Grecian mind should long remain in this state of equipoise: or that reverence for the memory and eminence of any man should produce a unanimity which even the acknowledged supremacy of a common revelation has not been found to ensure. The variety of intellectual endowments, the difference of moral susceptibility and even of physical temperament, and the desire of special celebrity, would of themselves be sufficient to destroy it. And almost under the eye of Socrates himself, schools were already forming in which the symmetrical unity of his picture of the soul and its duties was broken into fragments, and in which each leader of a sect had taught himself and his disciples to be contented with one exclusive compartment of a vast inheritance of truth.

The Socratic sects differ not solely in their ethical views.

The Socratic identification of Knowledge and Virtue led to differences of logical theory also.

As might have been expected from the predominantly ethical cast of the speculations of Socrates, these teachers were chiefly distinguished by the opposition of their views as to the rule of life and conduct. But they were not so without exception; nor will a view yet more accurate, of the doctrine of Socrates, lead us to anticipate that they should be so. I have before noticed the peculiar constancy with which Socrates identified Wisdom and Virtue; a proposition which lies at the foundation of his, and of the Platonic amplification of his philosophy. Now Wisdom, thus considered, necessarily includes two elements,—correct knowledge of the right, and the habit of constant action according to that knowledge. But whether it was that Socrates regarded the latter component as too obvious to be formally insisted on; or that, by a still deeper study of the subject, he considered that the unclouded apprehension of moral rectitude was itself in a great degree unattainable except in and by a course of practical goodness, and thence inclusively supposed it; or, again, conceived that if the Supreme Good were perpetually presented to the soul, it would infallibly incline it;—it is certain that he seems to insist on the intellectual element with peculiar force, with a force which indeed to many readers of his discussions seems altogether overstrained. *Ἐφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι**. Had Socrates intended by this formula merely to establish the *rule or criterion* by which actions were to be determined, and to constitute a conformity to the decision of pure reason as this criterion, he would have said no more than has been ordinarily said since his time; but his meaning seems to have gone beyond this. Unquestionably Aristotle understood him as having represented the

* Xen. Memor. III. 9.

state of knowledge as itself the state of virtue:—"ἐπιστήμης γὰρ ᾗς ἐστὶ εἶναι πᾶσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥστε ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον." (*Eth. End.* I. 5.) Without at present entering on this question, I remark that such a theory (in whatever precise form originally held) must necessarily involve much logical discussion, though always in subservience to moral speculation. If it be held that the full exercise of perfect rationality is the great aim of a rational being, and the constant contemplation of the Supreme Good his surest path to excellence, or itself total excellence,—the investigation of those powers by which that contemplation may be effected, will inevitably demand the attention of the ethical theorist. Logical disquisition will force itself upon him in the work of exposition or inquiry. The records of Plato and Xenophon evince how largely Socrates was engaged in discussions as to the nature of Science and Truth; and it is very remarkable, that among the lost writings of his immediate disciples we find many tracts enumerated upon detached portions of the same general subject. Notwithstanding, then, the ethical direction of the Socratic teaching, and the subservience of all its labours to the moral elevation of man,—you will not be altogether surprised to find that the school most exclusively dialectical in all antiquity is counted among the various results of the general Socratic movement.

(1) The school of MEGARA, however, (for it is to this society and succession of philosophers I am now directing your attention) cannot be correctly understood by those who are content to find in the opinions of its founder (Euclides) a mere development of the views of Socrates. If I mistake not, in a former series of Lectures, I took occasion (though in a brief transient reference) to represent this school as the legitimate inheritor of the profound philosophy of Elea; and endeavoured to evince the justness of this account of its origination by the manifest congeniality of its doctrine and phraseology. Cicero has unquestionably stated the true position of the case, by uniting in one character the two elements,—the Eleatic tradition and the Socratic discipleship:—"non multum (dissentiant) a Platone Megarici, quorum fuit nobilis disciplina, cujus (ut scriptum video) princeps Xenophanes, quem modo nominavi: deinde eum secuti, Parmenides et Zeno. Itaque ab his Eleatici philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides Socratis discipulus, Megareus; a quo iidem Megarici dicti." (*Acad. Quæst.* II. 42.) We saw (when treating it in its chronological place) the tendency of the Parmenidean philosophy, in inferior hands, to eventuate in

The Megaric sect,

founded by Euclides,

combined a Socratic with an Eleatic element.

LECT.
I.

merely logical disputation; to pass from the substance to the form of reason. We know that in Zeno of Elea—though we have rejected the low and unfounded estimate of that able disputant—this anticipation was, from the pressure of opposition, too nearly realized; insomuch that this active champion of Eleaticism has been commonly regarded as the inventor of the art of methodical disputation: and the reader of the mystic and oracular fragments of Parmenides, in which the deepest questionings of self-searching Reason are, or seem to be, met, laments to find the philosophy of that man at whose extraordinary depth Socrates represents himself in early youth astonished and charmed (in *Theætet.* 183), losing its coherence, and ravelling into a mass of tangled and unprofitable difficulties.

*Euclides:
his character,
and
anecdotes of
his life.*

Euclides, who was either born, as some held, in a Sicilian city^a, or connected with that country, would naturally receive his earliest impressions from the philosophy of Southern Italy; and a disposition eminently ardent (perhaps even choleric) would not be likely to intenerate the stern and disputatious character which it had now unhappily assumed. For though an affecting anecdote is related by Plutarch testifying on one occasion the patience and fraternal affection of Euclides^b, we can scarcely attribute the placidity of a philosophic love of truth to one who had recourse to the courts of justice^c to gratify that desire for oral conflict which the logical schools could only sometimes meet. With the elements of the philosophy of Parmenides treasured in a mind restless and acute, Euclides (whether directly from Sicily or Megara) came to Athens as the true centre of intellectual activity, and soon became an assiduous hearer of the great instructor of the Grecian mind. Plato's *Theætetus* presents to us Euclides as preserving in manuscript a long discussion of his master's on the nature of human knowledge. Residing at Megara, we are told, that to evade an Athenian decree which forbade any intercourse with that city, Euclides was accustomed to assume a female dress, and brave the death, which was the certain consequence of detection, in order to gain the benefit of nightly conversation with Socrates^d. In the *Phædo* we find him noted as one of the group that gathered round the bed, and hung upon the last accents, of the Martyr of Virtue; and Euclides is memorable in the history of philo-

^a [Gela, according to Diog. Laertius, who however does not seem to believe the tradition. ED.]

^b [De fraterno Amore, p. 489. ED.]

^c [I can find no authority for this statement, except the *Index* to Laertius. The passage to which the index refers (Lib. II. 5, § 30) has an entirely different meaning. ED.]

^d [This romantic story is found in A. Gellius, *N. A.* VI. 10. ED.]

sophers no less than of philosophy, as having made his house at Megara the hospitable asylum for his brother disciples⁹, terrified and dispersed by the fate of their common master. LECT.
1.

It is not probable that this union continued much longer than circumstances necessitated. Euclides established, or continued, his own school independently of extraneous aid, and with sophistry fought the sophists. The cynic Diogenes, who witnessed the tumultuous contests of the pupils of Euclides, and perhaps had suffered from their pertinacious acuteness, took vengeance in a pun, and pronounced that their angry meeting deserved not the title of *σχολή* but of *χολή*¹⁰: and Socrates himself, who had witnessed and lamented the perverted sagacity of the Megaric philosopher, declared to his face that he "knew how to debate with sophists, but not with men".

Of the substance of these disputations, and the nature of the opinions which were popular in the school of Megara, our records are detached and scanty. A few memorials of Lactius, and a single phrase of Cicero, nearly complete our narrow stores. The waves of time, silently closing over what once were vast and proportioned systems, have left in too many cases but lonely and insulated summits above them; and it is but an imperfect consolation, that the scattered and barren peaks that thus rise above the waste of waters may at least be regarded as having been the most prominent points of the entire territory; and may even in some measure assist us to conjecture the shape and extent of regions for ever lost to our eyes. The task is indeed difficult and precarious, but to many minds this character will only excite and animate to effort. At all events, with whatever chance of success, it is our duty (unless we would degrade the history of speculation to the dry register of unconnected aphorisms it has been too often made) to *endeavour* to penetrate to the harmony which, whether apparent in error or real in truth, will be found to have pervaded every body of opinions permanent among men; though it is true, if I may alter my former comparison, that our relics of many of these philosophies are like the faint snatches of distant music which the hearer involuntarily combines into a regular strain, scarcely aware how much of the completed

⁹ [So Hermodorus in Diog. Laert. II. 108. Ed.]

¹⁰ [Ibid. VI. 24. Ed.]

¹¹ [Ib. II. 30. Compare the bitter lines of Timon the Sillographer, Ib. § 107: "I reckon not of such babblers as Phædo, or the wrangling Euclides, who has infected all Megara with a frenzy for debate." Ed.]

LECT.
I.

result is received from without or created from within. And whether we succeed or not, in presenting a perfect copy of the perished original, the exercise at least is valuable, which accustoms us to pass in our historical researches from facts to reasons, and to recognize in every authentic relic, however isolated or obscure, the element of a theory which once explained and corroborated it. We thus employ upon different materials an art analogous to that of the illustrious naturalist of France; we attempt to reconstruct from these organic remains (the precious fossils of history) the entire framework of systems now no more!

Besides being a student of Parmenides and hearer of Socrates,

Euclides was probably influenced by the Sophists also.

The founder of the school of Megara presents himself as the compound result of three different elements. He came, as we have seen, from the study of the speculations of *Parmenides*, and he underwent a long and assiduous discipline in the hands of *Socrates*. Besides which, we cannot suppose him unaffected by the influence of that strange society of rhetorical philosophers everywhere present and active, the *Sophists*. In these commingled agencies we shall find a rational solution for the problem of his philosophy.

Eleatic Unitarianism described.

We formerly saw that the school of Elea, of which *Parmenides* was assuredly the most accomplished representative, delighted in separating the world of sense from the world of reason; and, feeling that the tendency of reason is towards generality, uniformity, unity,—in gradually reducing all the forms, ideas, or perceptions of reason to the sovereign category of "Unity." They could not believe that the ideas of the Reason can be elaborated from the phenomena of simple sensation, as blood is elaborated from aliment; and on the other hand, they could not believe that these ideas of the Reason are themselves without any corresponding archetypes in the system of being. Accordingly, they pronounced that there is a rational or intelligible world, the correspondent to human reason, and appreciable by it alone. Arriving at this point, they began to reflect upon this world of Reason, to measure the divisions and map down the features of this mystic country. In this important work, however, they seem to have discovered the precipitation of beginners; for before long we find them boldly enthroned upon the topmost peak of intellectual abstraction, the solitary idea of unity and existence. The sameness of the archetypal world, its independence of the limitations and variations of time and space, filled and overwhelmed their minds; and, in order to realize this conception of it with more directness and emphasis, they reduced all its categories to the bare notion of singleness and Being; and contrasted with this one

existence ever identical with itself, every subordinate nature liable to change. Now you know that on the perception of Change depends the acquisition of all our notions of time, space, and number; consequently in the Parmenidean philosophy the whole sensible world (of which these notions are as it were the framework) was condemned to a secondary, phenomenal, and transitory being. Moreover, the whole series of apparitions which compose the sensible world—its sights, sounds, contacts, pleasures, pains—have no necessary existence; but though they be all supposed to cease (as they plainly may be), though every sense be closed, and every notion that waits on sense be annihilated, the unchangeable indestructible Idea of Existence remains, one and identical. These multiplied phenomena, then, are but the outward and contingent manifestations of this interior reality; to them belongs that *δόξα*, or knowledge of opinion, which is based upon the believed constancy of their sequences, and which affords sufficient assurance for the temporary and physical sciences. Such is the single and all-sustaining principle of the philosophy of Parmenides. But into the bosom of this everlasting essence, thus one and unchangeable, the convictions of man irresistibly force him to introduce the ideas of Truth and Goodness; that they also may share in the same sublime unity, and be with it enshrined above the mutable elements of the sensible universe. How far Parmenides himself adopted this view it is not easy to determine, from our very defective materials; if we may trust the highly-finished representation of Plato, the supreme "Idea" of the Eleatic philosopher was *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ὃ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν*; but however this may be, we may well believe that Euclides as the pupil of Socrates, and with him inclining to the deification of justice and truth, could scarcely fail to invest his supreme and ultimate Principle with *moral* attributes¹³. Prepared, then, by these

With the
Eleatic One,
Euclides
identifies the
Good and
True.

¹³ [It is not however certain that Euclides assigned any distinctly ethical meaning to the term Good. His system seems rather to have been a recession from the Socratic and moral to the old ontological view of things. Socrates had said "Virtue is Knowledge" (*φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη, σοφία*), but by these predicates he declared himself to mean, practical insight into the nature and consequences of actions. So far as it is knowledge, virtue is one—one *per se* or formally considered—for knowledge is formally one. But the objects of knowledge are manifold; hence a corresponding multiplicity of virtues. Valour, for instance, is the knowledge of things really to be dreaded; Justice the knowledge of things which may lawfully be done; and Virtue in general the knowledge of the means to true happiness.

The Socratic formula, whatever its defects, is at least practical. But the doctrine of Euclides would seem to have made speculation the end or *summum bonum*. For there is little doubt that when Plato in the *Philebus* intimates his dissent from those who maintain that Intelligence or Knowledge (*νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη*) is the highest good, his arguments are directed mainly against the

LECT.
I.

Denied the
existence of
evil.

notices of the influences affecting the Megaric philosopher, you will not hear with surprise his definition of the sovereign good, which, as reported by Cicero, has perplexed so many of the commentators of that writer. "Id bonum solum esse (Megarici) dicebant, quod esset *unum, et simile, et idem semper*." (*Acad. Qu.* II. 42.) Nor will you be astonished that a thinker trained to regard the whole universe as the development of a divine unity, should have boldly declared that evil had no real existence; and that that which we mistake for positive evil is merely the privation in various degrees of the supreme good: τὰ δὲ ἀντικειμένα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀήρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων, is one of the few records of his habitual teaching preserved to us by Lactius. But as the upholder of the metaphysical system of unity and identity is accustomed to explain the multiplicity of the sensible world as a manifold *manifestation* of the eternal sameness, an exhibition of itself under various aspects or characters; so the transformation of this supreme principle into a *moral* entity will produce a parallel representation of the diversities of virtue as varied forms of the sovereign good. We are not, therefore, disappointed to find our memorialist, in the passage immediately preceding the last, declare to us, that Euclides ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ¹³.

There are two peculiarities in the reasonings of Euclides which seem to have perplexed the historians of philosophy even more than those which I have already enumerated.

Megarics. It may be remarked, that the *Philobus* is not the only dialogue of Plato in which the Megarian dogmas are criticized: though, as they had so much in common with the Eleatic philosophy of Parmenides, they are frequently mixed up with the latter in a manner which renders it extremely difficult to distinguish one from the other. One passage, (*Sophista*, p. 246) is referred by Schleiermacher to the Megarics. If he is right, we gather from it that Euclides, like Plato, asserted the reality of Ideas (ὡντὰ ἄττα καὶ δώματα εἶδη τῇν ἀληθινῇ οὐσίαν εἶναι), being herein distinguished from his Eleatic masters. Perhaps it is to this Cicero alludes, *Acad. Qu.* II. 42, where he says, "Hi quoque (Megarici) multa a Platone." Euclides however differed from Plato, in so far as he denied to the sensible world that *μέθεξις* or participation in the ideas which Plato insists on as the ground of its reality. With Euclides therefore metaphysics was the only recognized science: Physics and Ethics, the sciences of Nature and Man, were alike impossible. In fact Plato shows (*Ibid.* 248) that the Megarian Ontology was a system of pure Nihilism: or as he says with grave satire: "The absolute Being has then neither life nor intelligence: but stands ever unaffected by change, a thing august and holy, incapable of knowing or thinking." A passage, it may be remarked, not favourable to those speculatists who claim Plato as a Pantheist. ED.]

¹³ [This obscure passage is supposed by Brandis (*Handb.* II. p. 114) to refer to the Megarian doctrine of Ideas alluded to in the foregoing note. It seems, according to this author, to imply that Euclides had departed from the high Eleatic doctrine of an absolute Unity, and that he admitted "eine relative Mehrheit des Seyenden." We hear nothing of εἶδη in the reports of the opinions of Euclides' successors, until we find Stilpo, a hundred years after, engaged in disproving their existence. ED.]

We are told that he rejected all analogical reasoning¹⁴, and that he was accustomed to attack not premisses but consequences¹⁵. The argument by which he is represented as vindicating the former of these opinions, appears at first sight so unsatisfactory as to increase the difficulty. "The objects were either like or unlike; if unlike, the analogy was obviously illusive; if like, it were better examine the objects themselves." When we remember that the argument from analogy is intended not to supersede positive examination, where it is possible, but to supply its place where it is not, nothing certainly can be more ineffective than to object to this form of reasoning that absence of an impossible perfection which leaves so valuable a probability behind it, in circumstances that forbid any higher order of conviction. The poverty of our materials renders any explanation of this difficulty precarious. The tendency of a purely metaphysical philosophy is to despise all empirical conclusions; and as probable arguments, in all their innumerable degrees, from bare possibility to fullest moral certainty, form the foundations of belief in the world of sense, the pupil of Parmenides may have learned, and taught others, to slight them. The love of direct consecutive demonstration which urged him to pursue his antagonists through the long labyrinth of their own conclusions, in preference to questioning the original validity of their assumptions, may have been connected with the same general philosophic habits: and no doubt, the superior brilliancy of the triumph when the contradiction was, after a chase of successive conclusions, at length palpably reached, had its share in popularizing this species of attack in the "eristic" school. I am strongly inclined, however, to suspect, that the argument against the use of comparisons (*διὰ παραβολῆς λόγοι*, Diog. Laert.) was originally nothing more than one of that multitude of quibbles for which the school of Megara is famous through antiquity. Suppose the assailant to ask the employer of the comparison, "are the objects like or unlike?" and to proceed, "if unlike, your comparison is void; if like, since you know them to be like, you must know *both* the objects, and your comparison is superfluous; for what you know you can personally examine, *περὶ αὐτὰ δεῖν μάλλον ἀναστρέφεισθαι, ἢ οἷς ὁμοιά ἐστι*." This, I allow, is very contemptible sophistry; but the student of the fashionable philosophy of Megara will scarcely, on that

¹⁴ [Diog. L. π. 107. ED.]

¹⁵ [*ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ἐλισσάτο οὐ κατὰ λήμματα ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπιφορὰν*. Th. If, as Deycks supposes, these terms were invented by Euclides, to him will belong the honour of having discovered the form of the syllogism, *λήμματα* being equivalent to the *προτάσεις*, *ἐπιφορὰ* to the *συμπέρασμα* of Aristotle. ED.]

LECT.
I.

Eubulides
flor. about
B.C. 340.
His seven
sophisms.

account, deem it improbable. The very next champion of the school is immortal for conceits in whose company the inventor of such a quibble need scarcely blush.

I speak of Eubulides, the supposed author of seven sophisms whose singular celebrity through antiquity is known to every scholar, and really forms a most discreditable element in the estimation of ancient literature¹⁶. My object being altogether to accustom you to trace the physiology of the history of speculation, employing facts as little more than the symbols of principles, and such facts only as are *in themselves* indicative of principles latent but real, you may suppose I do not purpose to dwell upon these miserable trifles. When indeed I remember that Philetas of old caught a consumption in the intense study of the *ψευδόμενος*, and that Chrysippus (the glory of the Stoa) wrote six weighty volumes on the same puzzle, it is only prudence to withdraw from you the fatal attractions of the subject. Athenæus¹⁷ has preserved to us the epitaph of the unhappy martyr, in which the sophism itself is pathetically personified as the murderer:

Ξεῖνε, Φιλητᾶς εἰμί· λόγων ὁ ψευδόμενός με
ἤλυσσε, καὶ νυκτῶν φροντίδες ἐσπέρειαι!

These logical difficulties are known by titles intimating not the form of the sophism, but its accidental subject. Thus we have, besides the Liar just mentioned, the Vailed¹⁸, the Horned¹⁹, the Electra²⁰, the Bald²¹, the Sorites²², the Hidden. A late ingenious writer, in a dissertation on the subject, has endeavoured to elevate these fallacies into the symbols or examples of profound metaphysical difficulties. The

¹⁶ [Eubulides appears to have been the person especially aimed at by Aristotle in his anti-Megaric polemics. Ed.]

¹⁷ [*Diogen.* IX. p. 401 E. The sophism is given by Cicero, *Acad. Q.* II. 29: Si te mentiri dicis, idque verum dicis, mentiris, an verum dicis? In Arist. *Soph. Elench.* xxv. 3, it is called "the argument proving that the same man at the same instant lies and speaks truth." Ed.]

¹⁸ [Lucian, *Ver. Auct.* p. 22, gives the following example of the *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος*, called also the *διαλανθάνων*, or "Hidden": "A. Do you know your own father? B. Of course I do. A. Do you know this person who stands veiled beside me? B. No! A. He is your father; it follows that you don't know your own father." Compare Plat. *Theat.* p. 165 B: λέγω δὴ τὸ δευτέρωτον ἐρώτημα... ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τι τοῦτο ὃ οὐδὲ μὴ εἰδέναι. Ed.]

¹⁹ [*ῥεατίνη*. "What you have not lost you have. But you have not lost horns, therefore you have horns." Diog. L. VII. 187. Ed.]

²⁰ [The Electra is like the Vailed. Orestes stands veiled by Electra; she knows Orestes, but knows not that the veiled man is he; hence she "τὰ αὐτὰ ἅμα οὐδὲ τε καὶ οὐκ οἶδε." Luc. Ib. Ed.]

²¹ [The *φαλακρός* was probably a kind of reversed Sorites. As, for instance, Does the loss of one hair constitute baldness? No. Of two? No. When then does baldness begin? at the *n*th, or at the (*n*+1)th place? If not at the (*n*)th, why at the (*n*+1)th? unless the absence of one hair constitutes baldness, which was denied! Ed.]

²² ["Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano." Cic. *Acad. Q.* II. 16. Comp. Diog. L. VII. 82; Hor. *Ep.* II. 1, 45. Ed.]

"Vailed," or ἐγκεκαλυμμένος, would mark the difference between sensible and rational knowledge; the "Liar" would evince that he who denied the possibility of truth convicted himself, by avowedly speaking falsehood at the moment he made the assertion; and so of the rest. It is remarkable too, that one of these examples is employed by Plato himself²³ for the same illustration; and indeed I am not afraid to confess my belief that the expository style of even that great master, admirable as it often is, *was* unduly influenced by the dialectical fashions of his day. This supposed purpose does not seem to have been suspected by antiquity; it is not, however, impossible that it may sometimes have exalted these sophisms from barren perplexities into instruments of instruction; and I will not deprive their memory of the benefit of the possibility. The whole rich inheritance passed into the hands of the Stoics, who did not suffer it to remain unproductive. "Tell me the doctrines," said Chrysippus, "and let me alone for *proofs*!" proofs which he adduced in such multitude, and managed with such skill, that it was said (as of the language of Plato, so of the logic of this Stoic), that if the gods themselves were to use dialectics, they would adopt the dialectics of Chrysippus.

As far, then, as we have now reached, it is not difficult to discover in the early stage of the Megaric school the mingled influences which I have already noted, the metaphysics of Parmenides, the ethics of Socrates, and the dialectical habits of the sophists. The influence of the metaphysics of unity and identity seems still more apparent and direct in the opinions of Diodorus and Stilpo, the only remaining names of importance in this body of philosophers. To penetrate, to illumine, and to harmonize their opinions by the faint light afforded in the pages of our ancient reporters, is a task in which, though I will use all possible brevity, I can scarcely ask you to accompany me this day.

²³ [Possibly the author alludes to *Theætetus*, 165 B, where however the epithet δεινότατον ironically indicates the contempt with which Plato invariably speaks of this and similar tricks of controversy. The dialogue called *Euthydemus* was evidently written for the purpose of laughing them out of fashion. It is probable that in the numerous passages in which the ἐριστικοί or ἀντιλογικοί are censured, he has in view the practice either of the Megarics or Cynics, or both. As an instance may be quoted *Meno*, p. 80 E. In the context of the passage in *Theætetus*, Plato shows psychologically the sense in which the logical paradox may be true. Hegel in his *History of Philosophy*, I. p. 138, is copious on the subject of this and the sister sophisms. ED.]

LECTURE II.

SCHOOL OF MEGARA CONTINUED.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
II.

AT the close of our last meeting we had traced the gradual progress of the philosophy of Megara into the sophistical subtleties of Eubulides: and among the mazes of their perplexing labyrinth I was forced, through fear of overtaking your attention, to leave it. Some notice of these elaborate intricacies was necessary, not from their intrinsic value, but from their accidental celebrity in the literature of antiquity; but as my object is to pursue the history of Reason itself, rather than to undertake to track its multitude of collateral connexions and casual results in contemporary literature, I escape from the subject as speedily as possible; I abandon form for substance; I return with eagerness from the outward and ever-changing vesture, to the soul and spirit of philosophy.

*Diodorus
Cronus, flor.
about B. C.
300.*

It seems to me that in the speculations of *Diodorus* we may have an opportunity of making this transition. For though this reasoner comes before us with a full share of the disputatious characteristics of the school, I do not despair of finding something more solidly instructive in his history, though it seems to have been abandoned as hopelessly barren by the majority of our critics. *Diodorus*, who is styled by Cicero (*De Fat.* 6), "valens dialecticus," and by Sextus is termed *διαλεκτικώτατος*, was originally of a city in Caria, was favoured with the intimacy of Ptolemy Soter, and is said to have terminated a life of intellectual conflict by dying of grief and shame at being unable to solve the questions of Stilpo in presence of that monarch, who ridiculed his hesitation in a pun upon his name of Cronus.

*His distin-
guishing
tenets,*

As far as I can collect the tenets of *Diodorus Cronus* from the scattered notices of antiquity, he seems to have been eminent for the three following philosophic characteristics. He argued perpetually against the reality of motion;—he held a peculiar view of the nature of *συνημμένα*, or connected propositions, affirming (if I rightly understand two obscure and intricate statements of Sextus Empiricus,

Pyrr. Hypot. II. 11, and *Adv. Math.* VIII.) that the antecedent and consequent in a just hypothetic ought to be connected by reciprocal necessity;—and he was the inventor, or employer, of a species of argument known in the ancient logic by the title of the “argumentum dominans,” and specially used it for the purpose (as Arrian shows) of proving that nothing is possible which neither is, nor will be, true. (*Epictet.* II. 19.) I am now to attempt to illustrate the mental relationship of these tenets to each other and to a common origin,—seeming as they do, at the first sight, connected by so slender a thread:—and I do so, not merely as a specimen of the spirit of reciprocal illumination of every element by every other, in which I would have you study the detached records of ancient speculation; but still more, as including a valuable lesson regarding the tendency of a great philosophical system. Nor is the interest of the subject diminished by the circumstance that that system has been in our own day revived, unchanged in substance, but adorned with a novel splendour of detail and array of consequences, which have made it the most popular, and assuredly the most dangerous, metaphysical theory of the universe, in modern Germany.

and their
relation to
each other.

We must (to understand Diodorus not as Diodorus, but as the element of a natural development of principles) return to the school of Elea. We found in that school—whose metaphysics were inherited by the Megaric succession—the principle openly stated that the sensible world is purely phenomenal, accidental, apparent; in contradistinction from that substantial world of *Reason* which alone deserves the title of real existence. Considered, then, by the intelligence, the world of existence becomes of course subordinated to the laws and forms of intelligence; it is a world of which we have the interpretation in our own reason, there alone, and there perfectly. Now of these laws of intelligence, as it is their undoubted character, that they regard the Necessary, the Unconditional, the Absolute—so is it certain that this absolute thing, thus contemplated by intellectual intuition, being the common foundation and essential reality of all things, and of all things equally, cannot but be one and ever identical with itself. To the eye of reason, then, there is no plurality, no change; one Being not merely supports, but is, the universe; and all that reveals itself in the lower world of sense is but the external manifestation of this Absolute Unity. Of anything which that mutable world includes it cannot be said that it *is*—it *becomes*; for its property is incessant change; and of that which incessantly changes, as on the one hand, there can be no assured science, so on the other, there cannot even

Their philosophical importance, and that of their author, explained. The Eleatic theory of the One re-stated.

LECT.
II.

be any true and proper *reality* predicated. Vain it is to affirm, with the shortsighted naturalists of the Ionic school, that it is sufficient for us to trust the regulated sequences of nature; if these sequences be casual, not even the shadow of science can regard them; if they be arbitrary but believed to be invariable, this, again, is not science, but faith; if they be necessary and unalterable, then are they, what we affirm them, the mere manifestations in the world of sense of the necessary attributes of a necessary and eternal thing;—they are then, as it were, the Absolute contemplated by the eyes of sense; and all the scientific reality of such laws is only the reality of the absolute Being that exhibits itself in them. The universe, then, is *one*, to the total exclusion of superior, inferior, or equal:—ἐν τὰ πάντα.

My present object (as I cannot, to avoid misconstruction, too often remind you) being *not* to estimate the value of theories, but to trace their historical development, I do not now pause to criticise the Eleatic principle of Unity. For the sake of clearness, I simply and rapidly note the forms the same general principle has assumed in different ages; in order that you may be enabled advantageously to *generalize* the instruction afforded by analysing the relics of Diodorus. You will observe then, that all *rational* explanations of the universe (as contrasted with pure sensualism) admit that there exists a being absolute, self-sustained, and infinite: the point of difference concerns the *relation* between this Absolute Being and the Universe. On the one side, the *Theist* (I speak now not as a theologian but simply as a reasoner) holds that the Absolute Being and the Universe are two distinct beings, and both real, though not with the same form or quality of reality; and that the connexion between the two existences is strictly that of Cause and Effect. This general doctrine is divided between two classes, one of which maintains the energy of the Absolute Being in the universe to be literally *necessary*; and the other to be the voluntary result of free activity under the guidance of yet higher attributes, and compelled only by the glorious necessity of ever doing that which is morally best... On the other hand, the Unitarian of metaphysics contends that the Absolute Being and the Universe are not two but one Being; and he holds either 1, that the *Universe itself*, such as we see and feel it, is the absolute, uncaused Infinite; or 2, that matter is infinite, and the infinite Universe the modifications of matter alone; or 3, that a primal force is the Infinite, and the universe that force in infinite action; or 4, that matter and force are themselves (as well as *thought*) the manifested attributes of the Absolute Being; or 5, (the system of Spinoza), that

The admission of an Absolute Being is common to all rational theories of the Universe. How these theories differ. Theism distinguishes the Absolute Being from the Universe. Two forms of Theism.

The opposite or Unitarian theory identifies the Absolute Being with the Universe. Six forms of philosophical Unitarianism enumerated.

thought and extension are the original attributes of that absolute nature of which the universe is the manifestation; or finally, the theory of Schelling and his followers, which (upon metaphysico-logical grounds) pronounces the identity of subject and object in that Absolute Unity of which nothing can be determined (for determination itself supposes limitation), but which the reason directly contemplates by an exclusive privilege, and than which in truth it can directly contemplate nothing else*. It would be indeed extraordinary if the last form of the theory of pure Unity coincided with the first, and the circle of speculation returned into itself; yet it does appear to me that in their grounds and reasons the school of Elea and the modern votaries of the Absolute Identity probably resemble more completely than any other two systems in the series.

The latest form of the Unitarian theory, that of Schelling and his followers, coincides with the Eleatic.

I need scarcely inform you to which of the foregoing many varieties of hypothesis I would myself incline, as furnishing the true theory of the existence of the universe. The causal energy of God as exerted in the formation and support of a world dependent on, but separate from Him, is not more congenial to religion than it is acceptable to philosophy; but, as a lesson of toleration is never superfluous, I may, before leaving this part of the subject, seasonably remind you that the maintenance of even the latest of these forms of the theory that identifies the Absolute Being with the world of sensible manifestation, is not felt by many of its upholders to be inconsistent with a practical acceptance of the *Christian faith*. Whether the world be the attribute of which God is the substance, or the effect of which God is the cause, they regard as a transcendental question upon which Revelation was not meant to enlighten us; and though assuredly no small exercise of ingenuity would be necessary to reconcile this principle with the express declarations of the Scripture record, or to prove that Scripture did not, popularly indeed, but *positively*, decide the transcendental question itself; or again, to evince that the Deity of the Bible is only a manifestation of the Absolute Nature in a shape cognizable by the Understanding;—yet, while we firmly resist error in every shape, we ought to rejoice in being able to extend indulgence to those maintainers of it whose happy inconsistency allows them to join, with wayward speculative opinions in the regions of abstract thought, a reverential reception of the whole law of life, and a coincidence in all the requisitions of practical morality.

* See Ancill. II. for the above classification. [Frederic Ancillon's 2nd *Essai sur le Système de l'Unité absolue, ou Le Panthéisme*, contained in the 2nd volume of his *Essais* (Paris, 1832). See esp. p. 56. Ed.]

LECT.
II.

*Application
of the fore-
going dis-
tinctions to
the Megaric
philosophy,
especially
that of Dio-
dorus.*

I return to consider the subject in more direct connexion with the Megaric development of it, and specially in relation to the tenets of Diodorus. The supposition of the simple unity of the great All is inseparably bound up with the supposition of its eternity; for whatever is itself absolute, or an aspect of the absolute, has no relation to the limitations of time or space; of such there can (in the ordinary acceptance of the word) be no "creation." Now, this eternity is the eternity not merely of the whole, but of every the minutest element of the infinite mass: and this again inevitably implies the equal necessity of the whole and of each such element, whether considered as evolved to our senses in time or in space, or in that resultant of them both which we term "motion." Accordingly, in point of fact, the system is scarcely ever found unaccompanied by the strictest assertion of the doctrine of necessity; and this doctrine, by him actively maintained, will, I apprehend, be found the common chain that links the scattered fragments of the wisdom of Diodorus.

*His theory
of the pos-
sible,*

In the first place let us hear Arrian, who in the 19th chapter of the 2nd book of his precious discourses of Epictetus, presents us with the following account of one article in the lectures of Diodorus. "The argument called the dominative¹, about which disputants interrogated each other, seems to have arisen from hence. Of the following propositions, any two imply a contradiction to the third. They are these. That every thing past is necessarily true; that an impossibility cannot depend on a possibility; that something is a possibility which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus, perceiving the contradiction, employed the first two to prove, that nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true." The force of this reasoning evidently depends upon the assumption that in the scheme of the universe every element is *so dependent* upon every other, and (more directly) the future so dependent upon the past, that the assumed necessity of the past inferred the necessity of all that was to come, or, in his own words, inferred that whatever was not to come was an absolute impossibility. As this argument (though Brucker and others dispatch it

¹ [Ὁ κυρεῦν λόγος. The propositions in question are perhaps clearer in the original. They are: 1. Ἰὰν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Every truth (i.e. fact or event) of the past is necessary (could not have been otherwise). 2. Δυνατὸν ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν. 3. Δύνατον εἶναι ὃ οὐδ' ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὐδ' ἔσται. (Things which never did and never will happen are nevertheless possible.) Though Diodorus has the credit of this argument, it is of older date than he. See Arist. *Metaph.* VIII. 3: Φαίνονται Μεγαρίκοι, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, ὅσον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ κ.τ.ε. The paradox seems framed in order to overthrow the Aristotelian distinction of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. ED.]

as an elaborate trifle) is evidently connected with the profoundest of metaphysical inquiries, I make no apology for continuing the passage in Arrian. Cleanthes and his followers, he tells us, assumed as premisses the second and third propositions of the series. "They held, that something *is* possible which neither is nor will be true; and that an impossibility cannot depend on a possibility; and they consequently denied that everything past is necessarily true." The universal connexion of the possible only with the possible, and the impossible with the impossible, was here again assumed; but the conclusion was *against* the necessity of the *past*. Chrysippus, the most eminent of the successors of Cleanthes, however, preferred to reject the logical principle which the others had assumed, and boldly asserted that an impossibility and a possibility might be interdependent. It will probably strike you as singular, that in this controversy the doctrine of immutable fate should have been apparently deserted by the champions of the Stoical institute; and this, as well as the general turn of phrase, leads me to suspect, that, in perfect conformity to the spirit of the times, and especially of the Megaric school, the disputants were more zealously engaged with the logical² dependence of conceptions than the physical dependence of events. Cicero confirms the report of the views of Diodorus in his treatise *De Fato*, c. 9: adding the illustration, "*nec magis commutari ex veris in falsa ea posse quæ futura sunt quam ea quæ facta sunt; sed in factis immutabilitatem apparere, in futuris quibusdam, quia non appareat, ne necesse quidem videri.*" Unquestionably, in all these statements there is the same confusion as to the precise sense of "necessity," "possibility," &c. (whether considered as a quality in things themselves, or as a state of our knowledge regarding them), which has since darkened so many attempted expositions of the subject; and in the last passage it would seem as if the "necessity of the past" meant the impossibility that a thing which once has happened should be known not to have happened (for in what other sense can past facts evidence their own "necessity?") or be considered to be altered from "*true to false*?" But even this confusion between the *physical connexion* of events (independently of *our* cognizance) and the *certainty or uncertainty* of our knowledge of them, or even between either of these and the *logical connexion* of antecedent and consequent in propositions, is itself (especially the latter) very characteristic of the union of Eleatic metaphysics and dialectics in the school of Megara. When once the uni-

² [Obscura questio est, quam περί δυνατόν philosophi appellant: totaque est λογική; quam rationem disserendi voco. Cic. *de Fato* init. Ed.]

verse was to be contemplated as an object not sensible but *rational*; to be explained out of the forms of abstract reason, and not by the inductions or analogies of observation, the tendency was irresistible to regard all its connexions not as physical, but as metaphysically necessary, connexions; that is, as connexions of the same kind as that between the premisses and conclusions of a logical demonstration. And hence, from Xenophanes to Stilpo, the difficulty which perpetually recurs, of determining whether the few and detached fragments we meet are truly portions of a philosophy which was content to balance *logical* principles, or which aimed at establishing *a priori* principles of the actual *universe*. Nor is it likely that the authors themselves were always clearly aware of the distinction.

If you have accompanied me in what I fear has been a toilsome course, you will have little difficulty in now detecting the true bearing of the Megaric philosopher's theory of the reciprocal connexion of a true hypothetic proposition. The combination—or confusion—of logical connexion with actual reality is here still more manifestly apparent. You are of course aware that the only truth required in a conditional proposition is the truth of the connexion of antecedent and consequent; nor would *this* truth be endangered though each element of the conditional assertion were really false. The embarrassment of the earlier logicians, however, on this very simple matter was altogether inconceivable, and betrays an apparent indistinctness of conception which renders the student doubtful whether it can be possible that he has rightly understood their representations of variance upon a subject so manifestly admitting of none. I will not now afflict your ears with a detail of these uninstrusive quarrels: the theory of Diodorus and his auditors alone concerns us. Diodorus is understood to have held that no hypothetic was valid (and probably likewise no simple proposition) in which the propositions, or terms, were not reciprocally predicable or mutually inferential³. The relation of this logical tenet to that system of universal necessity in which every event was

end of hypothetic propositions.

³ [Sext. Empir. *adv. Logicos*, VIII. 113. Philo, Diodorus' opponent, had said: "There is but one case in which a hypothetic is untrue, viz. when the assumption is true, but the inference false, e. g. If it is day, it is night. A hypothetic is true, 1. When both assumption and inference are true, as, If it is day, it is light. 2. When both are false, as, If the earth flies, the earth has wings. 3. When the assumption is false, but the inference true, as, If the earth flies, the earth exists." Diodorus denied all these propositions, maintaining that the only true hypothetic was that in which a true inference is necessarily and always combined with a true assumption. ("Ὅπερ μήτε ἐνδέχεται μήτε ἐνδέχεται ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδους.") Nothing is said by Sextus of "simple propositions," to which the controversy is evidently inapplicable. *Ed.*]

dependent on every other, and nothing conceivably possible which was not also real, is too obvious to require comment. [I may note, in passing, that the doctrine that the possible and real are coextensive, has been developed in two opposite directions. A French theorist of the last century held a doctrine which involved the proposition that there was nothing conceivable which was not realized in some part of the universe*. The difference, then, between the doctrine of Diderot and that of Diodorus would be, that the one swelled the real to the possible, the other contracted the possible to the real; both equally ending in making them coincide.]

The last proposition which I informed you was held by this Megaric philosopher was that in which the opponents of the reality of the sensible universe in every age of Grecian philosophy agreed, and which formed the great practical example and public triumph of their doctrine,—the denial of the reality of *motion*. In the latter part of my last series of lectures I believe I endeavoured to show you that this famous proposition was far from being the mere dialectical puzzle it is so commonly represented. The “*Solvitur ambulando*” of a modern logician (an obviously unsatisfactory evasion) was tried upon Diodorus himself in a more disagreeable form. We are told by Sextus Empiricus⁴ that he had gone with a dislocated shoulder to the famous surgeon Herophilus; and that the latter delayed the operation for a considerable period, assuring the unhappy logician that he had been so abundantly convinced by his last lecture, of the total impossibility of motion, that though his eyes seemed to assure him the bone had left its place, he refused any longer to trust those deceiving senses:—nor was it without considerable entreaty and earnest recantation that the physician consented to forget that the bone could not have moved “either in the place where it was, or the place where it was not.” The proposition “that *motion* is impossible” is only a popular instance and practical example of the wider proposition, that *succession* is rationally inconceivable; and the principles on which the proof was based are equally applicable to every case of *change*. The true object in them all seems to have been to demonstrate, that, tried by pure reason, change is contradictory; and consequently, that in that intellectual world of which pure reason is the organ, the only real and eternal world, change, and all its phenomena of plurality and succession, can have no being. The steps by which the rational contradiction alleged to be

*Denial of
motion by
Diodorus*

*Principles
involved in
this denial.*

* Diderot—with Mr Stewart's comments in Prel. Disc. Notes.

⁴ [*Pyrrh. Hyp.* II. 245. Ed.]

LECT.
II.

*Distinction
between a
body moving
and a body
which has
moved.*

*Connexion
of the Me-
garic dialec-
tic with the
Eleatic me-
taphysics.*

*Stilpo of
Megara,
flor. B. C.
300, or
thereabouts.*

involved in the phenomena of motion was reached, were various; but the object was the same in all. It is evident, that to accuse this tenet of violating the evidence of our senses, was so far from being an answer to its supporters, that their triumph, and the intended value of it, were actually founded on that very fact...One of the forms of Diodorus's view of the subject led him to assert that though actual motion was contradictory, accomplished motion might be real; *κινεῖται οὐδὲ ἔν, κεκίνηται δέ* (Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* x. 85):—or, in his own accurate language, the *πατατικὸν ἄξιωμα* was false, but the *συντελεστικὸν* true. This manifestly turned upon the argument, that at any given moment the body being in a definite place was actually not in motion; though in a subsequent moment it might be asserted that it must *have been*. Whatever be the rapidity of the motion, argued the subtle Megaric, at each separate instant the body must occupy a single place, which gives the very notion of *rest*, which again is the formal *contrary* of motion; the same may be said of every successive instant; these instants make up all time; in what time then does the body “move?” Yet, on the other hand, we are irresistibly led to believe that the body *has been* in constant motion: it moves not, yet it will *have moved*. The suggested conclusion was, that the phenomenon of *change* presents a contradiction which cannot stand the test of reason; the world of sense (which is essentially a world of incessant change) is therefore an illusory presentation on which no science can rest; numerical plurality (involving succession) is itself a mere accommodation to the inferior nature; and no safe footing is to be had for philosophic thought, until the mind, penetrating through the veil of sense into the sanctuary of reason, there detects, beneath this multiplicity of appearances, the hidden unity of things—infinite, eternal, and alone! We may now take leave of the fragments of Diodorus, whose views, you will perceive, I have endeavoured to arrange and harmonize, so as to supply, not merely information as to definite facts, but an authentic illustration of the natural workings of a fundamental idea in speculation. You can now understand that the Megaric philosophy is nothing more than a development, in a dialectical form, of the metaphysical principle of Unity; it is the logic of the Eleatic metaphysics. The illustration will be completed by a notice of Stilpo, ordinarily reckoned as the last name of celebrity belonging to this school. The founder of the Stoics is said to have inherited and propagated the reflections of Stilpo; and his son and pupil Dryso is numbered among the masters of Pyrrho the Sceptic. The fact

is internally probable; as the moral theory of Stilpo is equally discernible in both. In arriving at Stilpo, then, we may consider ourselves as having reached that stage of the Megaric development when its original principles worked themselves out; thenceforth combined with new elements, and limited in their influence by more prevailing ingredients.

The logical dexterity of Stilpo was the charm and terror of his age. He was himself a native of Megara, where by an honour similar to that posthumously accorded to Pindar, his house was reverently spared in the sanguinary siege of the city by Demetrius. Celebrated as he was in his own and succeeding generations ("philosophus acutus et probatus" is the testimony of Cicero), our extant memorials of his opinions are not more numerous than those of Diodorus. But they seem to me, scattered as they are and broken off from the common trunk which supported and united them, to bear very perceptible proofs, in the fruit which they bore, of the germ from which they grew. The family-likeness of the Eleatic and Megaric parentage is stamped upon the remotest and most isolated of its progeny.

Of Stilpo, then, little more is reported than that he attacked the "Ideas" (τὰ εἶδη) now become, in two different theories of them, the badge of the Platonic and Peripatetic philosophy; that he denied the possibility of logical predication, and that in his ethical speculations (to which he earnestly devoted himself) he held that the sovereign good consisted in absolute impassibility, or "apathy." ... With these notices the ordinary chronologists of philosophy are contented; but the study would be of little practical utility if some principle were not attainable which might illustrate them by itself, and by each other. These tenets (especially the dialectical principles) are usually regarded as plausible exercises of ingenuity in "cristic" opposition to the popular philosophy of the day; but even difficulties themselves are seldom chosen without a motive; and the very absurdity alleged against one of them would seem to indicate some profounder purpose in its ardent vindicator. The doctrine to which I allude is thus reported by Plutarch⁶; and considered as an insulated opinion, does cer-

*His negative
politics.
Implies
the doctrine
of "Ideas."*

⁶ *Ado. Colot. c. 22*, confirmed by Simplicius *ad Arist. Phys. fol. 26*. From Plato's *Sophist* (p. 251 c) it appears that Stilpo was not the inventor of this sophism. It was used by the Cynic Antisthenes, also a bitter opponent of εἶδη, to whom the words τῶν γεγόντων τοῖς διμυλλοῦσιν point the allusion in the text of Plato. A German editor of Aristotle sees in this quibble an anticipation of the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. But this is to do it too much honour. See Deycks, *de Meg. Doct.* p. 85. Ed.]

LECT.
II.

*His tenet
that only
identical
propositions
are true.*

*Probable
metaphys-
ical basis of
this sophism.*

tainly appear eminently absurd. Stilpo denied "that one thing could be predicated of another," by this mode of argument: "if running be predicated of a horse, the subject is not the same with the predicate; and so likewise when good is predicated of a man: for if a man and good were the same, how could 'good' be predicated of *food* and *physic*, which are confessedly things so different?" The humblest novice in logical science at once rejects this reasoning as a sophism; and we can scarcely doubt that a disputant so eminent as Stilpo saw the force of the obvious objection quite as clearly as we do. It is plain, then, that he must have proceeded upon some principle *deeper* than a logical one; upon some previous theory with regard to human knowledge of which this argument was but an example. To what then does this assertion amount, when viewed not in the example but the principle? To the assertion that no proposition is truly affirmable in which the subject and predicate are not absolutely equivalent. Now I have repeatedly represented the Megaric school as the dialectical form of the Eleatic. The Eleatic reasoners maintained the absolute identity of all which in this world appears individually different, the identity of all in the unity of a common nature: and they regarded it as the triumph of reason that it could detect this sublime sameness beneath the shifting scenery of sense. The business of reason was, then, the perception of identity; and all was ultimately resolvable into *this* category. What, then, was more natural than the declaration of our bold logicians of Megara, that in the strictness of truth, no proposition was tenable but that which expressed the relation of identity; that no term was predicable of another except in the affirmation of absolute sameness? And, as a necessary consequence, that every form of assertion which refused to identify the subject and attribute belonged not to the sphere of pure reason, but to that inferior world of the senses with which a just dialectic had no concern whatever.

*It is con-
nected with
the denial of
"Univers-
als."*

In the strict prosecution of his fundamental metaphysic, then, Stilpo might be plausibly led to the apparently startling proposition which denied the legitimacy of predicates more extensive than their subject. It is obvious that this train of thought, pertinaciously pursued, would result in the denial of all *abstract notions*; for these abstract notions are the very predicates to which Stilpo refuses his logical passport, as well as being the very attributes that *difference* substances from each other. You will expect, therefore, to find the champion of the philosophy of unity obstinately opposed to every theory of the reality of universals, whether "*in things*" or "*beyond*

things"—Aristotelic or Platonic,—and here, accordingly, history places him. The guardian of the old Eleatic inheritance faithfully fulfilled his charge; and eagerly offered battle to every defender of every modification of the universal idea. The promptitude, the tenacity, and the publicity of the contests of these eristic gladiators of Greece at once remind us of the similar engagements in the scholastic ages; but I suspect that the discussions of the ancient logicians would be found more really interesting and more substantially valuable, because less strictly limited in their theological philosophy, and thence more at liberty to start and follow every variety of metaphysical hypothesis. This, however in its causes a misfortune for these inquirers themselves, may, with great probability, have made their engagements richer in variety and interest. It is a real cause of gratitude, that on many subjects of the higher metaphysics we are, for all practical purposes, released from dependence on the caprices of speculation; but we need not on this account resign all interest in their history: it is well to have that ground surveyed to our hand which we are unwilling ourselves to tread.

We must now briefly interpret Stilpo in his character of an *ethical* philosopher, a department in which he seems to have attracted much of the notice of antiquity, and largely to have influenced the subsequent fortunes of philosophy. I have before observed that internal evidence, as well as historical tradition, establishes the influence of this master in the rule of life advocated by Zeno and the Stoics, by Pyrrho and the Sceptics. The anecdote of the attachment of Zeno is well known; who, when Crates the Cynic in a fit of jealousy would have dragged this illustrious pupil from the lecture-room of Stilpo, exclaimed aloud, "You may remove my body, but Stilpo detains my soul!" And the Stoics themselves approved as a brother him who could reply to the conqueror of his native city, inquiring (in Seneca's version of the story), "Numquid perdidisset?" "Omnia bona mea mecum sunt!" a sentiment by which, as Seneca, in his usual style of epigram, observes, "ipsam hostis sui victoriam vicit."

The sovereign good of Stilpo was expressed in one word, *ἀπάθεια*, a term which Seneca translates "*animus impatiens*," not without apologies for the employment of a term which in his days, as well as in our own, seems to have obtained a signification the exact reverse of this philosophic use of it. (Ep. ix.) He distinguishes between this rigorous tenet and the more reasonable doctrine of the Stoics; "Noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne,

LECT.
II.

sed sentit; illorum, ne sentit quidem." (*Ib.*) This is the very principle which Cicero ascribes to the Pyrrhonic sect: "Pyrrho autem, ne sentire quidem sapientem; quæ Ἀπύθεια nominatur" (*Qu. Acad.* II. 42): a strong proof, as I have before intimated, of the connexion of these philosophic schools through the medium of their respective masters.

This Ethical theory harmonizes with the Eleatic metaphysics.

We have seen the Eleatic principle of Absolute Unity in its metaphysical and dialectical aspects; we must now spare a moment to contemplate it in its *moral* attitude, in which it will be found not less influential in itself or instructive in its manifestations.

Moral aspect of the doctrine of "Absolute Sameness."

The principle professes to merge all individuality in absolute sameness. We may expect, at first sight, to find this doctrine not less active in the world of life than in that of inanimate nature or abstract conception. If, then, the reasoner who habitually dwells upon the oneness of the universe, come to apply his views to the properties of separate minds; and if his philosophic loyalty can stand the test of carrying out his principle in the very citadel of individuality, the personal consciousness; he must, to establish his point (which, if not absolute, is nothing), undertake to break down the barriers which nature seems to have erected between man and man. Now, if we adhere to the world of consciousness, this enterprise is impossible. No effort of ingenuity can invalidate the conviction with which each individual pronounces himself to be himself alone, and not another. But, by this time, you can readily conjecture that the Megaric was not to be embarrassed by a difficulty of this nature. He could demur to the evidence itself of consciousness; not indeed by denying that the witness makes the affirmation, but by refusing to allow the witness's competency. He could declare that the internal sense was as worthless as the external in the search of eternal truth; and that if the laws and principles of morals are to be based upon a scientific foundation, they must be fixed, not on the yielding sands of consciousness (itself, as Heraclitus had so often shown, never for two instants the same), but upon the impregnable rock of Reason. The philosopher will, therefore, *morally* as metaphysically, labour to forget himself in the universe. He will obliterate the illusive conviction of individuality by making himself, as far as possible, a petty element in a general plan; and regard life, as well as nature, as the necessary servant of unalterable fate. But if thus it be wisdom to show no will but the will of the universe, it must be wisdom to efface every principle which can urge the will; and this without exception; for while by perfect

neutrality the man leaves himself to the disposal of the governing whole, by the exertion of any affection or desire, no matter how popularly virtuous, he advances himself beyond the level of his place in the machine, and presumes to establish a separate interest in the world. It thus appears (if I am not mistaken in this attempt to penetrate his views) that Stilpo might, by a resolute adherence to his metaphysical principle, have arrived at that *ἀπάθεια* which has so much perplexed the historians of ancient philosophy: nor can we be surprised to find, that, when from these cloudy heights of speculation the philosopher descended into common life, and transferred the theories of the pure reason into the sphere of sense, he would be likely to display what Pliny calls "*rigorem quendam, torvitatemque naturæ duram et inflexibilem.*" From this result it would seem that Stilpo himself was preserved, either by felicity of natural constitution, or by realizing that absolute indifferentism which is the directest practical form of his theory; or perhaps by that still more common solution of such difficulties to theorists of every class, a convenient oblivion of his whole array of irresistible truths when they threatened the smallest interference with his actual comfort.

In our day, under the modifying influence of Christian-
ity, and from other coincident causes, the moral and religious aspect (for it professes a religious aspect) of the system of Absolute Unity is very different. By the German apostles of the system advantage has been taken of these tendencies to the Infinite which seem to reveal themselves in every human breast, to cast round this imposing theory of the universe a garb of poetry and enthusiasm, which a severe critic has too justly designated "the mysticism of Atheism." That by a special intellectual appreciation that Absolute Essence which is no other than God can itself be contemplated, would seem calculated to elevate the soul to the loftiest apprehensions of itself and of nature, were it not that the Object thus discovered is left without attribute, almost without positive being; and a chilling silence observed as to the certainty or authority of all beneath this ultimate abstraction. Every aspiration after the infinite which can animate the heart of man is easily enlisted on behalf of a system which occupies ground so lofty, which does not *ascend* to the infinite, but supposes it attained, and thence at leisure surveys the universe: science, religion, and art—the true, the good, the beautiful—seem to swell to new amplitude, and rise to new dignity, when harmonized together as the necessary developments of that Absolute, which is one with the reason

*Modern
pantheism
unlike the
ancient in
this respect,
that it is
assisted
by enthusiasm
and
diff-*

LECT.
II.

and the reason with it; and it is not even difficult to conceive, that the more mysterious doctrines of revelation may be ingloriously made to appear the subordinate consequences of the vast conception. But with all this, the problem (which is no other than to reconcile the finite and the infinite, simply—to explain the mystery of *creation*) remains too certainly unsolved; and the votary of the absolute, cheated out of his God, receives nothing in return but a vast and impracticable abstraction.

I have spoken of these modifications of the Unitary system (the modern German and the ancient Grecian) in *connexion*, because they seem to have both arisen under a form very similar. They both seem to have been in their original essentially *logical* systems; systems, that is, purposing to show how the reason of man must necessarily contemplate the world to contemplate it at all; and afterwards to have assumed the form of direct *physical* discoveries. In this point of view, the system—erroneous even as an abstract scheme—becomes puerile and fantastic. Yet this metaphysical hypothesis of Schelling is actually styled the "*Philosophy of Nature*," and the student of the patient school of Baconian induction would start to see with what easy deliberation a teacher, perhaps the most popular and distinguished philosophical master of the 19th century, addresses himself to the task of constructing an *a priori* universe. Of course, the universe thus discovered coincides accurately with the universe of reality; and the illustrious professor felicitates himself for demonstrating that to exist which he has seen around him since his birth.

But even as a merely logical explication of the universe, I cannot think the system of "Absolute Unity" satisfactory. It is true that any multitude may be arbitrarily regarded under the category of unity; the whole reality of things, the effect and its Almighty Cause, *may* be contemplated as One: but the essential discrepancies of things are not neutralized by this logical amalgamation, nor can any sound mind accord to that fallacious unity which, in spite of irreconcilable discordance, identifies subject and object, cause and effect, finite and infinite! We may, if we please, term the finite a "manifestation" of the infinite, or an emanation, or an aspect: the true difficulty, the transit from the infinite to the finite,—the revelation of the Incomprehensible in a world determinate in time and space—is not one degree alleviated though we invented ten thousand titles for the process, and called upon every language of the globe to supply its contribution to our terminology. God and the universe exist: it is as impossible to identify the terms as it is to efface either!

You will not be astonished to find that Stilpo (along with the rest of the succession) was not remarkable for any cordial sympathy with the popular polytheism. With all its faults, the system of the "Unity of All" was at least calculated to raise the conceptions above the deified profligates of Olympus; and Stilpo, for some irreverences about the Minerva of Phidias, was cited before the Areopagus, and banished from Athens. "Ask me—" he whispered to Crates, who made some unseasonable inquiries about the proper mode of honouring these marble deities—"ask me, thou foolish man, when we are alone, and I'll tell you!" Euclides himself was famous for a reply still more evasive. He had been asked by some intrusive inquirer, how the Gods existed, and what were their tastes:—"One thing is quite certain," replied the sage coldly—"they have a thorough dislike for curious questioners!"

LECT.
II.*Contempt of
the Megarics
for the popular religion.*

We here abandon the Megaric school, but its principles, especially its moral principle, we shall recognize, in forms more or less determinate, on future occasions. At our next meeting we shall find it, little changed, among the precepts of Antisthenes, the founder of the famous sect of the Cynics. On that occasion I will endeavour to throw some light on the Cynic and Cyrenaic institutes of human life,—a subject of vast practical interest; the more popular character of which may make some amends for the unavoidable abstruseness of the disquisitions of this day; disquisitions which the poverty of original materials (amounting altogether to six or seven fragmentary notices), the absence of assistance from preceding inquirers, and the remoteness from ordinary conceptions of the fundamental theory which I have endeavoured to make the key of the entire,—have combined to render equally laborious to the investigator and (I fear) exhausting to the attention of minds not habitually exercised in these arduous speculations.

LECTURE III.

ELIAC OR ERETRIAC, CYNIC AND CYRENAIC SCHOOLS.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
III.

*Eliac or
Eretriac
School*

*founded by
Phædo,*

BEFORE proceeding to the subject announced for this day, I ought to take a brief and transient notice of the school known by the title of the Eliac, and afterwards (from its most distinguished master, who was a native of Eretria in Eubœa) the Eretriac school. This sect, which, though in its founder Phædo originally Socratic, was in its second founder Menedemus impressed with the stamp of Megaric opinions, differs so slightly from the school so largely illustrated at our last meeting, as to require little separate notice. Of Phædo, whose name has been familiarized to every ear by the celebrated dialogue of Plato, we know as a philosopher very little. It is said that to Socrates, who ever professed to regard the symmetry of body as mysteriously connected with harmony of soul, and who had been attracted by the appearance of Phædo in the midst of misery and want, he was indebted for release from a state of disgraceful servitude; and it is probable that the pupil's grateful fidelity was contented with extending the doctrines and reputation of a master so beloved.

*re-founded
by Menede-
mus, who
flor. about
n.c. 269.*

In Menedemus, however, who studied under Stilpo, the Megaric infusion becomes strongly perceptible. When I have informed you that Menedemus is related to have held that virtue is one and undiversified, all apparent differences being only differences of name¹; that the Supreme Good is itself one and unchangeable; and that if not the total suppression, yet at least the absolute government of desire, was the great element of human excellence, you will recognize these opinions as a reiteration of speculations already recorded and analyzed. One element in the opinions popular at Eretria is preserved by Cicero (*Acad. Qu.* II. 42). He tells us that to these philosophers "omne bonum in mente positum, et mentis acie, qua verum cer-

¹ [Plutarch *de virtute moral.* 2 p. 802 Wytténb. Μενέδημος μὲν ὁ ἐξ Ἐρετρίας ἀνὴρ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς, ὡς μίαν οὐσιν καὶ χρωμένῃς πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ βροτὸν καὶ ἀνθρώπον. ED.]

neretur*:" a doctrine which (if I can venture to interpret a brief and obscure sentence) would seem to make the perception of truth the highest good of man, or to identify in one truth and goodness, as different aspects of the same original essence. This would appear to betray a Platonic², as well as Megaric, influence; or perhaps a remaining tinge from the old Socratic sources. With his master Stilpo, the Eretrian teacher rejected all but identical propositions; and instituted dialectic warfare against all composite and negative assertions³. Of his opinions not much more has been rescued from the wreck of time, if we except the important practical maxim (not uncelebrated in antiquity), that a philosopher ought to get married⁴.

When we were engaged in considering the philosophy of Socrates, we saw that that great teacher had placed, as a corner-stone of practical morality, the proposition that virtue and happiness were inseparably united. Two auditors heard the maxim, but they left their instructor with opposite conclusions. The one held that virtue was happiness, the other contended that happiness was virtue; and both urged their respective opinions to an extravagant length. These auditors were the founders of the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools. Perpetually opposed to each other by the ordinary historians of philosophy, these schools are made to represent two irreconcilable tendencies of human nature. It will be my endeavour to carry the principle of harmony into even this opposition; and to discover, in the origination of these contrasted institutes of human life, the workings of a common motive and the effort for a common object. The aspiration after independence is the principle that equally interprets both.

The Cynics and Cyrenaics.

Their moral theories, seemingly opposed, have their root in the same principle, viz. the desire of independence.

Antecedently to the exercise of reflection, Man, suspecting no disparity between himself and his circumstances, submits to his position in the world, and instinctively imitates surrounding example. Encompassed by slaves he never dreams that he was born for freedom. More familiar with his own position than with any other body of facts familiarity produces its usual effect; con-

Development of this idea.

* Compare Plat. *Phileb.*

² [The doctrine is Socratico-Megaric rather than Platonic. It is combated in the *Philebus*, probably as the opinion of Euclides. (οὐδὲτερον αὐτοῖν (sc. ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως) ἐστὶ τὰγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἕτερον μὲν τούτων, ἀμεινον δὲ ἀμφοῖν, p. 20 B.) Diogenes Laertius informs us (II. 17, 134) that "Menædemus thought scorn of Plato and his followers, and also of the Cyrenaics, Stilpo being the only teacher he really admired." Cicero (*Acad. Pr.* II. 42) identifies the Eretrians and Megarics, significantly adding, "Illos contemnimus et jam abjectos putamus." ED.]

³ [These paradoxes are stated at length in Simplicius *Phys.* 19 b fol. Compare Prantl, *Gesch. d. Logik.* B. I. Abschnitt II. ED.]

⁴ [Diog. Laert. d. II. § 128. ED.]

stancy is confounded with absolute necessity; what is and has been seems to explain itself by its existence; and the wonder which he daily sees he forgets to be wonderful. But with reflection, however raised, comes restlessness and dissatisfaction. He is set at variance with the scene around him. He finds himself in the midst of a world of perpetual mutability; yet he aspires after fitness, certainty, repose. If, then, he be (through the mysterious dispensations of Providence) as yet untaught (except in the inefficacious form of a purely speculative tenet) to seek that high repose in resting upon what even the contemptuous Tacitus could find as an element of practical influence in the Deity of the *Few* alone—*Summum illud et æternum, neque mutabile neque interitum*⁵—it is manifest that the first office of self-questioning reflection must be, to attempt the arrangement of this matter between the world and the unquiet Being placed amidst it. The problem is simply no other than this,—to conciliate the demands of the mind, irresistibly forming to itself an ideal state of perfect fitness and harmony, with the actual circumstances of man in a world of apparent confusion. When the solution of a future state in which this great reconciliation may be effected, is presented to the mind, the difficulty is of course so alleviated as almost to vanish; and the corresponding intimations which Revelation contains with respect to the positive uses of the present state in the furtherance of a general scheme of progressive perfection, leave (in a practical point of view) scarcely anything to be reasonably desired on the question. But to speculators from whom this harmonizing truth was hidden, or by whom it was entertained only as a faint and shadowy possibility, reflection was restricted to the original elements of the calculation, and the dispute between Man and his Circumstances remained without mediator or umpire. Confined within the present world, man must prepare to meet his stubborn foe; nor will his enemy allow him choice either of ground or of weapons. The prize of the contest—the ultimate point of all earthly wisdom—assumes obviously this form, the achievement of such a conquest over the uncertainty of fortune as may amount to a total independence of all its possible caprices. And I need not remark, that as far as the anticipation of futurity can affect the happiness of the present, this still remains, as much as ever, the true form of the aim of all genuine

⁵ [Tac. *Hist.* v. c. 5. For *mutabile*, *imitabile* is now read, and rightly. Tacitus does not “find an element of practical influence” in this, beyond its incompatibility with image-worship, and it is hard to say whether he regards this as an advantage or the reverse. Ed.]

earthly prudence. The celestial element which Revelation has introduced into the estimate (powerfully influencing as it does, through the agency of faith, and hope, and fear, the state of present happiness) of course must enter into every rational computation of the sovereign good of even merely temporal life; but it does not alter the principles of the computation themselves. It has thrown a mighty counterpoise into the scales, and it has contributed to enlighten the Reason that holds them; but they are the same scales which the same Reason held two thousand years ago. Prudence is still prudence, and nothing else; the love of personal happiness still unaltered, however the materials of calculation may vary.

The problem, then, being the attainment of unalterable repose in the midst of change, our first analysis exhibits it—now as ever—as resolvable in two possible forms. The mind becomes independent of nature by a change effected in either the mind or nature: in the mind by suppressing all its desires, or in nature, by compelling it to gratify them. This is the most general form of the difference between the ascetic and licentious systems of human life; and between Antisthenes and Aristippus as their respective representatives. Proceeding from abstract supposition to the theory as modified by the actual relation and character of the two terms, we perceive of the ascetic system, that its course is simple and absolute; it presents vast difficulties indeed in practice, but no direct contradiction in its theory. But the case is different as regards the opposite institute; and on the nature of the difference depends the solution of the character of Aristippus. It is obvious that the proposal is hopeless to compel nature to satisfy all human desires; and we may presume that no intellect, however perverted by its extravagant wishes, could seriously advance this as a practicable code of happiness for man. Some modification, then, must be introduced; and in the adoption of this modification lies the peculiarity of Aristippus as a teacher of Hedonism. The enjoyment of pleasure is the business of man; the attainment of all conceivable pleasure is impossible; nor can humanity expect to summon, at its call, all the aggregated treasures of every time and every space, which yet alone could duly answer the conditions of such a problem. In this point, therefore, nature is manifestly too strong for man; yet our problem is to subdue nature to his desires. The proper solution will be found in neglecting this unattainable height in theory, without resigning any of its practical advantages. For though a single moment of time and a single portion of space are all which, by the very constitu-

The Hedonism of Aristippus described.

LECT.
III.

'tion of his being, is granted to man; and though into that moment of time and point of space cannot be compressed more than the eternal laws of things will permit;—yet, if such a temper of mind be generated as will snatch from each place and instant the utmost amount of pleasure that it yields, without counteracting the intensity of the emotion by reference to any other possible varieties of past or future position; the subjection of circumstances to the sovereignty of mind—the philosophic independence of change—will have been effected sufficiently to save the principle. This I consider to have probably been the ultimate form of the Aristippean reasoning. The maxim that the philosopher who commands all enjoyment is commanded by none; the *ἔχω ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχομαι* of his own apophthegm^o; the “*mihi res non me rebus subjungere*” of Horace; are subordinate exhibitions, or easy results, of the foregoing train of speculation.

Having thus endeavoured to illustrate these systems by exhibiting them as contrasted solutions of a common problem, I will notice a few further analogies, before proceeding to a more detailed examination of each.

doctrines.
1. Both
are distortions
of
genuine
Socratic
teaching.

1. That they were both fostered by the teaching of Socrates, is an historical fact and an internal probability. In the discourses of Socrates a very slight examination shows us elements which the spirit of system might naturally be expected to detach from their subordination, and erect into ultimate principles of action. His earnest confidence in the eventual happiness of virtue might easily be misconstrued into a representation that virtue was only of value as it insured it; from which the transition was almost imperceptible into the assertion, that all which produced real happiness was therefore virtue. In this stage of the deduction we find ourselves with the more mature school of Epicurus; but the earlier preachers of the maxim aspired to higher attainments than their successors. Happiness, not virtue, being once made the object in the foreground, it was felt necessary to confer that stability upon happiness which the advocates of virtue had ever claimed for their first principle. Despising as unworthy of the science of morals, if indeed this ever occurred to them, the evasions and compensations which Epicurus subsequently employed to shelter his feeble fabric of human happiness, by helping the present from the hopes of the future and the recollections of the past;—the Cyrenaics found the certainty and stability of happiness in confining it to the immediate instant of its enjoyment. Thus, not to urge the deduction farther, in this form of their theory you can without diffi-

^o [Diog. Laert. II. 8, 75. Ed.]

culty recognize the double distortion of Socratic principles; the attribution of happiness to virtue lost in the attribution of virtue to happiness, and the demand for the stability of the first principle of morals caricatured by the pretended certainty of all momentary pleasure for the moment of its possession.

Not less manifest is the Socratic influence in the Cynical school; as indeed Greece plainly recognized when it styled Diogenes of Sinope *Σωκράτης μαινόμενος**. When Socrates affirmed (as Xenophon reports him, *Memor.* i. 6), *τὸ μὲν μηδενος δέισθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυάτω τοῦ θείου*,—and when, in conformity with such a principle, he exhibited a constant though temperate hostility to the luxurious habits of his age, you can at once discern the side of his manifold intellect which attracted Antisthenes to his conversations, and the habit of life which that stern moralist parodied in the club and wallet of the mendicant.

2. The next point of analogy between these opposite systems is in their common disdain of all scientific inquiry, except in strict subservience to the explanation of their respective systems of moral life. I need not remind you that in this particular they are the types of the adopters of *extreme* views of human life, whether ascetic or licentious, in every age of the world†. But until it shall have been proved that the highest glory of man is not to know and commune with his Creator, and that that knowledge and communion is not facilitated by the knowledge of his works; the cause of science will have little reason to tremble at the arguments, however it may dread the influence of its opponents. It is a singular fact, however, that a vast number of philosophical works are ascribed to Antisthenes by Laertius, who gives us a catalogue of their titles, occupying some pages. It is not improbable that these performances were written previously to their author's adoption of his severer maxims‡. We know that he arrived at

2. The speculative element is by both Cynics and Cyrenaics subordinated to the moral.

* The Cynic founder himself professed that the life of strenuous virtue required a mental firmness which he styled "the Socratic force."

† The opposition of the advocate of mere enjoyment appeals too little to reason to deserve much notice; the antipathy of the votary of self-denial acquires some show of respectability from its motive. We know how common is that short-sighted jealousy which would dissociate the connexion between knowledge physical or abstract and the interests of a pure and high morality.

‡ [This is certainly not true of *all* the dialogues of Antisthenes. (See Diog. Laert. vi. 92, §§ 1, 2. *ὅτι ὁ πόρος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Ἱρακλέους, κ.τ.λ.*) Antisthenes survived Socrates more than thirty years, and seems during that time to have waged a brisk war with Plato and the Academy. He is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus as still alive in the archonship of Cephisodorus (B.C. 365). Aristotle came to Athens B.C. 367, and probably knew Antisthenes, for his notices of the Cynics and their master savour of strong personal dislike. Ed.]

LECT.
III.

the school of Socrates already advanced in life⁸; and doubtless had occupied his earlier days among the disputations of the sophists, of one of whom (Gorgias) he had been the recognized pupil.

3. Both are succeeded by more moderate schools, the Cynics by the Stoics, the Cyrenaics by the Epicureans.

3. Another characteristic in which the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools are united is very remarkable. From each of these sects proceeded successors who inherited their mutual hostility, under the well-known titles of the Stoic and Epicurean schools; but, contrary to the usual progress of philosophic opinions, the principles of the subsequent were less unqualified than those of the anterior teachers. In each case moderation was the result of enlarged experience. The same perpetual attenuation of the more startling peculiarities of the system is observable (as far as we can see) in the whole progress of the Stoical philosophy. In a brief attempt to sketch the principal laws that regulate the progress of opinions, on a former occasion, I believe I noted this double effect of the conflict of principles,—the mutual exaggeration and the mutual diminution. It is not much for the honour of human candour, that the latter should be, as here, the more unusual result.

4. The principles of both led to a contempt of life.

4. The only remaining coincidence which I think it now necessary to notice, between these opposing theories of life, is the important fact, that they both seem to have at length terminated in countenancing an absolute indifference to life itself. That this result should meet us among the maxims of Cynicism will probably not surprise you; that it should accost us—a grisly phantom—among the bowers of the Cyrenaic voluptuary, may perplex you, as it has perplexed the majority of the compilers of the history of philosophy. I trust, before the close of this lecture, to evince it to be the natural consequence of predisposing causes. I know no more instructive fact, indeed, than this—that both the special systems of moral philosophy most celebrated in antiquity seem, whether directly or indirectly, to have furnished their disciples with reasons for the justification of suicide. Is it not a tacit avowal of their universal failure in their universal object? The improvement of human life to its highest value, and the attainment of perfect happiness, were the common object of both; death, the gloomy refuge of despair, discovers itself among the maxims, or the suggestions, or the inferences, of both!

Cynical philosophy viewed in detail.

We have regarded these systems, Cynic and Cyrenaic, in their common origin, and detected those resemblances in the midst of opposition which a common origin and object

⁸ [The *ὀψιμότης* of Antisthenes must have been exaggerated. He was but 70 at his death, which occurred, as just stated, after B.C. 365. He was therefore not more than 35 when Socrates died. Ed.]

invariably produce. We must now proceed to contemplate them more distinctly. Virtue, even in her travesty, claims precedence over unblushing vice; and our first inquiry shall apply to the philosophy of the Cynics.

With the personal history of the masters of Philosophy farther than it is necessary to explain the complexion of their teaching, it has not been my practice to engage you. Of the champions of the Cynic life we know little more than the occasional references of contemptuous antiquity betray. Antisthenes was of humble origin; the father of Diogenes had been banished for forgery. To men who entered life under auspices so unpropitious, a levelling and rigorous philosophy would be naturally acceptable. The reader of almost any of the lighter fragments of ancient times will not require to be reminded of the peculiarities of Diogenes; but a more judicious curiosity will extend to the state of society in which such a character could obtain immediate and universal notoriety. Historical scepticism has long learned to doubt the story of his *Tub*; an elaborate dissertation has, indeed, been written to prove it the mere fable of subsequent inventors (*Heumanni de Dol. Habit. Diog. Diss.*); but the man is more wondrous than his dwelling, and his moral far more extraordinary than his physical position. It was assuredly no ordinary race of mankind among whom such a teacher could obtain eminence; and it is still the triumph of virtue, that even in her worst exaggerations she can command reluctant awe. The title of "Cynic" was a subject of dispute among even ancient etymologists. Some derived it from the scene of the master's teaching, the Cynosarges—a gymnasium near the temple of that Hercules whom he loved to cite as the representative of moral heroism and physical endurance. Many degraded it to an insulting allusion; but I find Sextus Empiricus happily softens this comparison to a compliment: "The Cynics," he declares, "rejoiced in the title of an animal celebrated as just, tenacious, grateful, spirited, and a terror to plunderers." To the latest period of heathen philosophy the sect seems to have maintained its scattered existence; but when its best and loftiest principles had been incorporated in the Stoical philosophy—"a Cynicis tunica"¹⁰ distantia—it naturally tended to extravagance in order to maintain its distinctness, and seems

The personal character of Antisthenes and Diogenes explained by their history.

⁹ [The accident of the locality probably suggested the characteristic name. Somewhat similar is the instance of the Dominicans, who were called, or called themselves, *Domini canes*. *ὁ κῶων* was a common substitute for *ὁ κυνικός* in writing of any of the Cynics, early or late. Inattention to this usage led Dr Whewell into a droll misapprehension of the meaning of Athenæus vii. 16, in his paraphrase of the *Gorgias*. (*Platonic Dialogues*, II. p. 221.) Ed.]

¹⁰ [Which the Stoics wore, but the Cynics dispensed with. Ed.]

LECT.
III.

to have become to the Pagan world of contemplation pretty much what the mendicant orders were to the Christianity of the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries. I ought to premise that our knowledge of the Cynic habits is mainly derived from later writers,—such as Laertius, Arrian, and Maximus Tyrius. Few as are the positive records they contain, the value of even such notices is necessarily lessened by the remoteness of the authority. You will then excuse me, if I seem to advance with a less assured tread in endeavouring the task of reducing these relics into system.

*Cynical
idea of the
Life ac-
cording to
Nature.*

*Their con-
ceptions of
virtue.*

*Indelicacy
of the
Cynics.*

*Remarks
on the
Cynical
morality.
Asceticism
fosters the
growth of
pride.*

We saw that the aim of the Founder of Cynicism was the establishment of man's total independence of nature; and that the means proposed consisted in the absolute suppression of the affections. The "Life according to Nature," a phrase which in other systems assumed a higher and better import, seems in the Cynic to have signified little more than a life independent of all the appliances of art. In the perfect votary of naked Cynicism the amputation of affection should be unqualified. Even the domestic impulses, and the ties of patriotism, we seem to perceive noticed with brief and harsh frigidity in the relics of the discourse of Antisthenes. The moral liberty which the annihilation of the passions was to ensure was declared to be the supreme good; this was virtue, and virtue brought happiness—the only happiness the sage could value. Laertius expressly records the maxim, τέλος τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν: and attributes to the Cynic legislator that principle which afterwards made so distinguished a figure in Stoicism, that all between perfect virtue and vice were indifferent (ἀδιάφορα). To such a degree did this enthusiasm for independence urge the Cynics, that, if we may believe many of their ancient assailants, it led, not merely to a superiority to ordinary business, but to a wilful exhibition of contempt for ordinary decency. It is in this view that Cicero speaks of the sect in a passage in his Offices—"Cynicorum natio tota ejicienda est. Est enim inimica verecundia, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum." B. I. 41.

Now the first remark which occurs in reference to a system based on the aspiration after total independence through suppression of desire, is this; that, in attempting the annihilation of all other vices, it inevitably tends to aggravate to portentous magnitude the vice of pride. In fact, the system amounts to little else than a sacrifice of all the rest of human nature on the altar of this single passion. It is like that stoppage of the natural transpiration in the animal frame, which only increases and exacerbates the other discharges. The truth is, that in such a system,

whatever may be its pomp of profession, virtue is only nominally the cardinal idea ; it is not cultivated for its own sake, but as the minister to another and more prevailing motive; and the Cynic (in this respect too closely copied by the Stoic of after times) thought much less of pleasing the Deity than of being his equal.

The next observation upon this system regards the Cynic conception of virtue itself. Virtue being mainly regarded as the means of liberation from the tyranny of those desires which are themselves the dependent slaves of circumstance, was considered to consist wholly in the subjugation of desire. As this rigorous rule extended to all the varieties of affection, it demanded (especially in those whose nature was not indurated by age and disappointment) a series of continued sacrifices; and accordingly by the Cynic no virtue seemed to be recognized of which the essence was not stern *self-sacrifice*. But this is an error, though even to this day a common error. Self-sacrifice, though a valuable test of the force of the virtuous principle, is not itself a necessary accompaniment of virtuous acts. *Cynical virtue consists solely in the subjugation of the desires and affections, that is to say, in apparent self-sacrifice.* Virtue consists in conformity to a rule. This conformity, partly through original frailty, partly through the aggravation of evil habit, can, in many cases, only by man be attained with more or less of self-denial: and in such cases the desert of virtue is unquestionably increased in proportion to the self-denial undergone in order to effect the conformity. But so far is sacrifice from being of the necessary essence of virtue, that the perfection of virtue consists in that state which habit has made it a sacrifice to abandon,—a state therefore in which, if self-subjection were of the essence of virtue, vice should obtain its honours; while on the other hand, years of self-sacrifice are endured by the slaves of ambition and avarice to realize their distant and prospective objects;—cases which plainly show that endurance of pain for a purpose beyond it is only incidentally connected with virtue. It proves the strength of the virtuous principle by trial; it heightens it by exercise; but it does not constitute it. *Defects of the principle pointed out.*

This error in the Cynical theory led to consequences similar to those which it has produced in all ages where it has been a prevalent practical principle. The endurance of suffering, valuable only as a means, was insensibly exalted into an end. Pain, which in itself has no moral character whatever, was identified with virtue; and physical misery made the necessary condition of moral happiness. By this perversion the virtues themselves were transformed into their opposites. Resignation, which, when founded on a high and holy principle, is nearly the loveliest form of *Consequences of its adoption.* *Identification of Pain with Virtue.*

LECT.
III.

human virtue, was hardened and embittered into frigid arrogance; and the fortitude that could despise the pomp of kings was itself the abject courtier of public notoriety.

Into the fundamental error involved in the whole principle of the absolute suppression of the affections, as themselves contradictory to reason, I prefer to postpone entering, until we shall have an opportunity of canvassing the theory in its maturer form, in the philosophy of Stoicism.

The influence of the Cynics was limited.

These Cynic parodists of virtue do not appear to have ever attained much real influence over the public mind. Their celebrity, like that of the earlier Christian ascetics, was chiefly confined to the more unlettered classes¹¹, who, unaccustomed to disentangle the complexity of the human heart, assumed that man can have but one motive for voluntary austerity, and that the highest of all. The very extravagance of their tenets attracted those who were not habituated to minute distinction; who want time, or inclination, or opportunity, or natural faculty, to close with subtle truth; and with whom therefore a teacher, to be popular, must forget his precision of outline and delicacy of shading, assuming a style that bears much the same relation to the accurate form of philosophical inquiry as scene-painting bears to miniature. Such disciples have no memory for limitations or exceptions. The Cynics accordingly abounded in those unqualified maxims in which much truth keeps much error afloat. 'Ο σοφὸς ἀναμάρτητος, "the sage is sinless!" *Μακρίν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν*, "I had rather taste insanity itself than pleasure!" *Τῶν μαθημάτων ἀναγκαιότατον, τὰ κακὰ ἀπομαθεῖν*; a truth certainly, but indicative of the coldly *negative* character of the Cynic teaching. "He that will be my pupil," said Antisthenes, in the same spirit, "must bring a new book, a new pen, and a new tablet." The enemies of cultivation, they became in each successive age more and more the objects of literary ridicule; nor need I remind you of the *Mordax Cynicus* of Horace, or of the unsparing satire—the Menippuses and Cyniscuses—of Lucian.

Cynical paradoxes. (Ding. Laert. vi. c. 1.)

Logic of the Cynics characterized.

I have not detained you with any consideration of the *logical* views of the early Cynics¹². They were either sub-

¹¹ [So Aristotle seems to say, *Metaph.* VII. 3, 7, where he speaks of Antisthenes and his admirers as uneducated, ἀπαιδευτοί. This however is said in reference to their logical tenets. ED.]

¹² [The logic of the Cynics was of the Eristic kind, like that of the Megarics, which it resembled in its general physiognomy, though the results to which it led were in some respects different. Antisthenes seems to have denied the truth of all propositions that were not identical, *Arist. Met.* IV. 29, and therefore the possibility of definitions, *Ib.* VII. 3. These sophisms he may have learnt from Gorgias, his first master. His abhorrence of the Platonic ideas seems to have betrayed him into a rude form of materialism.

servient to the declared hostility of the sect against all its contemporaries (such as Antisthenes's attacks on the ideas of Plato), or the perpetuation of the tenets of earlier schools, or doctrines intended as objections to the value or validity of all speculative science whatever. One principle, attributed by Cicero to Antisthenes, it is but justice to record as some counterpoise to the severity of my past criticisms. In it we seem to discover the sentiments of Socrates professed with the courage of the Cynic; if, indeed, the opinion (which appeared in one of his *written* treatises) was not rather due to the elder philosopher of unity. "Antisthenes, in eo libro qui physicus inscribitur, populares deos multos, *naturalem unum esse* dicens, tollit vim et naturam deorum." (*De Nat. D.* I. 13, 32.)

We must now change the scene, and instead of the harsh and unwelcome dictates of the Cynic school attempt to unravel the softer logic of Cyrene. With that city, one of the most beautiful of antiquity, this school is connected throughout its entire development. Whether we class its teachers as one continued succession, or rather (with some historians) arrange them in two nearly synchronizing successions, of whom Aristippus the elder, his sister or daughter Arête, the younger Aristippus the son of Arête, and Theodorus Atheus, form the first,—Antipater, Hege-

*The
Cyrenaics.*

He denied the existence of qualities, saying, "A man I can see, but I never saw the thing you call humanity." "True! your body has eyes, but your mind has none," was the retort. (Schol. Aristot. Brandis, pp. 66, 68; Tzet. *Chil.* VII. 606.) Many covert allusions to Antisthenes exist in the Platonic Dialogues, and have been pointed out by Schleiermacher and others, especially Winckelmann (*Antisthenis Fragmenta*, p. 35, note). To the list he gives ought possibly to be added *Sophista*, p. 246, a passage alluded to in a note on the last Lecture. In the War of the Giants there described the "gods" represent the Megarics, the εἰδῶν φῶλοι. Their earthborn opponents have puzzled commentators, who speak, some of Democritus, others of Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. The foregoing anecdote and the materialism it implies, incline me to suppose that Antisthenes may be meant. The fierceness attributed to the anti-idealists agrees best with the Cynic character; and the strong terms in which their materialism is described assort ill with the more refined theories of Democritus and Aristippus. Δρύς καὶ πέτραι (trees and rocks) are but indifferent synonyms for the "atoms and void" of the one, or for the ἐμπειρικόν τοῦ πάθους (the unknown somewhat, or quasi-somewhat, which produces sensation) of the other.

This speculative materialism found its counterpart in the ethical theory of Antisthenes, and if we may believe Xenophon, in his ethical practice also. See the speech of Antisthenes in the *Convivium*, IV. 38, from which we may derive the maxim, that vice is culpable in the inverse proportion to its grossness. An extravagant personal vanity was characteristic both of Antisthenes and of the obscene Diogenes: and it is impossible not to sympathize in the scorn with which the more high-minded Socratics looked upon these odious caricaturists of their master. The germs of Cynicism may indeed be detected in the teaching of Socrates as reported by Xenophon, but these theoretical errors were neutralized by his nobler nature. This topic is well handled by Zeller in his *History of Greek Philosophy*, § 15, p. 57; § 17, p. 117. Ed.]

LECT.
III.

sias, and Anniceris, the second; they seem to have all gathered round the luxurious capital of Cyrenaica. I have before endeavoured to show you how even this system sprang from the effort for a content beyond what nature ordinarily allows; how the motionless rigour of the Cynic, the active volatility of the Cyrenaic, are but two responses to the same question; I must now endeavour with brevity, but if possible with accuracy, to lead you through the path by which Aristippus appears to have gained his solution, avoiding those aspects of the system which I have already illustrated, and which I may trust to your recollection for still preserving.

Cynicism
in its specu-
la-
tive

the Cy-
nic sen-
sual-

Its con-
nexion with
Hedonism.

Every kind of *speculation*, I remarked already, was by both these sects employed as the mere instrument for establishing their respective ethical conclusions. That system of the human mind was, therefore, adopted by Aristippus, which would lead with the greatest directness to his practical philosophy. Though I have little doubt that this was the process by which the younger Aristippus (for to him the theoretic form of Cyrenaism is attributed¹⁹) modelled his philosophic views, it will, I believe, be most perspicuous to reverse his course of inquiry, and explain the theory in the synthetic form, deducing the ethical from the elementary physical principles. The author of the system, as we now have it, appears to have set out with the restriction of all human faculties to simple sensibility,—the power of receiving sensations; on which, as those of no two human individuals might be the same, no certainty of knowledge could possibly, he argued, be built. These phenomena of sensibility (“internæ permotiones,” Cicero calls them, *Acad. Qu.* II. 46) being the sole materials of knowledge, and thus the sole criteria of truth, all ethical rules must depend on the qualities of sensations. Now the qualities common to all sensations are pleasure and pain; pleasure and pain are, therefore, the only elements of moral calculation. Pleasure being the sole subjective good, all attribution of good, as anything separate from pleasure, can only

¹⁹ [Aristippus the elder, though the fact of his authorship is disputed (Diog. L. II. 8, 84), was undoubtedly the inventor of the Cyrenaic system. He must even have developed it in a logical and systematic form. The consistent theory of pleasure combated in the *Philebus* of Plato was certainly his; and there can be little doubt that the curious and very subtle psychological speculations criticized in the first half of the *Theætetus* were his also; however difficult it may be to distinguish them from the doctrines of Protagoras, from which, according to some accounts, they appear to have differed rather in phrase than in substance. I strongly suspect, however, that Sextus Empiricus, who gives the details of what he represents as Protagorean doctrine, drew largely from the *Theætetus*. This, however, is one of the numerous questions respecting the “Sophists” which we have no means of answering; but which ought to be answered before we can have the right to dogmatize on the merits or demerits of the teachers to whom that name has adhered. ED.]

regard those objects which are the means of pleasure, and which, by a natural licence of language, receive the title of that which they confer. Virtue, then, and every exercise of the affections (as friendship or patriotism) must fall under the sway of the universal formula; they are all to be sought or cultivated only with a view to the advantage of the possessor. And, as a certainty is essential to happiness, the sage will (according to the analysis I before produced) ensure his certainty in the immediacy of enjoyment, carefully rejecting all intrusive suggestions of past or future. Pleasure they constantly affirmed is *μονόχρονος*; and upheld that we reason inaccurately when we enlarge upon any universal notion of felicity, which in truth is only applicable to actual, individual, and instantaneous sensation. The Epicurean insisted upon pleasures of tranquillity,—the Cyrenaic despised this cold negation; the Epicurean pleaded for mental enjoyment as the great element of happiness, the impatient philosophy of Cyrene disgraced itself by an almost unequivocal preference for the claims of the body; the Epicurean would draw all the tender recollections of the past, all the bright anticipations of happiness to come into his treasury of existing felicity,—the Cyrenaic disdained a maxim which if it occasionally heightened pleasure might as often neutralize it by pain. But every sorrow that darkened the horizon of memory or expectation was as nothing to the practised Cyrenaic, who had trained his soul into the unparticipated idolatry of the present moment. This, perhaps, throws some light upon a sentiment which Cicero seems scarcely to have understood. He represents Aristippus (*Tusc. Quæst.* III. 13) as holding that no griefs were to be regarded but "*insperati dolores*." According to the representation which I have ventured to give of the Cyrenaic theory of pleasure and pain, these were precisely the only griefs which the genuine Hedonist would allow to exist. But when to the advocates of this system the obvious objection was proposed, that this account gave no solution of a very remarkable phenomenon which can scarcely be overlooked in any ethical estimate—the eternal sameness and independence of the rule of virtue; that rule acknowledged in all climes, under superficial, but with little or no substantial, varieties; that rule of which Antisthenes had so truly proclaimed, that "it governs the sage far more powerfully than the laws of his country can do;"—the answer of the Cyrenaic was that

Present enjoyment the only good according to the Cyrenaics,

who differ herein from the Epicureans.

Their answer to objections founded on the uniformity of moral rules.

¹⁴ [Cicero's words are, "Cyrenaici non omni malo ægritudinem efficiunt, sed insperato et nec opinato malo." Compare Lib. III. 22, and 31. Ed.]

LECT.
III.*The Cyrenaic system exemplified in the life of its founder.*

which has since been so often reiterated by those who clothe his principles in a less undisguised form—that the sameness of convenience produced a sameness in the means of ensuring it, and therefore an identity in the assumption of “virtue.” And if any more pertinacious antagonist objected, that by some mysterious contrariety to their own interest, men are found who wilfully maintain that even the highest certainty of physical pleasure and absolute impunity from avenging laws cannot justify a man in betraying his friend or assassinating his parent, the Cyrenaic escaped under vague references to the power of antiquity and prescription, and the veneration for all which is consecrated by custom and consent.

Of this degrading but seductive philosophy, Aristippus himself was the example as well as the teacher. Possessed, it would seem, of that constitutional gift of animal spirits which is so often mistaken for higher attainments in the art of philosophical or religious content, he resolutely pursued his maxim of extorting pleasure from every situation, and in every country gathering the fading flowers of enjoyment. We find him in Sicily the accomplished visitant of the court of Dionysius, at Corinth the acknowledged favourite of youth and beauty; but in every fragment of his discourse preserved from antiquity, we cannot fail to observe in the prosecution of his own art of pleasure, that total absence of refinement which proved that he was still ignorant of its most attractive forms. This is important to mention, because it was the direct result of the shape in which Aristippus adopted the general philosophy of Eudæmonism. To materialize pleasure, and to rob it of its associations in the past and future, was perhaps to be expected from the first advocate of the system; assuredly it proved that system to have not yet arrived at its most dangerous maturity.

General remarks. Tendency of materialism towards atheism.

The minuter varieties which the principles of Aristippus underwent in the course of their transmission from teacher to teacher, I am not now about to record. But there are one or two manifestations of their agency too instructive to be overlooked. And with a notice of these I shall close the subject.

1. The system of the school of Cyrene was a materialist system of psychology; and where a belief in Revelation has not interposed its extrinsic influence, it is undeniable that the materialist system has a strong tendency to speculative Atheism. I do not assert that it admits of no legitimate escape from this conclusion; I speak simply of the generation of a tendency to adopt it. To this result it seems to me that all philosophic history,

more particularly the history of the French philosophy of the last century, bears irresistible testimony. To the Theist the manifest existence and necessity of a designing Supreme Intelligence becomes a powerful argument for the possible, or probable, or certain, existence of a separate immaterial human mind; for he reflects, if matter cannot generate God to organize it into all its exquisite forms of design, why should it be deemed adequate to originate that thing from which alone we learn in the perception of design to conclude a God*? While on the other hand, as the materialist's only notion of intelligence in man (and thence his only notion of intelligence at all) is as a function of matter—one of the innumerable forms of material results—it is impossible that he can find any reason from analogy for admitting, or at all conceiving, intelligence distinct from matter. Consequently, as design inevitably infers intelligence, he escapes into a confused Spinozism, in which the primary matter of the universe is itself endowed with thought. The very notion of "design" in the materialist's view can signify no more than mental matter conceiving suitabilities; and accordingly beyond mental matter the argument from design is never likely to bring him. How these tendencies are increased by a system which destroys the distinctions of virtue and vice, and thus silences the promise which the conscience makes of a Supreme Judge, it is unnecessary to insist. The result in its completeness is presented in Theodorus of Cyrene, whose daring denial of a deity is perpetuated in the title, *Theodorus of Athens* (B.C. 310, about). *Theodorus of Athens*

2. To the development of Cyrenaism finally to be noticed, I have already promised to direct your attention.

That there is in even the wildest visions of earthly enjoyment a something mournfully brief and unsatisfactory, is a remark with which you are all of course familiar, and the truth of which, doubtless, you can all in many degrees attest. The remark itself is nearly as old as human experience, though under the empire of Christianity alone (for reasons not difficult to be apprehended) it has been brought out with a prominence commensurate to its importance. The same Divine Contriver, who has bestowed upon man

* If (from independent reasoning) we know that the First Cause cannot have been material, can we believe that which pronounces the necessity of a First Cause is itself a material product? If the conceiver of Order was separate from tangible matter, is the perceiver of Order the creature of matter? [Compare Shelley's *Adonais*].

"Nought we know dies; shall that alone which knows,
Be as a sword, consumed before the sheath
With sightless lightning?" ED.]

LECT. III. desires and affections with a view to their rational gratification in the maintenance of his temporal scheme, has yet taken care, by affixing to them all this melancholy character of felt insufficiency, to stamp them all as being, in their present exercise, the temporary machinery of a merely introductory stage of existence. To a mind habitually thoughtful, then, it may be expected that the very experience of pleasure will more or less constantly present this supplementary conviction; and, indeed, those who are conversant with one large class of the works of imagination at this day¹⁵ most popular in our literature, will not fail to have observed that their secret but pervading charm consists in the use of this sublime discontent as a means of interest and effect. These dangerous but fascinating productions attract, precisely because they administer to two opposite but coincident feelings—the love of pleasure and the conviction of its nothingness; and they are dangerous, because they accustom the mind to be contented with this imperfect development of the purpose of the emotion; to think that to deplore the deficiencies of earth is really to desire heaven; or that vaguely to long for that mysterious world to come, as the complement of earthly enjoyment, is truly to elevate the affections to “things above”!

Pleasure, then, tends to betray its own poverty, unless when the natural growth of satiety is prevented by variety or occupation. The possible consequences are twofold. The melancholy conviction must either cast the restless though wearied spirit upon the supposition of a future state, where its disquietude shall find peace (which is the legitimate lesson of the disappointed affections), or in default of the admission of this great reconciling fact—whether from mere despair of its possibility, or more deliberate disbelief—must darken into gloomy disgust with life, and impatience of its wretched remnant. The school of Cyrene fails not to furnish its example. In Hegesias, who from his doctrine was surnamed *πεισιθάνατος*, the philosophy of pleasure became a philosophy of suicide. Pleasures, according to this teacher, were the accidents of rarity or frequency; the pleasures of all classes were levelled to a degrading equality; they were indifferent, worthless, overbalanced by misfortune; and the sage, wearied with the unprofitable chase, would gladly seek the easy refuge of eternal rest. Suicide, like things of less moment, has in various ages of the world spread by the

*Hegesias,
the preacher
of suicide
(lived under
Ph'ladet-
phus).*

¹⁵ [This was written in or before 1840. In the margin stand the names of Byron, and the late Lord Lytton, to whose more recent productions the description in the text is quite inapplicable. EN.]

agion of fashion; and so powerful was the melancholy rhetoric of this advocate of the grave, that an Egyptian king was obliged to prohibit the publication of his discourses¹⁶. In that country of mysteries the gloomy orator might have found his own type; the shrouded skeleton of the Egyptian banquet might symbolize the sepulchral visions of Hegesias veiled—yet only lightly veiled—amidst the festive philosophy of Aristippus and his disciples.

LECT.
III.

¹⁶ [So Cicero *Tusc. Qu.* i. 34, 83, who adds, *ib.* 84: "Ejus autem...liber est 'Αποκατεργων, in quo a vita quidam decedens revocatur ab amicis: quibus respondens, vitæ humanæ enumerat incommoda." Ed.]

LECTURE IV.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. I.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
IV.

*The Platonic
Philosophy.*

*Subject ap-
proached.*

*The wide-
spread in-
fluence of
Plato's
writings
attests their
intrinsic
value.*

WE have traced the chief lineaments of those minor philosophies which engaged the Grecian world during the latter life and immediately after the death of Socrates. In reviewing them, marked as they are by strong characteristic differences, we have been, as it were, modulating through a diversity of keys in the human soul; but all these are only the prelude to the more solemn and profound harmony to follow. It is not without emotion that I arrive at that stage of our progress which brings me to the philosophy of Plato: a philosophy which, whether regarded in itself, or with reference to its influences upon the history of reflective man, rises before us in all the dignity of the mightiest and most permanent monument ever erected by unassisted human thought exercised upon the human destinies. It is true, that in the opinion of the multitude, this majestic structure can now be considered as little more than the ruin of ancient glory; the interest that still belongs to it is, in their mind, the interest that attends the decay of everything which bears the impress of former greatness, and that makes all for ever venerable which once was venerated. Even in this view the speculations of Plato would amply recompense the inquiry of every mind which has learned to find its Present in the Past; and which, seeing little in the world around it to engage or gratify, would gladly compose its favourite scenery of thought from the ideal excellences of a world that cannot return. But the claims of the Platonic philosophy far overpass this inferior ground. Its powerful influences in every age sufficiently demonstrate this. They prove that, whatever opinion we may justly form regarding the details of its reasoning, and however we may be disposed to criticize their legitimacy, there is, in the body of the system itself, a something which finds its echo in the heart, and its reflection in the reason, of universal man: and they suggest that even its errors, if they exist, are, from their peculiar complexion and character, likely to be better worth investigation than the truths of narrower the-

We may refuse assent to the express decisions of Master, we may often lament his wavering indecision in style, and his conclusions in which nothing seems concluded,—we may regret also that Imagination should flush with her rich and changeful hues those very regions which it is the declared purpose of the philosopher to present in the ethereal transparency of pure Reason; and, lost in the bewildering labyrinth of beauty, we may sometimes sigh for the cold exactness of Plato's great pupil and rival;—but in defiance of all our exceptions, objections, and perplexities, there is a spell in the page, and no man, worthy to read Plato, can read him, and not own himself in the presence of a mighty Interpreter of the human Soul.

It is not wonderful, then, that Plato (like one of his own Ideal Forms) has since manifested himself in our world in every variety of external shape. Every view of human nature which exalts its condition and its destinies, allies itself by a natural sympathy with the philosophy of Plato; and even by those who reject his reasonings in their original form, these wonderful conclusions are accepted, as presenting in a poetical or mythic shape the highest results of subsequent speculations. Platonism is immortal, because its principles are immortal in the human intellect and heart. After captivating the serene reason of Cicero, after receiving the strong tincture of Oriental infusions yet maintaining itself undestroyed in the schools of Alexandria, after supplying language to the mystic interpretations of Origen, and the aspiring affections of Augustine, it disappears to rise unmutated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; it possesses half the South of Europe, it encourages the speculations of Descartes, it fills and animates the whole capacious mind of Leibnitz, it affects the tone of theological exposition in every Christian country, and peculiarly in one remarkable school of divines in England¹; and, outriding the storm of the ultra-sensualism

*Causes of this influence.
The main conclusions of Platonism commend themselves to great thinkers in all ages, though some of its details may appear faulty or fanciful.*

Examples: Cicero,

the Alexandrians,

Origen and Augustine,

Descartes,

Leibnitz,

the Cambridge Platonists.

¹ [The so-called Cambridge Platonists, II. More, Cudworth, John Smith, Whichcote, Worthington, &c. See an interesting notice of these divines in Burnet's *History of his own Times*, i. p. 187. It is remarkable that some of the warmest promoters of the new mathematico-physical philosophy in Cambridge are numbered among these Platonists or their disciples; Wilkins, for instance, and Barrow, whose theology however is cast in a different mould from that of the divines above enumerated. It was to these that the name of Latitudinarians was first applied by "men of narrower thoughts and fiercer tempers." Burnet, *ib.* The impiety of Hobbes's opinions, which had "spread much," led "this set of men at Cambridge to assert and examine the principles of religion and morality on clear grounds, and in a philosophical method." "They were all very zealous against Popery." "And now that the main principle of religion was struck at by Hobbes and his followers, the papists acted upon this a very strange part. They went in so far even into the argument for atheism, as to publish many books, in which they affirmed that there was no certain proof of the Christian religion, unless we took it from the authority

LECT.
IV.

Kant.

*Its influence
is still in-
creasing.*

of France, it finally reappears in the *Critique of Pure Reason* of Kant, which reminds us even more of the ideal abstraction of the Platonic, than of the minuteness of the Aristotelian, dialectic. How Platonism has since then faded, it is needless to tell you. Its influence is at this moment on the increase. It has of late engaged the exegetical labours of the Continent far more than any other classical or critical subject: and elaborate translations of the entire works of Plato have been among the tributes of his admirers in France and Germany. High as are the unquestioned merits of his rival; minute and comprehensive as were his labours; clear as is his course of didactic exposition; accurate as is his reasoning and its expression; and aided as he has been, and is, for these reasons, by the direct patronage of our great Universities,—the influence of Aristotle is again waning before the triumphant star of his master;—if, indeed, since the expiration of the scholastic ages, he could ever have been regarded as mingling in the general current of human thought with the depth and force of Plato.

*Causes of
this influ-
ence further
examined.**The lofty
tone of Pla-
to's writings
commands
sympathy.*

[1.] One cause for this influence is, doubtless, to be found in the attractive and affectionate tone—in the high and consoling doctrine—with which, from the depth of antiquity, Plato still addresses every elevated spirit. Wearied with the daily nothingness of a life which mocks with the illusion of happiness, that retreats as we approach it, it is wonderfully soothing to speak across the chasm of ages with one who could thus distinctly perceive, in the nature of his own reason, the promise of an eternal heritage above and beyond the visionary scene of earthly life; and though to us from external testimony surer argument of this mighty truth is given than any which the investigation of the soul, and of its correlative ideal world, can confer, assuredly in no well-taught mind is its fellow-feeling with the nobler efforts and aspirations of reason on that account diminished. On the contrary, I am persuaded that the very tendency of faith, when it becomes an abiding principle, is to internalize more and more our proofs and con-

of the Church as infallible." In the present state of opinion in England, no apology seems necessary for inviting attention to this curious statement of Burnet. Interest in this school has been lately revived by the able essays of Principal Tulloch, which first appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, and have since been embodied in an elaborate history of the men and their opinions. Unfortunately, with perhaps the single exception of Whichcote's pithy Aphorisms, the writings of the Cambridge Platonists properly so called do not come under the vulgar description of "readable books." Henry More's poem is in parts excellent—but the general ruggedness of his numbers, and diction is but seldom interrupted by stanzas altogether satisfactory in point of rhythm and expression. See an article in the *Retrospective Review*, Vol. v. p. 223, containing extracts, some of which are justly characterized as "truly Spenserian." Ed.]

victions of a future world, to loosen their dependency on the evidence of witnesses, and thus to bring them, if not into coincidence, at least into sympathy, with the very class of proofs on which the Platonist loved to dwell.

LECT.
IV.

[2.] In glancing at this link of connexion, I have, indeed, fallen upon that which constitutes perhaps the most powerful cause of the prolonged influences of the writings of Plato,—the harmony of many of their sentiments with some parts of our divine religion. Limited as are our ideas and our expressions, it would be strange indeed if all the nobler views of the destinies of human nature did not in some measure correspond; “deep calleth to deep” in the human soul; and all that understand *it* must in some degree understand each other. A Revelation, though it descend from the Supreme Wisdom Himself, must be compressed into a size adequate to the human faculties, to be a Revelation to *them*; and must, therefore, in many cases, traverse ground already trod, and in all cases employ phrases already employed. We are not therefore to wonder, —and I trust no short-sighted jealousy will pervert the honesty of our judgment,—when we recognize in the high-wrought speculations of Plato, among much that is fantastic, and much that is false, glimpses of a world not unlike that which Christianity has disclosed; and when we hear the Holy Spirit that breathed in the Evangelists utter, to indicate supernal truth, words and phrases not unfamiliar to the student of Plato. This may perhaps be the fitting time to pause for a moment upon an objection which has been answered in just as narrow a spirit as it has been alleged:—nor the less fitly now, that in many minds it has hardened into a resolute prejudice against the whole subject of Platonism, and may, therefore, be properly resisted at the outset. You will, however, consider it a digression, (though a necessary or expedient one,) and be ready, after a brief delay, to return to our main topic.

*Their congeniality with Christianity,**and the congruence with that of Christian doctrine.**Prejudice hence arising.*

Infidel writers, who discern in the theology of the New Testament, and even in the discourses of its Divine Founder, expressions, and perhaps forms of thought, of a Platonic cast, have eagerly seized this characteristic as a pretext for humanizing its entire system and origin; and one^a, more

This prejudice examined, and objections answered.

^a [It is scarcely necessary to observe that the writer alluded to is the celebrated author of the *Decline and Fall*, whose 21st chapter is well characterized in the text. Gibbon's notions of Plato were confused enough: those of M. Guizot, his commentator, though much more precise, are scarcely more true. One point indeed the illustrious Frenchman has clearly stated; he has shewn that there is no *Logos* in Plato: but he is as clearly mistaken in supposing that St John was indebted for the term or its equivalent only to Hebrew sources. Nothing is more striking than the coincidence of phrase between the Evangelist and Philo; and Mr Milman properly calls attention

LECT. IV. eminently, has, with unmatched powers of sarcastic insinuation, represented the whole as a mere copy of the fashionable Platonism of the day. Various answers have been given, rebutting this charge by a reference to the historical facts of the case; answers completely satisfactory to every candid mind, as respects the total improbability of the connexion alleged. But when minuter discussion approaches the doctrines or phrases themselves, a jealous dread is evinced, of allowing, in the remotest degree, the analogy contended for. Now, as concerns the doctrines in question, especially that cardinal doctrine which is placed in the front of the controversy, it would be premature to speak; because any fair discussion of the subject would involve a lengthened consideration of the supposed Platonic models. It may be enough for the present to say, that the resemblance is, at most, nothing more than that faint similitude which may naturally be anticipated between the independent conceptions of a very gifted reason, and the general outlines of truth in even its most mysterious regions. Of the "Persons" (to use a very imperfect phrase) of the blessed Trinity we know little more than a distinction of offices; and such,—or something approaching to such,—a distinction of offices in the Supreme Essence is not, perhaps, wholly beyond the antecedent conjecture, however beyond the demonstrative certainty, of contemplative reason. And every such speculation, if it cannot much corroborate, cannot at all enfeeble, the truth.

But with regard to the *phrases*, especially with regard to one which holds a high place in the vocabulary of Christian Faith, there can be little doubt, but surely as little difficulty. Those who idly dream that he compromises Christianity, who willingly concedes the fact of the use of an old and recognized term to express a truth till then unknown, are little aware how far their principle will carry them. For example, the learned labours of Wetstein, Schoettgen, and others, seem to have shewn us many of our Lord's expressions, and even parables, among the relics of Rabbinical literature. Granting the critical question of priority decided, need the Christian advocate fear to assume a wider ground? is there anything unworthy of a divine Instructor in such

to the "long residence of St John at Ephesus, the centre of the mingling opinions of the East and West," in proof that he was acquainted with the Alexandrine literature. Mr Milman's conclusion nearly agrees with the views set forth by Prof. Butler in the text: "The simple truth may be, that St John took the familiar term, and, as it were, infused into it the peculiar and Christian sense in which it is used in his writings" (*D. and F.* Chap. XXI. note, p. 314, ed. Milm.). Those interested in the subject would do well to compare *Dorner's Christologie*, especially the Introduction to that valuable and now well-known work. Ed.]

adoptions? or rather are they not themselves a mark of superiority to that ambition of even the best human hearts, the ambition of exclusive originality? Surely we may conceive that out of thousands of possible forms of expression, an instructor liberated from earthly weaknesses would select precisely that which was most suitable, because most congenial, to his auditory; and this, though he possessed a complete acquaintance with every other form in which the same commissioned message of wisdom could have been fashioned. There seems to be no law of divine interference more certain than that God always uses the machinery prepared to His hand, as far as it can be consistently employed. I need not point to baptism, circumcision, and many other rites, as instances of this. It must be remembered that the natural world itself is His property no less than the supernatural; and that there is no right product of human thought of which He is not Himself the producer by the instrumentality of created minds. It seems to me most manifest, that the anxiety to claim absolute novelty for every the minutest element and circumstance of our belief, is only one of the many forms of our habitual degradation of God to our own standard. Were we charged with the publication of a system of belief, and allowed unbounded liberty in devising it, doubtless we should delight in startling the unbelieving world with unexpected terms and propositions; and we ascribe this petty pride to that Majestic Governor whose impartial care is over all His works, and whose purpose, when He came among us, was, not to triumph in the mistakes of His noblest creatures, but, without respect of persons, ages, or countries, to bring in an everlasting righteousness.

Now the use of the expression mainly alleged in this discussion is a prominent example of the very principle of adoption of which we have spoken. That the term *Λόγος* was already in use, and already employed in a sense not dissimilar to that in which it is consecrated by inspiration, is unquestionable. It is found in the writings of the Jewish Platonist Philo; it is found in a sense far less definite indeed in the writings of Plato himself; its Hebrew form was familiar to the Jewish theologians. The object of the great Evangelist was, manifestly, not to invent a term, but (what was much better) to declare that there was a Being who really possessed the same or similar attributes with those which his hearers had, from various sources, learned to ascribe to their *Λόγος* and their Memra* Jah; and with

St John borrowed the term ΛΟΓΟΣ from Alexandria Platonism.

What is implied in this admission?

* Memra is a Chaldaic term, signifying the Word. In many of those passages in the Pentateuch where the ineffable Name Jehovah occurs, the

LECT.
IV.

this view he makes (as it were) their Logos the Hero of his narration, incorporating in his own account, by the very adoption of the term, every fragment of truth which the world already possessed; and rather enlarging, fixing, and clearing the received notion, than introducing one radically new. You will perceive how natural, or rather, how necessary, is such a process, when you remember that this is exactly what every teacher must do, who speaks of "God" to a Heathen; he adopts the term, but he refines and exalts its meaning. Nor indeed is the procedure different in any use whatever of language in sacred senses and for sacred purposes. It has been justly remarked, by (I think) Isaac Casaubon, that the principle of all these adaptations is expressed in the sentence of St Paul, *Ὁν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν*. And in its most general aspect,—that He who has given us faculties for reflection and conjecture should now and then condescend to accept our poor products as materials for His own purposes of enlightenment, is only another instance of the same condescension, which, to the exaltation of His own glory, and of ours in His, accepts our temples, our praises, and our prayers.

Such are the principles on which I would recommend you to regard this controverted question; principles which I have here introduced with a view to their accompanying you in the course of studies which must perpetually bring you to points where Christian analogies will arise. You will everywhere see how freely our Revelation has adopted its language from every quarter, to what higher purposes and more assured hopes it has consecrated it; and in this very freedom in the use of its subordinate materials, you will (if I have succeeded in impressing my own view) recognize the calm superiority of independent truth.

Further
remarks on
Plat.
and its
relation to
Christian-
ity.

But, with respect to the prolonged popularity of the Platonic philosophy, as dependent on its connexion with the Christian faith,—the subject on which we were engaged,—you will readily apprehend that the foundation of this connexion lies deeper than any coincidence of occasional phraseology. As I have already intimated, the true bond of union was to be found in a certain similarity of sentiment upon the ultimate destinies of human nature, and upon the character of the Supreme Being^a. On these

Chaldaic paraphrasts have substituted the term Memra, thus ascribing Divinity to the Word. Vid. Calmet, *Dict.* in voc. T. W.

^a [In the *Tübinger Zeitschrift* for 1837 will be found an interesting essay by Baur, entitled "Das Christliche des Platonismus, oder Sokrates und Christus." Ackermann had previously published a treatise on the same subject: *Das Christliche in Platon &c.* Ed.]

subjects, which necessarily occupy so much of the Christian's thoughts, the Platonic treatises supplied expressions, views, and arguments, adapted without difficulty to Christian purposes. And however inferior to the warm-hearted ethics of Christianity, in all that concerns the reciprocal duties of men, and too absorbingly contemplative in its whole tone, it is easy to conceive how this very character might possess attractions for those who had rather think and feel than resolve and act.

LECT.
IV.*Theological
and ethical
coincidences.*

But while the reputation of Platonism has thus been upheld by its partial sympathy with the genius of revealed truth, I need scarcely remind you that this alliance has not always been favourable to its encouragement*. With many of the stricter fathers of the Church Plato was sternly pronounced to be the "Condimentarius hæreticorum".⁴ A later authority furnishes the warning, not, perhaps, always unreasonable, to the weaker order of minds, "Platonem tum præcipue cavendum esse, cum piis dogmatibus magis similis esse videtur." And Clement VIII. was earnestly dissuaded by his pontifical patronage this too seductive counterfeit of Christian piety. But, while noticing the more general grounds of its perpetuation, I must not now suffer myself to be drawn into any detailed account of the history of Platonism; one of the most interesting, indeed, but also one of the most complicated, subjects in literary history. We may find an occasion to trace it hereafter.

*Subject dis-
missed.*

Of a thinker, who has thus deeply impressed his image upon the subsequent fortunes of the human mind, every reader acknowledges a natural curiosity to learn the personal story; to penetrate to the springs of that mighty river which has since spread so widely through every region of thought. The minute history of the life and mind of Plato executed by his own inimitable pen, would be the richest biographical treasure in all uninspired literature. But the fountain of his wisdom (apart from the suggestions and excitements of the Socratic teaching) is nearly as secret as those sources of the Nile which he is said to have spent so many mysterious years in reaching. He himself soon became the god of a mythology more fantastic than that

*See
history
A TO.
"H. L.
" 426.)*

* One or two terrible characteristics of the original Platonic writings, which those at all conversant with them will too readily recall, could scarcely fail to mingle a darker colouring of dread (not to say abhorrence) in the admiration that accompanied a Christian's perusal; and the very resemblance of the higher elements of Platonian to Christian sentiments offered unhappy facilities to the endless caprices of heresy.

⁴ ["Doleo bona fide Platonem omnium hæreticorum condimentarium factum." Tertull. *de Anima*, c. 23. Ed.]

LECT.
IV.*His early
studies.**His first
introduction
to Socrates
(an. æt. 20).**On the death
of Socrates
Plato flees
to Megara.
(n.c. 329, an
æt. 32.)
Thence to
Cyrene,*

which he had lavished such treasures of fancy in beautifying^a.

His first essays were poetical, epic, lyric, dithyrambic; and we may conjecture, from the character of his writings, how deeply he enjoyed the wild and imaginative legends of his national history. At the age of twenty he became the hearer of Socrates; and charmed with the vista, which the converse of that teacher opened to his ardent and far-reaching intellect, abandoned the outward profession of poetry, too often, perhaps, only to embody it in the form of philosophical enthusiasm. We have scarcely a trace to guide the conjecture—How did Socrates receive this mighty pupil? Anxiously looking for facts, we are presented by Apulcius with a vision of a swan that predicted to Socrates the first arrival of Plato. The strong common sense of the old master could scarcely have approved the more daring flights of the pupil; yet his penetration cannot but have detected the germ, and admired the expansion, of extraordinary faculties. The few indications of their connexion are honourable to Plato. Illness prevented his presence on the day which he has immortalized in the *Phædo*^b; but he had endeavoured in vain to raise his voice among the mob of judges that condemned his venerable instructor, and his purse was then at the service of Socrates, who, however, declined to accept it. At the fall of the leader, Plato, with the rest of the scattered army of Philosophy, fled to Megara. Shortly after, he commenced those travels, of which so much has been said, and so little can be believed. At Cyrene he studied mathematics under Theodorus, whom he has introduced in more than one of his dialogues. If the duplication of the cube be justly ascribed to Plato^c, these lessons were not without fruit. In search of still deeper

^a [The particulars of this "mythology" are detailed by Diogenes Laertius, in his Life of Plato. See also Apuleius *de Dogm. Plat.* init. Ed.]

^b [This rests on the words in the *Phædo*. Ἰλάσσω δὲ, οἶμαι, ἡσθῆναι. The clause may however have been inserted by way of insinuated apology for the unsocratic ideas attributed in that dialogue to Socrates—one of those artifices which Plato frequently employs—an οὐκ ἐπὶ δὲ μύθος. Ed.]

^c [Plutarch, *de Socr. Genio*, p. 579 c. 7, ed. Wytenbach. The Delians had been promised by an oracle that they should "have rest from their troubles when they had doubled the size of the (cubical) altar" in their island. In their ignorance of geometry the poor islanders "doubled each of the sides, whereby they made a cube eightfold instead of twice the size of the original one. In their distress they called Plato to their aid," who, after administering a characteristic rebuke, referred them to his friend Eudoxus. According to the same Plutarch, *vit. Marcell.* c. 14, Archytas the Pythagorean was the subject of Plato's censure. Stories like this prove little more than that Plato was held in high esteem as a geometrician. According to Montucla, who quotes Proclus or Euclid, Hippocrates of Chios had before Plato pointed out the true solution of the Delian puzzle. *Histoire des Mathématiques*, t. p. 173. Ed.]

wisdom he continued his course to Egypt, where some of his biographers secrete him for thirteen years, penetrating with the zeal of a kindred mind the mysterious learning of the priesthood. *Αἰγύπτου ἡράσθη*, says Xenophon?; but there are few traces of this preference in his works; and the doctrines supposed to have been derived from thence he might more easily have obtained from that source which Xenophon sarcastically classes with the former—the *Πυθαγόρου τερατώδης σοφία*. No one understood better than Plato the influence of supposed antiquity over the imagination; and accordingly the *μάθημα πολιῶν* (*Tim.*) of Egypt meets us in the allegoric fictions of the *Timæus* and *Phædrus*, &c.; but instead of that frequent and reverential allusion which a philosophic speculator can rarely help making to the source of his knowledge, Plato, in his more critical mood, seems to notice the wisdom of Egypt with cold and slighting reference⁸. Whether true or false, the picturesque language of Valerius Maximus makes it worth citation: “Ægyptum peragravit, dum a sacerdotibus ejus gentis Geometriæ multiplices numeros, atque cœlestium observationum rationem, percipit. Quoque tempore a studiosis juvenibus certatim Athenæ Platonem doctorem quærentibus petebantur, ipse Nili fluminis inexplicabiles ripas, vastissimosque campos, effusam barbariem et flexuosos fossarum ambitus, Ægyptiorum senum discipulus lustrabat.” (Val. Max. VIII. 7.) With a spirit of enterprize not unlike that which some of our own explorers of the mysteries of the Chinese empire have evinced, the philosopher is said to have gained access to the country in the disguise of an oil-merchant. The Christian fathers delighted to trace him on his tour of inquiry among the He-

LECT.
IV.

and Egypt.

Exaggerated a-
counts of his
travels.

[Not Xenophon, but a late Sophist who assumes his mask. The document from which the Greek words in the text are taken is one of those “Socratic Epistles,” the credit of which has been thoroughly demolished by Bentley. (*Works*, Vol. II. p. 199, ed. Dyce.) The letter in question turns on the supposed feud between Xenophon and Plato: hence the disparaging remark upon Plato’s sojourn in Egypt. But the feud itself has been shewn by a great scholar to be but weakly attested, and the only passage in Xenophon’s writings in which Plato’s name occurs, indicates respect rather than dislike or contempt. (Boeckh, *De similitudine quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur*. Berolini, 1811.) Ed.]

⁸ [As in the *Laws*, v. p. 747, and *Repub.* IV. p. 436. In another passage Plato lauds the Egyptians for their proficiency in arithmetic. He nowhere appeals to the Egyptian priests as to authorities in questions of theology: nor does Cicero, when he speaks of Plato’s having received “numeros et cœlestia” from that quarter, intend by “cœlestia” *divine things*. These two seemingly superfluous remarks are suggested by Note 11 to the celebrated 21st chapter of the *Decline and Fall*, where, after quoting the passage of Cicero referred to, Mr Gibbon observes that “the Egyptians might still preserve the traditional creed of the patriarchs.” The coincidence of the quotation and the comment compel us to believe that this usually vigilant author seriously held both the opinions alluded to. Ed.]

LECT.
IV.*His voyages
to Sicily.**The Pla-
tonic Epis-
tles.*

brew nation, and attributed to this period, as well as to his Egyptian investigations, those sublime views in which they regarded him as the transcriber or amplifier of revealed truth. Plato's voyages to Sicily are better authenticated. His ineffectual efforts to reclaim Dionysius, and his attachment to Dion, are minutely related in the epistles appended to his works,—epistles, whose legitimacy, however (with perhaps the exception of one or two), the severity of modern criticism refuses to acknowledge⁹. The general fact that Plato travelled to Southern Italy, and there studied the congenial philosophy of Pythagoras, cannot be fairly questioned. Hermogenes is said to have been his instructor in the philosophy of Parmenides, which he has delivered and enriched in the very abstruse dialogue that bears that name; Cratylus, from whom another remarkable treatise has its title, taught him the theories of Heraclitus, and Archytas of Tarentum those of Pythagoras, of which he is reported to have secured a more permanent memorial in the purchase of the books of Philolaus, by which, if we may believe Laertius, the Pythagorean system was for the first time divulged¹⁰. Thus, rich with the spoils of all pre-

⁹ [Mr Grote is probably the only living scholar of eminence who adheres to the belief, which was not abandoned by Bentley, that all the so-called Platonic epistles were written by the persons whose names they bear. Mr Grote admits also as genuine all the dialogues enumerated in the Alexandrian Canon. Ast condemns all the Epistles indiscriminately; and the same is Niebuhr's judgment (*R. H.* Vol. I. not. 27), though, it must be confessed, on erroneous grounds, so far as regards the 7th. Special essays on the subject have been published by J. A. Grimm, Berl. 1815, and by Herr Salomon, Berl. 1835. Add Wiegand, *Epist. Plat. Specimen Criticum*, Gissae, 1828. The general impression of the learned is perhaps faithfully represented in the following remarks of Brandis: "The Platonic epistles were too meanly esteemed by Ast. Though undoubtedly *not genuine*, they are in all probability the work of comparatively early authors, who may have been exactly informed of the historical particulars referred to in them" (*Handb.*, II. p. 145). Bentley founds his belief in their authenticity mainly on the circumstance that they were acknowledged by the Alexandrine grammarians. This, were the letters intrinsically more worthy of Plato, would be a fair subsidiary argument: but too many of them savour of the "falsary" whom Bentley in other cases is so quick to detect. At the same time it by no means follows that because some are suspicious or worse, all should be condemned without exception. This rule has certainly not been adopted in judging of the Epistles for instance attributed to Isocrates—many or most of which have been accepted, while others, with or without good cause, have been rejected by critics. I still incline to the belief that the 7th and 8th Epistles, which properly form but one, were rightly excepted by the Dutch critic Cobet from the doom pronounced on the rest (*Cobet. Variæ Lectt.* p. 235). Ed.]

¹⁰ [The obligation to Cratylus is witnessed by Aristotle, *Metaph.* I. 6, that to Hermogenes only by Laertius. Plato was the pupil of Cratylus *before* he heard Socrates. How much of the lore of Pythagoras could be acquired in Greece Proper it is hard to say: but it seems unreasonable to doubt that Plato returned from his Italian sojourn a more accomplished Pythagorean than he went. The purchase of Philolaus's book (not "books") is regarded as a fact by Boeckh, whose *Philolaus* contains a searching critique of the ancient accounts. The question of the book, it should be observed, is distinct from

vious philosophies, this great genius returned at length to Athens, to devote his remaining life to the establishment of that comprehensive system which was to combine, to conciliate, and to supersede them all. The gardens of Academus have left the proof of their celebrity in the structure of language, which has derived from them a term now common to all places of public instruction. It will be readily believed that Plato soon became the most frequented of the Athenian teachers of wisdom; and not only the distinguished men of a most distinguished time, but the literary ladies of Athens, crowded the gymnasium of the philosophic analyst of beauty and of love. One of the strongest proofs of his popularity is to be found in an accusation which the libellous pen of Athenæus has recorded. That amusing but abusive writer presents us with a fearful list of the future tyrants who heard the lessons of Plato. Plutarch (*adv. Colot.*¹¹) meets us with a list of the champions of freedom formed in the same school. A combination of the catalogues shews us among the pupils of Plato all the aspiring minds of their day. The point here established Plato himself well understood. "The soul of the young philosopher," declares his hero in the sixth book of the *Republic*¹², "is warped from philosophy by the very qualities we have admired in him. Every plant, every animal, which finds where it is placed neither suitable nourishment, nor season, nor climate, corrupts in proportion to the very vigour of its nature...Think you that great crimes and consummate wickedness arise from an ordinary soul, and not from one of the highest natural force, whose lofty endowments have been depraved by circumstances of education; or do you imagine that a feeble spirit can ever do either much good or much evil?" To obviate such unhappy results, Plato did all which the lessons of a moralist could do; but he himself acknowledged how ineffective were his labours, and that God alone, (as the Heathen impressively declared,) could save the young men of his age from ruin. "When seated,"—if I may again venture to offer a feeble copy of the magnificent original,—“in the public assemblies, the courts, the theatres, or wherever the multitude gather,

that of the genuineness of the surviving Philolaic fragments, most of which, perhaps all, are open to grave doubt. A graphic passage in the *Theætetus* (p. 175) is pro

clides of Thrace; Aristonymus the lawgiver of the Arcadians, with Phormio and Menexenus, Eudoxus and Aristotle, who performed the same office at Elis and Pyrrha, Cnidus and Stagira. Chabrias and Phocion are also mentioned among Plato's pupils. For the counter-list see *Athen.* xi. p. 508. Ed.]
¹² [p. 491, b, seqq.]

LECT.
IV.

they blame or approve words or actions, equally tumultuous and extravagant in their censure and their approval, while the echoes of every wall reverberate the cries of both,—what effect can such scenes produce on the heart of a young man? What principles of education can escape shipwreck in this storm of contending judgments, and not run adrift with the current? Must not the young man judge with this multitude, of honour and shame? Will he not love what they love, and become what they are?... backed as they are by the power of degradation, fine, and death! No—there is not, there never was, there never will be, a moral education possible that can countervail the education of which these are the dispensers; *human* education, that is: I except, with the proverb, that which is divine. And truly, any soul that in such governments escapes the common wreck can only escape by the special favour of heaven!" (*Rep.* VI. 6; 7.) When we read these melancholy and indignant allusions to the political and social condition of his country, as forming the invincible obstacle to the moral advancement of its members, we may perceive how deeply Plato felt the responsibility and the importance of the office of a public instructor. They shew us also how little he is to be blamed for inevitable inefficiency. His Alcibiades is the ideal representative of the young Athenian political adventurer of his day. His Socrates is the representative of that philosophy which would have recalled these brilliant wanderers to the principles of a high, inflexible, morality, and which exhausted every allurements of fancy to win them to truth. But of Plato, in this character of a philosophic reformer of his degenerate countrymen, it would now be premature to speak; we shall have abundant opportunity to consider the subject in the sequel.

*Death of
Plato, B.C.
347.*

At the mature age of 81, in the 2nd year of the 108th Olympiad, Plato died; leaving the inheritance of his school to teachers who appear to have but feebly sustained its celebrity, and who, though their successive names and order are recorded, seem to have left but little impression upon the philosophy of antiquity. In the hands of a subsequent succession, who had little in common with Plato but the gardens in which he taught, his tenets were disguised, corrupted, and enfeebled into a system of almost unmodified scepticism. Had the opinions of Plato been consigned to traditional preservation, the most positive and doctrinal of philosophers would probably have descended to us as a dreaming doubter, floating the air-blown bubbles of fancy upon every breeze for the amusement of watching the beauty of their tints and the rapidity of their dissolution.

Fortunately, we have surer evidence of his views. Plato has the singular fortune of coming down unimpaired to posterity. The collections of his writings err by excess not defect; several performances are ascribed to him which custom alone now preserves among his works; but, as far as we can discover from the remotest catalogues and allusions, no one vessel has foundered, of the large squadron which Plato committed to the stream of ages.

LECT.
IV

These famous writings are, as you know, couched in the form of dialogue, the favourite shape for the philosophical literature of the Socratic age. Laertius ascribes the first adoption of it to Zeno, the Eleatic logician¹³; but it is probable that the dialogues of this stubborn arguer consisted rather in the rapid interchange of logical difficulties, than in the graceful play of intellect and fancy which makes the Platonic conversations still unrivalled in their line of art. To Alexamenus of Teos (an island or city of Ionia) the honour is likewise ascribed of originating this agreeable form of disquisition. But all its cultivators are forgotten in the merit of Plato. The dignified plainness of Xenophon is without his variety and skill, the solidity of Arrian is without his copiousness. In Cicero, (besides the immeasurable inferiority of the language in which he wrote,) we miss his ease and divine simplicity. Our own Berkeley presents a very pleasing copy of some features of the dialogues of Plato; and Shaftesbury recalls him often, though the evident imitation perhaps too often disturbs the effect. The opinion of antiquity seems unanimous upon the literary merits of Plato. The greatest of ancient orators was probably his hearer ("Audivisse Platonem *Demosthenes* dicitur," Cic. *Brut.* c. 31); and an age which could understand the excellences of a yet living language, has unhesitatingly placed the founder of the Academy in the foremost ranks of the artists of Grecian style. A single passage of Lucian¹⁴, which some of you will probably not have forgotten, briefly enumerates the excellences which the subtle apprehension of Greek criticism recognized in Plato. Σὺν, ὦ Πλάτων, ἡ τε μεγαλόνοια θαυμαστή, καὶ ἡ καλλιφρονία δεινῶς Ἀττικῇ, καὶ τὸ κεχαρισμένον, καὶ πειθοῦς μεστόν, ἡ τε σύνεσις, καὶ τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν ἐν καιρῷ τῶν ἀποδείξεων, πάντα ταῦτά σοι ἀθρόα πρόσεστιν. It would be endless to cite the attestations of Cicero:—"Quis uberior in dicendo Platone!...non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi, gravissimus auctor et

Plato's writings all in the form of dialogues. Invention of the dialogue variously attributed.

Plato compared with other writers of dialogues.

Ancient testimonies to the excellence of his style.

¹³ [Diogenes Laertius, III. 47, attributes the invention to Zeno. It was Aristotle, according to Athenæus, p. 505, who made Alexamenus the first writer of dialogue. Ed.]

¹⁴ [*Piscat.* c. 22. Ed.]

LECT.
IV.

magister...longe omnium quicunque scripserunt aut locuti sunt exstitit et suavitate et gravitate princeps...divinus auctor, varius, multiplex, copiosus...quidam deus philosophorum"... Such are a few of the phrases in which Cicero is accustomed to speak of his philosophical master. A judge not less accomplished than Cicero describes his more elevated style: "Multum supra prosam orationem, et quam pedestrem Græci vocant, surgit; ut mihi non hominis ingenio, sed quodam Delphico videatur oraculo instinctus." (Quint. *Inst. Orat.* x. c. 1.) Such was the critical estimate of the writings of Plato when Greek was still a living tongue, and those more delicate differences were palpable which have now perhaps for ever disappeared to our less instructed organs. Ancient critics declared his style to be the *medium* between prose and verse. Accordingly, in the midst of his severest discussions, Plato mingles the strange fictions of his national mythology and the venerable traditions of foreign lands; and endeavours to supply authority for his less assured decisions in the records of an immeasurable antiquity. Nor, however a colder judgment may disapprove of this combination, is it without an inexpressible charm to imaginative students of the past. "To speak," he declares in the *Timæus*¹⁸, "concerning the other gods, and trace their generation, is beyond my power. In this case we must trust to the accounts of the elder sages, who, being themselves the children of the gods, must have known the story of their parents. Wrong would it be not to believe the children of the gods, even though they could produce no arguments of scientific value. They speak of that to which they are naturally allied; and therefore, duly obedient to law and right, we should bow to their tradi-

Plato's introduction of myths.

¹⁸ [*Tim.* p. 40 D. In this passage the practised student of Plato will not fail to detect a savour of irony, which has evaporated in Prof. Butler's not very exact translation. Mr Sewell (*Plato*, p. 87) would probably have avoided the same error, and with it the necessity of inserting in his translation words which have no counterpart in the original, had he been aware that this ironical purpose was acknowledged by Eusebius. (See *Præp. Evang.* xiii. p. 640.) The Greek however tells its own tale: *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν εἰπεῖν τε καὶ γινῶναι μείζον ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς. πιστευτέον δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἔμπροσθεν ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν οὖσιν, ὡς ἔφασαν, σαφῶς δὲ τοῦ τοῦ γε αὐτῶν προγόνους εἰδῶσιν. ἀδύνατος οὖν θεῶν πατρὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἀνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς οὐκεία φάσκουσιν ἀπαγγέλλειν, ἐκπομπῆν τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον. Οὕτως οὖν κατ' ἐκείνους ἡμῶν ἡ γένεσις περὶ τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐχέτω καὶ λεγέσθω. Ἰᾶς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ παῖδες Ἰκεῶνάς τε καὶ Τηθύς κ.τ.λ.* Where, as Eusebius drily observes, the philosopher can hardly be in earnest when he styles the gods children of the gods (*χλευάζειν μοι δοκέει—ἑαβᾶλλαι ἐξῆς τοῖς θεολόγοις—παῖζειν δ' εἵκοι*). Theodoret, a weaker man than Eusebius, takes the passage seriously. (*Græc. aff. Cuv.* i. p. 12, ed. Oxon.) The remarks which follow in Prof. Butler's text are not, however, deprived of their importance by the selection of an infelicitous example. The loftier the "aspirations" of Plato, the less was it to be expected that they would find satisfaction in the theogonies of Orpheus and Hesiod. Ed.]

tion." That harsh and contemptuous criticism, to which it is not given to appreciate Plato, may discern in such declarations the proper food for a feeble ridicule; they who see in the illustrious Greek an invaluable study for historians of the human soul, will recognize those aspirations after a light supernatural and divine, which Plato inherited from his master, and which both acknowledged at every turn in the progress of thought! "Oh, Solon," cries the Egyptian priest in the same work, "you Greeks are ever children; there is not an old man in Greece!... You are all young in soul, you have no tradition venerable through ancient report, no doctrine hoary with years!" In this spirit, when he would recur to remote antiquity, he often professes to derive his knowledge from distant sources. Thus, it is an Armenian who delivers the remarkable portrait of the future state of recompense, in the tenth book of the *Republic*,—the same representation which is further illustrated in the close of the *Gorgias*. We can never rightly estimate the labours of Plato unless we regard his writings as themselves works of art, no less than transcripts of doctrine. His versatility in the dramatic representation of character has made some of his dialogues far more resemble what we should style "genteel comedy" than a philosophical exposition. Thus the entire *Euthydemus* is nothing less than a dramatic satire, of boundless humour and variety, upon the follies of the sophistic professors; and assuredly lies much nearer to Aristophanes than to Aristotle. The *Protagoras*, in like manner, while it treats an important philosophical question—the possibility of communicating virtue by didactic discourses,—includes a dexterous exposure of the same class of pretenders¹⁶. The *Hippias Major* discusses and rejects the vulgar and narrow definitions of Beauty; but in doing so, makes the mercenary trader in wisdom, from whom it derives its title, eminently ridiculous. The *Ion* speaks of poetry, but incidentally exposes another class of self-sufficient professors, the rhapsodists, or reciters of verse. Indeed the student of Plato will find how few of the absurdities which the Molières or the Congreves of modern times have exhibited on the stage can claim originality in extravagance; while he will find what authors professedly dramatic have scarcely ever presented, the entire exhibition of human folly made subservient to the establishment of a high-toned

LECT.
IV.*His affection
of ap-
pening to
antiquity.**The Plato-
nic dia-
logues are
works of
art, and
must be
judged ac-
cordingly.**Their dra-
matic merit
exemplified
in the Eu-
thydemus,**the Prota-
goras,**the Hippias
Major,*

¹⁶ [This statement requires qualification. I agree with Mr Grote and Dr Whewell in thinking that on the whole Protagoras has the better in the argument between him and Socrates; and the exposure of the other sophists present on the occasion is distinctly "Aristophanic," and therefore so exquisitely amusing. ED.]

LECT.

IV.

the Symposium,

and the Gorgias.

and presiding morality. It is remarkable, too, how in his loftiest flights, this great author never forgets the reality—even the lowest reality—of human nature. In the *Symposium*, Socrates has scarcely concluded his magnificent picture of the love of the eternal Beauty, when Alcibiades enters the apartment; the tone suddenly alters, and we are presented with the wild ribaldry of profligacy and drunkenness. The speech of Callicles, the shrewd man of the world, in the *Gorgias*, might have been spoken without the alteration of a syllable in a Parisian drawing-room of yesterday. Is *this* new to our ears?—"My dear Socrates, you talk of *law*. Now, the laws, in my judgment, are just the work of the weakest and most numerous of human minds; in framing them, they never thought but of their own interests; they never approve or censure except in reference to this. Hence it is, that the cant arises, that tyranny is improper and unjust, and to struggle for eminence, guilt. Unable to rise themselves, of course they would wish to preach liberty and equality. But nature proclaims the law of the stronger...We surround our children from their infancy with preposterous prejudices about liberty and justice. The man of sense tramples on such imposture, and shows what Nature's justice is...I confess, Socrates, philosophy is a highly amusing study—in moderation, and for boys. But protracted too long, it is the ruin of its votaries. Your philosopher is a complete novice in the life *comme il faut*...I like very well to see a child babble and stammer; there is even a grace about it, when it becomes his age. But to see a man continue the prattle of the child is absurd. Just so with your philosophy" (p. 484, fol.)...Or is not the maxim he interposes worthy the school of La Rochefoucauld?—"The philosopher cunningly avoids the life in which he knows he could not succeed; and praises such habits as suit his temper, insinuating, under these generalities, applause of *himself*."

Perhaps, however, it is in parody of the graver pretence of his day, that the exquisite dexterity of the pen of Plato most appears. The bustling Hippias, hot from Elis, charged with an embassy, and boasting his encyclopedical knowledge, equally conspicuous in shoemaking and in syllogism; the long-winded and pompous Protagoras; the declamatory Gorgias; all are transplanted into his page with unerring accuracy; and all successively contrasted with that one inimitable old man, who, ever the same, is never wearying; whose shrewd simplicity laughs in their face, while protesting the most unqualified humility, and who meekly conceding everything is gradually gaining all. Perhaps there is not in literature a more perfect specimen

of this assumption of style, than is presented in the course of a dialogue (the *Theætetus*) to which I shall have soon to introduce you at greater length. Socrates assails by irresistible proofs the famous dogma of Protagoras, that truth varies with the variety of opinion; and lamenting that Protagoras himself was no longer alive to champion his own tenet, undertakes in his stead to exhibit it to the best advantage. The speech in which this is effected is not only an imitation of sophistry, but, of the precise sophistry of Protagoras, and not this merely, but (as we can plainly detect) a formal copy of the inmost peculiarities of his style. So much does Plato delight in individualizing his characters, indeed, that we have sometimes to regret the restriction under which the proprieties of the speaker seem to lay the spirit of the reasoning itself. I have always felt this, for instance, in perusing a very remarkable dialogue (the *Euthyphron*), in which a great question—the independence of the principles of morality upon the mere will of a Supreme Governor—is perpetually approached, yet never fully met. Euthyphron is a heathen priest, and argues as one; and Socrates, though triumphantly exposing the discordance of Polytheism with the unity of religious morality, scarcely penetrates to the question in its ultimate form. He declares, indeed, with great precision, that an act is not holy because the gods love it, but that the gods love it because it is holy; but the fundamental question of the eternal coincidence of these two terms in the divine nature, could not be effectively stated to the minister of polytheism. It is, therefore, glanced at, and dismissed. Of the point itself, however, his whole philosophy sufficiently proclaims his opinion. We shall soon see, how, abstracting from those acts which we approve, the quality which we approve in them, and which we designate “just” or “good,” he made the Divine Mind the eternal depository of a goodness and a justice, of which these were the copies or participants, and thus identified the will and the rectitude of God.

LECT.
IV.*The Theætetus.**The Euthyphron.*

LECTURE V.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. II.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
V.

Further remarks on the Platonic dialogues, considered as works of art.

Their excellence in this respect has been thought to derogate from their scientific value.

Plato's apology for his own disquisitions.

My last lecture closed with some remarks on that style of Plato which has been the object of so unbounded an admiration to the critics of antiquity. A few further observations may not be superfluous before we proceed to contemplate the body that is clothed in this attractive dress.

I remarked to you that the dialogues of Plato are to be regarded as specimens of *art*, no less than as philosophical treatises. But it may be questioned whether their excellence in the former view has not tended to impair their value in the latter. The characteristic excellences of the philosophic style are perspicuity, precision, and method; the single-minded inquisitor of truth grows impatient at interruptions, and is not to be reconciled to deviations from the high road of reasoning by any occasional prospect, however novel or extensive. The flowery bye-paths of Plato's digressive style are, therefore, pronounced tedious and tantalizing by the dogged pursuers of a conclusion; and their indignation is not much alleviated by finding (what is not at all unusual in this writer) that at the close of a dialogue, "*magna et præclara minantis*," they are as far as ever from a settled declaration of opinion. This freedom from all the ordinary restraints of argumentative style was, indeed, not the least of the recommendations of the dialogic form of disquisition to its author. "Shall we return to our subject?" asks Socrates in the *Theætetus*. "Not at all, Socrates," is the reply. "You have justly said that we are not the slaves of our discussion, but our discussion of us... We are not like the poets, subject to judge or spectator, to preside over our conversations, to reprimand our deviations, and to issue directions which we must obey" (p. 173 B). But perplexing as these capricious changes are to the baffled student, perhaps the more rigorously methodical arguments are sometimes not less so. Plato is then metamorphosed from the enthusiastic visionary, whose soul seems at every

turn of the discourse impatient for the pure empyrean of contemplation, into the most microscopic analyst of words and propositions. No hasty enthymeme, no unpermitted assumption, will then escape. We seem to see the conclusion within an inch of our eyes, but we are compelled to approach it by infinitesimal gradations. The adversary's arguments must die, as Molière's physician dispatched his patients, *selon les règles*. On other occasions there is the same minuteness, but the purpose intended is long imperceptible; and when the final inference does arrive, we cannot avoid the suspicion that it has been strangely shuffled into the cards by some logical sleight-of-hand, invisible to us from the rapidity of the artist's motions. For my own part, with unbounded admiration for this great writer, I have often, in reading some of his more paradoxical discussions, sympathized with the candid perplexity of Adeimantus in the sixth book of the *Republic*. "My dear Socrates, it is quite impossible to oppose a word to all these reasonings of yours; but observe the manner in which those are affected who listen to your arguments on this subject. They think that, entirely from, their own inexperience in the art of asking and answering, they are by degrees brought on from question to question, until these minute deviations accumulated at the end, betray a direct contradiction to their original proposition. And just as at draughts the beginner is at length blocked up by the skilful player, so as not to know how to escape, so we novices are blocked up in this logical game of yours, without truth being at all the more concerned in the matter" (p. 487 B). The difficulty of these cases is augmented by our frequent uncertainty whether the author is really in earnest; whether he is amusing himself in parodying the affected precision of the Sophists, or, whether, from long familiarity with their style of debate, he has unwittingly fallen into their wire-drawn prolixity¹. These, however, if they be blemishes, are but occasional blemishes; and I ought in justice to add that the thorough idolaters of Plato, with the gifted perspicacity of devotees, invariably discover all the rarest treasures of wisdom in those very passages which I have

LECT.
V.*Minutenness**and seeming
sophistry of
his dialectic.**Occasional
difficulty of
detecting the
irony of
Plato.*

¹ [An advocate of "the Sophists" would find much to complain of in this sentence. Certainly none of the fraternity with whom we are acquainted equalled or approached the dialectical ἀδολοσχία of Socrates. Apologies for this seeming desultoriness and prolixity are not unfrequent in the dialogues. The passage recently referred to in the *Theaetetus*—one of the most desultory—has evidently this intention; but in the *Parmenides* prolix discussion is no longer apologized for, but urged upon the youthful inquirer as a sacred duty: καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις; ἔλκυσον δὲ σπαντὸν καὶ γόμωσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλονόμενης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολοσχίας, ὥς ἐτι νεοὶ εἰ. (p. 135 C.) ED.]

LECT.
V.

dared to pronounce prolix and fatiguing. How ready are we to reflect praise on ourselves in praising our author, and to extol *that* as food only for the gods which we rejoice to think few but ourselves have been able to digest!

His intentional obscurity,

Besides incidental difficulties of this kind, it seems also certain, that this great Philosopher sometimes assumed a veil of intentional obscurity. His language seems constantly to point to a gift requisite in his reader which no reading can give. "The father of the world is hard to discover, and when discovered cannot be communicated¹." Meditation, laborious and protracted, alone can reveal the mysteries of intellectual truth. In the *Phaedrus*² he speaks earnestly against writing; itself, and the spurious knowledge it confers. "Every man must obtain the heavenly fire for himself: and by uniting with the mind's celestial object, kindle that divine and circumfusing flame which alone can truly illuminate the mind." "On these things," he reiterates, "it is vain to write. Whoever attempts it will fail. Except a few divinely gifted men, whom God has made capable of finding these truths of themselves, he will only cause some to despise him, and swell others with a miserable arrogance as if they apprehended mysteries of which they are profoundly ignorant." You will easily perceive how such a conception as this, of the incommunicability of the supreme truth, must have led to a despair of satisfactorily expressing it; and how the deficiencies of language, and its dependence on sense, must have beguiled him into those varieties of mythic representation which form not the smallest of the difficulties that meet the interpreter of Plato.

and depreciation of writing as the vehicle of truth.

Nor can we doubt that the peculiar position of Plato must have necessitated this voluntary assumption of a protecting veil of enigmatical language. I see, indeed, little ground for the hypothesis which Warburton, to buttress his theory, has advocated, of the division of the dialogue into esoteric and exoteric; understanding the former term as involving a secret and mysterious learning, and the latter as including the inculcation of popular fallacies for politic purposes. The very instances to which he appeals seem to contradict his assertion; for assuredly the *ἀπόρρητα*—"the unity of God and the detection of polytheism,"—are as openly exhibited in the alleged exoteric, as in any of the

Warburton's distinction between exoteric and esoteric dialogues shown to be unfounded.

¹ [*Timæus*, p. 28 c. Ed.]

² [p. 275 c. Ed.]

³ [This and the preceding quotation are somewhat freely paraphrased from the 7th Epistle, p. 341 D, fol. The entire passage is curious, and should be compared with Ep. II. 314. Neither passage, it may be observed, lends any support to the Warburtonian distinction of "exoteric and esoteric dialogues." They rather prove that *all* Plato's writings are exoteric; his esoteric views having been communicated *orally* to the initiated. On the genuineness of the Platonic Epistles, see note (g) to Lect. IV. of this series (p. 302). Ed.]

other dialogues; and the immortality of the soul (the doctrine on which Warburton would charge Plato with insincerity) appears in those very dialogues which are supposed to contain his real thoughts. (*Republic, Phædo*, &c.) But with all this, it is manifest that (the fate of Socrates before his eyes) Plato must have felt the necessity of employing such language as, while it would be intelligible to the thoughtful, might yet admit of a popular interpretation for the jealous defenders of the popular system of belief and worship. And hence, while no mind to whom the discovery could be profitable can fail to read the main lineaments of the divine character—single, sempiternal, and supreme—in his page, the same page is filled with as multitudinous a throng of gods and demigods as could be demanded by the most unlimited source for a polytheistic theology.

One obstacle to the full intelligence of Plato can only be removed by persevering study. In the last series of Lectures delivered in this place, I endeavoured to supply somewhat of a clearer and more methodized account of the earlier Greek philosophies than you are likely to find in the unconnected chaos of our common text-books. Without penetrating to the spirit of these systems, the true position of the illustrious Founder of the Academy can never be understood. You are not to tear Plato forcibly from his native soil, to transplant him into the trim gardens of modern philosophy, and to judge of the size or proportions of this lord of the forest deprived of all his natural accompaniments, and condemned to droop in an unpropitious clime. The works of Plato are the result of all that had gone before them; they must be estimated as a result; they could have been produced at no other conceivable time. They are a revelation, and a system supplanting rejected systems. They assume theories as well-known, of which the mere modern knows nothing; they enter into discussions of subjects which then reverberated through every school in Athens, but of which the critic must now bend a patient ear to catch the faintest echo. Such considerations as these will suggest to you the value of the criticisms of cursory despisers of Plato. He could form but a defective estimate of the merits of Thomas Reid who had not before him the writings of Locke, of Hume, and of Berkeley: the poems of Parmenides, the Pythagorean books of Philolaus, the “dark sayings” of Heraclitus, should be our own before we could confidently pronounce on the merits of Plato. “Quamvis de diversis officinis hæc ei essent philosophiæ membra suscepta;—naturalis ab Heracliteis, intellectualis a Pythagoreis, rationalis et moralis

LECT.
V.

ex ipso Socratis fonte, unum tamen ex omnibus, et quasi proprii partus corpus effecit⁵." Those inimitable excellences, indeed, which arose from the depths of the author's own mind, and which address man equally in every age, we can scarcely fail to perceive unless hopelessly unfitted for the higher offices of speculation and feeling;—but how many are the remarks that now drop dully upon our ears which in their own day were decisive and significant; how many an argument, which, after the labours of innumerable subsequent thinkers, may now seem ineffective or superfluous, was then, without the waste of a single needless word, the very answer the time demanded!

To put the reader, as far as practicable, exactly in the position which Plato occupied, is the task of criticism. In this field much has been done by the successive labours of a vast number of learned men; and more in our own age, perhaps, than in any preceding one. The inquiry into the *origines Platonice* has been carried into the remotest quarters.

*Opinions of
the Christian
Fathers
respecting
Plato ex-
amined.*

The singular sublimity, and often the aptique cast, of his sentiments, his own love for the authority of tradition, and the legends of his mysterious wanderings in Egypt and the East, have united to engage many critics of the highest celebrity to endeavour to trace a wisdom so exalted to a divine source, and to see in Plato a commissioned "apostle of the Gentiles." This opinion of the derivation of the Platonic philosophy from the Hebrew Scriptures was among the Christian Fathers nearly universal⁶. Justin, Clemens, Eusebius, Augustine, insist upon it; and evince, by their prompt adoptions of the phraseology and, where-ever possible, of the theological views of Plato, how justifiable they considered it to enlist in the cause of divine truth the services of this eloquent commentator on primitive revelation. "What is Plato," says Numenius (cited by Clemens Al.) "but (Μωσῆς Ἀττικίζων) Moses in the dialect of Attica?" Eusebius cites an assertion of the Jewish Aristobulus, that a version of the Old Testament existed before that of the Seventy, and that Plato drew his wisdom from its perusal⁷. This seems, however, too unsupported by any corroborative testimony to be admitted:—and it

⁵ [Apuleius *de Dogm. Plat.* l. 1. 570. Ed.]

⁶ [*Præp. Evang.* xiii. p. 663 D. According to Gibbon, it was Josephus who persuaded the Christian Fathers that Plato derived a part of his knowledge from the Jews (*D. and F. c.* 21, note 11). See Josephus *c. Apion.* ii. c. 16. However this may be, the belief was current among the Alexandrine Jews at a much earlier period. Ed.]

⁷ [*Strom.* l. 1. § 22. Ed.]

⁸ [Aristobulus pretended that this earlier translation had been made "before Alexander's conquest of the Persians" (Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* p. 663 D). See Valckenæer's *Diatrise de Aristobulo*, xvi. Ed.]

certainly would be extraordinary that no traces should be perceptible in the writings of Plato, of his acquaintance with the singular people from whom this hypothesis would deduce his wisdom. Something has been made of the curious legend in the third book of the *Republic*⁹, which Plato calls a *Phœnician Mûθος*; but unfortunately no admissible parallel can be discovered for it in the Scriptures,—for that which Eusebius instances is utterly visionary¹⁰. A more circuitous route is proposed for the transmission of this divine teaching. The Israelites had commercial connexions with the Egyptians; the captivity of Jehoahaz, and the residence of Jeremiah and Baruch in the country of the Pharaohs, nearly synchronized with the travels of Pythagoras. The disciples of Pythagoras communicated his treasures to Plato, who himself might when in Egypt have conversed with the grandchildren, or even the children, of the exiles of Israel. This hypothesis, which is not altogether destitute of reason, would perhaps be more readily accepted, if its advocates had not done all that could make it ridiculous, by the frequency of their violent adaptations of Plato to his supposed model. If Eusebius reads in the *Laws* of good and bad dæmons, he protests that Plato must have had the first chapter of Job before him. If Plato commands the seller of a commodity not to exaggerate the merit of the article, he was plagiarising from the book of Proverbs. And Dacier pronounces that he must have been more than man, if he sketched the character of a legislator as laid down in his *Laws*, without borrowing from the history of Moses¹¹. The Soul of the

⁹ [p. 414 c.]. A mythus more palpably Greek it is impossible to imagine. Those who dream that these elegant fictions embody the "wisdom of the East," would do well to consider a passage in the *Phædrus*, which seems designed to refute by anticipation any such hypothesis: "Ὁ Σώκρατες, ῥαδίως σὺ Διγυγτίους καὶ ὁποδαποῦς ἀν' ἐθέλης λόγους ποιεῖς, p. 275 B. "It is no trouble to you, Socrates, to invent any story, whether it please you to lay the scene in Egypt or in any other country." ED.]

¹⁰ [*Præf. Ev.* XII. p. 613 A. The supposed parallel passage is in Ezekiel xxii. 18. This is a rather extravagant instance of the mode in which the Fathers (*virī optimi sed tachytheis*) were accustomed to deal with Plato. ED.]

¹¹ [Frequent use has been made by the Christian Fathers of two passages in the Epistles, which it is worth while to transcribe. In the second Epistle we read (p. 312 E): *περὶ τῶν πάντων βασιλεῖα πάντ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἐνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἷον ἀπάντων τῶν καλῶν. δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα.* And in the sixth as follows: *τὸν τῶν πάντων θεὸν ἡγεμόνα τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων, τοῦ τε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα κύριον ἐπόμυντας, ὃν, ἀν' ὅπως φιλοσοφῶμεν, εἰσάμεθα πάντες σαφῶς εἰς δύναμιν ἀσθράπων εὐδαιμόνων.* These mystical passages have been supposed by some to have been inserted by a Christian hand; in which case they must be understood as referring to the Christian Trinity. But the text bears no marks of such interpolation. The conjecture that the entire epistles in which the passages occur were the handiwork of a Platonizing Jew of Alexandria is more reasonable; and it is borne out by the resemblance of the mystical phrases in the letters to expressions of Philo relating to his Logos, &c. The difficulty

LECT.
V.

World is the "Spirit that moved on the face of the waters;" and the soul that animates the heavens, was the misconception of a phrase in Isaiah. But when the remoteness of the resemblances to antecedent passages of Scripture, and the supposed similarity to subsequent revelation, at once increases the interest of the problem and renders this solution inapplicable;—many of these writers do not hesitate to advance another more direct and decisive. Plato himself comes before us in the mantle of immediate inspiration. Augustine, Origen (in controversy with Celsus), Jerome, Eusebius, Clement, do not hesitate to affirm that Christ himself revealed his own high prerogatives to the gifted Grecian. From this hypothesis, however, the facts of the case force them to make many abatements. In the mid current of this divine revelation are found errors fantastic and frivolous which it is impossible to ascribe to the celestial illuminator. Plato, then, was *partially* enlightened; and clouded the heavenly beam with the remaining grossnesses of the natural sense. When the question arrives at this state, its decision becomes more and more perplexed. The natural providence and the supernatural interferences of God are separated by a line we cannot always draw. If He be the author of the faculties that apprehend truth, he is the author of every apprehension of truth. How far, then, the Deity was energizing in the mind of Plato, risks becoming a question of words; while this supposed revelation surrounded with dangerous error, becomes almost useless to those who are not furnished with an additional revelation to fix the demarcation.

The age in which the Fathers of the Christian Church flourished was not an age of criticism in our sense of the

arising from the later date of the Alexandrine's writings is removed by the supposition generally adopted, that his views and language were, to a considerable extent, inherited from earlier allegorising speculators of his own nation. (See Mangey's Preface to his ed. of Philo.) Eusebius truly says that no Greek before Plato would have dreamt of "speaking of the creative Father as the Lord;" and though we cannot accede to his hypothesis, that *Plato* borrowed the language in question from the Hebrews, we can find no difficulty in acknowledging the obligations of the *pseudo-Plato* to that source. (See Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* XI. p. 534 D, E.) The following account of the Philonic triad may save the necessity of quotations, which might be multiplied indefinitely, from the Alexandrine himself: "Duabus superioribus Dei virtutibus Deo et Domino (Κυρίῳ) quæ et διωδρω αὐτὸς πρῶται διωδρως audiunt, si quis adnumeret copulam, qua utraque conjuncta tenetur, sive Verbum Divinum, sive Deum ipsum, existit sanctissima quædam Trias." Dähne, *Quæstiones Philonicæ*, p. 25, not. 98. An English writer of the last century, who exhibits great sobriety of judgment in dealing with other passages in Plato, which had turned the heads of more learned men, ventures on the bold supposition that those in the Epistles refer, not to any Jewish speculation, but simply to the distinction in the *Philebus*, 31 C, between τὸ αἰδιὸν τὸ νέπας and τὸ ἀταρπov. (Cæsar Morgan, *Trinity of Plato*, pp. 43—46, ed. Holden, 1853.) This opinion is however hardly tenable. ED.]

term. These great men may have been employed upon weightier duties ; they certainly were little employed upon this. It is proper, therefore, to suggest, as a circumstance of some importance in this controversy, that the writings in which the *most* startling resemblances occur—the *Epinomis* and the *Epistles* of Plato—are, by the more searching sagacity of modern criticism, refused to that author. Their precise history is, however, very uncertain. The eagerness of the Neoplatonics to match the divine features of Christianity with parallel doctrines, unquestionably led to interpolations, which their adversaries had not always the learning, or the caution, to expose ; and the necessities or conveniences of exposition would often lead a Christian preacher to accept with complacency forms of expression which enriched his own vocabulary ; and, still oftener, to present to the enemy the impressive argument derived from exhibiting the name most revered by philosophic Paganism as a herald of the divine truth,—as “not that light, but to bear witness of that light.” In whatever way you decide the question of these resemblances of phraseology and sentiment, let me recommend to you all, in the meantime, the admirable language of one who leaves few to improve what he has once delivered. “Whatever,” says S. Augustine, (*De Doctr. Christian.* II. 40,) “those called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, may have said true and conformable to our faith is not only not to be dreaded, but is to be claimed from them, as unlawful possessors, to our use. For as the Egyptians not only had idols and heavy burthens, which the people of Israel were to abhor and avoid, but also vessels and ornaments of gold and silver and apparel, which that people, at its departure from Egypt, privily assumed for a better use, not on its own authority, but at the command of God, the very Egyptians unwittingly furnishing the things which themselves used not well ; so all the teaching of the Gentiles not only hath feigned and superstitious devices, and heavy burdens of an useless toil, which we severally, as, under the leading of Christ, we go forth out of the fellowship of the Gentiles, ought to abhor and avoid ; but it also containeth liberal arts filled for the service of truth, and some most useful moral precepts : as also there are found among them some truths concerning the worship of the one God Himself, as it were their gold and silver which they did not themselves form, but drew from certain veins of Divine Providence running throughout, and which they perversely and wrongfully abuse to the service of dæmons. These the Christian, when he severs himself from their wretched fellowship, ought to take from them for the right use of

LECT.
V.

preaching the Gospel...For what else (he continues) have many excellent members of our faith done? See we not how richly laden with gold and silver and apparel that most persuasive teacher and blessed martyr Cyprian departed out of Egypt? or Lactantius? or Victorinus, Optatus, Hilary,—not to speak of the living? and Greeks innumerable? And this Moses himself, that most faithful servant of God, first did, of whom it is written, that “he was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians.”...“Let every good and true Christian,” he says elsewhere, “understand, that truth, wherever he finds it, belongs to *his* Lord.” (1b.) “By whomsoever truth is said, it is said through His teaching who is the truth.” (Ep. 166).

The connexion of the Platonic philosophy with the inspired wisdom of the Hebrews, you will find maintained at great length, by Gale, Lamy, Dacier, and Huet, and resisted by Le Clerc, Menage, and L'Enfant.

*Influences
of the ear-
lier Greek
philosophies.*

The influence of the antecedent philosophies of his own country, upon the formation of the views of Plato, is far more palpable. The brief record of ancient criticism, authenticated by Plato's greatest pupil, and evidenced in the writings themselves, is, that “he followed in Sensibles, Heraclitus—in Intellectuals, Pythagoras—in Morals and Politics, Socrates.” To the second member of this division must be added a strong *Eleatic* infusion. And as we shall see that the Philosophy of Plato was eminently ethical,—all else being subservient to this,—we shall anticipate that the influence of *Socrates* would be everywhere discernible. Now, it is well worth considering how much of even the purely speculative tenets of Plato are directly connected with the characteristic peculiarities of his Master. For example, an unquestionable authority, Aristotle himself (*Met.* I. 5), refers the theory of Ideas to the Socratic custom of *definition*. After noticing the impression which the gloomy doctrine of Heraclitus (of the incessant change of all that encompasses us in the world) had made on Plato, Aristotle proceeds:—“On the other hand, Socrates being occupied with morals, and no longer with a physical system, and having sought evermore in morals that which is universal and first, directed his attention to *definitions*. Plato, who followed and continued him, was led to think that definitions ought to belong to an order of beings apart, and have no relation to sensible objects; for how should a common definition apply to things sensible, the subjects of perpetual change? Now these beings apart he designated Ideas,” &c. It is here evident that Plato sought to combine the universality of the Socratic definition with a stability beyond that of physical science; and

*Socratic
influence.*

*Connexion
of Platonic
“ideas”
with Socrati-
c “defini-
tions.”*

thus not only generalized with Socrates, but abstracted and realized his generalizations to meet the objections of the Heraclitian. Again, we recognize the habitual doctrine of Socrates, that the best good of man is in the perfect development of reason, in those tenets which abound in the Platonic dialogues, which identify vice with ignorance, and even pronounce that no man is voluntarily evil, οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός. The physics, again, of Plato are little more than an explanation by final causes; and in the fanciful suppositions to which this leads, we can read an exaggerated result of the Socratic convictions of a Divine Providence as evidenced in the structure of the world. But the luxuriant fructification of the Socratic germ transplanted into this rich soil, is even more remarkably exhibited when we seem to see doctrines gradually formed out of the very habits of the master's conversation. Thus it can scarcely be doubted that the Platonic doctrine of *Reminiscence* was at least partly suggested by that extrication of preconceived truths which Socrates was wont to call his "maieutic art." In the very course of the dialogue (the *Meno*) in which the doctrine is most explicitly set forth, we have an example of the process by which the doctrine itself was probably suggested¹².

LECT.
V.Socratic
tendencies
in Plato's
Ethical,and in his
Physical
speculations.The doctrine of
ἀνάμνησις
suggested by
the practice
of Socrates.

To the ethical principles of Socrates it is manifest that Plato added views for which he was much indebted to the lofty metaphysic of *Pythagoras*. The *Phædrus* is said to have been the first of his dialogues¹³, and in that wonderful

Pythagorean
element in
Plato.
The *Phædrus*.

¹² [In the celebrated conversation with the slave, in whose untutored mind a succession of judicious leading questions operates a "reminiscence" of certain mathematical theorems. *Meno*. p. 82 fol. Ed.]

¹³ [Against the tradition, that the *Phædrus* was the first-born of Plato's genius, several modern authorities have ventured to rebel. The arguments of C. F. Hermann (*Gesch. d. Plat. Phil.* p. 375) are especially entitled to attention; and we can only regret that the work in which they occur is written in a style which even a German must find difficult and repulsive. Among the internal reasons for fixing a later date for this dialogue, may be enumerated, 1. Its Pythagorism, implying that Plato when he wrote the *Phædrus* had studied in Magna Græcia. (See Cicero, *de Repub.* l. 10, 16; *de Fin.* v. 29, 87.) 2. The multifarious learning displayed in it—a learning of which there are few traces in his youthful works. 3. The maturity of its ethico-psychological views—as in the tripartite division of the soul under the figure of the charioteer and two horses (*Phædr.* 246), &c.—contrasted with the Socratic crudity of the *Lysis*, *Protagoras*, &c. 4. The clear exposition of the principles of philosophical method (lb. p. 265), and the complete theory of "ideas" implied in the great mythus (p. 247). Lastly, the perfection of the *Phædrus* as a work of literary art. On the other side, we have the testimony of early—apparently Peripatetic—authorities. See Diog. Laert. iii. 38, a passage from which some infer that the *juvenility* of the *Phædrus* was a fiction invented by way of apology for its supposed bad taste. Much stress has also been laid on the passage relating to Isocrates (*Phædr.* 279), who, it is argued, would not have been painted in such flattering colours at a later period, when the shallowness of that plausible rhetorician could no longer have escaped the penetration of the philosopher. This argument has the more force, if we admit that the description of the ἀρχὴ οὐλομένη πάλιν εἶναι σοφὸς in *Euthyd.* 304 D is intended

performance the youthful author is evidently fresh from the study of the mystic moralist of Crotona. The essential activity, and thence the essential immortality, of the soul, a doctrine held, as we know, by Alcmaeon of Crotona, and altogether Pythagoric; the metempsychosis; the ten periods of the soul;—all these show that if Plato at this period had not mastered the secrets of Pythagorism, he had at least been conversant with its exoteric doctrine. Nothing, indeed, can be more interesting to the student of the mental history of Plato, than the whole examination of this remarkable dialogue. It is to the other writings of Plato what Plato himself is to the more measured style that succeeded him. We find him in the *Phædrus* still encompassed with the poetry of his early days, and unable to contemplate truth except through the prism of imagination¹⁴. He is now *in love* with philosophy, and he delights to lavish his richest treasures of decorative fancy upon the object of his love. The necessity of an eternal world of intellect to form the basis for science, he perceives as clearly as ever; but perhaps never again does he picture its scenery with colouring so bright and so varied; nor even in the *Symposium* itself is the tendency of the soul to the absolute and central beauty painted in words so glowing. The very scenery of the whole is fraught with mystery, and adapted with exquisite art to second the effect of the main subject. The consecrated waters of Ilissus, the Muses' temple, the haunts of ancient song—of Boreas, and Orithyia, of the nymphs, and of mystic Pan,—such is the locality where the hierophant of the ideal world unfolds the story of the soul. Elements even more ancient than the wisdom of Pythagoras are to be found scattered through this composition; but all blended together with such masterly skill as to present a perfect and harmonious uniformity. Plato, who introduced many neologisms, is reported to have been the first inventor of the word "Poem¹⁵," the *Phædrus* alone would make it appropriate that he should be.

for a portrait of Isocrates, as Schleiermacher was the first to suggest. The question is discussed at some length in my Introduction to the *Phædrus*. ED.]

¹⁴ [The *inability* is a mere assumption. The *Phædrus* contains a perfectly clear statement of the theory of dialectic. If the argument were good for anything, it would prove that the *Symposium* and *Timæus* are youthful works; which it is certain they were not.

Notwithstanding the poetical colouring of the *Phædrus*, the ideal theory shines quite distinctly through the Erotic mythus, which, as well as that in the *Symposium*, is a deliberately planned *allegory*, differing from many of Plato's mythus in this respect, that the sign and the thing signified are always or nearly always distinguishable. The praise bestowed upon this mythus in the text is not in the slightest degree exaggerated. ED.]

¹⁵ [The word occurs several times in Herodotus. Plato may possibly have been the first who used it in the restricted sense. ED.]

Of the other philosophies which contributed to form that of Plato, the proper time to speak will be in direct connexion with the doctrines he established to conciliate or to refute them. LECT.
V.

Although, as I have already said, we may conclude that we possess all the written works of Plato, it is not certain that we possess all his opinions. Certain ἀγραφα δόγματα are spoken of in the *Physics* of Aristotle¹⁶, which have given rise among his votaries to discussions almost as anxious as those which our own age witnesses on the subject of unwritten traditions far more important. Aristotle also collected his διαίρεσεις, or Distinctions, which are preserved by Laertius¹⁷, and some of which are to be found in his writings, but which are of little value in estimating his opinions. The "unwritten dogmas" of Plato.

The genuineness, and the chronological order, of his dialogues have been largely debated by modern critics; and the sceptical spirit of the criticism of Germany has shewn no more mercy to the "Attic Moses" than to his venerable prototype. Socher denies us four of the most important of the entire collection¹⁸. Schleiermacher is content with refusing his critical passport to two or three; but the wholesale severity of Ast will not be satisfied unless twelve¹⁹ of our precious relics be sacrificed. The Disputed genuineness of some of the Dialogues.

¹⁶ [*Phys.* IV. 2, 3. Suidas asserts that Aristotle arranged the "unwritten opinions of Plato" in a work of his own *περὶ τὰ ἀγραφα*. All the accessible information upon this curious subject may be found in Trendelenburg's *Platonis Doctrina de Ideis et Numeris*, Lips. 1826, and in the treatise of Brandis, *De perditis Aristotelis Libris*, Bonn, 1823. Ed.]

¹⁷ [These "distinctions" are alluded to by Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.* II. 3: καθάπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς διαίρεσεσιν. Compare Diog. L. III. 80: διέρπει δέ, φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τούτων τὸν τρόπον. The author of the 13th Epistle also mentions them: τῶν τε Πυθαγορείων πέμπω σοι καὶ τῶν διαίρεσεων, p. 360 B. C. F. Hermann, from whom I transcribe these references, calls attention to certain γεγραμμένα διαίρεσεις alluded to by Aristotle, *de Part. Anim.* I. 2 (where the philosopher refers to *Politicus* init. and possibly to *Sophista*, p. 220 B), as evidence that no separate collection of διαίρεσεις was made by Plato himself. (See *Gesch. d. Platonischen Philos.* I. p. 549, not. 224.) The *ἔροι* or Definitions, which appear in the editions of Plato, are attributed by some editors to Speusippus, but without sufficient reason. Ed.]

¹⁸ [The *Parmenides*, *Sophista*, *Politicus* and *Critias*. The *Theætetus* Socher, as well he may, regards as "höchst wahrscheinlich ächt." His book, which is not without interest as the work of a clever amateur, is entitled *Ueber Platons Schriften*. München, 1820. Ed.]

¹⁹ [Not twelve, but twenty-one; to wit, the *Laws*, the *Epinomis**, the *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Alcibiades II.**, *Menexenus*, *Laches*, *Hippias I.* and *II.**, *Ion**, *Euthyphron*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Theages**, *Anterasta**, *Hipparchus**, *Minos**, *Clitophon**, *Epistles**, besides those already condemned by Diogenes Laertius! Those marked with an asterisk are rejected by the Zurich editors, who condemn the first *Alcibiades* also, and not without reason. The second is given up even by Stallbaum. The genuineness of the *Laws* has been called in question by some recent German critics. Its authenticity is ably, and it seems to me conclusively, defended by Professor Jowett in the Introduction to his translation. The *Epinomis*, the second *Alcibiades*, the *Theages*, *Anterasta*, *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, and *Clitophon* have few, if any sup-

reasons upon which this bold decision is founded are totally unsatisfactory. An ideal is formed of the Platonic style, and all which seems to fall below this conception is declared to be the feeble imitation of some ambitious pupil. Some construct this ideal in reference to the perfection of style, others in reference to force of doctrine; some look to the artist, others to the philosopher; but all equally adopt a principle against which the genuineness of none of the more voluminous authors of antiquity could stand²⁰. No one is more ready than myself to admit that among the Platonic dialogues are *some* which appear miserably unworthy of the author of the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic*; but when I find the *Hippias Minor*, with its barren paradoxes, authenticated by the express reference of Aristotle²¹, I learn to distrust *a priori* criticism. Plato's writings were spread over a long and meditative life; they were produced under various influences, and probably under many changes of temper and feeling; the Columbus of the Ideal World could not always steer steadily and exultingly for the land of his discoveries and his reputation; nor can we tell what conjectures may have given pertinency to discussions that now seem arid and unprofitable. The partiality of a writer for early essays may have induced Plato to permit imperfect sketches to shelter their imperfection under the shadow of maturer greatness²²; and his deep reverence for Socrates may have sometimes induced him to forbear qualifying with his own more finished excellence a few of those paradoxical discussions in which the old master kept his unrivalled powers of casuistry in play, and breathed himself for more moment-

porters except Mr Grote: but most of the remaining dialogues in Ast's list are not only worthy of Plato, but could not have proceeded from an inferior author. The difference of style observable in the *Larus* is, in the opinion of some critics, satisfactorily accounted for by the questionable tradition that it was left by Plato *ἐν κρηρῇ*, i.e. that he did not live to write a fair copy. But a certain degeneration of manner is observable in other probably late dialogues of undoubted authenticity; and were the literary merit of the *Larus* less than it really is, we should have no right to question a work which Aristotle expressly acknowledges to have been written by his master. Ed.]

²⁰ [This remark has undoubtedly great force against the sweeping criticisms, or *uncriticisms*, of Ast. On the other hand, there is an antecedent probability that Plato would find many imitators, and that their imitations would vary in merit. Some of the coarsest forgeries were rejected by the ancients (see the list in Laërtius), but the unresisting acquiescence in the genuineness of compositions so open to suspicion as the Platonic Epistles, is a proof that the Alexandrine critics are not to be trusted without reserve. Ed.]

²¹ [*Metaph.* IV. 29, 5, where it is called "the *Hippias*," as if Aristotle knew no other. The same dialogue is referred to in the same terms by Cicero, *de Orat.* III. 32. This is an argument, so far as it goes, against the genuineness of the *First Hippias*. Ed.]

²² [If this remark has any force, it constitutes a reason against the early date of the *Phædrus*, in which Plato's powers both of language and arrangement appear in their most perfect state of development. Ed.]

ous encounters. By the aid of such considerations as these, there are none of the works of Plato authenticated by fair *external* evidence, which we may not receive as possible, or probable, products of his mind.

Amid a collection so varied and so extensive it is impossible not to feel some curiosity as to the order of composition. With the exception of the tradition before noticed relative to the priority of the *Phædrus* and *Lysis*, and a statement in Plutarch's life of Solon, that the completion of the *Critias* was prevented by the author's death, the ancients give us little light on this subject. That some of the dialogues were intended to be mutually connected is unquestionable. Thus, the *Theætetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Politicus*. The *Republic*, the *Timæus*, and the *Critias*, are expressly conjoined by their author; though it may at first sight seem strange that a treatise of physics should form the middle term between a great political essay and a high-wrought moral romance. If the *Clitophon* were a genuine dialogue it should form the introduction to this series. The usual division is the old classification by tetralogies²³, which, we are told, Plato himself adopted in imitation of the tragic writers; a proof to you how distinctly he himself, or at least the ancient critics who received these works (if the division by tetralogies began with *them*), regarded the Platonic dialogues as works of art, as philosophic *dramas*. Another classification of great antiquity is based upon the style and purpose of the dialogue,—as maieutick, anatreptick, endeictick, and so forth. But all these divisions throw little light upon the literary biography of Plato. As the only remaining resource efforts have been made to arrange the order of production by the internal evidence of the writings themselves. In this enterprize Schleiermacher has displayed especial perseverance, and considerable sagacity. Of his reasonings, depending as they must on minute details, and comparisons of phrases, style, subject, and sentiment, it would, of course, be impossible to present you with any satisfactory account. The general result is thus stated by another able Platonist, who regards it as substantially justified by a close examina-

In what order were the Dialogues composed?

Classification by Thrasyllus in tetralogies.

Schleiermacher's principle of arrangement.

²³ [Thrasyllus, who lived under the emperor Tiberius, is the authority for this (in Diog. L. III. 56). He divided the whole series of dialogues into tetralogies, of which Laertius gives a list. It is quite certain that his division was not Plato's; though some of his tetralogies are assorted with considerable intelligence. The two or three tetralogies projected by the philosopher himself were never finished: thus, in that in which the *Theætetus* stands first, we are promised a fourth dialogue to follow the *Politicus*, but the promise is not fulfilled. Thrasyllus completes the tetralogy by prefixing the *Cratylus* to the other three; an expedient for which there is no justification in Plato's text. His selection of the wretched little *Clitophon* to head the series beginning with the *Republic* is another instance of injudicious ingenuity. ED.]

LECT.
V.

tion of the writings thus estimated. "He divides the works of Plato into three classes. To the class of the writings of his youth belong the *Phædrus* and the *Protagoras*, as well as several other minor moral dialogues in the Socratic vein; the second class comprises particularly those works of the higher dialectic which are mutually connected,—the *Theætetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*; finally, the dialogues directly constructive,—the *Republic*, *Timæus*, and *Laws*,—form the last class of the writings of Plato." The writer whom I cite adds that the *Gorgias* may mark the transition from the first to the second class; the *Phædo* and *Philebus*, from the second to the third. A general decision such as this, is, perhaps, the farthest point that criticism can expect to reach without external evidence to assure its advances.

But, whatever may have been the precise order in which the works and the mind of Plato were developed, and whatever may have been the circumstances, now irreparably lost, which determined each successive direction of his thoughts, there is a unity in the whole which speaks the creation of a single mind, and which appears in even the earliest of his disquisitions with a distinctness which proves that the main lines of his philosophy were caught and fixed before he ever wrote a page.

These prominent features, which decide the character of the whole, are to my judgment discoverable from the first, and discoverable in all. And these, felt to be the fundamental notes, are the notes which have found their echo in every age. To be more precise, the teaching of Plato presented a double aspect, and each found its exaggerated likeness in succeeding forms of philosophy. On the one hand, the constant depreciation of the certainty and value of such knowledge as is derived through the channel of the *senses*, was represented in the sceptical, or semi-sceptical, succession of the Academics; on the other, the loftier views of his more abstract tenets were resumed, and too often disfigured, by the Alexandrian mystics. In exhibiting the ultimate forms of his doctrines when separately and exclusively received, these schools afford very valuable instruction to the student of Plato. The double result is highly characteristic of the localities where it manifested itself. The subtle intellect of Greece soon adopted as its favourite that element of Platonism which gave room for endless distinctions, strange paradoxes, and scholastic conflict; the oriental genius of Alexandria found food for its musing quietism in those remote and ethereal speculations which seemed to justify a life of meditative inaction, and even to exhibit, as its reward and inheritance, an imme-

Twofold
aspect of
the Platon-
ic philo-
sophy;
its sceptical

and specu-
lative ele-
ment

represented,
the first in
the Acad-
emic, the se-
cond in the
Alexan-
drian
schools.

ciate commerce with heaven. No inquiry can be more interesting and profitable to those who desire to grow wise upon recorded error—to erect, as it were, warning beacons upon every perilous passage in the vast sea of human speculation—than that which examines these two developments of Platonism, and traces to their consummate efflorescence the germs which already lay scattered through the old dialogues of the master himself. Every one feels that the danger of the Platonic philosophy, from its earliest hour, was its bias to exclusive contemplativeness; and in these developments you have the inevitable result. Exactly as every one must recognize that one of the most wondrous evidences of divine wisdom in the Christian system, is the perfect proportion in which it exhibits its impulses to the contemplative and active forms of holiness, giving to each its appropriate stimulants; and while chiefly insisting upon the one which man's position in a world of social duties most requires, yet never allowing to it that absolute supremacy which could make the other wholly forgotten. It is, indeed, well worth notice, how in the very aggregate of writings which divine Providence was pleased to preserve to the Church as the exemplar of practice, this balance seems purposely and carefully held in view; and the characters of the writers, and the portion of inspired precept they record, suited with exquisite accuracy to give the complex impression required. Yet we know that even in Christianity itself, at various ages, the separate elements have obtained disproportionate influence, and the due equilibrium of the New Testament been forgotten; and we may, perhaps, be inclined to indulge to the reputation of Plato results which the caprices and perversities of our nature have introduced more than once into the ethics of Christianity itself. At the same time, I am willing to allow (as subsequent expositions shall evince), that any representation of Platonism would be imperfect, which did not fairly state that the scepticism of the Academy and the dreamy theories of Alexandria were not unnatural results of certain tendencies discoverable in the writings of Plato himself; tendencies for which his own well-balanced intellect, doubtless, provided sufficient counterpoise, but which too closely suited peculiar temperaments not to have been soon exalted into exclusive or predominant principles of speculation.

Comparison of Platonism and Christianity.

With such admonitions as these—and they should never be forgotten—the student of the Platonic treatises may prepare to yield himself to a course of philosophical speculation, which, taking all circumstances together, is probably the most ennobling that has yet proceeded from any

Concluding remarks.

human being unaided, directly or indirectly, by the notices of inspiration. How far such a philosophy can expect to obtain the rights of citizenship in these countries under their present habits of thought, it is not easy to say. That its fundamental principles, when stripped of unnecessary hypothesis and fanciful decoration (which Plato himself, perhaps, intended for nothing more), are founded on eternal truth, I cannot doubt; but it is unquestionable that they represent a class of truths which, for many years, and from various causes, have been feebly portrayed in the popular philosophy of our language. With all our admiration for the energetic labours of the great naturalists of our day, and for the advances which the physical sciences are receiving through their combined exertions, we cannot refuse to see—and in all quarters the conviction is gaining strength among thoughtful men—that the spiritual world (except as far as practically presented by the preachers of religion) is in proportion eclipsed. It is, as it were, unrepresented in the parliament of philosophy. This huge material universe with all its labyrinth of laws seems to fetter and entangle us; and we are so overwhelmed by weight and motion, that matter and being become equivalent terms, and we cannot allow the existence of a world to which these material attributes are not attached. Now, if it be essential to a right estimation of things, that we should evermore feel that there is that within us which can hold converse with truths that sense has never given and never could give; that these truths are real truths, things far more durable than ever was earthly bond or material law; that they manifest themselves on the stage of our conscious intelligence as the shadows of eternal realities; that these realities converge to one centre, which centre is no other than God Himself; if it be well that amid the dust of our laboratories these things should not be forgotten, then is it well that the high-priest of reason—that Plato—should be heard and known. In truth, it was a wondrous vision that this man saw! Untaught (if he was untaught, if any one moving in such a path can be said to move wholly without the guidance of God, but, for all outward evidence, untaught) by any supernatural instructor, he could look into his own heart and find there the image of eternity, he could see reflected in the human reason the divine, and catch from the mysterious caverns of the soul yet imprisoned in flesh, dim echoes of another world! Whatever be the errors, the fantasies, the failures, of Plato, to have thus seen and heard, to have thus stood forward a witness for the design and destinies of man, places him—if we forget for a moment his less aspiring master—alone among the

uninspired instructors of the earth. And in every age, when the tone of public opinion becomes relaxed, when its ambition becomes envy and its wisdom cunning, and men professedly determine to forget the inner for the outer world—the office of the *pulpit* is indeed plain and invariable; but, as for the *schools*, who must speak by book and system, it has been their safety to inscribe the venerable name of Plato upon their standards, and strong in the authority that belongs to recognized greatness when modern names might fail, to restore, under the charm and the power of this august philosophy, the falling fortunes of learning and the muse.

LECTURE VI.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. III.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT
VI.

*Subject of
the Lecture
stated.*

HAVING, at such length as our present occasion demanded, considered the chief characteristics of the life and writings of Plato, we are now to enter upon a much more difficult task,—that of briefly, but definitely, fixing our views of his philosophical labours. Upon the difficulty of the undertaking, however, I will not insist; as I should be sorry to suggest anything which might deter you from making that personal investigation, to which all my efforts in this place are only meant to be preparatory or auxiliary. Neither shall I (for reasons still more obvious) say anything about my own qualifications to be your assistant in the study. *My* only claims upon your attention consist in this,—that what I shall offer you is at least the result of patient and conscientious examination of the original documents of this great master of reason; and therefore, that if my conclusions should coincide with those already advanced in your ordinary text-books and treatises, they will possess the value (whatever it may amount to) of independent evidence; if they should differ, they will invite you to the tribunal where alone such differences can be properly decided—the great originals, the *fontes integri*—themselves. If they effect this, they will procure you a benefit cheaply purchased by the trouble of listening for a while to a tedious or inefficient exposition.

In our present Lecture we shall consider the Philosophy of Plato, generally, and as a whole.

*The Philosophy of
Plato as a
whole.
Its ethical
character.*

I. The quality which above all others manifests itself to the student of this philosophy is the eminently ethical character of the entire system. It is a contemplative philosophy only for practical purposes. Its ultimate object is the purification of the soul, and science is but the means for the attainment of this object. Thus, its tendency is to rationalize morals, and to moralize reason. Its phrases and definitions perpetually shew this. Wisdom, or *σοφία*, is expressly declared to belong alone to the Supreme Divi-

nity¹, who alone can contemplate reality directly, and with whom, indeed, it seems more than once intimated that knowledge and existence coincide: Philosophy is considered as the aspiration of the soul after this perfect and immutable truth,—that is, it is connected with perfect wisdom by the medium of a divine affection (that “love” on which Plato so largely dilates); in other words, it is itself essentially moral, no less than merely scientific (*Phædr.*). In this spirit he pronounces “philosophy,” properly speaking, to belong neither to the gods nor to the ignorant among mankind: the aspiration is below those who possess the reality, and above those who have never learned its value². In establishing the proper object of philosophic science to be the eternal and unchangeable (as far as man can attain it), we find (in conformity with what I have stated) this supreme essence invested with moral attributes; it is alternately τὸ ὄν and τὸ ἀγαθόν; and all which can be the material of speculation in the system of the universe is pronounced to be an emanation of goodness. “What,” asks one of the interlocutors in the sixth book of the *Republic*³, “is this science of which you speak as superior to all others, and what is its object?” “You have often heard me say,” replies Socrates, “that the Idea of the Good is the object of the sublimest of sciences...if we know not this idea, it will avail us nothing to know all the rest.”...“As eyes which should be unable to turn from darkness to light without turning the whole body, so the organ of intelligence ought to turn with the entire soul from the sight of that which is generated to the contemplation of that which alone *is*, and of that which is most luminous in Being; and have we not denominated that the Good?” It is even said that the Good is “the cause of things known, and of knowledge”⁴. And to render this ultimate ἀγαθὸν yet more definite, it is

LECT.
VI.*Platonic
section of
the philosophy.**The Idea of
the Good its
ultimate ob-
ject.*

¹ [*Phædr.* p. 278 D: τὸ μὲν σοφόν, ὃ Φαῖδρε, καλεῖν ἐμοιγε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῶν μόνῳ πρέπειν. Comp. *Apol.* p. 23 A. ED.]

² [*Sympos.* p. 204 A: θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι, ἐστὶ γὰρ...οὐδ' αὖ οἱ ἀμαθείς φιλοσοφοῦσιν, κ.τ.λ. ED.]

³ [p. 505 A and VII. 518 C. ED.]

⁴ [*R. p.* VI. p. 508 E: τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, αἰτίαν ἐπιστήμῃ οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, κ.τ.λ. So VII. 517 C: ἡ τ. ἀγ. ἰδ...πάντων ὁρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ...ἐν νοητῷ αὐτῇ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη. ED.]

* “The Good is the Sun of the Intelligible World; it sheds on objects the light of truth, and gives to the soul that knows the faculty of knowing.” “Consider,” he proceeds, “this Idea as the principle of science, and of truth, considered as subject to knowledge; and however beautiful be science and truth, you will deceive yourself, if you set not the idea of the Good apart from, and above, them. As in the visible world, we justly believe that sight and light are analogous to the sun, yet are not the sun; so in the intelligible sphere, we regard science and truth as analogous to the Good, but it would be a grievous error to take them for the Good itself, which is far more precious than they.”

LECT.
VI.*Use of the
particular
sciences.**Treatment
of the parti-
cular vir-
tues.**The per-
fectly good
is God.*

exhibited with a fixed and individual personality. The object of the particular sciences is said to be "to facilitate the contemplation of the idea of Good⁵," thus synonymous with reality itself: and this essential Goodness is described as "the happiest of all beings, and whom the soul ought evermore and in every way to contemplate⁶." Every special science is valuable only so far as it aids to enfranchise the soul for this free flight into the infinite excellence⁷. Accordingly, when Plato is engaged with the discussion of the particular sciences, he resolves them into the science of Good; when engaged with the particular virtues, he resolves them into the virtue of Science. The *Laches* is a discussion on valour, and it is shewn to be as nothing where not directed by that presiding knowledge which alone can raise it into the sphere of virtue; while, on the other hand, mathematics, music, astronomy, are below the level of the philosopher, where not made strictly subordinate to the art of converse with the supremely good⁸. You will have now perceived that, in Plato, philosophy is only another name for religion;—philosophy is the love of Perfect Wisdom; perfect Wisdom and perfect Goodness are identified; the perfectly Good is God Himself⁹;—philo-

⁵ [*Rep.* VII. p. 532 C: πᾶσα... ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν... ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐπαγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὐσι θεῶν. ED.]

⁶ [*Ib.* VII. 526 E: τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ βίου, ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν. The epithet εὖδ. is perhaps explained by *Phædr.* 250 B, C: μακάριον ὄναι τε καὶ θεῶν... τῶν τελετῶν ἦν θέμις λέγειν μακαριωτάτην, where the "blessedness" is the attribute of the spectators, not of the object contemplated. ED.]

⁷ And though this unimaginable Excellence is declared to be super-essential—above Being itself—ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας προσβείη καὶ δύναμει ὑπερέχουτος—(*Rep.* vi.). it is yet identified with moral entities by manifesting itself in and through them.

⁸ [*Rep.* VII. p. 521 C, fol. ED.]

⁹ [Whether Plato really identified the Idea of Good with God is still an undecided question. His ancient interpreters undoubtedly so understood him—Platonists and Neo-platonists alike: and the same is the view of most of his German expositors. The principal exceptions are Stallbaum and C. F. Hermann; the former holding that the Idea of Good is itself, in Plato's view, the creation of the divine Intelligence; the latter, that it is to be regarded as its coeternal object, immutable, uncaused, independent as God is. The opinion adopted in the text is evidently difficult to reconcile with the personality of the divine Essence, and with those passages, in the *Timæus* and elsewhere, in which that personality seems to be clearly asserted. Are we to suppose that such passages (which the reader will find quoted abundantly in the notes to subsequent Lectures) are to be taken in an exclusively mythical or popular sense, and that we are to look to the *Republic* and *Philebus* as conveying Plato's interior meaning? It does not fall within the province of the Editor of these Lectures to pronounce upon this most obscure, but profoundly interesting question; at the same time it would have been unfair to pass it over in silence. Those who would compare the arguments on both sides are referred to C. F. Hermann's tract, *De Idea Boni ap. Plat.* Marb. 1832, to Stallbaum's Prolegomena to the *Philebus*, p. xxxiv. and those to the *Timæus*, p. 46: and, as an able defence of the more generally received opinion, to

sophy, then, is the Love of God. Whatever you may think of the soundness of this reasoning, or the practicability of realizing it, you can at least perceive how susceptible was the language of Platonism of Christian adaptations; and how naturally the Evangelists, in rendering the expressions of their divine Master into the language which Plato spoke, adopted phrases analogous to those which Plato used. Such are those, especially, which speak of the *knowledge* of God as itself involving a spiritual state of the soul; and which, in like manner, make that spiritual state the path of access to that knowledge. The judicious student of the New Testament will not fail to observe the internal evidence of supernatural guidance which is contained in the very moderation with which phrases are used which may be so easily urged to mysticism, and which, in point of fact, formed the text upon which the extravagances of gnosticism were founded, and by which the impracticable theories of the later Platonists sought to obtain the countenance of antiquity.

Such then is the predominating quality of the Platonic philosophy,—the professed union of the Absolute Goodness with the Absolute Reality, of perfect Truth with perfect Virtue, of human virtue with philosophy. It is thus that Socrates on one occasion describes the votary of this celestial wisdom in language whose purport we shall just now understand more distinctly:—"He who possesses the true love of science, naturally is carried in his aspirations to the real Being; and his love, far from suffering itself to be retarded by this multitude of things whose reality is only apparent, knows no repose until it have arrived at union with the essence of each object by the part of the soul which is akin to the permanent and essential; so that, this divine conjunction having produced intelligence and truth, the knowledge of Being is won, and the true life in the bosom of the sage attained free of the painful throes that accompanied its birth!" "He whose thoughts are really occupied with the high contemplation of the eternal Existence, has no leisure to cast his eyes upon the doings of men, to war with them, and cherish envy and bitterness against them:—his gaze for ever fixed upon objects which preserve the same mutual arrangement and relations, and which, without seeking each other's evil, are all submitted to the law of order and of reason, he makes it his object to image forth in himself their perfect harmony. For how can one be unceasingly in the company of an object that excites

*Union of
the Good
and True
in the Pla-
tonic
scheme.*

E. Zeller's *Philos. d. Griechen*, Vol. II. § 23. Compare also Tiedemann *de Deo Platoni*, Amsterd. 1830. Ed.]

⁹ [*Rep.* VI. p. 490 B. Ed.]

LECT.
VI.

love and admiration without an effort to resemble it?... Thus the philosopher, by his communion with that which is divine and subject to the law of order, becomes himself a subject of order, and divine, as far as it competes to humanity¹⁰." I cite such passages as these, partly to establish the predominatingly moral complexion of the Platonic notion of science,—which is, in some measure, the key of his whole philosophy,—partly, I confess (as the spies of Sacred Writ), to exhibit some specimen of the productions of this promised land, and to animate you to penetrate it for yourselves, undismayed by the reported terrors of those *Anakims* of ancient philosophy—Ideas, and Essences, and Essential Forms.

The philosophy of Plato, then, being, as we have intimated, founded upon the eternal Unity of Goodness, Order, and Truth; and all the departments of Knowledge being referred to the Ultimate Reality in which these were considered to be combined, you will of course expect to find in the Platonic philosophy an intimate relation of all its parts to each other, as well as to their common object. This indeed is in some degree a character of all ancient, as contrasted with modern, philosophy; but it is more eminently observable in Plato than in any of his contemporaries or successors. There is no philosophy the entire of which so easily resolves itself into a few fundamental ideas. He is said to have divided his own speculations into three main departments,—Dialectics, Physics, and Ethics (for, like every *a priori* reasoner, Plato had a tendency to take the entire field of philosophy into his grasp); and it would not be difficult to shew that all these regions, as Plato regarded them, are directly and immediately connected. But, as we have already laid down the principle; that the ethical character is that which predominates in all the views of Plato, it is from this that we set out in exhibiting this second characteristic of the Platonic philosophy.

*Platonic
identification
of the
speculative
and practical
exemplified in his
dialectics*

II. When Plato examined the Idea of Humanity, he found its principal character to be the gift of reason. The rationality of man was his essential attribute; and the perfection of man must consist in its development. The proper object of reason is truth,—truth as single, identical, and immutable as reason itself. The apprehension of truth is, therefore, that which eminently belongs to man; in greater or less degrees to all men; in the highest degree of earthly cultivation, to the sage. As far, then, as man perceives truth—not truth physical and transitory, but truth unchangeable and eternal—so far is he aiming at the proper perfection of his nature. But the perfection of man

¹⁰ [*Rhp.* VI. p. 500 B. ED.]

is virtue itself; virtue therefore is evermore identified with the apprehension of truth; and the practical and speculative sciences are thus identified. I need not, to any of you who remember the attempt which I made to illustrate the views of Socrates himself, repeat that this view of thought is pre-eminently Socratic. To such a degree does Plato carry this conviction of the identity of true science with true virtue, that he repeatedly maintains that all vice is ignorance, in other words, is a mistake as to the nature and distinctions of good and evil. The knowledge of good, therefore, of that good which diffuses itself through all inferior goods, and gives them their character, is the main point of philosophical virtue. But how shall man attain to the knowledge of good? By what pathway shall he learn to climb to this dominant citadel of wisdom? Now, to solve this, we must remember that the knowledge of good, as being *knowledge*, must presuppose an object stable and unchangeable; an object, then, beyond this transitory scene. It must be a *science* (in the Platonic language) of that which *is*, and not an opinion (*δόξα*) of that which appears. The science which thus treats of everlasting existences, and among them, as supreme, of the Ultimate and Absolute Good, this is no other than the Platonic Dialectics.

But again, we have seen how morality itself, in the Platonic estimate, was referred to that Being who is essential order. The world itself is but the image in the sphere of sense of those ideas of order which perpetually inhere in the intellect of that great and central Being. To study the constitution of the world is then to contemplate, in a blurred and distorted reflection, indeed, but still to contemplate, the divine mind; and though the main business of philosophy is to rise above the transitory and phenomenal, yet, while held in its subordinate place, even the world of appearances may minister to the purposes of ethical discipline. At least its study may serve as a relaxation. For (I quote a sentiment which will sound strangely in modern ears) "if any man, with a view to relaxation from higher pursuits, should cease for a while from speculations regarding the eternal, and follow out arguments analogical or conjectural (*εἰκότας*) regarding the temporal, and by such means find himself in possession of unrepented pleasure (*ἡδονὴν ἀμεταμέλητον*), he will secure himself a temperate and proper recreation¹¹." But the directly moral purpose is still the main one; "God gave us sight," Plato declares in the same dialogue from which I have quoted, "that on surveying the circulations of the heavens, themselves the

¹¹ [*Timæus*, p. 59 D. Ed.]

result of intellect, we may fittingly dispose the revolutions of our own thoughts, which are kindred to these celestial motions; and thus may correct the tumult of our mind by the harmonious progressions of their intellectual periods¹²." And thus it is that the treatise I have cited, which contains the Platonic view of the physical universe, is only the *sequel* of a lofty exposition of practical and political philosophy¹³. By such ties as these, slender and attenuated, perhaps, to us, but solid and forcible to their illustrious Author, the cultivation of the moral reason was united with the study of *Physics*.

Once more, the world itself was the imitation of ideas. The science of these archetypal ideas was involved in Dialectics. Physical knowledge was thus reduced under the sway of this all-controlling science; and, in point of fact, became in the hands of Plato a science partly *a priori*, and partly dependent on the investigation of *final causes*. But of that which, you have seen, he regarded as a mere relaxation from the proper business of philosophy, it was not to be expected that he should think or discourse much. A single dialogue, the *Timæus*, comprehends nearly all which Plato has given us on physical science. The whole does not contain the record of a single experiment; and nearly a third of the entire is occupied with purely meta-physical dissertation.

Platonic
conception
of political
science, as
the realiza-
tion of the
idea of
Justice.

If we have thus seen the strict connexion of the main regions of the Platonic philosophy, if we have seen that this philosophy is but the idea of the Absolutely and Eternally Good carried into all the regions of thought, morals being the imitation of it, physics the sensible result of it, dialectics the investigation of it, it will be unnecessary for me to direct you to the obvious bond that unites the *Politics* of Plato with this central notion. The *Politics* of Plato are the realization of the just; they are that in the social world which his *Physics* are in the inanimate. His *Republic* is a republic of philosophers, and could exist with no other inhabitants. "I complain," says the Platonic Socrates on one occasion, "of finding no form of government that suits a philosopher. Thus it is that we see the character itself decaying. Just as a seed sown in a foreign soil loses its raciness and takes the quality of the soil in which it is deposited, so the philosophic character loses in this situation its proper spirit and changes its whole nature. On the contrary, should it but meet a government whose perfection corresponded to its own, then should we see that

¹² [*Timæus*, p. 47 B. ED.]

¹³ [That is to say of the *Republic*, of which the *Timæus* is professedly a continuation. See *Tim.* init. ED.]

it involves in it a something essentially divine, and that in all but *it*—in men, their characters and pursuits—there is nothing but what is miserably human¹⁴.” So that the polity of which Plato presents us the outline is, even confessedly, inapplicable to the ordinary world; it is the prophecy of future possibilities, when individuals were to carry out, each for himself and for the community, that scheme of perfection which God had shadowed forth in the sensible universe. And so completely identified are the Politics of Plato with purely ethical speculation, that many critics¹⁵ have contended that the whole *Republic* is but an allegorical description of an individual human soul.

We have seen the relationship that combines into one vast aggregate the entire philosophy of Plato. The manner in which he connected, as dependent satellites, all the inferior and special sciences with the central science of divine contemplation, we shall observe presently. It is now time to exhibit (as clearly as I can find and express it) the *most general* features of that philosophy and philosophical character which Plato had formed to himself as the ideal of *science* and the ideal of perfect *humanity*. Particulars and specialities belong to our subsequent analyses.

III. “Those,” says Plato, “are to be termed philosophers, and those alone, who attach themselves to the contemplation of the essential principle of things¹⁶.” This sentence is the close of an animated discussion, and comprehends the inference to which that discussion leads. Let us endeavour to represent the substance of this important reasoning. In being the reasoning of *Plato*, it will (I regret to say) differ from the representations of too many of his professed expositors, whose statements evince very clearly that they have derived them from every source except the original writings. ^{*Plato's ideal of philosophy and the philosopher illustrated from his own writings.*}

“Answer me,” says Socrates¹⁷—“when one says that a person loves anything, does one mean that he loves only such or such a part of it, or that he loves it in its totality (*παντὸς τοῦ εἶδους*)? Certainly, in its totality. So of the philosopher, he loves wisdom universally? Unquestionably. And just as a hungry man is not fastidious about peculiarities of diet, so we can scarcely call him philosopher who makes difficulties about peculiar sciences...but

¹⁴ [*Rep.* VI. p. 497 B. ED.]

¹⁵ [As for instance Morgenstern, in his elegant *Commentationes de Platonis Republica*, 1794. ED.]

¹⁶ [*Rep.* V. *lin.*: οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ᾽ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντες δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι. ED.]

¹⁷ [*Ib.* p. 475 B. The passage is paraphrased, with omissions, to the end of the Book. ED.]

LECT.
VI.

he who manifests a taste for all kinds of knowledge, who joys in learning, and knows no satiety in the acquisition of truths, think you (continues Socrates), does he not merit the name of philosopher? Why" (returns his companion, whom Socrates, with his usual skill, had brought not to *learn* the point intended, but to *discover* it for himself—"at this rate the world would abound with philosophers: for it appears to me that our lovers of brilliant shows (*φιλοθεάμονες*) are philosophers as far as the pleasure of novel learning is concerned; and our lovers of the gratification of the ear (*φιλήκοοι*), very queer philosophers, and who would not very willingly take part in such a discussion as ours; but who seem as if they had hired out their ears to all the choruses at the feasts of Bacchus, missing not one in town or country. Are we to call such as these *Philosophers*, merely from their ardour for new information? Certainly not," replies the master; "not philosophers, but resemblances of philosophers. But the true who are they? Those sight-lovers alone, who love the sight of *Truth**." This calls for explanation, which accordingly Socrates undertakes. "You will grant me, the beautiful and the ugly are distinct†. And if so each is *one*. It is the same with just and unjust, good and evil, and all other ideas (*πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν*); each in itself is *one*; but in their relations with actions and bodies they assume a thousand forms, that appear to multiply these primary unities....Here then lies the true distinction between these sight-lovers, and art-lovers (*φιλοτέχνους*), and men of practical skill, and those to whom alone the name of philosophers is fitly given. How, Socrates? The former, curious of sight and sound, love beautiful voices, beautiful colours, beautiful forms, everything that is constructed out of such; but their intelligence (*διάνοια*) cannot see and embrace the nature of the Beautiful itself....Are not such men rare indeed, who can advance to this Beautiful itself, and see it in its essence (*καθ' αὐτὸ ὁρᾶν*)?...And what is the life of a man who believes in beautiful things (*καλὰ πράγματα νομίζων*) but is a stranger to the Beautiful itself, and is powerless to follow those who would shew it to him? is it a dream or a reality? What *is* to dream? Is it not—sleeping or waking, I care not—to take the resemblance of a thing for the thing it resembles? Surely it is. What then? he who can contemplate the Beautiful, whether in itself or in that which participates of its essence (*καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέ-*

* The original is beautifully emphatic: Τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις; τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμονας.

† *καλὸν* and *αἰσχροῦν*, words of a moral as well as æsthetic purport: our English "*fair*" is similarly susceptible of a double significance.

χοντα), without ever confounding the object partaking with the essence partaken, seems *his* life a dream or a reality? Doubtless, a thorough reality." Socrates is then represented as establishing the distinction between knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and opinion (δόξα). "If," he declares, "Science refer to Being, and Ignorance to Non-Being, we must seek for that which holds the medium between existence and non-existence, something intermediate between science and ignorance." This is no other than *opinion*, a faculty (δύναμις) distinct from science—opinion, which is the faculty of judging by appearance (δοξάζειν). It is, then, equally evident, that we possess the two faculties, and that they have distinct objects. Opinion cannot rise to know what science knows, nor science descend to estimate as opinion estimates. The latter, less luminous than science, less obscure than ignorance, finds its object in that which, holding the mean between pure being and pure nothing, at once *is and is not*. This object, itself subject to perpetual variation, contrasts with the world of science, which is ever one and identical; and the φιλοθεάμων, untaught to repose in the absolute Beauty, is condemned to hover in a region of incessant and unsatisfying change. That which in one point of view presents itself as beautiful and just, in another point of view shall lose these high characteristics; and it is the same with every attribute that can affect the objects of the sensible world. Such objects then can hold their fitting place only between true being and absolute non-existence. Socrates then proceeds triumphantly to the close. "We have discovered," he pronounces, "that this multitude of things to which a multitude of persons ascribe beauty and the like, hovers between the absolute reality and total negation. Agreed. But we had settled beforehand, that of such things as these, we would properly affirm, that they are the object of the intermediate faculty, of opinion and not of science (δοξαστὸν οὐ γνωστὸν). Certainly. As for those, who, gazing on things beautiful, perceive not the absolute beauty, and are unable to follow him who would lead them thither; who observe many just things, but never justice itself; and so of the rest, all their judgments, we shall say, are opinions, not knowledge. Certainly. On the contrary, those who contemplate the unchangeable essences of things (κατὰ ταῦτ' ὡσαύτως ὄντα) possess not opinions but knowledge (γινώσκειν ἀλλ' οὐ δοξάζειν)? Equally certain. Shall we not say then of both, that they have attachment and love, the one for those things which are the objects of knowledge, the other party for those which are the subjects of opinion? Have we not said that these last are gratified with beautiful things,

LECT.
VI.

sounds, colours, and so forth, but that they will not hear of the Absolute Beauty as something itself real (ὡς τι ὄν)? So we said. Thus we shall do them no wrong if we call them φιλόδοξοι rather than φιλόσοφοι, the aspirants after opinion not after wisdom. Shall they take it ill of us if we style them so? not if they be persuaded by me; for none should take ill the truth itself. Be those then alone deemed 'philosophers,' who in each object seize the essential reality." I know not how many of you will join in the παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, with which the pupil, Glaucon, receives this decision; such however is the notion which Plato had formed of that which constitutes the only veritable philosophy. The reason embraces in its own eternal world coeternal realities; it apprehends these by a power which belongs to it as truly as the power of vision belongs to the natural eye; it apprehends them naturally, for all this transcendental knowledge is the heritage of every human soul; but the vast proportion of mankind die without ever realizing their own calling, and are starving in the midst of plenty. You will have perceived how distinct an apprehension Plato had obtained of all that sphere of physical inquiry upon which modern philosophy vaunts its eminence, and to which it would so often confine the energies of the human spirit. It is that which he here styles τὸ δοξαστέον, elsewhere τὸ φαινόμενον,—and to which he appropriates as its special organ the δόξα ἀληθής, a phrase, which, in compliance with custom, I have translated *opinion*, but which scarcely corresponds to our ordinary use of that word. The δόξα of Plato rather answers to the experience, or empirical information, of the modern philosophy of Germany; one instance of the many in which you will find *Kant* a commentator on Plato.

*Allegory of
the Cave.*

The same general view of the object of philosophy is presented to the imagination in that exquisite allegory in the opening of the seventh book of the *Politeia*, which has in all ages been the admiration alike of philosopher and poet. I feel how miserably defective must be any attempt which I can make at exhibiting this beautiful passage; but I also feel that a single sentence of an original author is, for auditors who can themselves reflect, worth a thousand laboured commentaries; more especially where, as in this case, the perspicuity and precision of the original transcends all illustration. The great philosopher, having in the preceding book compared that primary Nature from which Truth and Science flow to the sun of the visible world, proceeds thus: "Now, I resumed,—to conceive our condition when educated and when uneducated,—make this supposition. Imagine a subterranean cave, having its

whole length open to the light; and in this cave men confined from their infancy by fetters which so bind their limbs and necks, that they can neither change their place nor turn their heads round, and can behold only what fronts them. The light comes to them from a fire which is kindled at some distance and pretty high behind them. Between this fire and our captives rises a low wall like those screens that jugglers draw between them and the spectators, and above which their wonders are exhibited. Now conceive that there pass along this wall men carrying objects of all kinds, which appear above the screen, figures of men and animals in wood and stone, and other varieties, some of the bearers, as we may suppose, speaking, others silent. Strange similitude, Socrates! and strange captives these!—Here, nevertheless, is our own condition. In the first place, do you suppose they will see, of themselves and of those at their sides, anything but the shadows traced by the fire-light, on the opposite side of their cavern? Certainly not, since you suppose them unable to turn their heads round. And of the objects we have represented as borne along behind their backs, shall they see but the shadow? Unquestionably. Now if these poor prisoners could converse together, do you not think that they would regard as the entire things themselves the shadows they saw passing? And if the prison had an echo, whenever any passer-by spoke, would they not conceive that they heard the shadow itself speak, which alone they saw? In short, would they not attribute a perfect reality to the shadows?...Now let us suppose them freed from their chains and their ignorance, and what would be the result? Take one of these captives, force him suddenly to rise, to turn round his head, to walk forth, and face the light—he will never be able to do this without considerable un easiness, and the daz zling splendour will prevent him from even discerning the objects with whose shadows he was before so familiar. What would he say, if some friend were to tell him that till then he gazed but on phantoms, that at length nearer to reality he saw more justly, and showing him each object as it passed should oblige him by force of questioning to say what it was,—do you not think he would feel utterly perplexed, and even think his old shadows more real than the objects he now beheld?...Let him look at the fire! His eyes are pained, and he recurs to those shadows which gave him no trouble! He thinks them far more truly visible than all he is now taught to gaze on!... But once more, suppose him snatched from his cavern in spite of all his efforts, dragged by a pathway steep and rugged, to some eminence from which he is to behold the full lustre

LECT.
VI.

of the sun, will he not complain bitterly of this as cruel violence? And when he does come into the blaze of noon-day, shall his eyes, filled with the splendour, be able to see any one of the objects that we call real? No, surely; not at first. It is not without long use that those feeble eyes can get familiar with that upper sphere. First he will easiest discern shadows, then images in the water, and at last objects themselves. Thence he will direct his eyes to the heavens, which he will be able better to bear during moonlight and starlight, than while the sun appears...But at length he will have the power not merely to see the image of the sun in the waters or elsewhere, but to see it where and as it is!...Then shall he learn that that sun was the cause of all he had beheld in his cavern...And when he thinks of what he and his fellows in captivity thought once was wisdom, shall he not deplore their misery, and rejoice in his own emancipation? And if in that cavern-world there were honours and public prizes for the most successful analyst of that shadow-science,—for him who best could tell in what order they pass and combine, and best could predict their recurrence,—think you this freedman would covet their distinctions, even the loftiest? or would not rather say with Homer, that 'twere better be a peasant's hireling in the upper world?...But once again; suppose him to redescend into the cavern, and take his seat in his old place: in this passage from clear day to darkness, shall not his eyes be as it were full of darkness?...And if while he still sees confusedly, not yet accustomed to the darkness, which requires some time, he is called on to give his opinion on the shadows, and dispute with his fettered companions, will there not be a universal laugh at his expense? Will they not be sure to say, that from going to such heights the poor man has lost his sight, that it is clearly not worth while to attempt leaving their place, and that if any one proposes such schemes, he be if possible caught hold of, and dispatched?..Here then, Glauco, is the picture of our condition! The subterranean cave is this visible world; the fire that illumines it is the light of the sun; this captive who escapes to the higher region and contemplates it, is the soul that rises into space intelligible (*νοητὸν τόπον*). Such is my view, since you wish to know it. God alone can say if it be true!...At the utmost bounds of the intellectual world (*ἐν τῇ γνωστῇ τελευταία*) is the Idea of Good, perceived with difficulty, but which once seen makes itself known as the cause of all that is beautiful and good; which in the visible world produces light, and the orb that gives it; which in the invisible world directly produces Truth and Intelligence (*νοῦς*)."

This allegory exhibits, in the forms of the world of imagination, the progressive discipline which it was the object of the Platonic philosophers to realize. With this scope perpetually in view, Plato considered all the particular sciences as valuable only in proportion as they conducted by natural gradations to this master science. In the same work from which I have just quoted he states with great clearness their comparative value in relation to this end¹⁸. Arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, are specially fitted to guide the reason into this serener sphere of contemplation; both because they are calculated to force upon men the study of essences, and because, by habituating the soul to the calculation and observation of harmonious proportions, they lead to faint conceptions of that infinite perfection which is the fountain of all order. For the full apprehension of these views I must send you to the original; as it would be impossible to represent in any simpler form that progress from thought to thought which, beginning with the conception of mere numbers, eventuates in the "dialectic" of Plato. But to say a brief word of each. From what has been said, firstly, you can perceive the force and spirit of that rule of the Platonic teaching which forbid any unacquainted with geometry to enter the portals of the Academy¹⁹ (*μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσὶν*)*. Secondly, assuredly in these days it would seem a strange element of political philosophy, to insist on the knowledge of the science of *number*, not merely by our chancellors of

LECT.
VI.Explanation of the
allegory.Disciplinary
uses of
arithmetic,
geom.
and astr.
nomy.

¹⁸ [In the seventh book of the *Republic*, p. 521 C—535. Ed.]

¹⁹ [The authorities for this inscription are Johannes Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle *De Anima*, D_{III} reverse, line 9 ———— *Chiliads* of Tzetzes.

as his manner is, without any reference. Sir W. Hamilton, in his *Essays on Philosophy* (p. 271 note), dates the tradition at least six centuries too late. Philoponus lived ten, not "sixteen centuries subsequent to Plato," and he is not to be suspected of inventing the inscription. Sir William seems to have attributed the fable, as he calls it, to the much-abused Tzetzes, who seems to me as incapable as his laborious namesake of producing so good a story, which may have been a tradition preserved by the voluminous anecdotists of the first or second century B.C. The word *ἀγεωμέτρητος* is found more than once in Aristotle. Ed.]

* "Besides those *ἀπὸ καθεστῶτος*," says one of the most gifted of our English theological Platonists, "by which the souls of men were to be separated from sensuality and purged from fleshly filth, they devised a fourth way of separation more accommodated to the condition of philosophy, which was their *μαθηματικά*, or mathematical contemplations, whereby the souls of men might farther shake off their dependency on sense, and learn (as it were) to go alone, without the crutch of any sensible or material thing to support them... These were among their *ἀναβάσεις ἐκ τοῦ σπηλαίου*, steps and ascents out of this miry cave of mortality, before they could set any sure footing with their intellectual part in the land of light and immortal being." (J. Smith's *Select Disc.* pp. 14, 15.)

LECT.
VI.

the exchequer and their subordinate officers of finance, but by every statesman in high authority; and this, as Plato declares, "not for the purpose of a mere superficial study, but in order to rise by the exercise of intelligence to a contemplation of the essence of numbers; not for low mercantile purposes, but to assist the soul in soaring to that eternal world where alone are reality and truth²⁰."

Again, thirdly, as concerns the *astronomical* discipline for philosophy: "The adornings," declares Plato²¹, "which glorify the vault of heaven are certainly the most splendid of visible objects; yet they are but visible objects, and are therefore far inferior to the true magnificence which belongs to their eternal correlatives in the essential world:—the beauty which we contemplate in the heavens is the same symbol of that other and intelligible beauty, which a design of Dædalus is of absolute proportions; for what geometer, however he might admire the artist's statue, would dream of measuring *it*, in order to discover the abstract relations of figure and space?...We know," he continues²², "that astronomy is to the eyes something the same as music to the ears: now, observe our practical musicians! They will waste hours in endeavouring by the keenness of the ear to detect exquisite differences of proximate sounds; some affirming they can appreciate the tone required, others that it is impossible; but all agreeing in preferring the authority of the ear to that of the mind. Our astronomers are not unlike these indefatigable artists; but he who cultivates the study with any other view than to gain clearer apprehensions of the beautiful and the good, wastes his hours in unprofitable toil...Glauco! all these studies are but preludes to the air that we are to learn²³; he who studies not the reasons of things has not yet entered upon that better science of which I speak." Need I say that this "air," to which all the special sciences are but preludes, is no other than "Dialectic;" that high philosophy of reality, which though it be altogether the work of reason, I have already typified by the progressive advances of the organ of vision, which at first exercised on the objects of earth, rises at length to the stars, and lastly fixes on the sun itself? So he who advances into this study, soaring by pure intelligence to the essence of things, pauses not until having attained to gaze upon the essential goodness, he beholds the true Sun of the intelligible universe.

²⁰ [*Rep.* l. i. p. 525 C. Ed.]²¹ [*Ib.* p. 529 C. Ed.]²² [*Ib.* p. 530 D. Ed.]²³ [*τάυτα πάντα προοίμιόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν*, p. 531 D. Ed.]

"Finis coronat opus;" and the "end" that was to crown this "work" of intellectual discipline in the view of Plato, was no other than *death*. Convinced that death was the emancipation of the purely rational element of human spirits from all its corporeal accompaniments, this event was but the consummation of the very work of the whole philosophic life, that life which is therefore expressly designated as the *μελέτη θανάτου*²⁴. The intellect struggles through life into the intelligible world; death is its peaceful entrance there. So forcibly was Plato impressed with this conviction (that death is the entrance of the reasonable substance into a supra-sensible world), that in the *Phædo*, where it is peculiarly enforced, he thinks it necessary to guard against a philosophic tendency to suicide. Socrates admits that the very soul of true philosophy (of this "dialectic" of which we have spoken) is the unceasing aspiration after the future world of pure thought; and declines the path of suicide, only because the Deity has an inherent right over our actions, and, by placing us in this world, signifies his pleasure that we should not leave it until he himself has given the signal of release²⁵.

We have now seen that the spirit of the Platonic philosophy is the contemplation of, and the tendency to, the Absolute and Eternal Good. We have seen that this spirit pervades all, unites all, and governs all. But this is only a distant and general prospect. We must prepare to examine separately the chambers of the vast edifice. At our next meeting (on Monday) we shall briefly analyse the Dialectic (or Metaphysic) of Plato.

²⁴ [*Phædo*, p. 81 A. ED.]

²⁵ [Ib. p. 62 B. ED.]

LECTURE VII.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. IV.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
VII.

*The Platon-
ic Dialectic,*

*its relation
to subordinate
branches of
science.*

I HAVE promised to give you on this occasion some account of that portion of the Platonic philosophy which its founder was accustomed to call his "Dialectic;" and which answers pretty closely to what, after the spread of the Aristotelian views, was usually known by the title of Metaphysics. At our last meeting, however, we saw in how intimate a union all the divisions of Platonism were combined; and you will be prepared to expect that no department of the entire system can be duly surveyed without occasional intrusions on every other. Thus—to go no farther than our immediate subject—the Dialectic of Plato involves the elementary principles of his Theology, and some of the fundamental notions on which his fanciful structure of physical science was erected. The term Dialectic (assuredly not well chosen) was derived from the Socratic mode of discussion; and a phrase expressive of the accidental form of speculation thus applied to its internal substance. It is, however, characteristic of the peculiar views of Plato, who always represented this highest region of philosophic thought as reached by a course of protracted previous meditation¹, and of anxious mental conflict. It was not until the partial solutions and petty differences of inferior sciences had been unveiled that this ultimate and reconciling science was felt to be indispensably demanded. Now as this exhaustive process was usually conducted in the form of argumentative disquisition, it was not unnatural to apply to the speculations it produced a title expressive of the conferences by which it produced them. And thus the serenest and most contemplative of sciences bore a name that perpetually attested the pains and crosses that accompanied its birth; and he who was fortunate enough to reach this upper world of repose, could never

¹ [Which is described as ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἀνευ φωνῆς γινόμενος. *Soph.* 263 D. Comp. *Theat.* 189 E. ED.]

forget, in the very title of the blessed territory, the region of storm and tempest through which he had struggled to attain it!

To man, considered as an intellectual being, the great object is the attainment of satisfactory certainty,—certainty as to that which is directly exhibited to his experience; certainty, still more, as to that which transcends experience, and, outlying its whole domain, is of course apprehended by different faculties, or by different applications of them, from those which the world of immediate experience requires. Were a human being to stand alone in the vast solitude of nature, and to be (by whatever means) aroused to the exercise of his rational powers, it will be conceded by all theorists of the mind of man, that certain instinctive principles of belief and of action would, whether gradually or immediately, be developed, sufficient to guide and support him in the ordinary processes of human life. For example,—though prior to direct observation he could not venture the faintest conjecture as to the consequences of any concurrence of events,—though until his eyes had seen the stone fall, or the fuel blaze, he could not conceive these results at all more probable than their opposites,—it is certain, that after experience has once connected them, an innate principle of belief connects them for ever, and he would be astonished to find that *not* happen which antecedently to observation he had no reason to expect would ever happen. The present moment is thus, by man's mental construction, an index to him, practically infallible, of the past and the future. And were the being we have supposed to be the sole human intellect in the universe, about to pass into annihilation, he might instantly, before ceasing to exist, profess his confident anticipation of the indefinite continuance of a series of events to which he was never to have any direct relation whatever, with which he was thenceforward no more connected than if he had never existed at all.

Steps by which the mind of man ascends to science.

*Empirical theory of knowledge.
1. Principle of Expectation, which infers the future from the past.*

Here then is a principle which generalizes immediate experience through every moment of time and every point of space,—which declares of that which *is*, that it may be expected always and everywhere. It is the simplest of practical generalizations, and the foundation of all.

Again; if thus a single connexion of events indicates a connexion fixed for ever, so likewise a connexion thus established extends conviction beyond itself, gives probability (in all its various degrees) to thousands of connexions similar to itself, and thus becomes (in proportion to the reflective habits of the mind) a key to large regions of nature. From believing that the same will happen in

2. Principle of Analogy, which binds sequences together.

LECT.
VII.

the same circumstances, we pass to believing that the same will happen in similar circumstances, and from thence to confiding that the similar will happen in similar circumstances,—the anticipation varying, of course, with the degree of the similarity. As the former principle reveals to us the stability, so this reveals to us the unity of nature. And this—the principle of analogy—is the source of all discovery in every department of physical science. Here, then, is the second, and the higher, form of the practical generalization of observed events.

*These two
are the con-
stituents of
physical
science,*

These two principles provide for the foundation, and the augmentation, of the knowledge of nature, as obtained through the instrumentality of observation and experiment. And if of that which lies beyond the mere limits of our internal consciousness, and beyond deductions from our own suppositions, that is, beyond mental experience and mathematical demonstration,—if of all the external infinity of existences we have no knowledge, except by the aid of observation and experiment,—then these principles (the principle of the perpetuity of sequences, and the principle of analogy) are sufficient for all the science that man can possess of that which is *not himself*. If this be the case, it may be well to contemplate the amount of our inheritance: whether in wealth or penury, it is at least useful to know the exact extent and value of our available resources.

Now,—of these principles,—one very obvious character is this, that they are altogether conditionate principles; that is, they assert that *if* a certain event happen, another may be expected to happen; or, if a certain combination of events happen, a similar combination may be expected in similar circumstances to happen also; but they assert nothing whatever as to whether the events, absolutely considered, shall happen or not. The only certainty they bring is manifestly a hypothetical and dependent certainty.

*which ac-
cordingly
admits de-
grees of
certainty,*

Another characteristic of these principles is this, that they seem in their nature capable of augmentation or diminution of certainty. I do not mean this of any special instance, but of the principles themselves as attributes of the human mind. It is universally felt to be one of the most striking examples of providential arrangement in the adaptation of man to the world, that the antecedent conviction of the stability of nature is answered by the corresponding stability itself. Now let us suppose that this was not the case; that, the mind remaining unaltered, the series of events in the external world became utterly irregular—a different consequent every instant following

what was known to be the same antecedent; is it not obvious that the mental conviction could not stand against this outward contradiction, and thus that the principle of the invariability of sequences, though capable of being called into play upon the occasion of a single observation, is not independent of the confirmation of subsequent experience? While on the other hand, no one, I suppose, will affirm that we are as vividly assured of the future descent of bodies to the earth on the first instance perceived in infancy, as after the unbroken experience of forty or fifty years. The theory of Hume, who attributed the conviction altogether to habit, derived its plausibility from the fact, that though habit cannot originate the belief, it undoubtedly tends to corroborate it. It tells us (as it were) the mind and purpose of Nature, and assures us that it is fitted to vindicate our anticipations; in much the same manner as our confidence in a friend grows with the duration of our acquaintance with his truth, even though we had originally felt the strongest prepossession in his favour, or had received irresistible testimonies to his character.

It is also observable of these principles of belief on which our physical knowledge is ordinarily rested, that they are eminently practical in their nature; by which I mean that they are less calculated to be the elementary principles of satisfactory scientific conviction, than the indices and guides of practical conduct and operative art. Perhaps nothing evinces this more forcibly than the experience which I believe few will deny, that these convictions are felt to be much stronger as regards the future than as regards the past (from which the fundamental principle itself is usually termed "an expectation of the stability of nature"); and that the expectation itself is felt to lessen in assured confidence when the period to which it points retreats into the farther depths of futurity. If there be any one who, assuredly believing that a stone discharged from the hand will drop to the earth within the next ten minutes, has the same intensity of conviction with regard to the same event one hundred millions of years hence; I can only ascribe the perfect equality of his conviction in the two cases to principles that lie far deeper in the constitution of the mind of man than the instinctive and mechanical "expectation" to which our modern guides would reduce the whole logic of natural science.

These remarks (which it would now perhaps be unreasonable to extend much farther) may serve to intimate to you how unsatisfactory the ordinary accounts of physical knowledge must appear to any one who (whether rightly or erroneously) conceives that the human mind is

LECT.
VII.*its conclusion
is binding
on the
observer
as a fact**Hume's
theory of
cause and
effect is
partially
true.**Unsatisfac-
tory nature
of the empir-
ical theory
described
above.*

LECT.
VII.

The craving for a principle more certain than experience led Plato to the construction of a Dialectic.

The Platonists believed this certainty attainable.

State of philosophical opinion in Plato's day.

1. The Eleatics and their followers, a School of pure rationalism.

made for the possession of absolute certainty. If it be the whole office of physical science to classify observations, and (by an instinctive but unreasoning faith) to trust to their continued verification, it is obvious that, for the perfectness of absolute certainty, we must have recourse to something which is not physical science. It was for this that Plato struggled in the construction of his "Dialectic," a department of knowledge which was to contain the principles of independent unconditional truth; and in which the highest faculty of man was to be brought in presence of its proper and sufficient counterpart, namely, the supreme existence itself, the absolutely perfect,—and the emanations of that supreme existence dispersed through nature, and of which all nature participated,—the "*ideas*" of things. If you have been at all engaged in the study of the history of speculation, so similar in all its changes, you will at once recognize that this is but one attempt out of many to solve the problem of the prerogatives of the human reason, to pronounce whether it truly has an office higher than that of enumerating and arranging the products of experience. It was (as I have before intimated) the firm conviction of Plato and his followers, that it *has* such an office; and that there exists a sphere of being not in any way appreciable by sense or by imagination the minister of sense, of which the Reason of man is the only and the direct organ, and which that Reason by an innate and inalienable right grasps with utter and absolute certainty. But it is this very similarity of the problem and of its solutions in all ages that makes it now necessary for me to endeavour to catch the peculiar point from which Plato viewed it, and the peculiar form of his verdict on the question. I have as yet addressed you as readers fresh from the popular philosophy of the day; we must now descend into the dusky depths of antiquity to discover there the principles of which we have spoken, half-formed, it may be, in that primeval world, and often scarcely disencumbered of their tangling embellishments of allegory and fiction; yet still very discernibly the same principles, and often—to a degree altogether unsuspected by modern readers—the same details.

To stand, then, where Plato stood, and to see what Plato saw, we must consider his philosophy of the human reason as the result of a pertinacious controversy which occupied the literary and speculative circles of his day. On the one side stood the philosophers of Elea (or those who had imbibed their general principles²), whose solution of the general question as to themselves and the universe

² [See Series II. Lect. II. ED.]

was (as I have more than once shewn you), that all existence was absolutely *one*, variety being only apparent and illusory; that truth had no reference to anything diverse or multiple; that, therefore, the sole office of reason—the organ of truth—was to recognize this underlying unity, that faculty being incapable of application to that which was more than one single essence, equally indivisible and infinite. By these speculatists, then, the rights of Reason were loudly acknowledged; but its inheritance was impoverished;—they admitted the validity of the title, but the estate itself offered only the solitude of a desert. On the other hand was found a class of thinkers^a who denied the title altogether; who refused to allow the existence of any faculty beyond the receptive energy of sense; and who, placing all truth in the perception of the qualities or modifications of *its* elements, as a very natural consequence affirmed that truth itself altered with the alteration of the senses, or in the language of him whom Plato found the most distinguished champion of these tenets—that “man was the measure of all things.” This latter doctrine is evidently, in its spirit, not confined to mere “sensation;” it is the doctrine of all who, with whatever views as to the constitution of the mind, agree in holding that truth is purely subjective and individual; Plato, however, seems to have found it invariably connected with the theory of mere sensation, and speaks of them both—in the case of Protagoras—as identical.

*2. The
Sensation-
alists or
Empirics.*

Now Plato is to be considered as a mediator between these opposing theorists; as holding with the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, that the Reason of man contemplates by direct intuition a sphere of being beyond and above the sensible universe, but as denying that that sphere of being contains no diversity; as holding with the rival party, that there is a world of sensation, the object of a special faculty or set of faculties in the mental constitution, but as denying that science or truth in their proper significance can be at all concerned with that world, can be dependent on its phenomena or affected by its changes.

Plato endeavoured to mediate between these two extreme parties.

If I were not relating but investigating, I might enter largely upon the discussion of this general question; and by adding the lights of subsequent philosophy exhibit it in a form perhaps more luminous than the original Platonic one. As, however, my present purpose is to endea-

^a [Comprising, 1. the followers of Heraclitus (as Cratylus in Athens, and in Ephesus the school portrayed in *Theæt.* p. 179), 2. Protagoras, who is supposed to have learnt in that school—certainly not, as vulgarly stated, under Democritus—and, 3. the Cyrenaics, headed by Plato's contemporary, Aristippus. ED.]

LECT.
VII.*The Theætetus.*

vour to assist you in seeing with the eyes of Plato, and not with those of Leibnitz or Descartes, I shall content myself, for the present with the humbler office of giving you some account of one remarkable discussion in which—as far as a refutation can establish anything—the first elements of the Platonic theory of science are established; perhaps I might rather say (for the dialogue has no express conclusion) the ground is partly cleared for the future and still distant structure. The *Theætetus* has the advantage of being one of the most regularly consecutive of the compositions of Plato; and for this reason probably, more than one expositor has directed attention, in the first instance, to this important dialogue. At the same time, it cannot be denied that it also contains subtleties whose true scope and meaning (though doubtless in their own day intelligible enough) it is now nearly hopeless to attempt adequately to comprehend or to convey: while on the other hand, as if to evince the boundless versatility of the author, it also includes in the pauses and transitions of the metaphysical argument passages (especially *one* passage) of a sublime and solemn beauty which Plato has never surpassed in any other composition whatever.

Analysis of the dialogue.

On these latter attractions of style we have now no time to rest; nor shall I detain you with any minute account of the scenery, decorations, or dramatis personæ of the performance. Theodorus the mathematician, Theætetus a young Athenian of great promise, and Socrates, are the interlocutors. After some preliminary conversation, Socrates comes upon the question which occupies the dialogue: "What is Science?" His young friend, in the manner so often exemplified by Plato in the argumentative adversaries of Socrates, answers by instancing a *variety* of sciences; an error which Socrates represses by recalling him at once to the question, which regards *the idea or essence* of science itself: and you may here observe an instance of that process of definitions customary with Socrates, to which we saw that Aristotle ascribed the origination of the "ideas" of Plato. At length, after many approaches, and many digressions, and many modest excuses, the young student attempts formally to answer the question, and the "business"—as dramatic critics would say—of the dialogue fairly commences.

*Its subject: the idea of Science, or Knowledge properly so called.**Three definitions of Knowledge or Science proposed.*

Three several answers are offered; and all three are successively rejected. We shall briefly sketch the arguments involved by each; requesting you to remember, that, if these arguments seem to your modern apprehensions occasionally deficient in force, and, still more, occasionally

obscure in purport, they are not at all on that account the less historically interesting. But for my own part, I confess I cannot discover much that even our latest inquiries have added to this ancient refutation of the narrow theories of human knowledge; the theories and their refutations have been reiterated in many ages with little substantial difference; the soil of human nature (to which in its present state truth and error are both indigenous products) remaining the same, these flowers and weeds have risen together in each recurring crop; and the first mingled harvest, as we find it here heaped together, might nearly serve as an image of all that followed it.

LECT.
VII.

The first answer of *Theætetus* is, that science consists in sensation (αἴσθησις). Now sensation being in its nature variable, altering equally with the alterations of the sentient organ and of the subject perceived, the knowledge which depends on it must be likewise subject to perpetual change. If, as Heraclitus and Empedocles held, the whole machinery of sensible perception is in continual flux, never remaining the same for two successive instants, if motion be (as they conceived) the very principle of preservation, and rest, of corruption⁴, it is obvious that the knowledge which is confined to these ever mutable elements must itself be mutable. If nothing "exists," but all "becomes," science built upon a principle of incessant alteration loses all claim to permanence or stability⁵. The colour of an object (for example) has no claim to "existence," it has no determinate properties, it is not the same to another and to me, nay, it is not the same to myself at any two separate observations. It is so with every sensible object; for all such are but aggregates of qualities themselves incessantly variable; and sensation the result of a compound action between the object and the organ⁷. Hence it is argued that the assertion that science consists in the simple recep-

FIRST
DEFINITION.
Science consists
in sensation.
Theæt.
p. 151 D.*This theory
of knowledge
finds its
objective
counterpart
in the Ephre-
sian doctrine
of perpetual
flux.*
Ib. p. 152 D.

⁴ [*Theæt.* p. 153: τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπώλλυσθαι ἡσυχία.. ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διέλλεται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολλὸν σώζεται; E.D.]

⁵ [Ib. p. 152 D: γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὁρίως προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε· οὐδὲν αἰεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. E.D.]

⁶ [Ib. p. 182 E: οὐδὲν ἀρα ἐπιστήμην μάλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη. Comp. 183 A. ED.]

⁷ [Ib. p. 152 E: ὁ δὲ καλεῖς χρώμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑτερόν τι τῶν τῶν σῶν ὁμμάτων, μὴδ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμμασιν... ἥδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε ὅν ποτε ἐν τάξει καὶ μὲν ἰ καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο... καὶ ὁ δὲ ἑκαστον εἴη χρώμα ὅτε τὸ πρόσβαλλον ὅτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἐκάστω ἰδιῶν γεγονός· ἢ σὺ δίσχυρίσαι· ἂν ὡς οἶόν σοι φαίνεται ἑκαστον χρώμα τοιοῦτον καὶ κυλὶ καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἴψῳ; Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ib. 156 A: κινήσεως δύο εἶδη... δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον τὸ δὲ πάσχειν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμῆλιας... γίγνεται ἐκγονα... δίδυμα... τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, ἢ δὲ αἰσθησις, αἰεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. Compare 159 C, D: ἑκαστον δὲ κ.τ.λ.—ED.]

LECT.
VII.

tion of sensations, or even in the active operations of the faculties upon them, resolves itself into the doctrine of Heraclitus, and leads at once to irrecoverable scepticism. But again, the sensation theory supposes every sensation accurately and completely true, as otherwise sensibility could be no basis for knowledge. Now it would be impossible to prove that any two persons experience the same sensations; while, on the contrary, we have innumerable instances of the difference of the effects produced in the same circumstances upon different men. Above all, he observes, we have the striking instance of the phenomena of dreams and of madness⁸; and must admit the impossibility of proving ourselves at any moment awake, as the evidence of the dreaming and the waking mind is equally peremptory in favour of the reality of the state experienced: knowledge, then, must upon this theory be purely relative⁹, and truth vary with every variation of the mind. This theory of knowledge dependent on sensation, amounts therefore to the doctrine of Protagoras¹⁰, that "man is the measure of all things," and that that which he thinks to exist exists, that which he thinks not to exist, is by that very conviction deprived of real existence. I may observe that the whole of this preliminary discussion abounds with very just views of the whole process of sensation and the relation of the conscious being to external nature¹¹.

The same theory in subjective aspect: Sensation is relative to the sentient indi-

A proposition not to the dictum of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all"

⁸ [Ib. 157 E.—158 E. ED.]

⁹ [Ib. 160 A: ἀνάγκη δὲ γε ἐμὲ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γένωμαι... ἐκείνῳ τε τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὺ ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται· γλυκὺ γὰρ μὴδὲν δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι. ED.]

¹⁰ [Ib. 160 D: εἰς ταῦτα συμπίπτει κατὰ μὲν... Ἡράκλειτος... ὅσον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν... πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπων μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον... αἰσθησὶν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. ED.]

¹¹ [Plato's theory of perception is that denoted by some modern writers as the "representative theory." Of things as they are in themselves, the senses give us no knowledge: all that in sensation we are conscious of, is a state of mind or feeling (πάθος); the existence of self or the perceiving subject, and of a something external to self—a perceived object—are revealed to us, not by the senses, but by a higher faculty. The negative portion of this theory Plato holds in common with the Cyrenaics, with Protagoras, and with the later Academics and Sceptics. It was controverted by the Stoics, who maintained that the external world is the object of *immediate* consciousness (καταληπτόν). But all the remaining schools of antiquity,—sceptical, dogmatic, and mystical,—agree with Plato in denying that our sensations reveal to us anything beyond themselves. They are modifications of consciousness, feelings, states,—*perceptions intimes* (as Cicero has it),—and *nothing more*. (τὸ περὶ ἡμᾶς συμβαῖνον πάθος αὐτοῦ πλέον οὐδὲν ἡμῶν ἐνδεκνύται, Sext. Emp. de Placitis Cyrenaicorum, Math. § 194.) So far then as regards the theory of sensation, Plato is to be understood, not as refusing, but as explaining, nay, confirming the dictum of Protagoras, "Man (i.e. the conscious individual, whoever he is, ὁ αἰεὶ ἄνθρωπος) is the measure of all." But here an important divergence takes place. After shewing that the Protagorean principle pushed to its legitimate consequences, annihilates the reality of the outward as well as the identity or independent existence of the mind, or conscious subject, (ἐμὲ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι... ἐκείνῳ τε τινὶ... ὅταν γλυκὺ... ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται. Th. 160 A. Comp. p. 166 C),

Plato having thus argued the identity in substance of the three theories,—that of sensation alone constituting knowledge, that of the continual flux of all things, and that of man's beliefs being the true measure of existence,—proceeds, upon popular grounds and with great variety of illustration, to refute principally the last of these views as being the most general and the most dangerous of the three, but with constant allusions to the others also. For instance, on what grounds does Protagoras himself, by virtue of his calling as a philosophic instructor, profess to teach knowledge, if, as his principle declares, knowledge belongs equally to every human mind? and the peasant's apprehensions be as truly the measure of real existence as the philosopher's? Again, if the sensible occasion of knowledge be knowledge itself, it would seem that to read or to hear an unknown language, would be completely equivalent to perfectly knowing it; and that every varied circumstance of sensation (as, for example, seeing with one eye or with both) must, by force of this hypothesis, alter the reality of science¹⁸; a notion so frivolous that even the ingenious audacity of Protagoras himself could scarcely venture to accept it. Nor this alone. If it be involved in "knowledge," that it should be the direct perception of the sensible organ, it would seem that all which is retained by memory is blotted from the treasures of science¹⁹, that man hangs upon the ever-varying present, and that all which refers to past or future is absolutely annihilated. But even on his own grounds Protagoras may be convicted. For all experience establishes that some do arrive at a greater degree of knowledge than others (as the physician, the musician, &c.), and all the world implicitly

Plato proceeds, by a bold appeal to the *inner* consciousness, to establish the reality of both object and subject. See *Theat.* p. 184—187; a passage from which it suffices to quote the expressions following: Περὶ δὲ φωτὸς καὶ περὶ χροῦς... ἡ διανοεῖ δὲ ἀμφοτέρω ἐστίν; Ἐγώ γε.—Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα (sc. οὐσίαν, ομοιότητα, ἀριθμὸν) διὰ τίνας... διανοεῖ;... Αὐτὴ δὲ αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται... ἐπισκοπεῖν.—Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ. He had previously drawn Theætetus into an admission of the unity of the sentient subject: εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δὲ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ἥ διὰ τούτων ὅλον ὁργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

Students of the *Theætetus* would do well to read with attention the account given by Cicero in the *Academics* of the controversy between the Stoics and the Academy, renewed in modern times by Reid and Brown, of whom the former held with the Stoics that our knowledge of the external world is intuitive, the latter, with Plato and the majority of philosophers, that it is inferential. Sir W. Hamilton's masterly critique on the various theories of Perception (*Essays*, p. 38) will be read with profit even by those who are not prepared to accept his conclusions. ED.]

¹⁸ [p. 163 E. ED.]

¹⁹ [p. 164 B: συμβαίνει ἄρα, ὃς τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, εἰ μεμνημένος αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὀρεῖ. ED.]

believe it; so that, if truth be determined by momentary opinion, Protagoras, on his own hypothesis, is overthrown by a vast majority, the only decisive test admitted by his philosophy; nay, he personally subscribes his own error; for all opinion being (as opinion) equally authentic, he pronounces his adversaries to speak true, in the very argument that assails them as mistaken¹⁴. Another palpable form of self-confutation is built on the doctrine of Heraclitus. If, argues Socrates, everything be in a state of incessant change, it cannot be affirmed of anything that it *is*, rather than is not. Now this (if worth anything) must be a formula universally applicable, as no reason can be shown why it should be applied to one region of nature rather than to another. Sensations, then, are along with everything else involved in this predicament, and therefore no affirmation can be with certainty made as regards them; consequently, by the conditions of the argument, it may be as reasonably asserted that sensations are *not* science as that they are¹⁵. The great object¹⁶ of the doctrine of Protagoras was to unsettle the principles of moral obligation, by denying the permanence of moral distinctions. Accordingly Plato soon proceeds to examine his theory in that light. His argument is simple and convincing. He shews that the universal experience of man establishes that there is a known, assignable difference between the *useful and the injurious*¹⁷; this, indeed, is an idea totally distinct from that of the just and the unjust; but as far as concerns Protagoras's argument, they are completely on a *pâr*. Both are beyond the immediate scope of sensation; the calculations of the teacher of gymnastics as to his own art, or of the physician as to the results of medical applications, as much transcend the sphere of pure direct sensation as even the perceptions of right and wrong. But even beyond these objections

¹⁴ [p. 170: "Ἐπειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον· ἐκείνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἴσσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ἢ ἐκείνων ἡγοῦνται ψεῦδεσθαι, συγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ὁμολογῶν τὰ οὐτα δοξάζειν ἀπάστας. ED.]

¹⁵ [p. 182 E: οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινόμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὅ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη. ED.]

¹⁶ [Not perhaps the "great object," though certainly a natural consequence. Protagoras is made to admit that he excepts the distinction of good and evil from his general principle of relativity, *Theat.* p. 166 D sqq. How this distinction was justified we are not informed: but he evidently intended to save morality, according to his own view of it. The speech in the dialogue bearing his name, which excites Mr Grote's admiration, may or may not faithfully represent Protagoras and his opinions; though it is fair to suppose that a sense of dramatic propriety would restrain Plato from *misrepresenting* him, especially in a way too favourable to his character and abilities. ED.]

¹⁷ [p. 177 C—179 E: παντὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἂν θῆται πῶς δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἐστὶ δικαία τῇ θεμίστῃ, ὥσπερ ἂν κήται· περὶ δὲ τὰ γαθοῦ οὐδὲνα... τομῶν διαμάχεσθαι οὐ καὶ ἢ ὠφελίμα οἰηθεῖσα πῶς ταυτῇ θῆται καὶ ἐστι... ED.]

to the theory which makes the variations of sense the judges of scientific truth, is the decisive obstacle to its admission, that, by reducing science under the control of faculties which we share with even the brute creation, it makes every sensitive being equally the judge of truth with man himself; a consequence beyond which the argument can scarcely be carried¹⁸. From all these considerations, it is evident that the boasted solution of the question of science, which identifies it with simple sensation, is unable to stand examination, its defenders being on every side convicted of palpable inconsistency. Before closing this part of the discussion, Plato, affirming that science is the attribute of the soul, furnishes a most perspicuous proof of the unity of the thinking principle, and its distinctness from the complicated system of bodily organs whose reports it receives and estimates¹⁹.

I need now scarcely remind you that the principles here stated and refuted, are substantially the principles of scepticism in every age: and I believe you will find very few forms of reply to these logical perplexities, of which the discussion just analysed does not offer an example. But though this constitutes a very important incidental advantage of such studies, I must remind you that my present object is, simply, to arrive progressively at an estimate of the views of Plato himself, regarding the prerogatives of the human reason and the immutability of the truth it apprehends. Avoiding, therefore, extraneous comment, I continue his own exposition.

Theodorus, who very amusingly describes the logical frenzy of the Heracliteans in supporting their theory of the ceaseless fluxion of the universe, tells us that they are unfixed in their very thoughts and language, as if they were afraid that even there the appearance of fixity would destroy their cause²⁰. You will anticipate then that the advocate who in some measure represents their views, should be prepared, on being driven from his first position, to fortify a new one. Unable to find science in pure sensation, he endeavours to discover it in a region higher than sensation, and he pronounces, that science is "right judgment, or opinion" (*δόξα ἀλήθης*). In this part of

¹⁸ [p. 161 C: *τεθαύμακα ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὅς ἡ κυροκέφαλος...* ED.]

¹⁹ [p. 184 c to 186 E. ED.]

²⁰ ["They are living instances of the unrest their books assert," *ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται*, 179 E. Theodorus speaks of Heracliteans in Ephesus; but the most celebrated representative of these views was the Athenian Cratylus, of whom Aristotle speaks as an advocate of extreme "movement" opinions, *Μεταφ.* III. 5, 18. It was by him that Plato, in his early youth, was initiated into these Ephesian mysteries. *Ib.* I. 6. ED.]

LECT.
VII.

SECOND
DEFINITION.
*Science is
true opinion.*
Theæt. p.
187 B.

*This propo-
sition im-
plies that
there is a
false opi-
nion.*
*Investiga-
tion of the
nature of
false opi-
nion.*

*All the pro-
posed expla-
nations of
false opinion
rejected as
either im-
possible or
inadequate.*

the dialogue we enter upon a region characterized by all the peculiarities of the ancient logic, and which, therefore, can scarcely be made as familiar to modern readers, as the preceding disquisition. If science be true opinion, what constitutes a false opinion? This question is thus analyzed. We can only judge of what we know or do not know. Four possible cases arise. A man may be in error, by judging that a thing he knows is really some other thing he does not know, or some other thing he does know; or again, by judging that some thing he does not know is some other thing he does know, or some other thing he does not know. All these cases are rejected, as presenting apparent impossibilities. Another method of examination is proposed,—to estimate the matter not in relation to knowledge or ignorance, but in relation to existence or non-existence, that is, as he defines it—judging according to the truth and reality of things²¹. But here he finds as little satisfaction. For he argues, that as he who sees at all must see something which exists, so he who judges must judge what in some sense exists; and that he who judges that which does not exist (whether in real or abstract beings) cannot properly be said to judge at all²². Is then “false opinion” the mistake which arises when, taking one real existence for another, we affirm that one *is* the other²³? This, again, is shewn to be mentally impossible²⁴. Once more, is “false judgment” the erroneous application of an inward conception to an exterior sensation? (exemplified in the view of an object at a distance which we may mistake for another). This is rejected as too limited an account²⁵. In this way, by a diversity of examples Plato endeavours to show that a correct conception of “error” has not been presented in

²¹ [p. 188 D: “Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ ταύτη σκεπτέον ὃ ζητούμεν κατὰ τὸ εἶδέναι καὶ μὴ εἶδέναι... ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ;” The cases here suggested involve an obvious confusion between “judgment” and “simple apprehension.” They are in fact Cynical fallacies. Socrates shows this presently, by distinguishing the mental processes in question, 189 E: τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ’ ὃ περὶ ἐγὼ καλεῖς; κ.τ.λ. ED.]

²² [p. 189 B. ED.]

²³ [Ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῇ φάμεν εἶναι δόξαν. Ib. ED.]

²⁴ [To make this plain, we are presented with an elaborate examination of the phenomena of judgment (189 E) and memory (191 D), the latter illustrated by a comparison of the receptive faculty to a tablet of wax, more or less retentive of impressions as it varies in purity and consistence. To this part of the dialogue Locke’s celebrated chapter on Memory presents a striking parallel. (*Essay*, B. II. chap. x.) ED.]

²⁵ [p. 196 C. ἀλλ’ ὅτιον δὲ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ ψευδῇ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἰσθησιν παραλλαγῆναι· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασι φησεόμεθα, i.e. if error consist *solely* in mistaking a particular sensible image for a particular notion in the mind, every process of *pure* thought must be exempt from error. ED.]

any of the ordinary theories; for I have little doubt, that these solutions, which appear at first sight strangely chosen, were actually known as theories of the subject in the popular metaphysic of Plato's age²⁶. Returning from this digression, the philosopher once more demands, Can "true opinion" satisfy the notion of science? and feeling that it cannot rise above the evidence of testimony or analogy, he denies its claims²⁷.

A third and last attempt is made to define the notion of that which alone deserves the title of knowledge. Science is pronounced to be, "opinion *μετὰ λόγου*"—a qualification which seems, from the subsequent tenor of the discussion, to signify, judgment "with explication." For, it is observed, no primary element is knowable or explicable; it is merely perceptible (you will remember Locke's undefinable "simple ideas²⁸"); whereas compounds are decomposable, and thence definable: of simples, then, there is "just apprehension," but no genuine "science." The answer to this preliminary statement is remarkable. Socrates is represented as illustrating his meaning by words, and syllables, and letters: and he replies, that if the syllable consist of the mere letters, it cannot be known (as matter of science) unless they are known; for, assuredly, science cannot be compounded of absolute ignorance; but if the syllable be not the mere total of the letters, but a new and distinct being, then the being itself (or "form") becomes an indecomposable, and there-

THIRD
DEFINITION
Science is
"True (Opinion com-
bined with
explication."
Theat. p.
201 C.
By "explication" may
be meant
either enu-
meration of
all the com-
ponents,

²⁶ [For a specimen of this "popular metaphysic," see *Phaedo*, p. 96 B. πό-
τερον...ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἐστὶν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων...ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνεται μνήμη
καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης, λαβούσης τὸ ἡμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι
ἐπιστήμην. We can hardly err in conjecturing that the "wax-tablet" before
alluded to was borrowed from the museum of the school whose "theory of the
human mind" is here sketched. The dove-cote (197 D) may have come from
the same or a neighbouring repository. ED.]

²⁷ [The refutation of the proposition, "Science or Knowledge is true opi-
nion," is based on the necessity imposed on its advocates of admitting that of
the two terms of every Judgment one at least is given as known; for no Judg-
ment, true or false, is conceivable, of which both terms are unknown. Hence
the definition in question is faulty; for it means nothing, unless that which it
professes to explain,—the nature of knowledge,—be assumed to be already
known. Πάλαι ἴσμεν ἀνάπλεον τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ
ἐληήκαμεν τὸ γινώσκμεν καὶ οὐ γινώσκομεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα,
ὥς τι συνείπντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. *Theat.* p. 196 E. It is
true that a remembered impression is not a "knowledge" in the Platonic sense;
but those who hold that right opinion is science, acknowledge no other. See
the quotation from the *Phaedo* in the foregoing note. From a higher point of
view the refutation appears sophistical; for it seems to confound two different
acts: γινώσκειν (*cognoscere, kennen*) with ἐπιστάσθαι (*scire, wissen*). But then
this higher point of view is not yet attained, being indeed the very thing sought
in the present inquiry. It would not, and could not, be conceded by the em-
piricists with whom Plato is arguing. The "maieutic" or suggestive purpose
of the dialogue is here sufficiently obvious. ED.]

²⁸ [*Essay*, B. III. c. 4, § 4. ED.]

LECT.
VII.*or description
"per
genus et
differen-
tiam."**Negative
result of the
dialogue.**Its real im-
port.*

fore, by the hypothesis, an inexplicable thing. But what does this λόγος or additional "explication" really signify? Is it the image of thought by words, simply? In this case every "true judgment" will have explication, and all possessors of right opinions will possess genuine science; for every thinker, not deaf or dumb, can achieve such explication as this. But is it the determination of the whole by the elements that compose it? Even this does not reach the idea of the Platonic "science," which refuses to honour with its name a process of simple decomposition. Shall we declare, then, that "explication" answers to the assignment of a genus and essential difference²⁹? and is this what converts a "true opinion" into "science"? But to this it is answered, that (however this differentiation may assist clearness of expression) the perception of the distinguishing qualities must be presupposed in the mere apprehension of the individual object, to make it individual.

It does not appear, then, that any of these accounts of scientific knowledge reach the problem. There is, in the apprehension of truth, as fixed beyond possibility of change, a something which none of them include. When you have arrived at this period in the original Platonic discussion,—a good deal wearied perhaps by subtleties which, even in the most rapid analysis, I can scarcely expect to engage much interest,—you anxiously look out for the luminous conception which is to enlighten the obscurity of this mazy controversy, and by its own contrast to call out the fainter lineaments of the past reasoning in bold and clear relief. But you will expect this in vain. Socrates, after thus dissolving the structures of his brother-teachers, hastily closes the discussion by merely observing, that this removal of errors may clear the soil of his hearer's mind for future fruit; and by the still colder consolation, that it will at least prevent him from idly imagining that he understands the subject when he really knows nothing whatever about it.

But the true object of the whole is, nevertheless, manifest enough. If you have at all maintained your attention to the progress of the reasoning, you will perceive without difficulty that it refers to three great aspects of intellectual philosophy: the theory of mere sensation, the theory of mere judgment upon sensation, and the theory of logical definition—as comprising the office and functions of the human reason in relation to attainable truth. And if you have but slightly contemplated the history of speculation,

²⁹ [p. 208 C: τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν, ὃ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἑρα-
τῆδες. ED.]

you can scarcely fail to perceive that these are three forms of philosophy which, under endless superficial changes, have perpetually reappeared in almost every age of the history of reason. Am I, then, delaying you here upon unprofitable obscurities, when I exhibit to you this great Reasoner, in his own graceful simplicity of dialogue, thus holding forth (as if in prophecy), in the very childhood of philosophy, a mirror which was to reflect the future fortunes of human thought? What is the first of the theories he meets and prostrates, but that very account of human nature, which in language scarcely altered from the phraseology which he furnishes to it here, degraded all France, and from France half Europe, during the greater part of the last century? What is the second of these theories, but that very amelioration of the former, which allowing to man a faculty of apprehending the relations of thoughts, permits that faculty to wander no farther than the experience of receptive sensibility will supply him with materials? What, finally, is the third which Plato consigns to reprobation, but that theory which reduces all the prerogatives of reason to the logical offices of defining, and dividing, and classifying names. And what is that which Plato considered they all equally wanted, without which he deemed them structures fair and artificial, but without foundation,—bodies comely and proportioned, but without life? He believed that they wanted substantial reality, a principle of absolute and ultimate certainty; he conceived that, until the reason of man—by virtue of its inherent power—were brought in contact with the Infinite itself, were considered as an inward attestation of certain unconditional and consummate truths self-supported and independent, that until thus the human intellect was, as it were, incorporated with the very existence of the real universe around it, no anchorage could be found in the fathomless deep of philosophical scepticism. By what bonds he essayed to bind together that mystic Triad—the Creator, the Creation, and the Reason that images both—will form the subject of our next meeting.

LECTURE VIII.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. V.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
VIII.

*Dialectic
of Plato
continued.
General
reflections.*

WE have now seen that the ancient investigators of the principles of human knowledge had largely examined the subject, had submitted reason to its own reflective analysis, and had evolved theories to systematize its processes and operations, not at all dissimilar from those which later efforts have so elaborately presented. Differences of language, differences of habitual associations, differences of historical position, must produce difference in the *form* of exposition; but truth is limited; and where the facts of the case lie in no very extended compass, we may assuredly anticipate that the faculties of theorists will march in paths not widely separated from each other. Human nature recurs unchanged in every successive generation; its powers, its instincts, its prejudices, remain the same; and when you find that even in the simplest questions, and most palpable determinations of external physical science, philosophical heresies are seen, in spite of demonstration itself, to arise, you can scarcely wonder that the various ages of intellectual history have been found to return the echoes of old errors, to rush with all the ardour of novelty and inexperience into illusions long before exposed, and to mistake, again and again, *that* for the authentic coinage of eternal truth, which a forgotten antiquity had proved to be the base alloy of prejudice, or the gilded forgeries of a too active imagination.

Such a research as that which I then took occasion to make, will not have failed in one important object, if it have recalled or strengthened your respectful regard for our forefathers in the philosophy of mind; if it have led you to contemplate in these men inquirers whom no age need blush to desire as its own, thoughtful and gifted speculators who possessed all our faculties long before ourselves, and whose very exclusiveness of devotion to these peculiar studies, though it unquestionably lost them the benefit of lights flashed from other points of the intellectual heaven, yet gave them all the advantages of patient

concentration and enthusiastic perseverance in the work of exploring the region of their own peculiar choice. A spirit of most misjudging contempt has for many years become fashionable towards the metaphysical contemplations of the elder ages. Alas! I cannot understand on what principles. Is it, then, a matter to be exulted in, that we have at length discovered, that our faculties are only formed for earth and earthly phenomena? Are we to rejoice at our own limitations, and delight that we can be cogently demonstrated to be prisoners of sense and the facts of sense? In those early struggles after a higher and more perfect knowledge, and in the forgetfulness of every inferior science through the very ardour of the pursuit, there is, at least, a glorious, an irresistible testimony to the loftier destinies of man; and it might almost be pronounced, that, in such a view, their very errors evidence a truth higher than all our discoveries can disclose! When Lord Bacon, with his clear and powerful reasonings, led our thinkers from these regions of ancient thought (then newly opened to the modern world), to the humbler, but more varied and extensive, department of inductive inquiry,—I represent to myself that angel-guide, all light and grace, who is pictured by our great poet as slowly conducting the first of our race from Paradise, to leave him in a world vast indeed and varied, but where thorns and thistles abounded, and food—often uncertain, and often perilous—was to be gained only “by the sweat of the brow,” and in the downcast attitude of servile toil!

These haughty prepossessions against the speculative researches of antiquity are nowhere more necessary to be resisted than in approaching the subject of our consideration this day, a subject which has become almost proverbially the type of fantastic hypothesis. On this prejudication I shall make but one remark; but it is a remark worthy your consideration. Whether the IDEAL THEORY of Plato be or be not a system of pompous illusion, you will remember that it was a system chosen and supported by one who had before him nearly every objection your ingenuity could marshal against it. It was not the system of a novice, confident in opinions which he had never learned to contrast with their opposites. Our ordinary estimators of the Platonic philosophy (undertaking their office upon a careless and defective examination of his writings) exult in exhibiting the extravagance of the ancient realism, and in contrasting with its follies the simplicity, perspicuity, and truth of their own adopted theory. Hume pronounces Nominalism (the system which denies all universal essences whether real or mental) to be one of the most important “disco-

*Subject of
the present
Lecture.*

*The Ideal
Theory of
Plato.*

*Popular
prejudices
against this
theory con-
sidered.*

LECT.
VIII.

*Its supposed
inconsistency
with modern
Nominalism,*

and Conceptualism.

veries" of modern times, and rejoices in being even a subsidiary labourer in the work of extending and strengthening the influence of this novel solution. Yet we know that this very theory was upheld by the ancient Stoics in opposition to the Platonics, and, as I am strongly inclined to think, was known to the Megarics and Cynics¹, and therefore to Plato himself. It is, at least, remarkable, that the very objections against Realism, which were supposed to establish the Nominalism of the twelfth century, are by Plato advanced in the *Parmenides*; and as some of these objections would seem to lie equally (or nearly so) against the theory of universal conceptions, it seems not at all improbable that Plato had this third, or nominalist, theory within his view, but perhaps considered it not of sufficient force to require special mention and elaborate reply: I mean, not of sufficient force when regarded as an adequate solution of the entire question of the Reason of man;—for (strange as it may appear) I am strongly inclined to think that Plato, in his mere doctrine of *abstraction*, was nearer to what would now be called nominalism than to any other theory of that mental process. It is certain that he seems frequently to intimate, and to lament, the impossibility of obtaining, while we work on sensible materials, a general notion pure from sensuous admixture; and to insinuate that, if we could, the task would be achieved which death alone can effect—the immediate perception of essences as they exist in the intelligible world. Aristotle, on the contrary, seems to have believed that the *νόημα* could be thus obtained²; and in the spirit of that belief (as well as on other grounds) to have discarded the ulterior speculations of Plato.

The other theory which is opposed to the Platonic idealism, and which is known by the title of "Conceptualism," is in the same dialogue expressly stated and rejected. "Perhaps" (Socrates is represented as urging) "each of these *εἶδη* is nothing but a thought (*νόημα*), and can exist nowhere else than in the souls of men³." And so of several

¹ [Antisthenes not only knew, but seems to have deliberately adopted the Nominalistic theory, though in a somewhat crude form, and encumbered with gratuitous absurdities. Compare Arist. *Metaph.* IV. 20, 4: 'Ἀντισθένης φερε εὐφρων μὴδὲν ἀξίων λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οικείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἑφ' ἐνός; and *Ib.* VII. 2, 7: οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι...ἡτόρουν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι; with Plato, *Theat.* 201 E: αὐτὸ...καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνόμασαι μόνον εἰς; where, however, the reference to the Cynics is doubtful. ED.]

² *As de Animâ* III. c. 8. Aristotle frequently approaches the question involved in the Nominalist controversy, as *Categ.* c. 2 and 5; *Metaph.* VI. 13, 2; *Phys.* II. 1. All these passages are decidedly anti-realistic; and if they stood alone might be thought to afford ground for claiming Aristotle as a Nominalist. ED.]

³ [*Parmenides*, 132 B. ED.]

other objections. I do not mention these facts in order to pronounce any immediate opinion regarding the relative merit of these solutions; but simply to remind you, that, whether right or wrong in his choice, Plato saw these alternatives, deliberately rejected them as insufficient or untrue, and deliberately preferred to follow his own theory. If, when made aware of this, we continue to dismiss his views with contemptuous slight, surely we must possess a large measure of confidence in ourselves to prefer deciding that Plato devoted his life to circulating despicable reveries, rather than that we do not perfectly enter into his views and reasonings. Unfortunately, these reasonings are expressed in a form which it requires much patience to penetrate; and though we may be enabled to perceive much that inspires respect and admiration, he would be a bold critic who should affirm that he has left the dialectic of Plato without difficulties. We may enter far enough into the edifice to catch the general grandeur of the design, and the symmetry of the proportions; but to gain that point from which the whole is beheld at a glance, in all its complicated relations, has, I believe, been truly given to few of those who profess to have been so favoured.

I shall now endeavour to give you an outline of the theory of Plato considered in relation to its aim and purport. My object shall be to attempt to seize the spirit of the whole, without departing from his own habits of thought. Detailed accounts of detached dogmas you will find abundantly supplied by many writers and commentators; I must attempt something more systematically connected, because this combination or harmony is that which our learned investigators of particular questions most usually neglect to offer.

We saw that in the ancient world, at the time of Plato, the subject of the nature and the limits of human knowledge had attracted deep and general attention. Had the early inquiries on this great question been calmly and candidly conducted, there might have been agreement, or disagreement without extravagance. But it is one of the many evils of the controversial spirit that it inevitably urges opposition to extremes. The "odium theologicum" is theological, only because theology is to us the most important of speculative questions; the thoughtful ancients, when they did not fear the results, too much despised, or too wholly forgot, the gods of the people to allow their passions to be enlisted in assailing or protecting them; and philosophy became to them what religion is to us,—the theme of incessant disputation, because of the deepest

*Historical
genesis of
the Ideal
Theory.*

LECT.
VIII.

Plato's perception of the defects of previous theories concerning the relation of the mind to being:

1. Of the empirical.

speculative interest, and therefore of the most passionate controversial excitement. Accordingly, the primitive differences about knowledge, or the relation of reason to the Universe, gradually widened until they formed into two theories that may be considered as occupying the opposite poles of human thought: the theory that reduces all knowledge to the accidental receptive quality of the organs of sense, and the theory that denies the existence (except as an utter illusion) of the whole sensible world, and refers all knowledge to the apprehension of the One immutable essence which it hides behind it. But between these lay two less extravagant accounts of the nature and limits of man's knowledge: the one declaring it to be "right opinion," but without any further basis of reason, the other purporting to supply this deficiency by adding to the just opinion a logical explication by definitions and distinctions. Now you must conceive Plato as having gradually travelled from the first of these theories⁴ (or that of pure *αἰσθησις*) through the two last which rise higher and higher in the rational scale, until from the utmost verge of the logical system of science, he discerns that farthest (or ultra-rationalist) system of Unity. Arrived at this, the philosopher proceeds to estimate its value, and to determine whether it can satisfy the problem of the true nature of science, and the true prerogatives of the human reason.

To make this gradual advance more distinct, you must remember that there are, by the admission of all reasonable thinkers, at the least two separable faculties in human minds,—a faculty of receiving impressions, and a faculty of conceiving relations. Now the first of the systems I mentioned restricted our intellectual energies to the former, and (considered as an account of knowledge) we have seen that Plato overwhelmed it with argument and ridicule. The second and third systems (however mutually different as accounts of the cognitive powers of man) certainly agreed in adopting the two faculties—the receptive sensibility, and the power of judgment. But we find, that, even in the higher form, he was totally dissatisfied with this representation. And the reason was, doubtless, this:

⁴ [Comp. Arist. *Metaph.* 1. 6, 2: "Plato in his youth became familiar with Cratylus, and through him with the Heraclitic opinions of the flux of sensible objects, and their consequent unfitness to become objects of science; and this creed he continued to hold in his later years." It nowhere appears that at any period of his life he held "the doctrine of pure sensation," except in this negative way. His intolerance of the sceptical state of mind doubtless impelled him to seek elsewhere for a ground of certainty. So understood, the account in the text is true; but the formula, "sensation is knowledge," is evidently susceptible of a dogmatic sense, alien from the whole spirit of Plato's speculations, early as well as late. ED.]

that, carry these theories to the utmost, they yet leave us without (as he conceived) any substantial principle of certainty. Our opinions and our definitions may, as comparisons and distinctions of thoughts, be perfectly correct; they may be consistent with each other, and with the entire scheme of thought; and yet they may be (for aught that these theories involve) absolutely disconnected with reality. Exactly as in mathematics, it is altogether unimportant to the strict cogency of the demonstration, whether beyond the conceiving mind there be a single inch of real space in the world. They comprised general expressions indeed, the names of classes or genera; but these classes were themselves raised out of particular objects of sensuous experience, and if the sensible world was itself changeable, fleeting, and uncertain, how much less claim to fixed reality had these shadowy classifications of shadows? Now if, to the reflective mind, there arise an invincible conviction that it is formed for absolute certainty, and that on many points it possesses a certainty which declares to it the laws and nature of things, as they would be though every subordinate intellect perished,—then no account of human knowledge can be adequate which does not solve the phenomena of these absolute certainties, which does not in some manner bind together the universe beyond the soul and the soul itself.

Under these circumstances you may conceive that Plato approached with a more favourable prepossession the *Eleatic* system of the mind. For this, at least, purported to connect the reason with the rational element in the universe; that is, it (though, perhaps, indistinctly) admitted that there was, beyond mere sense and mere comparison or inference or generalization or abstraction, a faculty of which the inherent prerogative was this—that it could pronounce, independently of all sensible experience, certain truths regarding the universe; applying itself to that which was rational or intelligible therein, as truly as, but more intimately than, the eye can apply itself to light, or the ear to the pulses that generate a sound. But though an important step was here effected, a stride from the transitory to the permanent, from the temporal to the eternal,—the subsequent result was barren of profit and altogether inadequate to the demands of the question. In various parts of his writings^a, Plato meets and refutes the

LECT.
VIII.^a. Of the
empirical-
logical.³. Of the
unitarian
or ultra-
rational
doctrine.

^a [More particularly in the *Sophist* and *Parmenides*. Compare the well-known 3rd chapter of Aristotle's *Physics*, B. 1. where Trendelenburg, following Simplicius, traces a reference to the latter as well as the former of these two dialogues. This, if correct, is an answer to those who infer the spuriousness of the *Parmenides* partly from the absence of any allusion to it in Aristotle. ED.]

theory which would represent the rational substratum of the universal system as *one* in a sense so exclusive as to be incapable of diversity. Accordingly his own views far more resemble the earlier doctrines of Pythagoras, whose arithmetical metaphysics acknowledged this variety, and attempted to account for it, than the unwarrantable refinement by which the school of Elea professed to prove that the reason admitted no shadow of diversity in its objective counterpart. There is, then, an intelligible world as the Eleatics assert; but that world, though governed by one grand and presiding unity, is yet diversified by a boundless variety of intelligible essences.

Conceivability of the Platonic theory.

You can now enter easily into the aim of the theory of Ideas. That man's soul is made to contain not merely a consistent scheme of its own notions, but a direct apprehension of real and eternal laws beyond it, is not too absurd to be maintained. That these real and eternal laws are things intelligible, and not things sensible, is not very extravagant either. That these laws impressed upon creation by its Creator, and apprehended by man, are something distinct equally from the Creator and from man; and that the whole mass of them may be fairly termed the world of things purely intelligible, is surely allowable. Nay, further, that there are qualities in the supreme and ultimate Cause of all, which are manifested in His creation, and not merely manifested, but, in a manner—after being brought out of His superessential nature into the stage of being below Him, but next to Him—are then, by the causative act of creation deposited in things, differencing them one from the other, so that the things participate of them (*μετέχουσι*), communicate with them (*κοινωνοῦσι*); this likewise seems to present no incredible account of the relation of the world to its Author. That the intelligence of man, excited to reflection by the impressions of these objects thus (though themselves transitory) participant of a divine quality, should rise to higher conceptions of the perfections thus faintly exhibited; and inasmuch as these perfections are unquestionably real existences, and known to be such in the very act of contemplation,—that this should be regarded as a direct intellectual apprehension of them,—a union of the reason with the Ideas in that sphere of being which is common to both,—this is certainly no preposterous notion in substance, and by those who deeply study it, will perhaps be judged no unwarrantable form of phrase. Finally, that the reason, in proportion as it learns to contemplate the perfect and eternal, desires (*ἐρεῖ*) the enjoyment of such contemplations in a more consummate degree, and cannot be fully satisfied except in the

actual fruition of the perfect itself,—this seems not to contradict any received principle of psychology, or any known law of human nature. Yet these suppositions, taken together, constitute the famous THEORY OF IDEAS; and thus stated, may surely be pronounced to form no very appropriate object for the contempt of even the most accomplished of our modern “physiologists of mind.”

It appears, then, that the Ideal Theory, historically considered, is to be regarded as a reaction from the Eleatic Theory of Unity; a return from the doctrine of the absolute simplicity of the rational world to the prior Pythagorean doctrine of Unity in Multiplicity¹. That the “Numbers” of Pythagoras and the “Ideas” of Plato were closely analogous, cannot be doubted; and much investigation has been lavished on the question of their precise relation to each other. The differences between these philosophers in their elementary principles are noted by Aristotle at great length (in the 1st, 12th, and 13th books of his *Metaphysics*); but the obscurity of his language, and the difficulty of particular phrases, render it impossible to obtain any tolerable conception of this exposition without careful perusal of the entire original itself. A single sentence may be quoted as, apparently, the most comprehensive; though it will require some meditation to detect its exact purport. He tells us², that Plato, with the Pythagoreans, held that *numbers* were the causes of things, and of their essence; but “to make a duality of this unlimited³ which they regarded as one, and to compose this unlimited of great and small, was his peculiarity.”

The Ideas of Plato compared with the Numbers of Pythagorus.

Aristotle's testimony on this head.

¹ [The object of this brilliant paragraph being evidently to commend the Platonic scheme to the notice of persons conversant only with the language of modern metaphysics, the author has allowed himself considerable latitude in the use of phrases to which it would be difficult to find a precise counterpart in Plato's writings. I have therefore abstained from the attempt to support the several positions by quotations; which will be more appropriate to the detailed expositions which follow. ED.]

² [The question of priority is at least doubtful. It is remarkable that Aristotle nowhere connects the Ideal Theory with the Eleatic doctrine of Unity; while he devotes whole chapters to explaining its relation to the Pythagorean number-theory. But Plato has fortunately left us in no doubt of the fact of the former connexion. See the *Parmenides* passim; and especially p. 130 fol. ED.]

³ [*Metaph.* I. 6, 6. The “duality” (δύας) is explained in a passage of the *Physics*; B. III. c. 6, § 11: Πλάτων δὲ αὐτὰ δύο τὰ ἀπειρα ἐποίησεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖ ὑπερβᾶλλον καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καθάρεσιν. “Plato represented the unlimited as Two, because it is susceptible of infinite augmentation as well as infinite diminution or division.” Hence there is no material unit; unity is ideal in its very nature: ὡς ὅλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὡς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἓν. *Metaph.* I. 1. The word ἀπειρον means “matter,” as Prof. Butler states; but matter in its Platonic sense, its predicates rather resembling those of pure space than anything of a corporeal nature. See the following Lecture. ED.]

⁴ Sc. *matter*, I presume: constantly so called.

LECT.
VIII.

Furthermore, Plato (he tells us) held that "these numbers exist out of and beyond sensible things; whereas the Pythagoreans held that the numbers were the things themselves." It is singular that the technical phrases of the two masters would lead to a conclusion directly opposite; for Plato's *μέθεξις*, or participation, of ideas suggests an intimate embodying of these essences, while Pythagoras's *μίμησις τῶν ἀριθμῶν* rather brings with it the conception of a copy of a distant exemplar. On the whole, I would say that the "Ideas" of Plato were the natural product of a state of thought more advanced than that which the Pythagorean "Numbers" represent. The term "Idea," which must have been from the first more comprehensive in applicability and flexible in use than the *ἀριθμός*, evidences that the theory itself had risen to higher generalization in the mind of Plato. He, however, often employs fragments of the Pythagorean phraseology, with the inevitable consequence of obscurity which so forced and mystical a form of expression must involve. It would seem that after Plato's decease the arithmetical nomenclature rose again into fashion; for Xenocrates incorporated it in his fundamental dogmas, and Aristotle identifies it with the Platonic philosophy to a degree not apparently warranted by the writings of Plato himself.

Theory of
Ideas deve-
loped.

I must now proceed to regard the Theory of Ideas more closely and systematically. Plato believed that there is a perfect science of the reality of things, independent of sensible experience, which he considered (as is most true) incapable of bestowing absolute certainty. In every observation made by the senses, therefore, he considered that the reason might disengage an element exclusively its own, which, until that disengagement, had been mingled and hidden in the complex result⁹. Now that this was no unwarrantable train of thought may perhaps be thus manifested. In the observation of any change whatever, the senses can detect only the terms of the change, that is, the successive phenomena themselves: but it is unquestionable that every such change is accompanied with the irresistible conviction of the absolute necessity of a *cause* to effect it, in virtue of a principle above and beyond sense, which pronounces the universal truth that "every change requires a causal energy to produce it." Were we then to proceed no farther, it is obvious that every sensible mutation brings the reason of man (which is the organ or depository of necessary principles) in contact with a genuine "Idea;" which if it truly have (as it truly has) an eternal

⁹ [Phædr. p. 249 B: εἶδος ἐκ πολλῶν τὸν αἰσθητὸν εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυ-
αἰρούμενον. Ed.]

reality independent of the mind that apprehends it, may be fairly said to belong to a "world or sphere of ideas"¹⁰; the appropriate object of the inner world of reason*. But as yet we have gained only one presiding Idea; let us try if reason will not evidence a more varied inheritance as its property in the ideal world: as otherwise Plato has not been its correct interpreter, his theory assigning (to the endless perplexity of the systematizers of Platonism) ideas to everything that can receive a name¹¹,—ideas of relations¹², of colours, of sounds¹³,—even of artificial instances of mechanism¹⁴, no less than of beauty, symmetry, and truth. Any account which does not comprehend this universality must therefore fail to catch the spirit of the Platonic reasoning. Now—as we saw in a former Lecture—that the Good is the cardinal point of the philosophy of Plato, and by him enthroned in majesty supreme at the summit of the whole universe¹⁵, you must learn with him to regard the sensible world as a development of supreme perfection in an inferior and transitory form. From whatever cause (for this inscrutable difficulty with all other philosophers he evades), this manifestation of excellence, acting upon a subject that limits and embarrasses it, is in the world of sense necessarily imperfect; but, by a still nobler necessity, it is also as perfect as circumstances will admit¹⁶. If this be granted, it will follow that in every phenomenon there may be contemplated an instance of absolute perfection in partial development; and as surely as sense cannot be explained without something beyond sense, so surely does there exist in the eternal

Every existence that can be named has its appropriate Idea.

The Idea of the Good is revealed, though imperfectly, in every phenomenon.

¹⁰ [σοφὸς τόπος, *Rep.* VII. 517 B, al. ED.]

* For what constitutes a *distinct* sphere of being in any sense, but *independent reality*,—the qualities of time and space being here obviously inapplicable?

¹¹ [Arist. *Metaph.* I. 9, 1: καθ' ἑκαστον...ὁμώνυμόν τι ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. (speaking of the ideas). *Plat. Rep.* X. 596 A: εἶδος...ἐν ἑκαστον εἰσθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἑκαστα τὰ πολλὰ οἱ ταύτων νομα ἐπιφέρμεν. ED.]

¹² [Of the "relations" to which ideas may be assigned, specimens may be found in *Republ.* V. 479 B. *Comp. Phaedo*, 100 B. If I rightly understand Arist. *Metaph.* I. 9, 3, the propriety of this assignation was contested by some of Plato's followers. ED.]

¹³ [*Cratyl.* 423 E: αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἐκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅσα ἤξιώται ταύτης τῆς προσήψεως τοῦ εἶναι; ED.]

¹⁴ [As of chairs and tables, *Rep.* X. 596 B: πολλὰ εἰσι κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι... ἀλλ' ἴδαι γέ του περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκεύη δύο, μία μὲν κλῖνη, μία δὲ τραπέζη. To these are added in the *Parmenides* οἷσι, καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ τι (sic leg.) ἀμύωτατόν τε καὶ φανύότατον, p. 130 C. ED.]

¹⁵ [As *Repub.* VI. 505 A, fol. VII. 517 B. *Phileb.* 20 B, fol. See esp. *Rep.* VI. 509 B: οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς σβέλῃ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. ED.]

¹⁶ [*Timæus*, 29 D: Λέγωμεν δὲ δι' ἣν τινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν τότε ὁ ξυμπᾶς ξυπόστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἢ ἀγαθὸς δὲ οὐδεὶς...ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ' ἐκτός ἐν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἀγενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια αὐτῷ... ED.]

LECT.
VIII.

constituting
the
reason of
such phe-
nomenon.

These
"reasons"
are sepa-
rate from
the Divine
Mind.

world a special reason (consistent with the laws of beauty, goodness, and truth) for every separate apparition in the sensible world: a reason antecedent to the sensible manifestation, but embodied in it, and to which therefore the sensible manifestation serves to guide the human intelligence. Nor is it a satisfactory account of this matter to identify these reasons with the very essence of God; and thus to pronounce that there is no medium between Him and the transitory world of sense. The Divine Nature (which only by faint analogy we describe by what we can best conceive of excellence when we term it The Good) is as far above the world of ideas as ideas above sense; a truth which seems manifest from the fact that reason, the apprehender of ideas, can form so indistinct and unsatisfactory a conception of the uncaused, illimitable, and all-containing God. Through ideas, however, we may hope to rise in perpetual progress towards this supreme idea; as from sense the reflective mind struggles into the sphere of idea.

The Ideas
are not ab-
stractions,

Now we know that there is a faculty in the mind of man which generalizes the facts of sense, or abstracts them; and to the result applies a common name. On the other hand, we have already laid down that there is a faculty altogether distinct and above it, which exists antecedently to all experience, and is the highest element of the rational soul; distinct,—for no generalization can pronounce with certainty the universal, necessary, and absolute; antecedent,—for though gradually evoked into activity by the stimulus of observation, its dormant properties existed before they awoke. Here, then, are two faculties,—*logical abstraction* and *substantial reason*; the one the organ of general conceptions, or general names, the other the higher apprehender of eternal realities: the one gradually rising towards the universal, the other descending from above to meet it. Now as the former in proportion to our increase of reflection perpetually swells to nearer and nearer approximation to the latter, general conceptions becoming more and more fitted to represent eternal reasons; it is natural that Plato should regard them as a kind of *idea umbratiles*, shadowy assimilations of those everlasting Ideas which form the property of the pure reason when wholly emancipated from sensual confinements; nor are we to wonder that innumerable critics of Plato, mistaking the true purport of his philosophy of the reason, should have estimated him by modern standards, and because they found little acknowledgment of any faculty for apprehending the absolute in our ordinary treatises, but abundance concerning the faculty of abstracting and generalizing,

as some
modern cri-
tics of Plato
have ima-
gined.

should have conceived this alone intended in the realism of Plato, and thus exulted in detecting in the teacher of ages the preposterous absurdity, that the conceptions formed by abstraction had themselves as abstractions a distinct external existence. Yet I can scarcely point to a single one among the slighting and cursory notices of the realism of Plato, contained in the works of the Scottish school, in which this imputed absurdity is not ascribed to the founder of the ideal philosophy.

An opposite error—even more manifestly contradicted by the writings of Plato—has often been advanced for the purpose of vindicating the philosopher's reputation from the charge of supposed extravagancies. I allude to the attempt which Plutarch¹⁷, and others in various ages, have made to demonstrate that the "Ideas" of Plato were not meant as distinct realities at all, but simply as models conceived in the mind of God, in the same manner as models are imagined in the mind of man. The operation of the Deity is thus conformable to Ideas, in being the shadowing in the world of sense of His own conceptions of order. This carries with it the attraction of simplicity, but it is utterly inconsistent with the assertions of Plato, which everywhere, and in every form, distinguish between the reality of eternal forms and the mere conceptions of a mind. Holding that the "ideas" are intimately incorporated in creation, being its very life and substance, Plato could not, without identifying the Deity with His work, regard them as in any sense a portion of the divine nature itself. These "forms" or eternal laws of things are above us, but they are below God; and though they point to us the character of that Supreme Essence of Essences, they are not to be worshipped as Him. God is not the aggregate of laws, nor are those laws only existent in His Intellect—for then where were "creation"?—but He is the Cause, and Sustainer, and Substance of Laws. The theory which would represent the Ideas of Plato as simply divine conceptions of order, would altogether misconceive the spirit of his views regarding the connexion of God and the universe. In Plato's view, the true universe was itself ideal, an aggregate of ordered laws accidentally, not essentially, embodied in matter; and consequently the version of his philosophy which I am opposing, would imply in strict con-

They are not merely archetypal conceptions in the Divine Mind, as Plutarch, and others have supposed.

¹⁷ [This view was adopted by some of the later Platonists. See the next Lecture, note (1). It is unjustly attributed to Plutarch, whose account of the ideas in his *Platonic Questions* (p. 1001) is derived from good sources, and differs entirely from the superficial statement of the Pseudo-Plutarch in the *Placita Philosophorum* (Lib. I. c. 3). It is to this latter, doubtless, that Prof. Butler refers. Ed.]

LECT.
VIII.

sistency that, according to Plato, the whole reality of the universe was merely the mental reality of a Conception in the Divine Intelligence. The error of these representations is irresistibly established by the authority of *Aristotle*; who through the whole of his detailed examination of the Platonic Theory, never once regards the Ideas as being other than true, and real, and distinct existences.

The Theory of Ideas, as a solution, or rather a systematic statement, of the intercourse between reason and reality, requires, as I apprehend, a distinct discussion of three separate points,—the relation of Ideas to God, of Ideas to the universe, and of Ideas to man: it being evident that unless these three connexions are granted, the theory is inadequate. But this subject is too extensive for the present occasion; and I shall therefore devote the remainder of our time to a very necessary point,—the peculiar phraseology of the Ideal Theory.

*Phraseology
of the Ideal
Theory;
εἶδος and
ἰδέα, not
distinguish-
able.*

It has been thought by some critics, that Plato insinuates a distinction between the εἶδος and the ἰδέα; the εἶδος being the mental apprehension, and the ἰδέα its counterpart in nature; εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς being equivalent to ἀρετὴ καθόλου,—κατ' εἶδη σκοπεῖν το κατὰ γένος σκοπεῖν. But though this distinction may appear sometimes maintained, it assuredly cannot be verified by larger examinations²⁸: and in the writings of Aristotle on the ideal controversy, we may observe in a single page the phrases used indiscriminately. This seems at first sight an unhappy

²⁸ [The word ἰδέα, in its strictly Platonic or transcendental sense, as distinguished from the merely popular or logical meanings, "form," "kind," "genus," which are common to Plato and other writers, occurs but in four or five dialogues. Its appearance is the signal of the completion of the ideal theory in the mind of its author: and the dialogues in which it is found are accordingly reckoned among his maturer productions (Brandis, *Handb.* II. p. 241). They are, the *Farmenides*, *Philebus*, *Phædo*, *Republic*, and *Timæus*. Passages may be quoted from one or two others in which the word *may*, but never (so far as I know) in which it *must*, bear this signification. Etymologically, indeed, ἰδέα is but another form of εἶδος, and Plato as well as Aristotle uses the latter word in meanings parallel to all the senses of ἰδέα, including the highest. I apprehend, however, that Plato will be found to prefer ἰδέα in those cases in which especial accuracy is required: as where he may wish to exclude the merely logical sense, or to present the "idea" under its aspect of a *παρὰ δειγµα*, or *pattern*. See *Rep.* X. 596 B, where this sense is brought out. Εἶδος had been used just before, where the sense of "genus" is uppermost. So Aristotle, though in his critique on Plato he uses εἶδος and ἰδέα interchangeably, preferred to entitle his monography on the subject (now lost) *περὶ Ἰδεῶν*. For a like reason he never uses the word ἰδέα in developing the theory of εἶδη which forms so important an integral part of his own metaphysical system. And Aristotle's commentators evince a still more decided preference for ἰδέα, as the distinguishing characteristic of Platonism. These *nuances* are not without interest to the accurate student: I have therefore thought it worth while to qualify the generally true observations in the text, though at the risk of appearing enamoured of a distinction without a difference. ED.]

instance of verbal confusion; but it was probably the result of deeper design in the original construction of this celebrated phraseology. We shall hereafter see how the theory of the connexion of the idea *external* to man with the idea *internal* of the reason, purported to illustrate the absolute certainty of the convictions of scientific intelligence; and I have no doubt that it was the object of Plato to bring these antithetical essences as nearly as possible into the position of mutual absorption and identity, without wholly doing so. Now, for this purpose, the very indifference of the names would be one of the most obvious means of producing the impression required. When he uses the expression *εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*, however, he seems invariably to intend the Divine Idea itself, resident in the Divine Reason, not indeed as conception in man, but with a distinct individual existence.

The usual phrases by which Plato endeavours to intimate the connexion between the ideas and sensible phenomena, are such as these:—*παρουσία, κοινωνία*¹⁹, *μέθεξις* (presence, communication, participation) of ideas. Sometimes he affirms that things in this world are *ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἐκεῖ*²⁰, and that the phenomenon of sense is *τοιούτον οἷον τὸ ὄν* (something such as is the real). Of all terms expressive of the original idea, none is more constantly used than *παράδειγμα*, an exemplar, to which corresponds *εἰκὼν*, a copy²¹; and no relation between the real and sensible more ordinarily attributed than that of similarity. The phrase which Aristotle has usually employed—*μορφή* or *form*—occurs more than once in the genuine writings of Plato²². It would likewise appear, that in the ideal world itself he conceived that there were distinctions of rank and precedence; for while to the ideas in general an eternity and incorruptibility is uniformly ascribed, he also speaks of certain *γεννητὰ παραδείγματα*²³, which shared in some measure in the temporal and inferior character of the sensible world itself. These occasional inconsistencies (for such they certainly seem) break the symmetry and precision of the theory; but we feel them to be only occasional; and if we were in possession of the oral discourses and

¹⁹ [*Κοινωνία* is rather said of the relations of ideas to each other than of their relation to sensibles. See *Sophist.* 257 A: *ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἡ τῶν γενῶν φύσις*. But in one passage of the *Phædo*, 100 D, we read: *ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία. μέθεξις* is used *passim*. ED.]

²⁰ [*Phædrus*, 250 A. ED.]

²¹ [*εἰκὼν* and *παράδειγμα* occur *Tim.* p. 29 B. The latter *passim*. Comp. *Ib.* 48 E, and *Parmen.* 132 D. ED.]

²² [As in *Phædo*, 103 E, 104 D. But these instances are rare and perhaps ambiguous. Plato would probably not have spoken of *τὰ εἶδη καὶ αἱ μορφαὶ* as synonymous, as Aristotle does, *Metaph.* VII. c. 5. ED.]

²³ [*Timæus*, 28 B. ED.]

Phrases denoting the connexion between the Idea and the Phenomenon.

LECT.
VIII.

traditional doctrines of Plato, probably even these minor discrepancies would be resolved into more general formulas explanatory and even confirmatory of the main theory itself. Of the real world which is intercepted, and yet suggested, by the sensible, such phrases as these are customary, and are familiar to every reader of Plato: it is τὸ ὄν αἰεί, γένεσιν οὐκ ἔχον²⁴,—it is τὸ οὕτως ὄν,—it is αἰεί κατὰ ταῦτά ὄν,—ὡσαύτως ἔχον,—τὸ αἰδίων; and, in reference to the special faculties by which it is apprehended, it is νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτόν, μετὰ νοῦ καταφανές, τὸ νοητὸν and τὸ γνωστόν, while οὐσία or essence is met by ἀλήθεια or truth, and γένεσις or generation in time by πίστις or faith²⁵. On the other hand, the fleeting world of sense is characterized as τὸ γιγνόμενον αἰεί ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε,—as γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον,—as ἔπ' αἰτίου τινὸς γιγνόμενον; and, in relation to the mental faculties that perceive it,—as δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγῳ περιληπτόν²⁶,—as δοξαστόν,—as αἰσθητόν. Many other forms of expression similar to these are scattered through the Platonic expositions; but the general purport of them all is the same, to contrast the seen and temporary with the known and eternal.

Plato's popular expositions of the doctrine of Ideas.

It would, perhaps, have been well for the perspicuity, though scarcely for the popularity, of the Platonic philosophy, if its Founder had always restricted himself to phrases such as these, distinct in their purport, and illumined by mutual contrast. But this is, indeed, far from being the case. The richest effusions of lyric poetry have never surpassed the profusion of imaginative decoration with which Plato delights to adorn these cold and feelingless forms of the pure reason. It would seem as if, convinced that the imagination and senses were to cease to be ours beyond the grave, he was determined to tax them in this life to the utmost, for the adornings of the philosophy of the eternal world. To the conception of Plato this life was itself a kind of perpetual allegory, an image in the language of fancy of truths infinitely beyond it; and his discourses are thus a picture, in the spirit of the Picture that evermore surrounded him. But in the midst of all this lavish ornament, and these constant appeals to the lovely scenery of sense, it is remarkable how little he suffered the seductions of sense to affect the substance of his teaching. Though there never were discourses more beautifully imaginative, there never was philosopher who

²⁴ [*Timæus*, 27 D. For the remaining phrases, see *Republic*, esp. VI. and VII. *passim*. ED.]

²⁵ [*Ibid.* 29 C. ED.]

²⁶ [*Ibid.* 28 A. ED.]

more steadily discountenanced the subjection for an instant of moral or metaphysical truth to the perilous despotism of sense in any of its forms: and they are grievously mistaken who (judging from some misunderstood phrases) habitually endeavour to justify the refined immoralities and false sensibility of so much of our popular literature by reference to the teaching or opinions of Plato. Nothing can impress more strongly the truth of this superiority, than the well-known opinion of the most poetical of philosophic expositors with regard to the exclusion of poetry in its usual forms from his ideal republic; and even when he speaks in the course of argument or illustration of that exquisite art which possesses so mysterious a control over the affections, and which forms, as it were, the link between the worlds of external sensation and inward emotion, the art of *Music*, it is with little respect for its pleasurable or exalting influences (except as a useful practical fact), and altogether with regard to any powers it may possess of suggesting by its sensible harmonies the harmony of that world of order, where its charms are absent and forgotten.

If I am not mistaken in the views which I have this day presented of the scope of the ideal theory of Plato, you will now, I trust, have perceived in it a mighty substance of imperishable truth. I am not prepared to defend, I shall have at our next meeting to criticise, many of its details; but many fallacies should indeed be accumulated around it to obscure to any candid mind the dignity and symmetry of the structure itself. It may here and there betray feeble and unsightly additions, but for the most part they detach without much difficulty from the body of the edifice; it may seem to impatient pursuers of unadorned truth too profusely overlaid with flowers, but remove the flowers and the pillars are disclosed unshaken. As an effort to exhibit the eternal existence of the laws which the reason apprehends in the universe,—their reality, independence, and truth,—the theory of Plato is noble in its aspirations, and (as I believe) unimpeachable in the justness of its ultimate object; though, as we shall see at our next meeting, in the details there may be difficulties into which he (and in him human nature itself represented) could, and can, scarcely expect ever thoroughly to penetrate.

Conclusion.

LECTURE IX.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. VI.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
IX.

*Platonic
Theory of
Ideas con-
tinued.*

I ENDEAVOURED in the last lecture to convey a general idea of what I conceive to be the substance of the Platonic theory of Ideas, when, disembarrassed of mythological and imaginative decorations, it is exposed to the scrutiny of reason. I attempted to shew you, that this theory purports to affirm, that there is in every sensible phenomenon a rational element, discernible by the intellect alone; which rational element determines the entire sensible apparition, and may therefore be regarded as standing to it in the relation of a cause and reason, or even, with some plausibility, may be considered its model or exemplar: that this rational element, being from its nature eternal, must be considered as antecedent to the sensible image, as independent of it, and therefore as belonging to a region of being essentially different from the sensible; while again, being united to the sensible world so as to form its true basis and reality, it cannot merely be regarded as a conception in the intelligence of the great Architect of the world, but as truly existing, distinctly from Him, yet bound to Him in the strictest bonds of coeternal existence. When in this manner you have gained a view of the *Ideas* of Plato, you at once perceive that they are no other than those eternal Laws and Reasons of things which even the most cursory examination cannot (I should suppose) deny to be a necessary element in every metaphysical estimate of the universe: and which equally applying to every existence whatever, to the least as to the loftiest, to the artificial as to the natural, are justly represented in those "*Ideas*" which, we have already seen, are in the theory of Plato ascribed to everything that has actual being. This UNIVERSALITY of the ideal reasons, which from an imperfect apprehension of metaphysical truth many of the later Platonists denied¹, Plato under-

*The Ideas
are the eter-
nal Laws
and Reasons
of things.*

*Erroneous
restriction
of the Ideal
Theory by
the later
Platonists.*

¹ [As Alcinous, *de Plat. Dogm.* c. 9: "Few of Plato's followers will admit

stood the scope of his own reasoning too well not constantly to enforce. Thus, in a remarkable passage near the beginning of the *Parmenides*; "Socrates!" says Parmenides², (who, now the aged patriarch of the philosophical world, is introduced conversing with Socrates just commencing his career of inquiry)—"Socrates, how admirable is your earnestness in the pursuit of speculation! But tell me, have you indeed distinguished as you say, on the one side these ideas themselves, on the other their participant objects (*τὰ μετέχοντα*)? And does similitude itself (*αὐτῇ ὁμοιότητι*) seem to you to be really anything beyond that similitude which we possess; and in like manner unity, and multiplicity, and the rest, which you have heard from Zeno? Certainly (replied Socrates). And probably (said Parmenides) it is so with the idea in itself (*εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ*) of the just, the fair, the good, and such like? Assuredly. What? an idea of man apart from us and all such as we are,—an independent idea of man, or fire, or water? In truth, replied Socrates, I have often hesitated, Parmenides, about these; whether we ought to speak of them just as of the others, or differently. And does your doubt extend, Socrates, to things apparently ridiculous, as hair, mud, filth, and everything else that is worthless and vile,—do you hesitate whether we ought to pronounce that of each of these also there is an idea apart, distinguishable from what we handle? By no means, said Socrates. These are nothing more than just what we see them: to imagine an idea of these would be quite extravagant. Yet, I admit, it has often perplexed me whether the same thing does not take place with respect to *every* actual existence: but after standing for a while to this, I have fled the thought, for fear of falling into an unfathomable abyss of absurdities: and, returning to those particulars for which we have admitted that ideas do exist, I devote myself wholly to contemplating *them*. Ah, Socrates, replied Parmenides, you are yet young, and philosophy has not yet got possession of you, as I think she will one day do—when you will have learned to find nothing truly despicable in any of these things. But now your youth inclines you to regard the opinions of men." It is, indeed, quite manifest that the reasoning on which

which is anticipated and refuted in the *Parmenides*.

that there are ideas of artificial productions, such as a harp or a shield; or of things which disturb the order of nature, as fever or cholera; or of separate individuals, as Socrates and Plato: they also deny ideas to vile and paltry objects, such as filth or chaff; and even to mere relations, as those of 'greater' and 'higher.' For they contend that the ideas are the eternal and perfect conceptions of the Divine Mind." The original may be found in Stallbaum's *Parmenides*, p. 44, or in C. F. Hermann's edition of Plato. Ed.]

² [Plat. *Parm.* p. 130 B. Ed.]

LECT.
IX.

Plato built his theory applies with equal force to *every* positive being whatever. In short, if I may venture to present the essence of the theory in a yet simpler form, the whole conceivable universe is metaphysically divisible into Facts and Reasons, the objects of experience, and the objects of intellect; with—as equally the ultimate point of both—that Supreme Essence, who is at once the greatest of facts, and the most perfect of reasons, holding in Himself the solution of His own existence. Now this statement, though not perhaps adequate to Plato's entire meaning, yet marks with a line of light the distributions of his whole philosophical picture: presenting at once the essentially successive nature of the actual, the eternity of the rational; the equal subordination of every positive existence to its own special correlative in the sphere of reason; the complete generical distinctness of the two, yet the participation of the sensible in the intelligible through every part of its being, as qualified, differed, and determined, by it. Thus the object of Plato was, to trace all that is offered by the senses throughout this wondrous world, down to its root in a deeper and invisible world; and to pronounce that the notion of perfect science is a delusion when it does not penetrate to this profounder reality. And I have already professed my own entire coincidence with the general principles of such a philosophy; and expressed, in language which they alone who depend on the vulgar representations of Platonism will regard as exaggerated, my admiration of the first full and systematic teacher of such views, as standing almost alone among the uninspired instructors of man.

But while the general spirit of the Platonic theory is thus true and thus admirable, I do not affirm that we must not make occasional abatements, in considering its details. Unquestionably, extrinsic influences so far affected the mind of Plato as to lead him to encumber his system with additions altogether superfluous and often deforming. These will offer themselves to you naturally in the sequel.

The Ideal Theory admits of being considered in a threefold aspect.

I stated at the last lecture, that it would be necessary to consider the ideal theory of Plato in three aspects, the relation of ideas to the reason of man, to the sensible universe, and to the Supreme Being. Central between these three terms, ideas were supposed to embody the substance of truth, and to present it in different modes of communication to them all. I must demand your attention in this matter; you can scarcely expect that a subject so profound can be exhibited in a very popular form. I

will however disembarass it of every avoidable perplexity, and systematize the whole.

LECT.
IX.

I. First, then, as to the relation of ideas to the human reason. It is certain that the human reason possesses an assured conviction with regard to the absolute truth of that great metaphysical law of the universe, that all which exists has beneath it a foundation in the reason of things, and exists only in virtue of that relation to the intellectual system of Being. Such a reason of existence is itself a mental essence, distinct indeed from the human mind which apprehends it, yet, as being mental, unquestionably of the same nature. The human intelligence knows that there is the ideal substratum, knows that it must be different for every different kind of perceived objects, yet cannot pretend to apprehend it with the plenitude of perfect vision. But though this fulness of direct apprehension belongs to a better—as Plato believed, to a simply incorporeal state³—there is, as I have shewn, a contact sufficiently intimate between the soul of man and the ideal reason, to convince that soul of the reality of its possession; to assure it that it holds the treasure in its grasp, though it cannot pronounce its weight, or form, or value. If any one questions whether this is conceivable, he may be referred to the analogous argument for a Deity; where from the irresistible law of causality and intelligent ordination the existence is demonstrated of a Being whose mode of existence our minds are totally inadequate to comprehend. A connexion, then, is admissible between the human reason and the ideal forms, which, though manifestly in this state partial and imperfect, yet evinces a substantial homogeneity between the two. And thus on the one hand ideas are said to reside in the universal mind, and, on the other, the mind itself is designated as an idea⁴: forms of phrase that attest the conviction of a substantial sameness in the nature of

1. The relation of Ideas to the human reason.

The reasons of phenomena are mental essences.

³ [*Phædo*, 66 D: εἰ μέλλομεν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἶσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον (τοῦ σώματος) καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, κ.τ.λ. *Ed.*]

⁴ [*Theæt.* 184 D: εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ἑνωρεῖται. This however is one of the numerous passages in which *idéa* is to be taken in a popular sense, as = φύσις v. t. q. A passage in the *Phædo* (103 E, fol.) is apparently incompatible with the assertion that Plato regarded the soul as an "idea;" at any rate the argument, a very subtle one, in favour of the soul's immortality, loses its force on this supposition. The error, if error it is, is Ritter's, and Brandis seems to countenance it (*Handb.* II. p. 231, *anm.*) Plato's real opinion, at least at the time when he wrote, is adumbrated in the figurative passage of the *Republic*, which sets forth the relation of the Soul to the Ideas as that of the *ἡλιοειδὲς* to the *ἥλιος*, the *sunlike* to the sun (p. 508 fol.). The ideas are rational, the reason ideal in its nature; but neither are the ideas Reason, nor is the Reason an idea. It will be seen that the general tenor of the remarks in the text is not affected by this correction. It does not appear in what sense Aristotle pronounced the soul to

LECT.
IX.*The Platonic Eros.*

both. I need not add how such views were fortified in the ancient philosophy by the belief which in former lectures I shewed to be nearly universal, of the essential divinity of the rational spirit in man. To this community of nature between the soul and its objects, belongs that very celebrated portion of the doctrine of Plato, the *love* of ideal existence, which has since held so prominent a position in the romantic and fictitious literature, no less than in the theological speculations, of most countries. The theory of the Platonic love belongs more properly to another—the ethical—department of the present investigation; but its immediate relation to the argument before us requires a brief notice of its bearing here. Holding, as we have seen, an affinity between reason in man and the forms of reason in the universe, Plato found a strong confirmation of this doctrine in the process which in minds at all raised beyond a merely sensible existence he perceived to take place in the contemplation of objects characterized by beauty, order, and proportion. The mind, in such cases, instinctively refers the object to a standard of higher perfection which the object itself suggests. Pronouncing the visible phenomenon excellent in proportion as it approaches this higher standard, it yet is forced to avow that nothing earthly realizes it. This however is certain, that even the earthly object is, by virtue of its partial exhibition of perfection, capable of awakening a tendency to itself, varying in intensity according to the measure of the absolute beauty it manifests: and Plato, unquestionably taking advantage often of very ambiguous instances, attributed the admiration excited to the innate affection of the eternal spirit of man for that kindred exemplar of beauty which the object shadowed forth on the cloudy screen of the sensible world. Into the consequences of this theory (which you will find largely exhibited in the *Symposium* and *Phædrus*) I am not now about to enter; my object at present being merely to adduce it as an illustration of the intimate affinity which Plato maintained to exist between the soul and the intelligible essences. For this doctrine and the former, taken together, exhibit both regions of the soul—the intellect and the emotions—as equally attracted by congeniality of nature to the ideal world. It is easy to exemplify the two tendencies in a

be εἶδος τι, as Simplicius *de Anim.* p. 62 assures us he did in his dialogue *Eudæmus*; whether as the formative principle of organic matter or otherwise. There are passages in the *Sophistes* of Plato which, if not representing the soul as an εἶδος, allow to the εἶδη inherent vitality. Whether this makes in favour of Professor Jowett's opinion as to the late date of this dialogue, it is not now the time to enquire. ED.]

single instance. An act of virtue receives its name from its embodying the eternal "idea" of virtue in a transient shape, which "idea" the reason apprehends directly as its own appropriate object,—as the law of the intelligible world which forms the basis, modifies the quality, and fixes the whole character, of the act thus wrought out in the world of time and sense. At the same time, the soul, urged by this observed instance, rises from admiration of the fact to admiration of the law; and feeling that even in the noblest exhibition of that law by man the reason finds something to desire, yearns for that blissful country of the soul where alone absolute perfection exists, and where the essence, whatever it be, (for something it surely is,) of unclouded virtue shall be disclosed to the intellectual eye;—where, as it were, virtue and the soul shall unveil to each other, and one shall be seen, and the other shall see, both alike disenshrouded of the impeding embarrassments of their earthly and material organisms.

In the processes just mentioned, it is evident, as I stated in the last lecture, that Plato necessarily regarded the faculty of abstraction as the threshold of the temple of philosophic contemplation; but it is also evident (contrary to the representations of so many of the modern censurers of the philosopher) that he was far from regarding it as ensuring (except in a very subordinate sense) a position within the temple itself. The "Ideas" of Plato, those ideas to which he assigned a distinct existence in a distinct world, I must again repeat, were not the 'abstract ideas' of the modern philosophy. They were designated by the same name, the "justice," of which experience instructs us to speak as an abstraction from observed facts, and the "just in itself," which forms its exemplar in the sphere of reason; because from the deficiency of our present faculties we are unable to rise above the abstraction, and therefore give to the higher essence, whose existence alone we can be properly said to know directly, the name of that which is most worthy to represent it. But while the common name is thus from necessity assigned to both, Plato is careful to distinguish them in nature; and I know no single passage in his writings in which an abstract idea is said to have an existence outside the mind that conceives it. The faculty of abstraction is unquestionably represented as requisite in order to bring the reason into a position to hold such imperfect communion as it can in this embodied state attain, with the Eternal Ideas; but the best conceptions it can form are still represented, however they may refine the products of sensible experience, to be yet deficient in that independent reality which forms

Use, according to Plato, of the faculty of Abstraction.

LECT.
IX.

the great prerogative of the ideas to which they struggle. It seems to me, that in such passages as the following from the *Philebus*⁵, the two are not improbably distinguished from each other. "Whatever faculty we possess stable, and pure, and true, and as we say sincere (*εἰλικρινή*) belongs to things which remain unmixed and for ever immutable; or, next to them, to those which are most kindred (*συγγενή*) to them." When Plato reflected on the objective reality of the universal and necessary truths which the reason discerns to be the governing principles of the universe, he might pronounce that in the apperception of them the reason held a direct communion with ideas, manifestly by a faculty altogether distinct from abstraction; when by the exercise of abstraction he obtained a general name, or conception, of the geometrical figure, the moral virtue, the physical quality—and along with this had, by the independent exercise of reason, pronounced that these characters of things thus common to many, must have their ultimate reason, their model, their consummation, in the farther and invisible system, he might affirm that by this act of the reason he had cast a bridge across the abyss that divides the sensible and intelligible, while by the previous act of abstraction he had brought the sensible objects to the utmost verge of their own sensible territory. But I do not believe that Plato ever held that the abstraction itself could bridge the abyss, or transfer the seen to the unseen, the temporal to the eternal.

But what relation, then, had the generalizing process to the apperception of ideas? This. The world of sense pictures the world of reason. Now the sensible world is made up of a vast complication of qualities and of laws, which in the world of reason are presented in distinctness and simplicity. To represent this latter scene, therefore, the philosopher must study to disentangle complexity, and separate accidental concomitants. To do this is to abstract. But the necessity also arose (in Plato's estimate) from the perversity and hostility of the sensible subject-matter itself; which, debasing the ideal perfection in every instance, obliged the aspirant after the better world to abstract these unhappy accompaniments in order to obtain that which truly found its model in the sphere of ideas. In this relation of the abstract to the eternal ideas, you will find sufficient reason for Plato's constant admiration of the abstractive habit, and his reverence for language which is its creature. But that he did not urge its claims beyond the bounds I have assigned, seems eminently manifest from this consideration. The mathematical

⁵ [p. 59 c. Ed.]

sciences are the palmry instance of the abstractive faculty; and to Plato the favourite one. Yet we know from Aristotle, that the *μαθήματα* were τὰ μεταξὺ λεγόμενα, only intermediaries between sense and reason; having gained even this advance from causes not now worth investigating; and we know that Plato himself considered them the mere preliminaries to the philosophy of essences⁶.

LECT.
IX.Plato's
view of the
intermediate
character of
the math.
truth.

Ideas and the "pure reason" (the phrase is Plato's own, λόγος εἰλικρινής or καθαρός⁷, though since appropriated) being thus essentially kindred although unhappily separated, knowledge being the conjoint result of both, and demanding both, it was not unnatural that Plato should have united them in a common eternity of nature. He usually argues the essential eternity of the soul from its faculty of self-activity⁸; but from various hints and trains of thought, I cannot but think that the view I have stated strongly influenced his mind. The rational element in the human soul, that which addresses itself to the absolute, the necessary, the essentially true, is inherently eternal; because even in its incorporate state not truly dwelling in time or space, to whose laws or conditions it is in no sense amenable. It is not to wait for an hereafter, it now lives in eternity. Its spiritual vehicle, the portion of the mind which, operating in time, ministers to the imagination (and thence ultimately to the senses), by comparing or abstracting, must vanish with the dissolution of the machinery of sense; but it only vanishes to leave the purely intellectual essence where it found it, in its own intellectual home. Such reasoning as this (which I suspect to have

ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῶν τα μὲν πολλὰ αὐτὰ ὁμοία εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἑκάστων μόνον. Plato himself, as stated in the text, regarded the study of mathematics as a preparation for speculative philosophy; and distinguished the mathematical faculty (διάνοια) from the higher speculative intelligence (νοῦς), as well as from the mere notion or opinion founded on sense (δόξα). *R. Philol.* VI. 511 B. The conceptions which the mathematician takes for granted as the basis of his reasoning (ὑποθέσεις), such as space, number, &c. are among those which the philosopher seeks to account for. Compare a remarkable passage in *Euthyd.* 290 B: οἱ δ' αὖ γεώμετροι...οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλὰ θηρεύσαι μόνον, παραδιδόσιν ὅπου τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρῆσθαι αὐτῶν τοῖς εὐρημασιν. ED.]

⁷ [Νοῦς, not Λόγος, is commonly found in this combination. I remember no instance of "λόγος καθαρός" or "εἰλικρινής." The word νοῦς answers well enough to the German "Vernunft," but not so well to our "Reason," of which λόγος is the natural correspondent. Milton's distinction of Reason Discursive and Reason Intuitive represents fairly the difference between the two modes of mental action. Accordingly in ascending to first principles the philosopher is said to employ μετὰ λόγον, or λογισμοῦ. ED.]

⁸ [Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον...μόνον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν...οὐποτε λήγει κινούμενον. *Phædr.* 245 C. ED.]

LECT.
IX.

The Platon-
ic doctrine of pre-
existence.

passed through the mind of Plato) would of course establish—if the phrase be not itself inaccurate—the *anterior* eternity of the soul. This doctrine of pre-existences, however, Plato endeavoured to demonstrate by a very fallacious experiment; which purported to evince that all discovery, or even instruction in abstract truth, was but the recollection of former knowledge: as if it were at all easier to conceive the mystery of remembrance than the mystery of successive suggestions, or the one were a whit more antecedently probable than the other*. The intellectual essence, then, Plato considered coeternal with those *ideas* which are its sole appropriate aliment; that which men call life was but a dark and transitory imprisonment; and time an episode in eternity. It dwelt of old in its own region; it sighs for it past, it longs for it to come; but, emancipated from the burden of flesh, it shall feel as one who awakes from a dream, discovering at length that though surrounded by visionary forms it never changed its real place through the entire; it reposes where it reposed before the vision began†.

With regard then to the connexion of the reason and the essential forms, we may pronounce it the spirit of the Platonic theory, 1st, that a true knowledge or communion of reason with the reality of things is ensured by the kindred, or even homogeneous, nature of reason and ideas⁹. 2ndly, that this intimate connexion is testified by the impassioned aspiration of the instructed soul for the perfection to be found only in the ideal world¹⁰. 3rdly,

* This singular passage (in the *Meno*) I suspect to have been a merely popular illustration of a doctrine which Plato—or Socrates, if it was truly his—built upon a deeper basis.

† To qualify this statement, it must, however, be noted, that in various parts of his writings Plato very distinctly lays down the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment; which it certainly is not easy to reconcile with this simply metaphysical conception of the eternity of the rational soul as the main ground of the belief of immortality. In these representations it is exceedingly difficult to detach the mythological dress from the substance of doctrine; but it would appear that, though rejecting the notion of a re-integration of the dissolved bodily integument, Plato held that enough of the conscious mind remained united to its rational element to form a subject for happiness and misery; and, if this were difficult to admit, that by the perpetual transition from body to body, it continued to be provided with a corporeal vehicle until such a process of refinement had been effected as, by gradually weaning it from body, at length qualified it for a purely immaterial existence. We here observe the independent originality of the Christian tone of thought, which, while it countenances (as we have seen) some of the nobler views, and adopts some of the more forcible expressions, of Platonism, altogether denies its theory of the inappropriateness of a connexion of body and soul in the state of perfect and consummate bliss.

⁹ [συγγενη ἔσθαι τῷ ψυχῇ] τῷ θεῷ...καὶ τῷ δὲ ἐντι.—*Republ.* X. 611 E. Ed.]

¹⁰ [*Phædo*, 68 A. Compare the erotic mythus in the *Phædrus*, p. 249 D, fol., and that in *Sympos.* p. 203. Ed.]

that the great business of the philosophic cultivator of his intelligence, is, by the constant exercise of accurate abstraction, to fit the qualities of sense to represent the everlasting models of the sphere of truth and being¹¹. 4thly, that we may well conclude the rational nature of man, formed as it is for ideal contemplation, to be eternal as ideas themselves¹²; and though the sensible world itself is, by the participation of ideas, as perfect as the dull obduracy of its material subject will permit, yet that to the philosophic soul it can never appear in any other light than as a restriction to the inborn energies of the spirit, suggesting, indeed, the absolutely good and fair and true, but clouding and concealing the very perfection it suggests¹³.

II. We have, next, to define the connexion of the Platonic ideas with the sensible universe. And here, as there is much obscurity, and has been much difference of opinion, I think it infinitely the best course to present you with the phraseology of the master himself: a phraseology which will to the meditative student afford a safer and clearer light than could be supplied in many pages of comment.

Plato, as I have before shewn, regarded the sensible as an image of perfection, whose adequateness to represent the perfect original was impeded by the unyielding nature of the subject on which it was impressed. He saw in the universal system, as all must, the two antagonist terms of good and evil; and his merit was, that in devising his theory of their mutual relations, he pronounced the principle of good naturally and eternally the superior principle; he pronounced the principle of evil to be itself devoid of real personality, and as far as possible of reality; and he pronounced that the evil—this dark negation of excellence—did not, and could never, stand in the relation of effect to the Almighty Personification of Good:—Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ὕγαθόν ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον¹⁴. You will therefore perceive, that,

II. Relation of the Platonic ideas to the sensible universe.

The sensible world an imperfect image of ideal perfection.

Causes of its imperfection according to Plato.

¹¹ [Symr. 211 C: ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ αἰεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἐνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυνεὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τ. καλ. ἐπιτ. ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, ἔστ' ὅν ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐκ' ἐκείνου τὸ μάθημα τελευτήσῃ, ὃ ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι καλόν. Compare also a well-known passage in *Republ.* VII. 523 A—527 D on the uses of the mathematical sciences as a preparation for philosophy or the science of ideas (ἐλκτικὰ πρὸς οὐσίαν). ED.]

¹² [*Phaedo*, 80 B: τῷ...θειῷ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδέϊ καὶ ἀδιαιλύτῳ καὶ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι αὐτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχῇ. ED.]

¹³ [Compare *Phaedr.* 249 D, fol. with *Phaedo*, 65 A—66 C. *Symr.* 211 B—212 A. ED.]

¹⁴ [*Republ.* II. p. 379 B. In the sequel yet stronger expressions are used. "It cannot be true, as the vulgar affirm, that 'God is the author of all things'; ...all that is good in the world must be traced to him as its cause; evil—which

LECT.
IX.

His distinction of limit and the unlimited;

expressed in several different ways.

whatever modifications it might afterwards have undergone, the original theory of Plato is absolutely distinct from every form of Manichæism. I need not say, that this theory leaves the subject in much mystery; but this *every* theory must do: and the true merit in such a case is, not to explain the inexplicable, but to fix the mystery (which can never be absolutely evaded) in such a part of the question as will preserve the Divine characters and prerogatives unimpeached*. The material subject being thus opposed to the formative principle of good, the office of the eternal forms was to qualify and confine it; and hence Plato perpetually designates bare matter as the "*unlimited*" (τὸ ἄπειρον), and the intelligible essence that impresses and controls it, as "*the bound or limit*"¹⁵. When he attempts to characterize the relation between these laws of perfect excellence and the sensible phenomenon, he speaks of it, as the relation, 1st, of one to many (τὸ ἓν τὸ τὰ πολλά, by which title the sensible world is constantly designated)¹⁶; and hence, 2ndly, as of that which is single to that which is internally opposite to itself (ἐνάντιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ), multiplicity admitting of this reciprocal opposition of parts¹⁷; and hence again, 3rdly, as of that which is simple to that which is confused (συγκεχυμένον)¹⁸; and 4thly, as of that which is indivisible to that which is divisible (τὸ μεριστόν)¹⁹; 5thly, as the unchangeable to the changeable²⁰, the sensible (as we have so often seen) never truly existing, but "*becoming*;" 6thly, as the Divine (θεῖον) to the necessary (ἀναγκαῖον), a connexion very obscure, and by Plato treated briefly and hastily²¹; 7thly, as the absolute to the relative;

exists in far larger measure than good—we cannot regard as caused by God, we must seek some other origin for it." ED.]

* The great practical defect of the system of Plato (as afterwards appeared) was the identification of the material, or corporeal, nature with the nature of evil; which unhappily countenanced all the extravagances of the ascetic discipline of the East, and assuredly injured the simplicity of Christian practice in the early ages. But this belongs to future inquiries.

¹⁵ [*Philæbus*, p. 23 C: τὸν θεὸν ἐλεγόμεν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας. ED.]

¹⁶ [*Ib.* p. 16 C: ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν αἰ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἄπειραν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἐχόντων. ED.]

¹⁷ [*Ib.* pp. 24, 25; *Tim.* p. 49 C, fol.; *Phædo*, p. 70 D, fol., compared with 103 B, where the contrast between that which *becomes* and that which *is* is clearly brought out: τότε μὲν ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐνάντιον πρᾶγμα γίνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ.....αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνάντιον αὐτῷ ἐνάντιον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. ED.]

¹⁸ [*Rep.* VII. p. 524 C: μέγα μὴν ἡ ὄψις καὶ μικρὸν εὐρα...ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ED.]

¹⁹ [*Tim.* p. 35 A, where ἡ ἀμεριστος καὶ αἰ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχουσα οὐσία is contrasted with ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μεριστή. ED.]

²⁰ [*Ἀλλοιοῦμενον, κινούμενον, οἱ κεινημένον; ἀλλοίωσιν οἱ κίνησιν ἐνδεχόμενον, contrasted with τὸ ἀκίνητον, τὸ ἐσθός, τὸ αἰ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχον κ.τ.λ. These phrases occur *passim*. ED.]*

²¹ [*Tim.* 68 E: οὐ αἰτίας εἶδη, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ δὲ θεῖον. The passage is

the sensible world being thus known by the very peculiar expression (τὸ ἕτερον), and its existence being constantly described as little more than a relation to the real. Hence every actual phenomenon is pronounced (in the *Timæus*) to be a composition of *same*, *different*, and *essence*²² (or οὐσία). 8thly, as exemplar to copy,—the sensible being the picture of the invisible in the visible: this expression, though the commonest of all, is manifestly metaphorical; for there can be no proper resemblance between the sensible and ideal. There may indeed be conceived an analogy of elements correlatively connected in each; and to this, doubtless, it was that Plato referred in his παράδειγμα and εἰκὼν²³. 9thly, as the means for the display of good, to the good itself. 10thly, as the object of science, pure and perfect and eternal Being, to the object of opinion, which is declared intermediate between being and not-being, even as opinion is intermediate²⁴ between science and ignorance*. Finally, as comprehending them all, and forming the technical term of the school of Plato, the relation of the intelligible to the sensible was as the original idea to that which *participates* of it (τὸ μετέχον). I have no time now to try your patience by a separate investigation of all these ways of bringing within the scope of our faculties the relation of the eternal laws of the universal system,

illustrated by p. 48 E: μεμιγμένη ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη κ.τ.λ. E.D.]

²² [ἐκ τῆς ταύτου καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἐκ τε οὐσίας. *Tim.* 37 A. E.D.]

²³ [*Tim.* 29 B: πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι...ὥδε οὖν περὶ τε εἰκόνας καὶ περὶ τοῦ παραδείγματος αὐτῆς διοριστέον. Ibid. 28 A, 48 E. E.D.]

²⁴ [*Tim.* 28 A; *Symph.* 202 A; *Rhynch.* 477 A: τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὃν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὃν δὲ μηδαμὴ πάντῃ ἀγνωστόν...εἰ δὲ δὴ τι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι...μεταξὺ ὃν κείνου τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὐτῷ μηδαμὴ ὄντος. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνώσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δ'...ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι, ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ μεταξὺ τι καὶ ζητητέον ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης. 478 D.: μεταξὺ ὅρα ὃν εἴη τούτων δόξα. 479 D: τὸ δοξασθῆναι...μεταξὺ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς. E.D.]

* Bare matter, however, abstracted from its forms, Plato scarcely distinguished from *place*; and pronounced the connexion to be almost that of entity to absolute non-existence. This was consequent upon his notions of the purely negative nature of evil, and of its coincidence with matter,—the receiver, but the debaser, of the eternal and all-perfect Ideas of God. In its primitive state this dark essence was characterized as ἀειδὴς ἄμορφος, ἀσχημάτιστος; and every artifice of language employed to convey the notion of pure negation, without directly asserting it. [*Tim.* p. 52 A: ἐν μὲν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα εἶδος ἔχον...τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νόσις εἰληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν· τὸ δ' ὁμώνυμον δεύτερον αἰσθητόν, γεννητόν...δόξη μετ' αἰσθήσεως περιληπτὸν· τρίτον δὲ αὐτὸ γένος ὃν τὸ τῆς χώρας αἰετ., φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἔδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἀπτόν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν, πρὸς δὲ καὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπινοούμενον βλέποντες, καὶ φάμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι που τὸ ὃν ἅπαν ἐν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά. These three constituents of created being are presently styled ὃν τε καὶ χώρα καὶ γένεσις, and the second very expressively, τιθήνη γενέσεως, the nurse, or, as we should say, receptacle (or substratum) of the created or phenomenal world. See by all means Zeller's remarks on the Platonic conception of matter, *Phil. d. Griech.* 11. p. 457 fol. 2^{te} Aufl. Compare also the following Lecture. E.D.]

LECT.
IX.

themselves substantially true and good, to the sensible or apparitional world of experience. They illustrate, modify, and confirm, each other: and from the union of those which I have collected from various portions of the Platonic dialogues, and of others which you may discover there, you will attain as clear a conception as is now possible of the meaning of the author; and, if not much light as to the true nature of the mysterious connexion itself of the rational and irrational elements in the structure of the world, yet as much as our present state permits, which Plato himself regarded as at best a knowledge obscure, imperfect, and analogical only.

Difference between the Platonic and Peripatetic theory of the relation of ideas to sensible objects.

To this question of the relation of ideas to the sensible, belongs the subtle controversy between the Aristotelians and Platonics, as to whether the forms of things were distinct from, or truly embodied in, the phenomena. The founder of the Peripatetic school argues at great length, in his books of metaphysics, against the theory of *exemplar ideas*, pronouncing them purely poetical metaphors²⁵, and acknowledging no medium between the First Cause and that sensible world into which he has infused the qualifying forms of things. This metaphysical question has often been discussed in ages which we are now accustomed to regard as the peculiar era of verbal and unprofitable controversy. Into the voluminous writings of these disputants I cannot pretend to have struggled far; but I can, at the first aspect of the question, perceive that the controversy about the distinctness of forms is so far from being the puerile logomachy of dreamers, that it actually and necessarily involves the profoundest and most interesting of all philosophical questions. This will appear in the few words I can now devote to the third point proposed,—the relation of ideas to the supreme intelligence of God.

III. Relation of Ideas to the Divine Nature.

III. I have often reminded you that the character of Platonism is eminently ethical, and its great object the foundation on a permanent basis of the great principles of the moral law. Now, when the great philosopher contemplated the miserable destitution of his countrymen in all that regards a genuine sense of natural religion, he at once ascribed it to the necessary influence of polytheism, which, by erecting a multitude of divine standards of duty, all differing from each other, and many of them mutually contradictory, inevitably destroyed the connexion between religious belief and ethical conviction. This he has very fully explained in the dialogue entitled *Euthyphron*; which assuredly, if it was really a report of the Socratic conversa-

²⁵ [*Metaph.* I. 9, 12: τὸ δὲ λέγειν παραδείγματα αὐτὰ (τὰ εἶδη) εἶναι, καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν τάλλα, κεκοινοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικὰς. ED.]

tion, may leave us little surprised at the fate of Socrates. But the reasoning of this precious fragment extends much farther than to confute the extravagances of the Olympian theology; its spirit, and some of its express details, are equally directed against a dogma which has reigned far more extensively than the pagan multitude of gods ever spread their authority,—the doctrine, namely, that the moral qualities of actions are themselves dependent on the arbitrary constitution of a Supreme Governor. Plato saw, that, even though the unity of God were universally received, the reception of this belief would be practically as injurious as the influence of absolute Atheism. Accordingly, his whole philosophy of ideas as related to God is a structure raised to fortify the elementary principles of the eternal law of right against the irruptions of this degrading tenet.

To evince this, observe, that we may be able legitimately to pronounce that a certain metaphysical connexion does *not* exist between two terms, even though we are wholly unable to apprehend what their true link of connexion is, and though, therefore, if we speak of it at all, we can do so only by the aid of analogies derived from experience. And such analogies may be logically received, as long as it is understood that they are presented for no more than they are worth; and less to pronounce a positive principle in the ideal system of the universe, than to occupy a place where intrusive errors might enter, until such time as we may be enabled to apprehend the truth in its direct, explicit purity. Remembering this, you are now to remark that Plato accounted for the existence of things, by affirming that a nature beyond all natures called the universe into being (whether from eternity or not, we are not now discussing); that in so doing this Being held in view as the sole end of his acts absolute and unclouded goodness²⁵; to be exhibited in the language of sensible objects; and that, the nature of goodness being coeternal with himself, not caused by him, nor dependent on him, but nevertheless the voluntary rule of his acts, he referred in all which he did, to these eternal relations of things, and made his work—as far as the mysteriously opposing principle would allow—the copy of their perfection. That is, divine goodness was the final cause, divine energy the efficient cause, and the eternal laws of right—the “*ideas*” of holiness, and proportion, and beauty—the formal cause of the world. The relation of Deity to the Ideal Models is, then, a most important and valuable element in the

²⁵ *Τίμαιος*, p. 29 B: ἀγαθὸς ἦν (ὁ θεός)...πάντα διὰ μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. 28 C: πρὸς τὸ ἀτίδιον ἐβλεπεν. E.D.]

Platonic metaphysics; and stands manifestly opposed, in its whole spirit and consequences, to the theory, which, by merging the Form in the Phenomenon, denies it separate existence or antecedent reality, and tends to exhibit it as a mere effect of Divine causation. Plato has, indeed, with his usual metaphysical accuracy, seen that the Eternal Laws of Right are in some mysterious bond (altogether beyond our conception) entwined with the Divine nature; and he accordingly represents them as contained by him in his own Divine reason; but, nevertheless, he maintains their substantial distinctness from the personal activity or volition of God, and their relation to him not in the bond of cause and effect, but—to express eternal truths by sensible analogies—in that of model or exemplar. They are coexistent, they may even be pronounced coincident; but they are not consequential, resultant, inferior: nor in the order of reason (for of the order of succession we speak not in eternal things) are they to be, with the Aristotelian, declared non-existent except in the phenomenal embodiment; a theory which would render it impossible to characterize any act as right, any relation as proportionate, any form as beautiful, for any reason beyond its bare existence; or to affirm that the Divine Will acts according to justice upon any ground distinct from that on which we affirm that he acts at all. If the Deity operates in any sense he operates rightly, if he operates rightly he operates according to a rule; and if he operates according to a rule, that rule is logically antecedent to the operation which practically exhibits it. God, then, is related to the eternal ideas as an architect is related to the model by which he labours.

Gentlemen, we have now surveyed the chief elements of the Metaphysical Principles of Plato; and if I have at all rendered this lofty philosophy more familiar to your thoughts in the Lectures which I am now bringing to a close, I shall at least have done what I candidly confess I know scarcely where to point to you the means of otherwise effecting. The popular treatises are so inaccurate, the accurate treatises so tedious and obscure, that it may, I fear, be pronounced that our language does not contain a satisfactory exposition of the genuine philosophy of Plato. I will hope that I have awakened the curiosity of some of my hearers to become more thoroughly acquainted with the illustrious original; and may thus, perhaps, have been the means of exciting that spirit of inquiry which yet may gift our language with this great desideratum.

The physical and ethical systems of Plato still remain. The next term I may hope to investigate these.

THIRD SERIES.

LECTURE I.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. VII.

GENTLEMEN,

I RESUME the consideration of the Platonic Philosophy with*which we were engaged when last I addressed LECT.
1.
you. We had at that time, as you may remember, traversed one large district of this sublime and impressive doctrine; a district too which holds the key of all the rest, and which rightly to survey is to have caught those features that determine the expression of the whole. Undaunted by its reported terrors, we ventured to scale that Ideal World of whose obscure and cloudy elevation so much has been sarcastically said and written; and, though I cannot pretend to be the hierophant of all its mysteries, I trust you will at least have agreed with me that the theory, detached from some brilliant decorations of fancy, possesses a very discernible foundation in truth. Truth, both intellectual and moral, was beset by enemies in the days of Plato, exactly correspondent to those with whom you are all familiar in the last and current century,—enemies who endeavoured by the same arguments, urged with the same audacity, to impugn its evidences and question its very existence; and the Theory of Ideas was the first of those mighty appeals to the higher gifts and prerogatives of the human mind by which, under the guidance of the great lights of our race, such assaults have ever been resisted. When considering the foundations of the theory, I directed you principally to its *speculative* value, as an answer to the logical difficulties concerning the reality of our knowledge; but I took care to admonish you that with Plato all things are subservient to a moral purpose. It is true that Platonism is a contemplative philosophy,—pervadingly, perhaps too pervadingly so,—but its contemplativeness is altogether directed to a practical purpose: it

LECT.
I.

is an intuition of truth, but of truth as identified with goodness. It rejoices to behold the reality of things fixed on a rock against which all the waves of sceptical opinion beat in vain; but it never forgets to insist that it is the supreme *Ἀγαθόν*—that last and loftiest abstraction of intelligence—that, as the sun of the invisible world, quickens nature into being, and pours upon all things that revealing light of truth which makes them, in their ideas, the direct objects of human apprehension. Detached from these moral relations, Plato manifestly took little interest in the sciences; even his favourite pursuits, mathematics, music, and astronomy, are everywhere represented as mainly or solely valuable as elements of discipline for a science beyond them. In this respect Aristotle seems to furnish a strong contrast to his master; and will find far more sympathy in the existing condition of the world of thought. Plato would not have written the passage (noble, certainly, and awakening) with which Aristotle opens his metaphysical philosophy, by ascribing to the pursuit of causes the highest claims for its own sake. On the contrary—though it may seem paradoxical to attribute to Plato any form of utilitarianism—the founder of the Academy never speaks of knowledge as valuable when insulated from its practical scope, that of approximation to the source of perfection; and though I confess I see in this what is more than once to be seen in Plato, a view too simple and exclusive for the complexity of human nature,—it is, nevertheless, one of the characteristics which contribute to make the study of Platonism a most salutary corrective for the opposite and far more dangerous excess into which the present and the last age (especially in our own country) have universally fallen.

THE PHYSICS
OF
PLATO.

With such views as these predominant in all his writings, you will not expect in the PHYSICS of Plato—the subject announced for this occasion—anything analogous to the vast, various, and ascertained body of knowledge which the magnificent successes of modern inquiry have enabled us to attach to the word. The very fact that the dialogue to which we must have recourse in order to obtain those views, contains a scheme of almost all the physical knowledge of the time—cosmical, anatomical, medical—is a sufficient indication how imperfect and superficial that knowledge must be. The departments of inquiry were so limited that the division of labour had scarcely commenced; and an accomplished teacher was expected to have mastered the whole.

THE TIMÆUS;

Nevertheless, the *Timæus*—the performance of which I speak—is one of the most characteristic, and, in this

respect, one of the most precious of all the writings of this great master; but nothing is less understood than the *Timæus*. LECT.
I.

It would be very mistaken to imagine that in this work Plato dogmatically advanced an ascertained system of nature, or a system professing to be such. Were this the case, the practised disciple of Bacon might indeed close the book with contempt; and the ordinary sarcasms with which the "dreams" and "fictions" of Plato are received would be perfectly justifiable. But he can have a very faint perception of the peculiarities of the Platonic style who fails to see in this singular dialogue more than the surface exposes. But to illustrate this point (which really seems to have been but feebly caught by even the modern commentators on Plato) we must make a few preparatory remarks.

The word "Idea," which stands at the head of each district of the Platonic philosophy, is employed in senses which differ considerably from each other, though resolving into ultimate sameness. I do not here refer to the modern adaptations, but to the genuine Platonic uses, of the word. In our former discussions, regarding the Ideas mainly in their speculative aspect, I endeavoured to illustrate them by such expressions in the modern philosophy of Reason as seemed to approach nearest to the scope of Plato,—more particularly by such phrases as the "Grounds" and "Reasons of Things," which, though necessarily occurring more or less in all philosophies that do not overlook fundamental truth, have perhaps become peculiarly associated with that of Leibnitz. But there is a view in which Ideas are altogether Platonic, and in which all who have subsequently insisted on them have been the manifest followers of Plato. This second and most characteristic purport on which the Platonic Ethics are finally based, as his Dialectics on the former, is that in which the Idea is used as synonymous with *Paradigm* or *Exemplar*. This signification so far pervades all Platonism as to affect even the former or merely theoretic import of the word; for in this philosophy all things are blended with all: but an easy analysis separates them: and though, to be faithful to my author, I could not avoid introducing it even in the simplest view of the Platonic dialectics, it is unquestionably with the moral system that it holds its chief affinity. This we shall probably see more fully when the ethics of Plato come under review. My present purpose is to detect in what are regarded as his *Physics*.

In firmly holding the absolute excellence of the Deity, and in regarding the visible world as His formation, the

*Use of the
Ideal theory
in the con-*

LECT.
I.struction
of the
Platonic
Physics.

philosopher held that the world and all its parts were images, in the sensible sphere, and as far as the sensible subject could receive their impress, of exemplars of unshadowed perfection;—of “Ideas,” that is, in the sense which I have just instanced. Gazing upon these Ideas, the great Artificer projected the universe into being by a process such as Cicero describes when, speaking of the Grecian statuary, he tells us, “Nec vero ille artifex, cum faceret Jovis formam aut Minervæ, contemplabatur aliquem e quo similitudinem duceret; sed ipsius in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quædam, quam intuens, in eaque defixus, ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat” (*Orat.* c. 2*). Now, as all the value and dignity of the sensible world lay in its presenting a faint copy of these invisible originals, it was natural to pronounce that the only utility of physical research—the only utility, at least, that philosophy could recognize—was to be found in its perpetually recalling these forms of perfection: in its representing, in the language of visible facts, unseen excellence. This was but one case of a general principle. To portray Ideals is the perpetual occupation of Plato,—and that not as answering to what exists, but to what might or ought to exist. The use of such a practice is twofold. Sometimes it points out a model to which men may endeavour constantly to approximate—“the curve,” as it has been expressed, “to the asymptote” of their exertions; and of this object of Ideal representation the *Republic* of Plato is the palmary instance. Sometimes, where the subject is beyond the power of man to modify, the practice of Ideal Representation assists the mind in conceiving the exquisite order and simplicity by which actual results may have been brought to pass,—and to this purpose I would assign the composition of the *Timæus*¹.

The uncertainty
of physical
researches
cautiously ad-
mitted by
Plato.

I am convinced that if you read this remarkable work with this directive idea, you will find abundant confirmations of the truth of this conception of its real object. Instead of being the bold blundering dogmatism of pretended learning, you will find its hypotheses everywhere marked with the utmost modesty and candour, and the subordina-

* I may add that the process by which the *human* soul endeavours to ascend to these exemplars by a reverse course may be found described by the same gifted master of language in a very analogous passage in his treatise *de Inventionibus* (II. 1, 1), where he relates the well-known story of Zeuxis's picture of Helen.

¹ [This thought is very well expressed by Stallbaum: “Quemadmodum igitur in libris de Republica quæ ideæ boni vis in vita humana et publica et privata esse possit vel debeat ostenditur, ita in *Timæo* docetur eandem ideam per totam regnare rerum universitatem atque in humana natura quoque divino quodam beneficio elucere.” *Ann. in Tim. init.* ED.]

tion of the uncertain suppositions to the great truth of Divine wisdom and goodness which they are meant to illustrate, everywhere impressed. "We attach ourselves in these explanations," he observes, "to whatever seems to carry most probability." "I will not undertake to expound the cause or the causes and reasons of all that exists; and I decline such an attempt, because altogether foreign to the plan of this discourse. Do not expect it from me; nor am I presumptuous enough to imagine myself competent to such an achievement. But content with probabilities, I will, as all along, endeavour to give you opinions at least as likely as those of others, and to treat the subject, both generally and in detail, with somewhat more extent than usual." "I who speak, and you who judge, partake of a common humanity; so that if you receive probabilities (τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον) you ought to ask no more." These characters of uncertainty are meant by Plato to apply,—partly to the very nature of physical, as contrasted with pure intellectual inquiry,—partly to the imperfection of existing materials of knowledge. As if to prevent misconception, the author continually interposes these observations about the uncertainty of that which he can only propound upon conjecture; and even in the very complexity of some portions of his theory (as the mathematical calculations of the constitution of the soul of the world) we can easily perceive that these elaborate deductions are introduced on very much the same principle of instructing by harmless illusion which induces the novelist to complicate his narrative. The *Timæus*, then, is nothing more than an ingenious series of hypotheses meant to deepen and vivify our notions of the harmony of the universe, and the consequent wisdom and goodness of its Author. Whatever physical truths were within the author's reach took their place in the general array; the vacancies were filled up with the best suppositions admitted by the limited science of the time. Thus, and only thus, the *Timæus* enters naturally where we know Plato made it enter—immediately after his books on a Republic: it is the Ideal of a physical, following the Ideal of a moral, harmony.

Moral and
theological
object of the
Timæus.

It may, indeed, be asserted with truth that Plato had no clear conception of the advances that a true system of observation and experiment might make in the knowledge of nature; but I believe it most unfair to conclude that he considered the *Timæus* as having realized them. And when we deplore that the loftiest conceptions ever entertained by uninspired man, of the moral advancement of

² [*Tim.* p. 48 E. Ed.]

³ [*Ib.* p. 29 C. Ed.]

LECT.
I.

our race, were not united in one mind with the sagacious views of Bacon as to its artificial and exterior amelioration, we ought also to remember how much larger was the philosophic experience of a sage of the sixteenth century, how much ampler and safer therefore his survey of human errors, than could belong to one who, if he raised philosophy into the vigour of manly youth, rose in almost its childhood.

*Plan of the
Timæus.
God's goodness the
motive of
creation,
and its law.*

In accordance with the representation which I have given you, Plato sets out by fixing Creation upon the absolute goodness of God, and thence evolving a system of optimism. He declares indeed (in a passage which has often been quoted, and censured, perhaps, without much reason) that "it is difficult to discover the Author and Father of the universe, and impossible after the discovery to make him universally known⁴;" but this difficulty concerns only his intimate essence and productive power, and does not extend to his moral attributes. "Let us pronounce," says Timæus⁵—and I invite you to observe the exquisite simplicity, the decision, and the depth, of the statement—"with what motive the Creator hath created nature and this universe. He was *good*; but in the good no manner of envy on any possible subject can subsist. Exempt from envy, he has wished that all things should as far as possible resemble himself. Whoever shall from wise teachers receive this as above all others the highest principle of the production of nature and the world, shall receive the truth. God, wishing that there should be as much good and as little evil as possible, took the whole fluctuating mass of things visible, which had been in orderless confusion, and reduced it to order, considering this to be far the better state. Now it was and is utterly impossible that He who is most excellent should form anything else but what is most excellent likewise." The same principle of the absolute perfection of the universal scheme, which is here applied physically, is affirmed in its moral aspect, in a noble passage of the Tenth Book of *Laws*⁶, which I shall here cite, as contributing to illustrate a cardinal point in Platonism. "Let us persuade this young objector," says the Athenian interlocutor who represents Plato himself in that work, "that He who provides for all has arranged all for the advantage of the whole; that each part does and suffers only what it is suitable for it to do and suffer; that guardians have been set to watch unceasingly over each individual even to his minutest acts and affections, and to carry the general perfection into its smallest details. You

*This idea in
its moral
aspect illustrated from
the Laws.*

⁴ [Tim. p. 28 C. Ed.]

⁵ [Ib. 29 D. Ed.]

⁶ [p. 903 B. Ed.]

yourself, thoughtless mortal! you are something, however minute, in the common system of order, you are incessantly referred to it. But you fail to see that every production is produced with this relation to the entire and to its happiness; that the universe exists not for you, but you for the universe. Every physician or other skilful artist directs all his operations towards a whole, and makes them contribute to the greatest perfection of the whole; he makes the part for the whole, not the whole for the part; and your murmurs (at the unequal disposition of fortunes) are all for want of knowing how these relations co-operate according to the laws of the general scheme...The Monarch of the world⁷, having observed that all our operations arise from the soul, and are compounded of vice and virtue, that the soul and body, although not eternal as the gods of the established creed, ought not to be allowed to perish⁸ (for if either perished all production of animated beings would cease); and that it is of the essential nature of good, as it springs from the soul, to be advantageous, of evil to be mischievous; the King of the world, having known all this, conceived, in the general distribution, the system which he considered simplest and best, to the end *that good might have the upper hand and evil be undermost in the universe*. It is with this view to the whole that he has constructed his arrangement of the positions that each individual, according to his distinctive character, is to occupy: at the same time that he has left to the disposal of our own wills the causes on which these distinctive characters shall depend; for men are what men make themselves to be....Thus all animated beings are subject to various changes of which the regulative principle is *within themselves*; and in consequence of these changes, each finds himself in the place marked out by the established law." He then proceeds to bring the retributions of the future world under these general laws whose final cause is the perfection of the universe, in much the same manner as has been so admirably done by the author of the *Analogy of Religion and Nature*. "Those who have undergone but slight alterations of their present state, remove but slightly, and along the same plane in space; those whose souls are more radically perverted to evil descend into subterraneous dwellings....and when a soul has made a marked advance whether in evil or good by a firm purpose and constant

⁷ [Ibid. 904 A. Ed.]

⁸ [ἀνθρώπων ὃν γεγόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί. Ib. where οἱ κατὰ νόμον θ. are equivalent to οἱ νομιζόμενοι θ. Plato himself in the *Timæus* denies immortality to the created gods, i. e. to all but the one Supreme Creator, p. 41 A. In this respect his gods are contrasted with those of the 'established creed.' Ed.]

LECT
I.

habit, if so united to virtue as to share in her divinity of nature, then passes that soul from its present dwelling to one altogether blessed and securely happy; if surrendered to vice, its abode is conformable to its condition....In life, and in every successive death through the long annals of the soul, like meets like, and the natural results of actions are fixed. No man can ever evade this order, inviolably established by heaven." The dress borrowed from the religion of the times, and coloured by some of the peculiarities of Plato's own system of psychology, will not here hide from you the lineaments of a noble and rational view of the moral universe. And it is the very same conviction of an established scheme of perfection that Plato has attempted to embody in his account of the physical structure of the world. The description which *Socrates* is represented as giving, in the *Phædo*⁹, of his own early love of physical investigation, his delight with the great principle of Anaxagoras, ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ δι᾽ ἀκοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἰτίας, and his subsequent disappointment at finding this principle apparently forsaken by the philosopher himself, perfectly harmonizes with this view of the purpose of the Platonic physics. "I sink at once from all my high hopes," declares *Socrates*, "when on eagerly perusing his writings, I find the man never once employing mind, or any thing such as mind, to order the system of nature, but recurring to air and ether and water and the like."

Consequences.

From a physical system thus intended as illustrative of a principle of optimism, the following consequences may be expected, which accordingly you will find abundantly exemplified in the *Timæus*.

1. Teleological character of Plato's Physics.

1st. That it will mainly concern itself with *final causes*. The universe being regarded chiefly as it is an indication of the Divine Intelligence, every phenomenon will be contemplated as it tends to display that intelligence; it is the volume in which the Deity inscribes His perfections, and is to be read in order to discern them*. It was, as we have just noticed, the neglect of these considerations which *Socrates* reprehended in the speculations of Anaxagoras, who had first placed philosophy on the road to detect them; and no plainer exposition of the importance of this view in the estimate of Plato can possibly be given, than the

⁹ [pp. 97 C, 98 B. Ed.]

* "The lover of reason and science," declares Plato, "will pursue, in preference to all others, those causes which flow from the rational nature; causes which are themselves but passive and necessary he will regard as secondary in dignity and in order of contemplation. Both should be specified, but the distinction should be maintained between those that with intelligence work out the fair and good, and those that, destitute of reason, operate without order and by chance." *Timæus*, p. 46 D.

long and interesting passage of the *Phædo*, in which Socrates refers all physical inquiry to the notion of The Best. A large body of treatises expressly devoted to the subject within the last few years, is one of the many proofs of the attention which this part of philosophical inquiry has received in modern times; but we can scarcely estimate, blessed as we are with distinct and independent proofs suited to all capacities, the importance which it must have assumed in the eyes of men who had little else to depend upon for the inculcation of a rational theology. And this is, perhaps, one of the many services which the belief in a Revelation has done to science; it has liberated it from the obligation of an almost exclusive attachment to this "Virgo Deo consecrata quæ nihil parit"¹⁰. It is a singular instance of the caution with which the representations of Aristotle regarding his master are to be received, that he accuses him of neglecting efficient and final causes¹¹. The entire current of Plato's researches will appear to modern readers to have been but too pervadingly imbued with both.

Use of Revelation in liberating Physics from subservience to final causes. Aristotle's criticism on Plato.

2ndly. The next characteristic which may be expected in a system raised on such views, is, that it will be mathematical rather than experimental. Intended to embody conceptions of proportion and harmony, it will have immediate recourse to that department of science which deals with proportion in space and number. Such applications of mathematical truths, not being raised on ascertained facts, can only accidentally represent the real laws of the physical system¹²; they will however vivify the student's apprehensions of harmony, in the same manner as a happy parable, though not founded in real history, will enliven his perceptions of moral truth. And (as I before intimated) I do not conceive that the cautious and acute intellect of Plato ever contemplated any other purpose in presenting

2. Plato's Physics are mathematical rather than experimental.

¹⁰ [Bacon, *De Augm.* Lib. III. c. 5, speaking of the "inquisitio causarum finalium." ED.]

¹¹ [Arist. *Metaph.* I. 6, 9, compared with c. 3, 1. Aristotle is himself made the subject of a hostile critique by Bacon: "Magis in hac parte accusandus Aristoteles, quam Plato: quandoquidem fontem causarum finalium, Deum scilicet, omiserit, et naturam pro Deo substituerit, causasque ipsas finales, potius ut logicæ amator, quam theologiæ amplexus sit." He adds, "neque hæc eo dicimus, quod causæ illæ finales veræ non sint, et inquisitione admodum dignæ in speculationibus metaphysicæ: sed quia dum in physicarum causarum possessiones excurrunt et irruunt, misere eam provinciam depopulantur et vastant." *De Augm.* Lib. III. c. 4. ED.]

¹² [It is however Plato's merit to have divined, more or less clearly, that the laws of the physical universe are resolvable into numerical relations, and therefore capable of being represented by mathematical formulæ. In many other points of physical science Plato's guesses contrast favourably with the dogmas of his disciple and critic; e.g. in his notions of a centripetal force, of the causes of gravity, of antipodes, and of the nullity of the popular distinction of "up" and "down." Compare *Timæus*, p. 62 C—63 D, with the passages from Aristotle's physical writings referred to in Stallbaum's judicious notes. ED.]

LECT.
I.

them as adjuncts to his philosophy. Many ingenious suppositions have indeed been advanced with a view to reconcile these abstruse and obscure calculations to the cosmical theory of modern times; yet though some remarkable coincidences have been elicited, we are scarcely justified in concluding that Plato wrote in view of any theory correspondent to our own. But it is not, perhaps, impossible that he formed his calculations upon facts of a different region of nature, which subsequent investigation may discover to be connected under the bonds of a common principle or law with the actual facts of the planetary system. I may return again to this subject. I shall now only remark, that as the former characteristic of the Platonic physics contemplates the Deity acting in the view of *goodness*, so this regards him as acting in the view of supreme *beauty*; and that, as Plato appears to have owed to Socrates and to Pythagoras nearly all which his own meditations did not produce, so we may consider the former as eminently the Socratic, and the latter as eminently the Pythagorean, element in his system of nature.

3. Their
anti-mechanical
character.

3rdly. Another peculiarity which we may anticipate in a system constructed with such a design, is, an impatience of every merely mechanical theory of the operations of nature. The psychology of Plato led him to recognize mind wherever there was motion, and hence not only to require a Deity as first mover of the universe, but also to conceive the propriety of separate and subordinate agents attached to each of its parts, as principles of motion, no less than intelligent directors. These agents were entitled "gods" by an easy figure discernible even in the sacred language, and which served, besides, to accommodate philosophical hypotheses to the popular religion. Plato, however,—though the later Platonists, to meet certain peculiarities of the Christian theology, misrepresented his words,—carefully distinguishes between the sole Eternal Author of the Universe on the one hand, and that "soul," vital and intelligent¹³, which he attached to the world, as well as the spherul intelligences, on the other. These subordinate deities or spirits, though intrusted with a sort of deputed creation, were still only the deputies of the Supreme Framer and Director of all¹⁴. This soul, or moving and intelligent principle infused into the world, is that which binds and secures it according to the will of its Author; it is formed in time, and if incapable of decay, is so only¹ because the goodness and wisdom of the Supreme deter-

Subordinate
deities em-
ployed in the
work of
creation.

Soul of the
universe.
Explanation
of these
hypotheses.

¹³ [Tim. 34 A: οὗτος δὲ πᾶς ὄντος ἀεὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ περὶ τὸν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον θεὸν κ.τ.λ. Ib. B: εὐδαίμονα θεὸν (τὸν κοσμὸν) ἐγεννήσατο. ED.]

¹⁴ [Ib. p. 42. ED.]

mine its conservation¹⁵. And being thus indissolubly connected with the world, it may be considered to animate it; the world then itself is a thing of life, an animal, giving the same indications of an animal and rational nature as man himself, in that it moves, and moves according to the most consummate harmony; it is, therefore, ζῶον ἐμφυχὲν ἐννοῦν τε, ψυχῇ being infused into the vast body, and νοῦς into this ψυχῇ or vital vehicle¹⁶. Such a notion has its ludicrous and its sublime aspects; and if Velleius in Cicero¹⁷ could expose to warrantable ridicule the "mundus animo et sensibus præditus, rotundus, ardens, volubilis Deus," you are all familiar with the majestic portrait which Virgil has given of the same doctrine:—

Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.

For the hypothesis of this soul of the world, the greatest of created deities, and of the separate intelligences governing the celestial bodies, besides the reason already intimated (the anxiety to oppose all tendencies to theories of pure material necessity), others doubtless may likewise be conceived. These views of intermediate agency satisfied the demands of the public creed, which presented its facts to be accounted for no less than those of external nature; and they harmonized with the disposition, natural to all inquirers, of interposing some scale of ascent between the world and its infinite Author. It probably seemed also scarcely answerable to the dignity of that sovereign controller, to be laboriously and constantly engaged in the actual revolutions of the system; it was more correspondent to his majestic repose that, though ultimately deciding and dispensing all (for Plato earnestly argues against the subsequent Epicurean theory of divine apathy)¹⁸, he should yet distribute among his inferior functionaries the execution of his commands. This theory, also, by representing a "prerogative instance" of soul antecedent to body, added to it, and authoritatively directing its passive movements, enabled Plato to insist with special force upon one of the great principles of his philosophy, a principle at that time not at all familiar to Grecian speculation, namely, that soul (generically considered) was so far from being a composition or result of body even in its most refined state of attenuation, that it existed by its proper force before body had even been generated by the Father of the

¹⁵ [Ib. p. 41 B: ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ οὐδ' ἄνθρωποι τὸ πᾶν, οὗτοι μὲν δὴ λυθῆσθε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῇς ἐμῆς βουλῆσεως μέλειτος ἐτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες κ.τ.λ. ED.]

¹⁶ [Ib. p. 30 B. ED.]

¹⁷ [De Natura Deorum, Lib. I. c. 8, § 18. ED.]

¹⁸ [As in the Laws, B. X. p. 899 D, fol. ED.]

LECT.
I.

Universe. This object appears in the very context of the description of the universal soul. "It is thus," says Timæus¹⁹, "that the everlasting Deity conceived the generated Deity; he formed this being smooth, spherical, symmetrical, a whole, perfect, and compounded of all perfection; he then injected soul into the midst, interpenetrated and invested the mass with soul, and thus framed a globe revolving of itself, single, solitary, self-sufficing by its own inherent virtues, independent of all extrinsic aid, knowing and loving itself. In this way he produced a blessed god. But the Framer of all did not produce soul *the last*, in the order I have here followed; for in uniting soul and body he would never have permitted the more ancient to subserve and wait upon the younger. We who are conversant with uncertainty and conjecture, speak thus only by conjecture. The Creator formed soul superior to body, both in order of generation and in innate virtue, in order that it might be the lord and governor of that inferior nature."

But the chief reason with Plato for the host of inferior deities which he interposed between men and their First Cause was, doubtless, in order to furnish a solution, superficial it might be but plausible, for the defects and disasters of sublunary affairs. The philosopher, jealous for the unimpeachable honour of the Divine character, and well knowing that with the surrender of this last citadel of truth and virtue all must be directly or indirectly conceded, represents man, animals, and the rest of the changeable furniture of the earth, as deriving their origin from inferior and created divinities; a supposition to which the influences of the celestial revolutions, over which these divinities presided, upon the formation, growth, and decay of plants and animals, lent great apparent confirmation. In order, however, to vindicate to the human soul its dignity, Plato assigns to these inferior intelligences (or dæmons) the formation only of the human body and the junction of it with the soul, a diviner essence composed of a nature similar to, but less perfect than, the soul of the world itself, and proceeding directly from the hands of God²⁰.

These are some of the characteristics which may be traced more or less directly to the very design of the Platonic philosophy of nature; and which, by being thus easily referred, tend to illustrate the true nature of that design. In enumerating them I have necessarily been led to intimate some of the principal features of the system itself. It

¹⁹ [Tim. p. 34 B, fol. Ed.]

²⁰ [καθ' ὅσον μὲν αὐτῶν [τῶν ζώων] ἀθανάτοις εἶναι προσήκει...σπέρματος καὶ ὑπερξέμερος ἐγὼ παραδώσω· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς κ.τ.λ. p. 41 C. Ed.]

will be proper to enter somewhat more closely into these, not indeed into any of the minuter physiological details, which in the present state of experimental science can only be subjects of curiosity, and whose interest cannot pass beyond themselves, but into those larger principles which connect themselves with philosophical speculation in every age. At the same time, I do not know a more interesting work than would be an edition of the *Timæus* which should descend into all the specialties of its physiology, and by comparing them with our present attainments, should elucidate the progress of natural knowledge, vindicate the sagacity of happy conjecture, and illustrate the ordinary though subtle and elusive causes of error.

LECT
I.

In that part of the *Timæus* to which, though not first in actual arrangement, it may be best first to direct your attention, Plato, turning as it would seem with reluctance from the contemplation of the Divine agency in the production of the angelic essences and of men, to a more obscure part of his subject, undertakes to explain according to the most probable conception the primitive constituents of the universe. "We have spoken," he says²¹, "of the acts and operations of intelligence. We must now add those that arise through necessity; for the world is the result of the combination of necessity and intelligence (ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ); intelligence governing and persuading necessity to produce all things in the most perfect way, necessity yielding to the wisdom of intelligence." "We must follow this origin, as we followed the former." That is, as the former investigation led directly to the Supreme Mind, this is to lead as directly to the antithesis of mind, which with intentional vagueness he terms "necessity." "Let us examine," he continues, "what was, before the creation of the world, the nature of fire, air, water, earth; for assuredly it is most shortsighted to be satisfied with these as ultimate principles." He intimates, that these, or such like, may be considered "elements" of the world as it now is, but that they have no claim to the title when viewed antecedently to their present mode of existence. In that point of view they will each be found to consist of, or rather to represent, three distinct principles²², the subject-matter on which they are impressed, the model after which they exist as they are, and the actual sensible object which they constitute and exhibit. Matter, ideas, and the objects of sense, which depend on both the former, are, then, the principles of the universe, the elements of elements; nor is there the minutest fragment in nature which does not

Further
analysis of
the *Timæus*Principles of
Necessity.²¹ [p. 47 E, fol. Ed.]²² [p. 48 E, fol. Ed.]

LECT.
I.*Platonic
conception
of Matter.*

include and require this triple origin as the rationale of its existence.

*A substance
without qua-
lities.*

The first of these principles is obtained by an abstraction of the most refined accuracy. To term it "matter" is, in one sense of that word, already to corrupt its simplicity; for the "matter" of modern logicians possesses the inseparable qualities of extension and solidity. But the subject-matter of Plato is utterly without qualities²³, being considered antecedent to all sensible phenomena and their qualities. It could exist only in a state of things to which none of the forms of either sense or understanding have any reference. It was, as you must by this time be aware, the spirit of Platonism to regard all mental abstractions, not indeed as in themselves realities in the absurd sense of realism so commonly ascribed to Plato, but as the signs of real existences corresponding to them in a world of reason. When a man had from contemplating instances of virtue risen to a notion of the quality common to all those instances, and which he termed by the name, Plato instructed him to regard that quality and its name as representing in the mind of the speculator an ineffable something, which in the sphere of immutable reality answered to the conception in the soul. And as of single qualities so of their compounds; in a perfect world all sensible objects, whether simple or complex, were correlatives to ideal archetypes. Now though this system was mainly constructed to resist the assaults of sophistry upon the permanence of moral distinctions, it was of universal application. Successive abstractions can separate the passive subject from all its modifications; the passive subject then has a distinct reality in the world separate from sensible experience, a reality, however, of a kind different from that of the occupants of the ideal world, inasmuch as the recipient of ideas cannot itself be confounded *with* ideas. In this way, the same course of reasoning would lead to the independent anterior existence both of matter and of ideas; and would yet preserve them distinct from each other. But Plato appealed also to experience in illustration of this point. He observed that all sensible qualities undergo perpetual change; in this coinciding with the well-known doctrines of Heraclitus and the rest of the φιλόσοφοι ῥέοντες. The more accurate our examination becomes, the more fully we perceive that this change is incessant. But beneath all this superficial alteration we cannot but know that there is an unchanging subject, which yet is neither deity, nor ideas, nor the soul

²³ [p. 49 E: ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἐγγιγνόμενα δὲ ἕκαστα φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν... ἀπόλλυνται, μόνον ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ παραμένει τῷ τε τούτῳ καὶ τῷ τότε προσχωμένους ὀνόματι, τὸ δὲ ὁποιοῦν τι, θερμὸν... ἢ καὶ ὅτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων... μηδὲν ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τούτων καλεῖν. EN.]

of man. To express this original subject-matter, the basis of the universe of sense, Plato has exhausted every form of expression. It is the receptacle (*ὑποδοχή*), the nurse (*τι-θήνη*) of all²⁴ that is produced. It alone gives any reality and definiteness to the evanescent phantoms of sense, for in their ceaseless change *they* cannot justly receive any title whatever; it alone can be styled *τόδε*, or *τοῦτο*, they rising no higher than *τοιοῦτον*, or *ὅποιονοῦν τι*. It is not earth, or air, or fire, or water, but it is "an invisible *species* and formless universal receiver, which in the most obscure way receives the immanence of the intelligible:"—*ἀνόρατον εἶδος καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές, μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατα πη τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτό*²⁵. And in relation to the other two principles it is *the mother** to the father and the offspring²⁶:—it is *τὸ ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται*, *τὸ ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον*, and *τὸ γιγνόμενον*. But perhaps the most remarkable passage²⁷ is that in which he seems to identify it with *pure space*, which "itself imperishable furnishes a seat (*ἔδραν*) to all that is produced, not apprehensible by direct perception, but caught by a certain spurious reasoning, scarcely admissible, but which we see as in a dream; gaining it by that judgment which pronounces it necessary that all which is be somewhere, and occupy a certain space." This you will perceive approaches the Cartesian doctrine which resolved matter into simple extension; a view which was by both united with the rejection of vacuum²⁸.

LECT.
I.
Various designations of the primitive matter.

Its attributes are those of pure space.

It has been much disputed whether Plato held that this subject of ideal impression was eternal or originated in time. As on the one hand he maintained a strict system of dualism, and avoided without a single deviation that seduction of pantheism to which so many abstract speculators of his own school have fallen victims, so on the other it appears to me that he did not scruple to place this principle, the opposite of the divine intelligence, in a sphere independent of temporal origination. This view of the groundwork of the world of sense and contingency, though it unhappily led to the impieties of Manicheism in after ages, was never meant to countenance such tenets by Plato.

In the Platonic matter eternal!

²⁴ [p. 49 A: πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτὸ οἷον τιθήνην. ED.]

²⁵ [p. 51 A, fol. ED.]

* It substantializes them, as they to our sensible apprehensions individualize it.

²⁶ [p. 50 D. ED.]

²⁷ [p. 51 A, fol. ED.]

²⁸ [p. 58 A: ἡ τοῦ παντός περίοδος... πρὸς αὐτὴν πεφυκνία βοῦλεσθαι ἐνέμναι, σφίγγει πάντα καὶ κενὴν χώραν οὐδεμίαν ἐξελίπεσθαι. In this denial of a vacuum Plato was followed by Aristotle. See the references in Stallbaum's note on the passage quoted. ED.]

LECT.
I.Plato's con-
ception of
Time.

But we can scarcely enter into his views unless we ascertain his notions of the nature of *Time* itself. This was considered to have been created with the rest of the sensible world²⁹, to finish with it, if it ever finish,—to be altogether relative to this phenomenal scene*. I need not remind you that these views in forms only slightly differing have been revived in various ages of philosophical speculation. They form a leading element in the most celebrated system of the last century, that of Kant³⁰; but in substance existed long before it in the schools of Germany. In our own country (and it would seem independently) they have been now and then suggested; but have attracted little attention, partly from being presented in an isolated and conjectural form, and partly, doubtless, from the national distaste for metaphysical inquiry. The first full and distinct statement of these remarkable doctrines (which obviously must more or less affect every region of any system which includes them) is too interesting to omit; and if I could induce you to study carefully the original (for the metaphysical expressiveness of the Greek language is altogether intransferable) I suspect you would agree with me that very little has been since added to their cogency and decisiveness. I will not, indeed, conceal from you my own conviction, which increases the more I study this great Author, that in every thing of the higher metaphysic we can scarcely enter any chamber of the modern edifices of speculation where we shall not find that Plato has been before us.

"The generating Father," says Timæus, "having beheld this created image of the invisible powers, in life and

²⁹ [p. 37 A: ἐκὼς...ἐπινόησεν [ὁ θεὸς] κινήτην τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμήων ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐπὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν τοῖσιν αἰῶσιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ χρόνον ὀνομάκαμεν. 38 B: χρόνος...μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ὅν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γένηται. The use of αἰῶνος in the former passage is noteworthy. It seems to be used in a modified sense; for shortly after we are forbidden to apply the terms "was" and "will be" to the "eternal essence" (ἀίδιον οὐσίαν), past and future being mere "modes of time" (χρόνου εἶδη). This seeming antithesis between αἰῶνος and ἀίδιος is not noticed by the commentators. In no part of the dialogue is the superiority of Plato's metaphysical to his physical speculations more clearly manifest than in the very noble passage (translated in the text) from which these extracts come. Ed.]

* I speak thus generally, because, though the "time" spoken of seems to have, in the original, a peculiar connexion with the heavenly revolutions; as if Plato meant only *such* time as is measured by their changes; it is equally manifest, as we shall just now see, that the strain of the reasoning is applicable to Time in its most abstract form; so that though he speaks of life and motion antecedently to this mention of the creation of Time and its divisions, I cannot but believe that he intended the fullest sense of the metaphysical principle, but wished to defer stating it until it could be done in connexion with those celestial phenomena which have in all ages been associated with the flux of time as its natural and universal indices.

³⁰ [Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, 1. Theil, § 4. Von der Zeit. Ed.]

motion, rejoiced at the sight ["saw that it was good"], and in his delight thought to make it yet more resemble its model: and this being a living thing, he endeavoured to give the universe this sort of completeness as far as might be. The nature of the exemplar animal was eternal; and it was impracticable to adapt this character to any thing created, without qualification; he determined therefore to create a moving image of eternity (εἰκὼ κινήτου τινα αἰώνος), and in disposing the heavens, he framed of this eternity reposing in its own unchangeable unity an eternal image, moving according to numerical succession which we call Time. With the world arose days, nights, months, years, which all had no previous existence; the past and future are but forms of time which we most erroneously transfer to the eternal substance: we say it was, and is, and will be, whereas we can only fitly say it is. Past and future are appropriate to the successive nature of generated beings; for they bespeak motion; but the Being eternally and unmovedly the same is subject neither to youth, nor to age, nor to any other accident of time; it neither was, nor hath been, nor will be, which are the attributes of fleeting sense, the circumstances of time imitating eternity in the shape of number and motion. Nor can anything be more inaccurate than to apply the term real Being (τὸ εἶναι) to past or present, or future, or even to non-existence (τὸ μὴ εἶναι). Of this however we cannot now speak fully. Time, then, was formed with the heavens, that together created they may together end, if indeed an *end* be in the purpose of the Creator; and it is designed as closely as possible to resemble the eternal nature, its exemplar. The model exists through all eternity; the world has been, is, and will be, through all time." This doctrine, as far as regarded the formal or accidental nature of time, was admitted by the Epicureans:

Tempus item per se non est; sed rebus ab ipsis
 Consequitur sensus.
 Nec per se quonquam tempus sentire fatendum est
 Semotum ab rerum motu placidâque quiete.

Epicurean

Τὸ
 παρὰ τὴν
 τῆς Πλάτωνος.

LUCRET. I. 460.

The contrast with the nature of eternal Being was peculiarly Platonic, and does not seem to have entered into the Epicurean views; and even the tenet itself was held under different forms by these very opposite schools, though their language might resemble. The Epicureans gave thorough reality to the sensible phenomena, but held time to be a superadded mental relation; Plato considered both time and the sensible phenomena to be equally real, because neither of them truly so, but alike copies of super-

LECT.
I.

sensible realities. This part of his master's system was not accepted by Aristotle²¹, to whose cardinal argument for the eternity of the universe it would have offered a very obvious answer. The founder of the Peripatetic school argued that the creation of the universe at any definite period was inadmissible, for that the difficulty would always lie—what had produced the delay, or determined an activity dormant from eternity? But Plato could at once reply, that the objection was founded upon an assumption not only gratuitous but contradictory, that eternity was but an infinite extension of the time with which the human mind is here conversant. If this supposition (which is unquestionably encumbered with great difficulties) be denied; if it appear that the mode of divine existence is altogether different from that of beings in successive duration; the force of the argument of Aristotle is at once destroyed, for it becomes absurd to speak of the Creator as creating the universe at any one period rather than another; it is referring creation to a standard which was itself created.

In this ineffable eternity Plato placed both the Supreme Being and the archetypal ideas of which the sensible world of time *κατὰ δύναμιν* "partakes." Whether (which was the question immediately engaging us) he also included under the same mode of existence the subject-matter of the sensible world, it is not easy to pronounce, and it appears to me quite evident that he did not himself undertake to speak with assurance on this obscure problem. You will now however be enabled to perceive under what form he would have contemplated the subject, in what way he would have addressed himself to the solution. And endeavouring to fix the mind in the same attitude, I incline to think that he meant the creation of time to be subsequent (if I may so speak) to the existence of this mysterious substratum; a doctrine which certain features of his ethical system tended to confirm, as we shall endeavour hereafter to unfold. At the same time it is proper for you to reserve your decision on this question until you shall have considered a very different view of the Platonic conception of matter which I shall briefly notice in our next lecture.

²¹ [See *Phys. Aus.* VIII. c. 1, esp. § 11: *περὶ γε χρόνου ἔξω ἐνδὲς ὁμοιοητικῶς ἔχοντες φαίνονται πάντες· ἀγέννητον γὰρ εἶναι λέγουσιν...Πλάτων δ' αὐτὸν γενεῇ μόνος, κ.τ.λ.* ED.]

LECTURE II.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. VIII.

GENTLEMEN,

I CONCLUDED the last lecture by some observations on that mysterious substratum of the sensible world which it perplexed Plato so much to conceive or describe, and regarding which his real opinion is to this day so much contested. The main reason for this obscurity to modern readers, especially to readers conversant with the Epicureanism all but universal for a long period in this division of the world of speculation, is undoubtedly the position which Plato habitually assigned to the universe of sensible experience and to the physical inquiry that undertook to explain it. It is not easy to place ourselves in a point of contemplation so utterly dissimilar to our ordinary one; as difficult as it is for the young astronomer to exchange *geocentric* for *heliocentric* measurements. With Plato truth, absolute scientific truth, was everything; and truth he considered to be found only in the abstractions of reason, the representatives and interpreters of the only real existences — of ideas. These latter were the proper objects of the Soul of man, itself a discontented prisoner in this scene of shadows; and every philosophic tendency which deviated from the single purpose of furnishing the soul as much as might be with this its congenial food, betrayed the duty of philosophy, degenerated into ingenious trifling, and, however laudable in its own sphere, fell as far below the aspiration after true wisdom as the loftiest heights of earth are below the expanse of heaven. From these principles, it was natural that when the great Idealist descended into the world of sense he should regard that world itself under a dialectical aspect, that he should consider not so much the succession of phenomena as the connexion of consequences with principles. Accordingly, the "matter" of which we have spoken is with Plato rather a logical entity than a physical; it is the condition or supposition necessary for the production of a world of phenomena. It is thus the transition element between the real and the apparent, the eternal and the contingent; and lying thus on the borders of both territories we must not be surprised

LECT.

II

The Platonian conception of matter further examined.

Matter is with Plato the condition of phenomena, not existence.

that it can hardly be characterized by any definite attribute. This leads me to notice another view of the Platonic theory of the Subject of the Sensible. Contrasted as it seems to be with the eternal basis of the world of reason, it may be doubted whether Plato meant to attribute to this condition of the sensible any reality of existence at all; and to this opinion some of the latest of his critical commentators incline. It is true, that he seems to hold that, as ideas are copied in the fluent world of nature, some subject must be provided on which the copy may be imprinted; it is true that he speaks of it as the direct subject of the operations of the Divine Artist; but it is also certain that he appears to provide no faculty of the mind by which it can be discerned. The proper objects of the senses are distinctly mentioned; the proper objects of the reason are Ideas; beyond ideas and their copies there remains nothing that can be the object of thought. Susceptible of all forms but determined to none, how can it be reached by any mental organ? We saw already how he declares it to be caught by an *illegitimate* exertion of reason (*νόθῳ λογισμῷ*); and in the singular and abstruse discussion in the *Sophistes*, he seems to affirm that the sensible images of eternal truth are produced by a combination of the existent and non-existent, that is, of ideas by the way of *μέθεξις* or participation, and of the subject-matter, which thus seems identified with the *non-existent*. While again, the material substratum is constantly indicated by the title of *θάτερον*, or "The other," a term

¹ [*Soph.* p. 249 C, fol. esp. 255 E: *ἐν ἑκαστον ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου*. The *Timæus* presents the physical, the *Sophistes* the purely dialectical view of the same distinction, expressed variously as that of *τὸ ἐν* to the *ἀόριστος δυνάς*, of *τὸ πέρας* to *τὸ ἀπειρον*, of *οὐσία* to the *μὴ ὂν*, or, as in the passage referred to, of *ταῦτόν* to *θάτερον*. The actual phenomenal world is that which is mixed or participant of the two; and is designated as *τὸ συμμειγόμενον*, *ἡ γένεσις*, *τὸ οὐσίας μετέχον*, or, in the *Timæus*, 35 B, even as *οὐσία*—in the secondary sense however of existence, actuality, not of essential or ideal reality, which is the more usual meaning of *οὐσία* in Plato. The "matter" or *ἄπειρον*, &c. of Plato is a mere potentiality—*mera essendi possibilitas*, as Stallbaum truly says, in his note to the passage last quoted. It is certainly incorrect to class Plato with those less scrupulous, because perhaps more superficial idealists, who deny matter *in toto*. To his *ἄπειρον* the corresponding Aristotelian term is *ὕλη*, which Plato nowhere uses, though it is suggested by such passages as *Timæus*, 69 B. It is however found very convenient by the self-styled *Timæus* Locust, who uses *ὕλη* as the synonym of the *ἄπειρον*, &c. of the Platonic *Timæus*. The term is however objectionable, as suggesting the notion of something corporeal, like the "wood" from which the metaphor comes; though it must be confessed that Aristotle takes sufficient precautions against this misconception.

It has been made matter of serious reproach to Plato, that he allowed the existence of an independent co-eternal infinite side by side with the Divine cause—the *ἐναρτίον*, as God is the *αἰτίον*, of the actual universe. Stallbaum, indeed, attempts in his *Prolegomena* to the *Timæus*, to shew that matter itself is understood by Plato as produced by the Creative Mind: "*ipsa cogitatione*

which implies, both in itself and in its Platonic use, the notion of mere *relation*, of an existence which possesses reality only in relation to true reality, and by a relation of even contrast, which certainly approaches as near to the notion of absolute non-existence as can easily be conceived. If this account be the nearest to the truth, it would be curious to compare the very different paths through which speculatists have arrived at the denial of the reality of matter in different ages. I may add to these arguments for this interpretation of the sense of Plato, that it certainly seems far more perfectly to harmonize with the system of universal ideality that was always present to his mind. Those who are induced to reject the reality of Time (on whatever grounds) will seldom be found to maintain the reality of Space; and we have already seen that Plato draws scarcely any distinction between the sensible substratum and simple extension. If Time, then, be but the image of eternity, in the sensible scene, Space may fairly be regarded as equally imaginary; and perhaps Plato would have expressed this conviction with equal directness if he could have found in the attributes of the ideal world a model answering to Space as readily as Eternity appears to answer to Time. For, whatever be the reason, it appears more easy to conceive a generic difference, and yet analogy, between Time and Eternity than between Space and Immensity.

If, then, it be next sought, what degree of subsistence Plato allowed the sensible sphere, the answer will depend upon your opinions as to the subject of our late discussion. If it be considered that he meant to allow reality to the unknown recipient of ideas*, we shall have the reality of the sensible depend on the reality of this basis, and on the "participation" in the reality of ideas. If, on the other hand, we conceive this recipient unreal, the whole amount of reality allowed to the sensible will be resolved into its relation (of participant) to the ideal. In this case, the world (*γένεσις, τὸ γεννητόν, τὸ γιγνόμενον αἰ. κόσμος, φύσις, τὸ πᾶν, οὐσία*), though destined for perpetual durability as an image (*ἄγαλμα*) of divine perfection, must refer for all its claims of reality to its connexion with the eternal

LECT.
II.

To what extent does Plato concede the reality of the sensible world?

[Dei] ortum esse sensilis mundi principium atque fontem." (*Prolog.* p. 44.) This, however, is nowhere even hinted by Plato, and seems to contradict his plain language. The creation of matter "out of nothing" is an idea which could scarcely have occurred to the mind of an ancient Greek, and it is surely an anachronism to attribute it to Plato. ED.]

* [A passage quoted in note (23) in the former lecture from *Tim.* 49 E, makes in favour of this supposition. We are there forbidden to call the unknown recipient by any name denoting quality (*ὁποιοῦν τι*), but permitted to style it "this" or "that" (*τοῦδε* or *τούτου*). ED.]

LECT.
II.

exemplars. It is the shadow that waits upon their substance. And whichever solution of the expressions of Plato we adopt, whether we regard the receptacle of the sensible as a mere condition in the nature of things for the apparition of eternal principles in a contingent form, or as a real physical groundwork for qualities analogous to the eternal principles, in either case its use and purpose is very clearly stated in the passage I subjoin. "It is proper to distinguish," observes Timæus³, "between two forms of cause, one necessary and one divine [*τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον*]: and to seek out the divine in all things with a view to rational happiness as far as our nature admits; but the necessary element only for the sake of the former, remembering that without this it would not be possible to apprehend or seize or partake of the other." Now the "necessary" element is unquestionably this material condition or principle of physical existence; and we are here taught that, whatever it be, it exists as the means and occasion of the evolution of divine intelligence in the organization of the world. In another place he speaks of the Deity as "persuading it" to receive the impress of the eternal forms, subduing it to be the mirror of his ideas. This is what in modern language would be entitled the imposition upon the inanimate universe of laws of consummate wisdom; laws, which, because they are not to be referred to the arbitrary will of Deity, but to an eternal standard of rectitude according to which the Deity perpetually directs his own actions, Plato carefully set apart by appropriating to them their own foundations in their own sphere of being.

The Psychology of the Timæus.

The manner in which Plato proceeded, upon the justest principles of logic, to construct the objects of the human mind in their two great divisions of successive and eternal upon an investigation of the correspondent faculties, and thus exemplified the true process for framing a correct ontology or philosophy of real existences, is very clearly exhibited in a well-known passage of the *Timæus*. After the exposition of this subject in the last series of Lectures, it is now, however, unnecessary to enter upon it at any length. As, nevertheless, the course of the subject (the elementary principles of the Physical Creation) requires us to hold this cardinal point in remembrance it may be well to cite the concise passage⁴ to which I allude, one of the commonplaces of Platonism, and which, therefore, ought to be familiar to every student of this philosophy. "Is that which we see or feel by bodily organs alone real? is there indeed nothing beyond it? do we idly assert that

³ [*Tim.* 68 E. Compare p. 48 A. Ed.]

⁴ [*Tim.* 51 C. Ed.]

there does exist a form intelligible (εἶδος νοητόν) of each of these objects, or are these forms mere words? We should not affirm it without due investigation; at the same time that it would be unsuitable to extend into the minute details of any accessory subject this discourse of itself sufficiently voluminous. But if we could condense this important question into brief limits, it certainly would be highly advantageous to treat it. My own opinion is the following:—If Reason and Right Opinion (νοῦς and δόξα *Distinction of Noûs and δόξα, and their corresponding objects.* ἀληθείης) are two faculties generically distinct, it is absolutely necessary that there should be Ideas self-subsistent, not objects of our senses, objects of reason alone (ἀνάλυσθητα, νοούμενα μόνον). While if, as some imagine, there is no difference between these faculties, everything on the other hand which we apprehend through the bodily organs must be taken for perfectly stable. But they must be pronounced distinct, inasmuch as they are formed within us separately and with dissimilar characters. The one comes by the way of scientific instruction (διδασχῆς), the other through persuasion (πειθοῖς); the one is always accompanied by true rational conviction, the other has no rational foundation (ἄλογον); the one is immoveable by arts of persuasion, the other changeable by them. Of the one all men partake (Opinion), of the other only the gods, and a few among men*.

These things being so, it must be acknowledged that there does exist on the one hand an ideal form, immutable, ingenerate (ἀγέννητον), imperishable; not receiving into itself any external element whatever, nor passing into anything else; invisible and to every sense imperceptible; and this it is the office of pure thought to contemplate: that on the other hand there is a second nature bearing the same name and similar to the former, perceptible by sense, generated, ever in motion, rising in a definite locality and thence again disappearing, apprehended by opinion with the aid of sensibility" (δοξῇ μετ' αἰσθήσεως περιληπτόν). He then proceeds to describe that third species of being of which we have already spoken so much; that which receives the sensible images of the eternal; and which we have already seen he declares to be not an object of sense, nor yet properly an object of reason, but perceived by a kind of spurious intelligence, and known only inferentially as presupposed in the existence of sensible phenomena. Finally, he condenses his account of these prerequisites of the physical or contingent and created universe in words

* Not that all human souls have not the mere faculty of scientific reason; but that only a few have been brought by discipline and reflection to its exercise, this discipline being the very object of philosophic education.

LECT.
II.

with which I shall leave the subject. "Here, then, is briefly my opinion; there exist, and existed before the formation of the universe, three distinct principles, Being, Place, and Production;" that is to say, the real which we know is essentially eternal, the nature which received the subsequent sensible creation, and the creative principle which was prepared, as it were, to project the eternal and invisible in the forms of time and sense. The chaotic confusion is then represented; and then the ordination of the whole by the interposition of a Supreme Intelligence.

One remark is useful here; that as some of these changes are conceived out of and beyond the sphere of time itself, whose date must commence with the first activity of the productive or genetic energy in framing a sensible system, they must be interpreted sometimes as mythical representations of metaphysical principles (as perhaps the chaos itself), sometimes as historical successions embodying the concatenation of logical conceptions. In reading Plato you will find it a rule of almost universal application to construe everything in its most abstract form; he represents principles by instances, general formulas by particular cases; it is as if you had to study Algebra in a book of Arithmetic. And, unhappily, the necessity of reversing the process must inevitably make his commentator, however he labour to avoid it, much duller and drier than the original. These deductions, which in their grave scholastic form appear so arid and uninteresting, are in Plato thrown off with a sparkling vivacity that never suffers the attention to slumber, or expressed with a gracefulness of phrase and a delicate attention to the rhythmical flow of periods, which while it never sacrifices a particle of accuracy, while it is indeed far more minutely accurate than perhaps is possible in any living language, shews us that "divine Philosophy" in some of her severest exercises may indeed be made "not harsh and crabbed,

but musical as is Apollo's lute."

Plato's physical system.

Its optical system.

Having now considered these *a priori* or purely metaphysical principles of creation, as Plato conceived them, we may descend into some account of the physical system itself. I must here again remind you of the object of the entire, the embodiment in the facts of creation, of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator, by a representation, ideal in its nature, but accommodated as nearly as might be to the evidence of experience. You are not to criticise the *Timæus* fresh from the observatory of Airy, or the laboratory of Faraday; you are not to insult this venerable monument of early speculation by parading in its presence

the accumulated wisdom of two-and-twenty centuries. The *Timæus* is a physical Romance⁶ with a mighty moral; to that moral all is subservient; and amid many paths through the labyrinth of phenomena the author always adopted that which seemed to lead most directly to his end. It is salutary, too, for us sometimes to humble our own pride at our modern advances in these studies, by remembering for how much, after all, we are indebted to that interposition of Providence which our ignorance calls chance; had the telescope been known in the days of Plato, Archimædes might have anticipated Newton.

In agreement with these views of the scope of the work, the main argument employed by Plato for all that lies beyond direct experience is confessedly drawn from his own conceptions of fitness. It is "better" that it should be so, more harmonious, more beautiful;—and he candidly admits that if anyone else can contrive a more perfect arrangement he will "welcome him, not as a foe, but as a friend⁷." In fact, you will remember that for the principal details of this system Plato was not himself answerable; they were the Pythagorean hypotheses⁷, and the exposition itself is by Plato put in the mouth of a Pythagorean philosopher, Timæus of Locri. It was, therefore, natural that he should not feel personally interested in the adoption of these physical opinions by his readers; while in treating the more speculative principles, those which were in his mind always connected with the stability of moral truth, we observe an earnestness and decision prominent amid the calm conjectural tone of the rest of the

*Introduc-
tion of
the notion
of fitness
and beauty.*

⁶ [This epithet is hardly stronger than some which Plato himself applies to his own work. "Whenever," he says, "the philosopher, in the intervals of his abstract dialectical enquiries, takes up by way of recreation the contemplation of mutable nature, and thus secures a pleasure which leaves no sting behind, he will enrich his life with a resource of amusement at once temperate and rational." *Tim.* 59 D. In physical enquiries, he more than once admits that analogy and probability (*τῇ τῶν εἰκότων μύθῳ ἰδίαν*. *Tim.* 1. 1.) are his only guides; for, says he, "Being is related to Becoming (the Absolute to the Contingent) as Truth to Belief: consequently, we must not marvel should we find it impossible to arrive at any certain and conclusive result in our speculations upon the creation of the visible universe and its authors; it should be enough for us; if the account we have to give be as probable as any other, remembering that we are but men, and are therefore bound to acquiesce in merely probable results, without looking for a higher degree of certainty than the subject admits of." (p. 29 D.) Accordingly, as if to disclaim the responsibility of the opinions put forth in the dialogue, instead of employing Socrates, the usual representative of his own views, he takes care to speak through the mouth of a stranger and a Pythagorean. Ed.]

⁷ [p. 54 A: *ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐχθρὸς ὢν ἀλλὰ φίλος κρατεῖ*. Ed.]

⁸ [Mixed, however, with Heraclitic and Empedoclean notions. The reputed fragments of Philolaus present many coincidences with parts of the *Timæus*, as indeed Stallbaum has pointed out. Unhappily however the coincidences are in some cases so striking as to suggest a suspicion that "Philolaus" was the borrower, and not Plato. See Bywater, on the Fragments of Philolaus in the *Cambridge Journal of Philology*, No. 1. Ed.]

LECT.
II.

dialogue. It was in these latter that he was eminently Socratic, and eminently himself.

Among those opinions which may be regarded as holding a middle place between pure dialectic reasoning and direct observation, we may mention the conclusions which he proposes at the opening of his exposition, with respect to the universe as a whole. Having already shewn that it is unquestionably not eternal, as sensible, and therefore in a state of constant generation, and therefore dependent upon a cause^b beyond itself (a course of reasoning not very unlike that of Clarke upon the idea of necessary and contingent existence); and having further established that it was formed after an eternal not a created exemplar, inasmuch as this supposition alone corresponds with a perfect world formed by the best of causes; and having, as was formerly explained, pronounced the divine goodness to have been the sole motive of creation;—he advances to a proposition which at once displays the chasm between our modes of thinking and those of that early age,—he declares the world endowed with intelligence, and this solely on the ground that the intelligent surpasses the unintelligent, and the universe must be perfect^c. If, however, you remember the peculiarities of that earliest age of Greek philosophy through which I had the honour of conducting some of you in the course of last year, this idea will not appear novel or startling. The extension of the entire bodily and mental nature of man to a universe which visibly possessed one element of the compound, was nothing new to the speculatists of that time; motion seemed to demand mental activity, and regularity of motion mental intelligence; and these sages seemed to conceive that the instance of the animal creation evinced it to be more in accordance with the analogy of nature that the Divine Principle should everywhere create separate centres of intelligence and will than that it should itself be the sole mover of an inanimate immense. The boundless universe, then, was quickened with a spiritual essence, and all its parts with separate portions of mind; it and they lived as well as moved. That, reasoned the philosopher, which so manifestly makes the great glory of one part of the creation, cannot surely be denied to the whole creation itself; the universe is not to be surpassed by any of its contents. You will, of course, recognize in this also the secret influence of polytheistic habits infecting the stream of thought even when guarded most laboriously from the stain.

In this supposition, likewise, you will perhaps observe

*The sensible
universe is*

^b [p. 28 A: τὰν γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσθαι εἶναι. 1b. B. ED.]

^c [p. 30 A, fol. ED.]

an exemplification, though doubtless one to our notions strange and inharmonious, of that great principle of the Platonic philosophy, its tendency to subordinate everything to higher and higher generalizations, and to see in the universal system a scale of being without defect in the intervals and almost without limit to the ascent. The single vast Idea of the Universe contemplated by the Creator is supposed to possess in it every noble attribute which any of its contained objects possesses; it is the fountain from which their streams are derived; it possesses in fee that treasury of perfections of which they, as it were, inherit the use. This presiding intelligible form includes the other forms, as its sensible counterpart includes its sensible contents. "This," declares Timæus¹⁶, "contains all intelligible animals (*νοητὰ ζῷα*) in itself, just as this sensible world incloses us and all other visible animals (*ἑῶα ὁρατά*). This evidently is not a mere logical inclusion of species in a genus, in which case the universal genus would be successively stript of all its perfections as it rose, and left at last in the bare solitude of abstract animality; but rather, the inclusion of an inferior body of laws under a single comprehensive law, itself endowed with all the prerogatives and powers of every law beneath it.* And more especially, that as there are examples of *life* in the various departments of the creation, so is there a vast law or principle of life in the huge frame of the creation itself. This is, we may object, a most unwarrantable generalization; yet is it, in the supposed absence of all experimental confirmation, more intrinsically unreasonable to imagine that the life which moves a man may move the heavens, than to ima-

LECT.
IIcopy of the
intelligible.*ζῷα νοητὰ
and ὁρατά.**The Platon-
ic Ideal
is not an
abstraction
but a Law.*¹⁶ [p. 30 C. Ed.]

* I may observe in passing, that this is one among many instances of the gross mistakes of those who identify the Ideas of Plato with mere logical abstractions. It also seems possible that this theory may be otherwise (and as many may think more simply) interpreted. It may be intended to intimate that the Supreme Idea contains *really and physically* all the inferior attributes; according to the plan so observable in the disposition of species, while all seem to rise by regular progression above each other, not however by total differences, but each assuming into itself all the qualities beneath it, and adding to them its own. This has often been shown as regards the portion of this boundless progression that lies within our experience. I conceive, however, that the other view is more accordant with the expressions of Plato in the passage itself, and with the genius of his philosophy. "God, determining to frame the world to resemble that which is fairest and most perfect among things intelligible, made it animated, visible, single, and including in itself all other animated beings, as of the same nature with itself." Besides, it certainly does *not* literally include all the properties of the animated natures its idea comprises;—for instance, as he shows soon after, either their irregularity and diversity of motion, or their sensitive organs. We must, then, regard this Idea of the Universal Animated Being as intimating in the peculiar forms and phrasology of Platonism, that God has originally impressed upon the visible universe a principle of life and of intelligence of which all subordinate forms of motion and harmony are deductions and results.

LECT.
II.

gine that the weight which makes an apple fall directs the planetary revolutions? Or if, as many of our best thinkers maintain, all origin and continuance of motion bespeak a volition somewhere and somehow exerted, is it at all absurd to conceive that a special agent may be appointed to urge by direct energy of volition the moving systems of the universe? And if this agent be indissolubly connected with his department, under the disposition of Providence,—shall there be much difference assignable between such an arrangement and the composition of an animated being? And however this be determined, we may perhaps ask ourselves with a sigh, whether it might not have been better if philosophy had preferred as its motive principle life and intelligence pervading every region of creation, to the universal adoption of a purely mechanical principle, which, though decorously reserving a nominal first mover in the last resort, has already by the mouth of some of its highest organs boasted that it can do without that superfluous hypothesis? Unfortunately it is the very genius of a physical science acting on that philosophy, to defer the “dignus vindice nodus” to the last moment; and I fear that with too many the “nec Deus intersit” has been accepted without the poet’s qualifying conjunction.

*The Unity
of the
World.*

The next principle delivered by Plato is one with which you can more readily accord. It is the unity of the world; a conception which indeed is embodied in our very word *universe*. Plato reasons it out from his own principles, and in connexion with the last article. He tells us, that if the *κόσμος* or harmonized physical system has been formed on an exemplar, and if the exemplar contain within it all intelligible beings, the world can be but one¹¹. “For this universally Comprehensive Intelligible Being cannot admit any other collateral to itself, by the supposition: if it did, it would at once be necessary that it should sink from its universality and rank with that other under a vaster idea; and the universe would then be the copy not of the two, but of that which comprises them. The Divine Artist, then, made the universe neither plural nor infinite; he made it the finite image of real perfection, and single as that is single.” In the same way of thought, he pronounces it not amenable to the infirmities of disease or age¹²; no evil can accede to it from external influences, for it involves all; it is therefore dissoluble only by the will of a Being too immutably wise and good ever to destroy that which wisdom and goodness alone have created. Beyond these characteristics, he conceives it

¹¹ [p. 31 A. Ed.]

¹² [τέλειον καὶ ἀγήρων καὶ ἀρροσόν. p. 33 A. Ed.]

fitting likewise to separate it by further distinctions from the inferior instances of animal existence. It is devoid of organs of sense, of the machinery of ingestion or egestion, of members adapted for motion. Its shape is strictly spherical¹³, as being the most regular, the most comprehensive, the fittest for even revolution; its rotation circular, as being that among the seven species of local motion "which is the most nearly allied to reason," (τὴν κίνησιν τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν); a singular ground, indeed, and at once placing us in the midst of the Pythagorism of Plato, but which is only one instance of the most abstruse principle pervading this system, its representation of mental natures by mathematical relations. This brings us to the remarkable account of the composition of Soul—of soul generically; for though the passage seems peculiarly intended for the soul of the world, this itself is the type of all inferior souls. The soul of the universe is, in a manner, soul universally.

Soul is that which stands midway between the eternal and the contingent; itself created, and yet the interpreter of the uncreate. We may suppose, then, that its substance in some mysterious way partakes of both; that, on the one hand, it is intimately associated with those eternal realities which its rational faculty apprehends, and, on the other, sufficiently congenial to the sensible to address itself to it likewise. For in the meditations of the early sages on the nature of Truth, they met, we may be well assured, with the same difficulties which we encounter in our efforts to connect knowledge with reality, and those who did not identify both (by either raising knowledge itself into coincidence with reality, or lowering reality into the mere forms of mental knowledge), were content to say, that there subsisted a perfect *resemblance* between both, an inward relation of complete analogy; for that "the like could only be known by the like." It seems to be in the spirit of this conviction that Plato, obtaining by reflective abstraction the primary elements of creation, conceived the soul as analogously formed: so that ultimately the knowing and the known might be traced to the same original basis, though in the actual state of the soul we are conscious of their distinctness. This very refined analysis I suppose to be the key of the perplexing passage¹⁴ which relates the constitution of Soul. It runs thus: "With the substance indivisible

The creation is composition of the Soul.

¹³ [Ib. c. See the description of the σφαῖρος of Empedocles, p. 200, note (12). ED.]

¹⁴ [Tim. p. 35 A; where Stallbaum's note is worthy of attention. ED.]

LECT.
II.

and ever subsisting the same, and with the substance divisible and concerned about bodies, he mingled a third form of substance intermediate between both these natures of same and different; and set it midway between the indivisible and the corporeally divisible: and then taking these three things he compounded them into one comprehensive idea, forcibly combining the intractable nature of the Different into union with that of the Same; and having mingled these both with that mediate nature and formed of the three one, he divided the whole into suitable parts, so that each part involved in it the three constituents of Same, different, and intermediate." He then proceeds to the divisions made in his $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, which I shall presently notice. But in the mean time you cannot fail to perceive, that these ingredients of the principle of soul are exactly the logical characteristics of the three elements of creation which have already come under our review¹⁸.

Application
of numerical
relations to the
soul.

As then the substance of soul is taken from the substance of the universe, so the *divisions* of soul are identified with the harmonies of the universe. The system of the heavenly bodies, as Plato held it, is represented (on the Pythagorean doctrine) by the intervals of the musical scale; and these intervals are given as distributions of the Soul of the World, this universal intelligence being thus regarded as one with his own incessant operations. This soul being diffused through the entire frame, and energizing with equal vitality through every separate part of it, is described as divided among its distinct localities according to the proportions they bear to each other.

For the proportions selected for this geometrical division many reasons have been assigned. The intervals stated may be represented by the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27,—which constitute the diatonic scale of the ancients composed of two disjoined tetrachords. Proclus considers that in the scale of *Timæus* an adumbration is intended of that triple nature of soul of which we have just spoken; an arithmetical, a geometrical, and an harmonical proportion being discoverable in it. The numbers are evidently divisible into the two progressions, 1, 2, 4, 8,—and 1, 3, 9, 27; and Stallbaum¹⁹ considers that the four terms of each progression denote the degrees by which the soul arrives at the plenitude of existence, according to the mystical language of the Pythagorean school. It is more important to observe that the same proportion immediately reappears in the arrangement of the planetary orbits; in consonance

¹⁸ [That is, with the principles denoted as $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho$, $\theta\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\rho\epsilon\upsilon\sigma$ and $\sigma\acute{o}\lambda\alpha$, or $\tau\acute{o}$ $\sigma\upsilon\mu\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\nu$. See note (1). E.D.]

¹⁹ [Note to *Tim.* 35 B. E.D.]

with the supposition that these bodies are directed by laws accordant with those observable in the progression of the musical octave: LECT.
II.

Thus the consideration of the vital and intelligent principle of the universe brings us to the very simple and inartificial astronomy of the *Timæus*. Eight concentric spheres are provided to bear in their revolutions the bodies affixed to their interior surface¹⁷. It is the first and simplest effort of hypothesis, yet how far below the diviner simplicity of Nature itself! *Timæus* first presents us with two vast spheres which embody the principles of same and different*. The outer sphere includes the innumerable multitude of the fixed stars. The interior sphere is subsequently divided by the Divine Artist into seven spheres which revolve with various velocities and in various directions. The earth is placed in the centre, and the moon, the sun, and the five planets, with the still mightier sphere of the stars beyond them, move in measured harmony around it. The central position and the immovability of the earth seem to be both asserted and implied; but one expression has offered too fair a ground for contesting this point to have failed of becoming one of the battle-fields of criticism. Plato speaks of the earth as "whirling around the pole of the universe" (*εἰλλομένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πύλον τεταμένην*). Aristotle accordingly accuses him of holding the heresy of the earth's rotation; but I fear that that honourable accusation can scarcely be substantiated. A solitary passage susceptible of other explanations¹⁸ cannot be admitted against the entire tone of the expressions of Plato; nor can this supposition be conciliated with the declared motion of the other spheres, which alone suffice to account for the phenomena contemplated. "Hoc etiam," says Cicero, after stating the opinion of Hicetas of Syracuse ["neque, præter terram, rem ullam in mundo moveri, quæ cum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem

The Astronomy of the Timæus.

¹⁷ [p. 36 c. See the diagram in Stallbaum's note. Ed.]

* We are informed that the Demiurgic Father first divided the mysterious composition before stated into two parts or lines; placed these lines so as to intersect obliquely (as the equinoctial and ecliptic); bent them into circles, and then set them to revolve.

¹⁸ [The controversy turns upon the interpretation of the word *εἰλλομένην*, which, it is thought, may either mean "revolving," or "circumvolved," i.e. wrapped or fastened or packed, round the pole or axis. To discuss this question fully would occupy too much space, and I am glad to be able to refer the reader to a nearly exhaustive dissertation on the subject contained in a recently published volume of the Minor Works of the late Mr Grote, p. 239; the only weak point in which is, in my opinion, his failure to perceive and therefore to explain the grammatical difficulty arising from the *sense* of *εἰλλομένην*. This may perhaps be disposed of, if we admit a slight modification, not so much of his theory, as of his rendering of the passage in the *Timæus*. Ed.]

L'CT.
II.

effici omnia, quasi stante terra cœlum moveretur"]—"Hoc etiam Platonem in Timæo dicere quidam arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius¹⁹." The notice of Hicetas, though so incidentally introduced by Cicero, bore its fruits in future ages. Copernicus declares that it was this memorable sentence which first led him to speculate on the mobility of the earth. But antiquity does not recognize in Plato a supporter of this doctrine; which, nevertheless, he might have obtained from the speculations of Philolaus, an inheritor of the opinions of Pythagoras. But higher claims than these have been advanced on behalf of the *Timæus*. It has been argued that the harmonic proportions of the universal soul nearly agree with the true distances of the planets from the sun; and that Plato not merely held the rotation on the axis but the revolution in the orbit;—that thus the spherical music was itself only a mystical and ambiguous expression of profounder truth*. Aristotle and Plutarch attribute to the Pythagoreans certain beliefs respecting the motion of the earth; the dark saying of Philolaus is still preserved, that "the earth and moon revolve, like the sun, around a central fire" (for it appears that this philosopher held that the sun we behold was but an optical image of an interior luminary); and Plutarch from Theophrastus records the report that Plato in his latter days was said to have regretted not having displaced the earth from the centre of the system. These faint gleams of ancient science have caught the observation and interested the inquiries of many historians of astronomy; but the indecision of expressions, the fragmentary character of the notices, and the veil of purposed obscurity which unfortunately conceals so much of the choicest wisdom of early ages, unite to render any satisfactory conclusion almost hopeless.

Subsequent
modifica-
tions of the
Platonic
Astronomy
by Eudoxus
and others.

The hypothesis of solid concentric spheres was calculated for indefinite expansion; and accordingly these auxiliaries of the imagination were soon multiplied beyond their original number. The difficulty of accounting for the direct, retrograde, and stationary positions of the planets induced Eudoxus, a pupil of Plato, to attempt a further complication. In order to escape the apparent improbability of such a variety of motions in each of the planetary spheres, Eudoxus imagined the addition of three spheres to each, in such an order that the body itself revolved in the lowest, and the three above it presided over the diversity of its motions. The nearest to the

¹⁹ [*Acad. Pr.* II. 39, 123. Ed.]

* I confess this notion appears to me altogether incredible, being inconsistent, not only with the order of orbs mentioned in the *Timæus* itself, but also with the general strain of the writings of Plato. (See *Phædo*, near the end.)

planet had an oscillatory motion which it communicated to the sphere of the body itself, and this occasioned the direct, retrograde, and stationary movements; the next communicated the daily, the highest the annual revolutions. Three spheres were thought sufficient to account for the motion of the sun, and as many were assigned to the moon; which with the sphere of the fixed stars made the number twenty-seven. Callippus was dissatisfied with any allowance under thirty-four, and Aristotle could not undertake to inclose the phenomena in any number of spheres below fifty-six. Augmentations even beyond these were thought necessary in subsequent ages; but in the mean time another system had arisen, that of which Apollonius is said to have been the author, and which, improved by Hipparchus, we have received under the title of the Ptolemaic:—a system cumbrous and complicated indeed, but recommended by many advantages above the former. I am, not now, however, to enter into the detailed history of it or of its successors. The slight notice already presented is merely meant to exemplify the inevitable progress of hypothesis. A system invented to comprehend a few facts is burthened with more and more accessories as new facts appear; nature swells beyond the measure of its artificial bondage; custom and imagination are still unwilling to alter fundamentally the greater lineaments of the portrait they have so long cherished; accordingly, the system continues to live until too heavy to bear its own weight—that is, until the explanations become almost as numerous as the facts to be explained. The imagination at this point finds no help in the hypothesis, and deserts it. “Systems,” says Adam Smith²⁰, in one of his many passages of happy illustration, “Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little system, created to perform as well as to connect together in reality those different movements and effects which the artist has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine, invented to connect together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in reality performed. The machines that are at first invented to perform any particular movement are always the most complex; and succeeding artists generally discover that with fewer wheels, with fewer principles of motion, than had been originally employed, the same effects may be more easily produced. The first systems, in the same manner, are always the most complex, and a particular connecting chain or principle is

*A. Smith's
remarks on
the early
physical
systems.*

²⁰ [*Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, p. 44. Most of the foregoing statements come from the same source. F.D.]

LECT.
II.

generally thought necessary to unite every two seemingly disjointed appearances: but it often happens that one great connecting principle is afterwards found to be sufficient to bind together all the discordant phenomena that occur in a whole species of things. How many *wheels* are necessary to carry on the movements of this imaginary machine, the system of eccentric spheres! The westward diurnal revolution of the firmament, whose rapidity carries all the other heavenly bodies along with it, requires one. The periodical eastward revolutions of the sun, moon, and five planets, require for each of these bodies another. Their differently accelerated and retarded motions require that those wheels or circles should neither be concentric with the firmament nor with one another; which more than anything seems to disturb the harmony of the universe. The retrograde and stationary appearance of the five planets, as well as the extreme inconstancy of the moon's motion, require for each of them an epicycle, another little wheel attached to the circumference of the great wheel, which still more interrupts the uniformity of the system. The motion of the apogee of each of those bodies requires in each of them still another wheel to carry the centres of their eccentric spheres round the centre of the earth. And thus this imaginary machine, though perhaps more simple and certainly better adapted to the phenomena than the fifty-six planetary spheres of Aristotle, was still too intricate and complex for the imagination to rest in it with complete tranquillity and satisfaction."

I return to the *Timæus*. You will perceive that the fundamental conception which sustains all the Platonic or Pythagorean opinions on the cosmical arrangements, is that the universal soul is to be the medium between the eternal and the successive, and therefore to have its roots in both. The Deity forms it, but he forms it of those elements which lie at the foundation of the real and the apparent, of same and different; since it is to address itself to both, it must have some original affinity for both. Now the first grand development of these opposite attributes of soul is conceived to be the arrangement of the magnificent framework of the universe; this is the universal type of active intelligence; and here, therefore, in their simplest exhibition will be found the two presiding characteristics of soul. When from this *a priori* conception the Platonist descended to inspect the facts, he found that the few then known could be without much difficulty organized as a sensible manifestation of the primary metaphysical principles already elicited; as manifestations, that is, of principles that may be said to form the very substance of intelligence itself.

He therefore expressed the harmonies of the heavens as reducible in the last analysis to the two original principles of intelligence, the categories of sameness and difference of permanence and change; and inasmuch as soul was not only cognitive but active, not only an intelligence but an energy, and thus vitally present in each of its functions, he expressed the measurements of these harmonious motions as distributions of the very soul that quickened and preserved them. The proper interest to our age of such speculations is of course altogether metaphysical; we have long outgrown the cosmical hypothesis in which the conceptions were embodied; but the profound questions which arise out of these conceptions themselves are still as pregnant with interest as ever to all reflecting spirits, and the withering breath of oblivion which has passed over the mere astronomy of the *Timæus*, has left its speculative philosophy as fresh and as attractive as in the days of the old Locrian himself. You will now, I trust, be prepared to enter into the purport of the following passage, which succeeds the account of the geometrical division of soul²¹.

"The whole composition of the soul being completed according to the design of its composer, he, after this, constructed all the bodily nature within it, and fitting centre to centre united them: but the soul, diffused from the middle to the uttermost bounds of creation, and investing the whole circularly from without, introduced a revolution on itself, the divine principle²² of incessant and intelligent life to last for ever. The body of the world is visible, the soul invisible; participating of reason and of the harmony of beings intelligible and eternal, it is the most perfect of all such beings as the Perfect Being has formed. Now, since it is composed of these three elements—the same, the different, and the mediate "substance,"—divided and combined according to proportion, and returning circularly on itself, whenever it meets anything essentially divisible, or anything essentially indivisible, moved through its whole self, it pronounces with what any substance is identical, and from what it differs, why, and where, and how, and when, it happens that anything either is or suffers in relation to anything else through the whole sphere both of the created and of the eternal. Now Reason, which is true when conversant with the immutable, may be engaged with both the changeable and the immutable; and when, borne along in its own silent course, it meets a sensible object, and the circle of difference in its regular function

Combina-
tion of soul
with body.

²¹ [*Tim.* p. 36 D, fol. ED.]

²² [*Θεὸν ἀρχὴν ἡρώτα*, "began the divine commencement," "divinum fecit initium." ED.]

LECT.
II.

transmits the message to the entire soul, then are generated opinions and beliefs firm and true: but when, on the contrary, it is engaged with the rational, and the revolving circle of sameness declares it to the soul, intelligence and scientific knowledge necessarily result. But if any man shall say that these things are anywhere but in the soul produced, he shall speak what is utterly erroneous." Nothing can be more plain than that in this description the universal soul is the type of soul in general; that its circles of sameness and difference are but representatives, in the language of that celestial system with which it is directly connected, of the faculties of belief and knowledge, *πίστις* and *νόησις*, which Plato so carefully separates in the human soul, and which he evidently conceived to be the appropriate and necessary faculties of every description of soul, when once placed in relation with a phenomenal or sensible system, the image of one invisible and eternal. But this may appear more distinctly when in the next Lecture, passing from these inevitably abstruse deductions, I proceed to the Psychology of Plato, to his views of the substance, properties, prerogatives, and fortunes of the human soul.

LECTURE III.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. IX.

GENTLEMEN,

As I have already stated to you, it is not within my plan to enter at any length into the details of the system of the natural phenomena offered by Plato. For those who are interested in tracing the history of the physical sciences, the *Timæus* presents a rich magazine of ancient speculations, if not upon the anatomical construction (in which it is brief and imperfect), at least upon the objects and adaptation of the parts of the human body; as well as upon the arrangement of the "elements," as they were called, and the productions of the more striking appearances of external nature. To enumerate these particulars would only be to transcribe the work itself, which is easily within your reach, and the language of which could scarcely be abridged. But even if I could succeed in condensing and methodizing the entire of these details, the result would only be to lead me away from my object in these sketches, which is to catch and portray the features and expression of the Platonic habits of thought, and to represent the opinions of this great master upon those questions of eternal interest which no variation in the science of the visible creation can ever antiquate,—no successes in that field of investigation ever supersede. I know, gentlemen, that these discussions can scarcely hope to be popular: I avow that I cannot rid you of the burthen-some necessity of patient meditation, if you would think as Plato thought: the depths of the ocean cannot sparkle with the glitter of the surface, nor the student who would enter into the regions of the *φιλοσοφία τοῦ ὄντος*, the philosophy of the real and absolute, expect to be entertained with the brilliant varieties of the last new theory of association or of taste. To Plato himself almost alone of mankind belonged the gift of conveying the profoundest truths in the most airy vehicle of fancy, of being livelier among ideal abstractions than most men could contrive to be in the scenes of a romance; yet even Plato himself has

LECT.
III.

*Platonic
Physics
concluded.*

LECT.
III.

in some respects suffered by this very perfection. The forms of Grecian art are too exquisitely wrought for our dull sensibilities,—the parallel motion of philosopher and poet is too rapid and perplexing for our slow faculties; we cannot read the two languages together,—we mutilate this mighty mind to bring it within our grasp, and vexed at feeling that the life has evaporated, take revenge by talking of it as the mind of a dreamer and a phantast. In truth, there never were written pages less marked by the negligent vagueness of reverie than those of Plato; the severest control governs his highest flights,—the sublimity is ever in the substance of the thoughts, not in their accidental connexions; nor is there a sentence of what a modern critic would call declamation from beginning to end of his writings. Serenest when loftiest, he rises without effort or perceptible motion.

“Ye cannot see
The stirring of his wings, and yet he soars!”

These singular perfections, however, are the excellencies of a Greek; and of all Greeks, the special excellency of Plato. The lecturer's work of cold analysis is necessarily very different; he cannot even lay the body itself on his dissecting table, when though lifeless it would at least be entire; he must take it limb by limb, and the limb itself few can recognize after it has been disfigured to be exposed, and its external result of beauty lost in tracing out its tissues and arteries.

*The four
elements ac-
cording to
Plato;*

I shall not, therefore, attempt any minute account of the merely hypothetical explanations which Plato gives us of the arrangement of the elements and their original constitution. He obtains the four elements by arguing that corporeal nature was meant to be visible and tangible¹; that fire was necessary for the former (a supposition, by the way, countenanced by those late interesting investigations which seem to establish that light and heat are really modes of the same original essence, rays of heat being light invisible, and light caloric visible)—and earth, the principle of solidity, necessary for tactual grasp. But between these very different natures it is fitting that some connecting medium or media should intervene; and Plato shews by some geometrical considerations, which, however, have rather perplexed his commentators, that the most perfect arrangement is that in which two proportionals are inserted; so that fire may be to air as air is to water, and air to water as water to earth². He subsequently enters

their geometrical forms.

¹ [*Tim.* p. 31 B—32 C. Ed.]

² [*Ib.* p. 53 C—56 C. Ed.]

into their mathematical construction, in the spirit of the Italic school, and decides it primarily on the principle of beauty. The pyramid is assigned to the particles of fire, the cube to those of earth, the octahedron to air, the icosahedron to water. The reasons for these distinctions are of course altogether fanciful; yet in the course of the exposition conjectures not wholly unlike truth occur; and it is impossible in reading it not to conceive with what pleasure Plato would have entered into the modern law of definite proportions, and still more, perhaps, into the striking and beautiful phenomena of crystallization. In such cases as these, where ancient hypotheses are contrasted with modern discoveries, and the reality found so far to excel the anticipation, it is instructive to regard the difference between the moral and the purely intellectual in man. In his moral being, it is the tendency of awakened man to aspire perpetually after a perfection which this world does not concede him, and even out of his own preconceptions of the just and the good to faintly dare to shadow a scene infinitely surpassing it; and reason and revelation alike encourage him in the noble and elevating occupation;—in the sphere of simple fact, the object of his observing and theorizing faculties, on the contrary, the construction of imaginary worlds on principles of supposed perfection, if intended to satisfy the reason, is discountenanced by reason itself, while even piety bids us beware how we risk degrading that workmanship which all experience perpetually proves to rise beyond the utmost ingenuity and harmony of our best ideal constructions. And could I believe that the very imperfect system delineated by Plato was ever meant by him to be the last term of physical speculation, I should judge him strictly amenable to this censure;—everything about it, however, seems to me to mark his clear conviction that he walked among the obscurities of conjecture, and that his attempts at theoretical representation of phenomena were only valuable as they seemed to exemplify in a vivid form what might be the real wisdom and benevolence of the Deity. You will remember also what was the actual position and vocation of true philosophy at this period. Schools existed—popular and fashionable schools—crowded by all that was influential and eminent in Greece, in which every principle of moral and religious truth was systematically undermined. Among other devices of this unholy warfare, the physical universe itself was raised into a fortress from which heaven might be stormed. The evidences of design in its structure were questioned; its existence attributed to necessity, to destiny,

General remarks upon the physical speculations of Plato,

viewed in relation, first to contemporary opinion;

LECT.
III.and second-
ly, to the
popular
religious
creed.

to caprice, to chance³. Under the pressure of these circumstances, something should be done, and speedily: to wait until full certainty should be attained, was to wait for the lapse of ages. The instructor of the public mind had only to take the best account that thoughtful men had till then been able to devise; to insist upon such instances as appeared least questionable; to attire the rest in the most becoming dress, and so to arrange the whole as to leave upon the mind of his reader the ideas of order and beneficence deeply and distinctly impressed. And as he would be obliged to admit the public religion of his country in its chief elements, his object would be so to represent polytheism as to give the moral effect of monotheism; by classing the received gods as the subjects and deputies of the Supreme, all animated by a single purpose derived from him, and moving together in harmony of will and action. For it is clear that the great moral evil of polytheism consists, not in it merely as polytheism, but in its defect of subordination among its deities, and its tendency to admit private interests, personal preferences, and even positive hostilities among them. This Plato himself bitterly felt and lamented; and the diffusion of such debasing tenets among the mass of the people formed one of his prominent and constant charges against the popular poetry of his country. Against this doctrine of divine dissension he has forcibly and unreservedly argued in the *Euthyphron*⁴; and we can easily conceive, that, while on the one hand the belief of rivalry among the presiding deities must at once destroy all the religious foundations of morality, on the other, the belief of their common animation by a single spirit and purpose, their conjunction in the same strict principles of right and wrong, must unconsciously infuse into the mind the very spirit of monotheism itself,—the standard in which they agree becoming in a manner the deity of the reason, and the several divinities becoming to the hopes and fears the avenging and rewarding ministers of that Supreme and Eternal Law. But this process becomes still more simple and certain, when, as with Plato, the Supreme is clearly represented on the stage of creation, and the deities⁵ (even Jupiter⁶, the governing divinity of the poetical and popular mythology) are classed as the descendants of powers included within that creation itself. Such, then, on the whole, seems to me the historical position and design of the *Timæus*; and to estimate fairly the execution you must remember the

³ [See the tenth Book of the *Laws*, p. 889 A. ED.]⁴ [p. 8. ED.] ⁵ [*Tim.* p. 40 A. ED.]⁶ [*Ib.* 40 E. ED.]

age and the purpose. I shall only add, lest my own selections should do injustice to the philosopher, that in the course of the work the instances of design are really taken in far the greater number from the most accessible, and what Paley, and Socrates himself, both agreed to be the most convincing department of nature, the organized animal creation. The few references I have made have been chosen with a different view,—in illustration of the purely speculative philosophy of Plato: with which view it is also that I now proceed to consider and generalize the principal opinions of Plato regarding the nature and destinies of the human soul.

"If," said Socrates, "there be anything about man that partakes of divine, it is the soul⁷." This brief sentence may stand as the text of the whole Platonic psychology. The spirit that animates the entire of his many and diversified references to this subject, whether they be general or detailed, is ever the same, the conviction deep and ineffaceable, that there is a principle in man which manifestly separates itself from the rest of his nature, and internally proclaims an essence kindred with the skies. The whole force of his genius is bent to clear and confirm this conviction: to it directly or indirectly he perpetually returns; it is assumed in every dialogue in which it is not argued. And yet it is unquestionable, that, though he has fortunately left us some imperishable memorials of the grounds of his belief, considerable obscurity still hangs over his opinions on some parts of the subject; an obscurity arising partly, we may suppose, from his disinclination to speak dogmatically upon matters which he could not but feel were, without direct revelation, inevitable uncertainties, and partly from the very different periods of a long life in which his dialogues were meditated and written. The most striking of these instances in which we are still left in some doubt as to his real sentiments, occurs in the very opening of the subject.

Plato informs us⁸, that after the Supreme Being had created the visible and the invisible gods, he commanded them to frame the animated natures of the Earth; but that in doing so he reserved to himself the formation of that portion of their being which deserved the name of immortal, "to be entitled divine, and serve as guide to all who would follow justice:" that accordingly the Father of the universe, composed this diviner portion of the remainder of that

The Platonic Psychology;

1st, as set forth in the Timæus;

⁷ [Legg. v. init. : πάντων τῶν αὐτοῦ κτημάτων μετὰ θεοῦ ψυχὴ θεϊκώτατον. Ed.]

⁸ [Tim. 41 A. Ed.]

LECT.
III.

mysterious substance of which the soul of the world had been already formed, but of an essence, from some unexplained cause, much less refined⁹. This mythical representation embodies the doctrine, that the soul of man, and (it would appear) that of all animals, are of the same nature with the universal soul, though of inferior excellence—a point of view in which we have already in the last Lecture contemplated the subject; that, though of the same kind and family, they are individually distinct from it and from each other; and consequently that the notion of ultimate *absorption**, so often ascribed to Plato, is really without foundation in his theory.

andly, in the
Phædrus.

Apparent
discrepancy
in the two
dialogues.

However, when from this account of the soul just recited, of the soul "the most excellent of generated beings," we turn to the *Phædrus*, we find an account not easy to reconcile with the above, an account which seems to attribute to the soul an essential eternity of nature. Plato here argues¹⁰, that the soul, as self-moving, is a *Principle* of motion; that a principle cannot be produced any more than it can be destroyed. Not produced, for it would then no longer be a principle, no longer the self-dependent source of its own energy; not destroyed, for if so the whole existence of things, which rests on first principles of production, might cease. "If then," he con-

⁹ [ἀκήρατα δ' οὐκ ἐκ κατὰ ταῦτά ὡσαύτως ἀλλὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα. Ib. D. Ed.]

* The opinion of Warburton, who ascribes this notion of the derivation of the souls of men from the divine essence and their final resolution into it, to all the ancient philosophers without exception, is, I think, quite unsupported in the case of Platonism, as it came from the hands of Plato himself. Plato may, in the last analysis, have embraced all things in some mysterious unity—an idea which in *some* vague sense it seems impossible for human reason to avoid; but as far as he professes to trace the fortunes of the souls of men, he seems to me to see them distinct to the end, even when most closely combined with those great realities of the Ideal World with which their origin is so intimately blended. I have already attempted to shew what appears the true foundation of the Platonic theory of the constitution of soul, viz. the mysterious oneness of truth and knowledge, which naturally led to deriving the *rational* element of the Soul (the element that *knows*, that possesses the faculty of *νόησις*) from the *real* element in things (the element that *is*, the *νοούμενον*); and in the original, the final, and, though imperfectly, the present, state of that rational element, he, doubtless, conceived it united with its object in an eternal conjunction or even identity. But though Intelligence and its correlative Intelligibles were, and are, thus combined, the soul is *more* than pure intelligence; it possesses an element of personality and consciousness distinct to each individual, of which we have no reason to suppose, from anything his writings contain, Plato ever meant to deprive it. [It is thus we must explain the Platonic doctrine that the number of souls in the universe is constant. *Rep.* X. 611 A: (ψυχαι) αἱ δὲ εἰς αἱ αὐταί, ὅτε γὰρ ἂν ποὺ ἐλάττους γένοιντο μηδεμίᾳ ἀπολλυμένης, ὅτε αὖ πλείους, εἰ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλεον γίγνεται, ὅσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνεται, καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτώτα ἀθάνατα. This number is elsewhere defined to be that of the stars. (*Tim.* 41 D.) Whimsical as this may seem, it is at least conclusive against the absorption theory, which indeed there is otherwise no pretext for attributing to Plato. Ed.]

¹⁰ [*Phædr.* p. 245 C: ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγέννητον, κ.τ.λ. Ed.]

cludes, "all which is the source of its own motion is soul, assuredly the soul can have neither commencement nor termination..." LECT.
III.

That this profound argument is truly applicable to the First Principle of the Universe, no one can justly deny; and accordingly in an elaborate exposition in the tenth book of *Laws*¹¹ Plato admirably applies it to the proof of the existence of God; but in that very discussion he draws a marked distinction between the divine and human forms of the moving principle, and suspends the continuance of created souls upon the will and wisdom of the Deity. I do not pretend that I can throw any decisive light upon this great difficulty. I will remark, however, that Plato himself describes the Soul as formed of pre-existing materials: the demiurge in the *Timæus* is not the framer of either the material or mental universe out of *nothing*,—an idea not embraced by the Platonic habits of thought. In the *Timæus* we contemplate him as intelligent and active; not as literally creative in our sense of the expression. But if the soul was conceived to have been the result of a composition of previous elements; and if, as we know, one of these elements (that which Plato calls "The Same") is always by him represented as eternal in the strictest sense; we may, perhaps, venture to imagine that in uniting these notions we shall have obtained some conception of the manner in which he might have contemplated the human soul as a generated being in its actual manifestations and personal history, and yet as in its ultimate constitution a principle essentially eternal. That which in the passage of the *Phædrus* is called the Principle of Self-motion ought probably to be generalized as the principle of self-determination¹²; for motion was, in the Greek philosophic phraseology, a word almost indiscriminately applied to every species of change. Now the self-determining principle in man is rationally inferrible from the conception of duty (as Kant has so nobly demonstrated)¹³; if, then, the immutable element of the soul styled by Plato "the Same," be, as I have in the last Lecture supposed, the part of the Soul which corresponds to the objective "Same," that is, to the intelligible world, and if, as we well know, the noblest furniture of that eternal scene was believed by Plato to be the idea of Moral Rectitude, it is not too overstrained to conceive that in this way not merely the faculty of beholding the intelligible, but the ground of the self-directing

¹¹ [pp. 893 A, 894 B, fol. Ed.]

¹² [See Ibid. 896 E: ταῖς (ψυχῆς) κινήσεων...ἀνάματ' ἐστι βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Ed.]

¹³ [*Pract. Vernunft*, I. Th. Ed.]

energy, might have been involved by Plato in that element of the soul whose foundations lay in Eternity*.

This doctrine of the Eternity of the Rational and Moral¹⁴ Elements of Soul appears more repulsive than, perhaps, it ought fairly to do, in consequence of not being accompanied by an appropriate conception of the Platonic eternity itself. As long as we regard this great Idea as merely an indefinite extension of time with its past, present, and future, the notion of the anterior eternity of soul will perhaps startle us as something altogether imaginary and incredible. But I have already remarked, that Plato had risen into a very clear apprehension of the inapplicability of these relations of successive existence to the ideal sphere of being¹⁵. And as succession was refused to these mighty essences (the Ideas), so the notion of succession to the contemplative element of the soul; for the contemplation of immutability to our own experience destroys the perception of time, and the transcendent glories of the ideal scene presented in one unchangeable picture to that soul would be independent of the aids of memory to recover the past, and thus intrude the notion of successive existences. The Soul, therefore, in its elements of rationality and freedom, has existed anterior to time, because it now and essentially exists in eternity. In these respects it

* We should, however, again observe, with respect to the notion of "absorption," that even this supposition—the eternity of the self-determining Principle—still leaves us perfectly distinct the conscious personal exercise of that principle, and thus saves the felt individuality of each soul now and for ever.

¹⁴ [The eternity of the "rational element" is an undoubted Platonic doctrine. With regard to the *emotive* part, in both its divisions of *θυμὸς* and *ἐπιθυμία*, it is difficult to clear his utterances of inconsistency. In the *Timæus* the emotive part is conceived as mortal (see p. 41 C al.), whereas in the great Mythos of the *Phædrus* the tripartite soul is represented as in its entirety pre-existent in the *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος*. And such must be his meaning in a passage of the *Law*, x. p. 896 E seqq. This alone seems to me to forbid the interpretation of the Phædric allegory of the Chariot which was adopted by Hermias as a means of escape from what he imagined to be the unplatonic doctrine of the immortality of the emotive principle. This difficulty, we may observe, was felt by the old as well as by later Platonists—and their varying theories are enumerated by Olympiodorus, Schol. in *Phædonem*, § 175 οὐ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρι τῆς ἐμψύχου ἕξως ἀπαθανατίζουσιν, ὡς Νουμήνιος. οἱ δὲ μέχρη τῆς φύσεως ὡς Πλωτῖνος ἔστιν ὅπου· οἱ δὲ μέχρη τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπείσιππος, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Πλούταρχος· οἱ δὲ μέχρη μόνης τῆς λογικῆς, ὡς Πρόκλος καὶ Πορφύριος· οἱ δὲ μέχρη μόνου τοῦ νοῦ, φθεῖρουσι γὰρ τὴν δόξαν, ὡς πολλοὶ τῶν Περιπατητικῶν. I take this from a tract of Gieseler *De partibus animi immortalibus secundum Platonem*, Gottingæ 1850, where the restrictive view of the Platonic Immortality is ingeniously defended. Ed.]

¹⁵ [Zim. p. 37 E: τό τ' ἦν τό τ' ἔσται χρόνον...εἰδῶ, ἃ δὲ φέροντες λαμβάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν αἰδίαν οὐσίαν οὐκ ὁρθῶς. λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἦν ἐστὶ τε καὶ ἔσται, τῇ δὲ τό ἐστὶ μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει. "'Was' and 'will be' are but modes of time, which we are apt without thinking to apply wrongfully to the eternal essence. We say, It was, is and is to come: whereas in strict reason 'is' alone can properly be said of it." Ed.]

knows no past, present, or future; it is, as the *Phædrus* declares, a principle uncommenced and interminable.

Still it may be asked, how the notion of *Creation* can be properly applied to an essence thus supposed in certain respects self-existent? And to this I can only repeat my impression that Plato meant to apply the fact of Creation, or, as he calls it, Generation by the divine Father, not directly to the soul in its primitive elements, but to the soul in its *manifestation* as the mediate nature between the eternal and sensible. The Universal Soul, we have seen, may be regarded as the type of soul in general; having all those prerogatives in the highest and amplest degree which appertain to soul essentially, and which in inferior degrees characterize every separate instance of soul throughout the universe. Now, that universal soul is on one side linked with eternity, formed of that element which constitutes the real or immutable, and beyond which is nothing,—on the other side linked with the sensible and contingent, being formed of that element which is purely relative and phenomenal. The office of the Demiurgus or Creator was simply to combine these elements into the state in which they are actually presented; and thus to give a definite and positive existence, in a conjunctive form, to ingredients already prepared. When the mysterious compound is thus projected into the sphere of positive existence, the elements will still preserve indefeasible the rights of their eternal ancestry; and thus a soul, which as a soul owes its being and its continuance to the wisdom and beneficence of that Almighty Disposer and Parent of whom it was the firstborn offspring, may yet recognize in itself the essential powers of a *Principle*, and know that, whether in its faculty of pure intelligence or in its corresponding faculty of self-determination, it lies out of the ever-varying circle of sense, is so far the subject of no direct causation, and transcends the world of successive duration.

This portion of the soul, accordingly, it is to which Plato has assigned a proper immortality, and whose present state he believed bore manifest indications equally of a prior and a future perpetuity. The rest of its characteristics he ascribed to its junction with the body; and he clearly intimates that the object of this temporary connexion was the establishment of a state of moral discipline and probation. He describes (and of course you will understand these descriptions as mainly intended for picturesque forms of metaphysical truth, philosophy in the dress of narrative) the souls which were to be distributed through the universe as first distributed among the stars, one to each, and the

LECT.
III.

Deity as unfolding to these souls the irreversible decrees of the universal system, which consist mainly of the law of moral trial and the transmigration through various bodily vehicles of such as lose their original purity, until, after a period more or less protracted, they become fitted to recover their primal state in the star to which each has been first associated¹⁶.

The philosophical doctrines of the eternal existence of the free and rational elements of the soul, of the possibility and propriety of the conjunction of the soul with a variety of successive bodily organizations, and of the object of the whole arrangement,—the manifestation of the final triumph of the good over the evil principle; these doctrines rest on their own evidence, whatever that may be, and should be carefully separated from all that mass of imaginative representation and ornament with which in the Platonic dialogues they are combined. Nothing can be more unjust, or indeed more wearisome, than the clumsy criticisms of those unsympathizing judges of Plato, who, unable to rise to the habitual elevation of his thoughts, or unable to breathe in an atmosphere so rare when they have attained it, content themselves with watching his flight through their critical telescopes from below, and registering with painful minuteness every golden cloud he pours around his path, as a solid body which he is establishing in his system. The "Homerus philosophorum," as Cicero¹⁷ calls him, loves to see everything flush with the colours of a pure and solemn poetry; standing for ever in front of the changeless and eternal, his spirit is filled with the exceeding awfulness of the presence; and when he would speak, his thoughts swell into the strong rapture of a hymn. And *why*, upon yet profounder motives, he purposely sought thus to engage the Imagination as well as the Reason, and deemed both efforts equally his duty, we may, perhaps, hereafter inquire, when in the last section of the subject we examine the single grand object of his entire labours. It is enough here to remind you that it will be necessary to interpret constantly for yourselves the profuse language of mythological representation into the simpler dialect of scientific truth.

The anterior state of the soul, and its fall, according to Plato in the Phædrus.

To this class of imaginative shadowings of moral truth belong nearly all the descriptions which Plato has given us of the actual occupations of the soul of man prior to its present earthly existence; descriptions which are all meant for those who can penetrate beyond the veil of imagery, and which are intentionally thrown into a form as remote as possible from scientific exposition. He constantly warns

¹⁶ [εἰς τὴν τοῦ συνόλου πορευθεὶς οὐρανὸν ἀστρον, *Tim.* p. 41 B. *Ed.*]

¹⁷ [Rather *Panætius*, whom Cicero quotes. *Tusc. Qu.* I. c. 37. *Ed.*]

us of this. "To explain," he declares, "what the soul is in itself would require a science divine, and prolonged disquisitions; but to give an idea by the way of comparison, human science is enough, and there is no need of many words." It is after making this admonition, that he proceeds to present one of the most elaborate of all these allegories. It is that in the *Phædrus* in which he has described under the most brilliant and varied colourings the prior state, and the fall, of the spirit of man; a passage curious and important on many accounts, and not least on this,—that it evinces how early¹⁸ in the annals of Plato's philosophical life the main features of his system were fixed, and thus seems to indicate that these outlines must have been, however rudely, sketched in some of the philosophies (especially, doubtless, the Pythagorean) with which he was at that time conversant. As to the doctrines of pre-existence and transmigration, these we know were Egyptian and Pythagorean; the chief question of interest regards the connexion of the Ideal Theory with these antique traditions, which in themselves, and probably in the old Egyptian conception of them, wore rather a physiological than metaphysical aspect. And unfortunately Plato's own singular modesty (which, in spite of ancient scandal, strongly marks his writings) puts it still more out of our power to determine the exact amount of his contributions of doctrine absolutely novel to the general fund of thought; his usual practice being to assign his sentiments to others,—to Socrates, to Parmenides, to even the Sophists. All this dramatic personation was of course well understood in his own age among the literary circles of Athens; and his contemporaries and successors seem, assuredly, to have agreed, that wherever he touched he superseded all who had gone before him in the same walk; but whether the miracle was achieved by absolute creation or by new and felicitous combination of previous materials,—by bestowing what men never possessed, or by teaching them the unsuspected value of what they had,—this it remains in many respects difficult to decide.

I shall give you the passage to which I have alluded. You may find some interest in comparing its picturesque

The allegory of the chariot and horses.

¹⁸ [I have already intimated my dissent from the popular tradition which represents the *Phædrus* as the firstborn of Plato's genius. Cicero's authority may fairly be held as of equal weight with that of the Peripatetics, with whom the report seems to have originated. For it is difficult to believe that he wrote without book, when, in reference to the notice of Isocrates, "on the last page of the *Phædrus*," he observed, "Hæc de adolescente Socrates auguratur. At ea de seniore scribit Plato, et scribit æqualis, et quidem, exagitator omnium rhetorum, hunc miratur unum."—*Orator*. c. 13. § 41. The vulgar tradition cannot have been unknown to Cicero, nor would he have contradicted it without some reason. I have entered at some length into the question in the *Prolegomena* to my edition of the *Dialogues*. Ed.]

LECT.
III.

and symbolical imagery with the grave account which Bishop Butler in the fifth chapter of his "Analogy" gives, of the course of temptation by which persons "made upright may fall." The substance of these very different forms of deduction is not itself very different; for the "particular propensions" hostile to conscience in the Bishop's argument are personified in the unmanageable courser of the allegory, I proceed to translate.

"Let us compare," he says¹⁹, "the soul (in its original state) to the combined energies of a winged equipage and a charioteer. The coursers and the charioteers of the gods are all noble and nobly sprung; but those of other natures are very various. With us men, for example, the charioteer does indeed direct the equipage; but of the coursers one is well proportioned and well bred, the other quite the opposite; from whence it results that the work of guiding the chariot is exceedingly difficult. And here we may explain the difference between the mortal and immortal species. Soul in general presides over lifeless nature and makes the voyage of the universe under many forms. As long as it is in perfection, and preserves its wings in all their vigour, it traverses the ethereal regions and governs the whole world; but when its wings fail, it is carried at random until at length it falls upon and attaches itself to something solid, and thenceforward remains there. It is thus that we call the union of soul and body a living being, this body appearing to move itself, by reason of the power derived from the soul. As to the immortal nature, we have no certainty upon the subject, we can only offer conjecture; and without having even seen Deity or sufficiently understanding its being, we imagine a living immortal essence whose soul and body are everlastingly united. But however that be, it is for us to consider and recount the causes why souls first lose those wings of which we have spoken.

"The power of the wings is to elevate that which is heavy to those higher regions of the gods; and they share, more than anything else which is corporeal, in that which is divine. Now that which is divine is the Beautiful, the True, the Good, and everything that resembles them. This then is what feeds and nerves the wings of the soul; while, on the other hand, all that is evil and deformed injures and destroys them. Well then, the sovereign ruler, Jove, advances in the van, guiding his winged chariot, disposing and controlling all. After him comes the host of gods and powers in eleven divisions, for Vesta remains alone in the palace of the immortals; but the eleven other 'dii majores' advance, each at the head of a detachment, in their

¹⁹ [*Phædr.* p. 246 fol. Ed.]

appointed rank. And then what captivating sights, what grand opening vistas, enliven the inner depths of the heavens while the blessed discharge their divine offices accompanied by all who will or can follow them; for far is envy from the celestial choir. When they return to the splendid banquet provided for them, and ascend to the crown of the vault of heaven, the chariots of the immortals, always in perfect balance, advance with lightness and ease; the others toil on with difficulty; for the bad courser drags down earthwards the car, unless he have been right well trained by his driver. Here comes the great and sore trial of the soul. The souls of the immortals, after rising to the highest point of the heavens, dismiss their equipages and place themselves on the convex side of its vault; and while they remain there the circular motion of the system carries them round the heavens of which they contemplate the exterior region. That region above the heavens none of our poets has yet celebrated; none ever shall celebrate it worthily. I will venture, however, in truth's cause, now especially demanding it, to portray the wondrous abode. True essence, colourless, formless, impalpable, cannot be contemplated but by intelligence, the guide of the soul. Around essence is the place of true science. Now the thinking energy of the gods, which feeds on intelligence and knowledge, pure as that of every soul that would fulfil its vocation, loves to gaze on that essence from which it has been so long separated, and surrenders itself delightedly to the contemplation of truth, until the moment when the circular revolution brings it to the point of its departure again. In this transit it contemplates Justice, Wisdom, Science—not that science which is concerned with change, and which appears under a different manifestation in different objects which we choose to call beings, but science such as it is in that which alone is indeed Being. After having thus contemplated all essences and been fully satisfied, it returns to the divine palace in the interior of the heavens, the chariot-*eer* conducts the coursers to their stalls, and spreads before them immortal food. Such is the life of the gods. Among the other souls, the one which best follows the divine souls, and resembles them the most, lifts the head of the chariot-*eer* above the highest regions, and traverses them, borne on by the circular motion; but at the same time, embarrassed by its coursers, it has great difficulty in attempting steadily to contemplate essences. Another, again, is now lifted, and now depressed; the irregular plunging of its coursers allows it to perceive some essences, but hides the rest. The last in the train follow afar, eager to contemplate the higher region, but unable to attain the object; the

LECT.
III.

revolution carries them into the lower ; they are overthrown, they fall over each other in attempting to advance, they crowd, they battle, they toil, and by the awkwardness of their charioteers many of them are disabled, many others lose the best part of the plumage of their wings, and all, after painful and unavailing efforts, are disappointed in the view of real being, and are obliged to find their aliment in mere conjecture. The cause of their anxiety to gain the field of truth is, that the appropriate nourishment of the best part of the soul is to be found in the fertile meadows which this plain incloses, and that the nature of the soul's pinions is thereby strengthened and refreshed. It is an Adrastean (irrevocable) law, that every soul which, in un-deviating attendance on the divine souls, has caught the sight of any of the essences, shall be exempt from suffering until a new voyage, and that if it can always succeed in thus accompanying the gods, it never experiences any evil. But when it cannot follow the gods, or contemplate essences, and that unfortunately becoming fattened on the gross food of vice and forgetfulness, it gravitates, loses its wings, and falls to the earth, the law protects it from animating the body of any beast in its first stage." He then proceeds to describe the various fortunes of life, and the subsequent destinies of the undying spirit passing through forms of death, until at the close of ten millenniums it arrives again at its original state. But there is one exception, in which the period is abridged ; it is that of the philosopher—Plato's ideal of human excellence ; who after the third revolution of a thousand years recovers the wings of the liberated soul. During his human life his power of reminiscence is, as far as possible, engaged with those essences he once knew in his state of enfranchisement. "The man," declares Plato, "who turns these precious recollections to good account, participates incessantly in the true and perfect mysteries, and himself alone becomes truly perfect. Isolated from earthly cares and disquietudes, attached to things divine alone, the multitude warn him to be more a man of sense, or treat him as an idiot,—they see not that he is inspired !"

*Explanation
of the
allegory.*

Into the portion of this remarkable representation which concerns the future state of the soul, it is not now the time to enter. It would appear, with respect to the anterior state, that Plato conceived the soul, after its elements had been combined by the divine Framer, to be possessed of certain tendencies distinct from the purely rational, and for which it was not indebted to the body. These tendencies are symbolized in the two coursers, and it is impossible not to connect them with the well-known division of the soul which Plato elsewhere makes into the rational, irascible,

*Triple di-
vision of the
soul.*

and concupiscible²⁰, and in which division he always speaks favourably of the second element²¹. It seems to me, then, that either at this time he had not matured the doctrine which appears in the *Timæus* and elsewhere, and which seems to make the passions wholly the result of the bodily connexion;—or that he conceived the soul in its original form to possess in a germinant state those tendencies which are afterwards in full energy for good and evil developed in the corporeal²². It is, at all events, certain, that in this mythical portrait he represents the bodily state as the result of the incompetence of the soul to preserve its original purity, through a weakness from which the immortals, themselves created, are free; and you will remember that in the account of the first composition of human souls in the *Timæus* it was expressly stated that their substance was inferior in purity to the animating principle of the universe. We are to collect, then, from this narrative that the soul of man, kindred to the powers and principles of the universe, possessed in its primal state a strong desire to enjoy the perfection of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth, which desire was partly, but only partly, seconded by its powers; that failing to attain its mighty object through inseparable defects, a failure which, however, varied in degree in different individuals, it was condemned to assume the grosser bodily condition, in which a vast accession of evils alleviated by scarcely any advantage assails it, but which also affords a scene for the exercise of moral control, a period of trial, and an occasion of ultimate triumph. Anything much more minute on this subject we shall scarcely find in Plato without overstraining casual expressions. The peculiar questions which the Christian revelation has made to us so interesting, were not prominently before the public mind in his age; and he consequently was not led to investigate them except briefly and incidentally.

The body, then, is the prison of the soul, which however defies its oppressor; and the aim of virtue is to preserve the distinctness of the two, and realize liberty even in bonds; looking forward as its recompense to a total enfranchisement. From this seminal idea the whole moral system of Platonism springs; and it is this general conception which all the allegorical representations of the past and future state are intended to vivify and impress.

²⁰ [See esp. *Rep.* IV. p. 436 A. ED.]

²¹ [As *Ibid.* p. 440 E: φαίνεται πολὺ μᾶλλον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ δὲ πᾶσι πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ. ED.]

²² [In the curious passage of the *Lysis* x. p. 897 A above referred to, the emotions of Joy, Sorrow, Courage, Fear are attributed both to the gods and to the unbodied souls. This is quite consistent with the mythical psychology of the *Phædrus*. ED.]

LECTURE IV.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. No. X.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
IV.

*Psychology
of Plato
continued.
The doc-
trine of pre-
existence.*

THE doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul of man, which was widely spread through Egypt and the East, probably came to Plato by these foreign and traditional conveyances. He received it along with many other theories, of which the original reasons had, perhaps, been lost; of which, perhaps also, the original reasons had never been well worth preserving. The strong conviction, which, to the honour of human nature, subsists among so many of its scattered families, that there is in the living being that feels and reasons a true composition, an element that asserts its natural superiority above the rest, took, without much difficulty, the form of a supposition that the higher element was essentially removed from the sphere of change and decay; the easy and obvious analysis by which the bodily sensations, passions, and affections were detached from the power of contemplation and the originating principle of motion, would help to define and distinguish the opposite members of the combination; and when the conception had been thus cleared, the very misfortunes, infirmities, and diseases of the inferior element would heighten the contrast, and lead the mind to dwell with pleasurable pride upon that glorious principle for which, at length, no merely created origin would seem adequate to account. Men of reflexion and virtue, anxious to impress moral principles upon society, would look with favour upon everything which tended to exalt the rational principle above that of mere desire, and on which a scheme of moral discipline or purification could be so readily grafted.

*Why is this
doctrine re-
fugant to
modern ap-
prehension?*

Indeed it may be doubted whether the strangeness and improbability of this hypothesis of pre-existence among ourselves (omitting now the notion of absolute sempiternity), arises after all from grounds on which our philosophy has reason to congratulate itself highly. It may be questioned whether, if we examine ourselves candidly, we shall not discover, that the feeling of absolute extravagance with which it affects us, has its secret source in materialist or semi-materialist prejudices, and that we believe the thinking principle cannot have existed before its bodily apparatus,

because we strongly suspect that in some unknown way out of the bodily apparatus it arises. But however this may be, it is certain that with Plato the conviction was associated with a vast and pervading principle which extended through every department of Nature and of Thought. This principle was the priority of Mind to Body, both in order of dignity and in order of time; a principle which with him was not satisfied by the single admission of a *divine* pre-existence, but extended through every instance in which these natures could be compared. A very striking example of the manner in which he thus generalized the principle of the priority of Mind to Body is to be found in the well-known passage in the Tenth Book of his *Laws*, in which he proves the existence of divine agency. The argument employed really applies to every case of motion, and equally proves that every separate corporal system is but a mechanism moved by a spiritual essence anterior to itself. The universe is full of gods¹, and the human soul is, as it were, the god or demon of the human body*. "The systems," says Plato², "which have originated impiety, have reversed the proper order of things by taking away the character of first principle from the primary cause of the generation and corruption of all beings, and setting before it that which exists only after it; thence arise their errors on the true nature of gods.... Scarcely one of these philosophers has truly known what the soul is, and what are its properties. They are all unaware that in every respect, and particularly with regard to origin, it truly is one of the first beings which has existed, that it has been prior to bodies, and has presided eminently over their various changes and combinations."... "Have we not," he asks³, "fully established that the soul is the first principle of generation and of motion, of corruption and of repose, in all beings past, present, and to come, since we have seen that it is the cause of every change, and every motion in all existing things? Is it not true that motion produced by a foreign cause in a substance where one perceives no self-moving essence—this motion being nothing else than the change of a body really inanimate—ought to be set in the second rank, and, as far as possible, below the first?—Certainly.—We have, then, spoken the exact truth when we said that the soul has existed before the body, that it possesses authority over it as being superior to it in rank

The doctrine of pre-existence is founded on the principle of the priority of Mind to Matter.

Proof of this priority given in the tenth book of the Laws.

¹ [θεῶν πλῆρη πάντα. *Legg.* x. p. 899 B. ED.]

* The "Gods" of the Platonic System are answerable in use and conception to the "Angels" of the Christian Theology. The Creator is regarded as equally superior to both.

² [*Legg.* x. p. 891 B. ED.]

³ [Ib. p. 896 A—897 B. ED.]

LECT.
IV.

and order of existence, and its natural governor. And just so, all that belongs to Soul must likewise be admitted to be prior to Body. Consequently, characters, manners, volitions, reasonings, true opinions, foresight, and memory, have existed before length, breadth, depth, and strength of bodies, the soul itself existing before bodies. It thence follows, too, that Soul is the principle of good and evil, of honesty and dishonesty, of just and unjust, and of all other contraries, if we but recognize it as the cause of all which exists. Must we not then allow," he continues, rising to his immediate subject, "that the Soul which dwells in all that moves, and governs its motions, rules also the heavens?" He then condenses his argument into one emphatic statement—"Soul governs, then, all which is in heaven, on earth, and in the sea, by motions which are its proper functions, and which we call will, attention, foresight, deliberation, judgment; and, whether true or false, joy, sadness, confidence, fear, aversion, love; and by other similar movements which are the first efficient causes, and which directing the motions of bodies, as so many secondary causes, produce in all things increase or diminution, composition or division, and the qualities which result from them, as heat, cold, weight, levity, hardness, softness, white, black, harsh, sweet, and bitter. Soul, which is a divinity, calling to its aid another divinity, intelligence, to govern these divers movements, governs, then, all things with wisdom, and conducts them to true felicity." In this remarkable passage, Soul appears to me to be regarded with the utmost possible degree of generality, as a first principle which, in all cases, preceded and presided over both bodily masses in general, and thence, the particular organizations with which in separate instances it became specially connected. It is here considered mainly, though not exclusively, as an active principle; the aspect in which, when its intellectual faculties are not directly specified, Plato most usually may be interpreted as regarding it.

*Extension
of the doc-
trine.*

This universality of Plato's views of the principle entitled Soul naturally led him to extensions which to us are not less startling than the theory of pre-existence itself. It may, I conceive, be collected from various expressions in his writings, that he considered the animating principle of the brute creation to be itself but a repressed and mutilated form of the same essence which in man shone forth in the fulness and brilliancy of reason. This supposition, as it flowed naturally from the enlarged conception of which we have just been treating, so it readily countenanced, and combined with, the doctrine of transmigration,

which conducted the same substantial essence through all varieties of expansion and limitation; with, however, the special provision noted in the *Phædrus*, that the man might sink to the brute, but the brute which had not originally entered the human frame could never rise to that culminating point of earthly mind. The astonishing diversities of intelligence which are observable in the human species, and which seem to separate man from man almost as much as the lowest form of humanity is separated from the most sagacious of the inferior animals, probably gave appearances of plausibility to this doctrine, which in Plato's age was not unfamiliar to the Grecian mind. It peculiarly pleased the intellectual disposition of Plato to comprehend, as far as possible, every variety of phenomenon under the simplicity and unity of single general formulas; and to view the whole system of Nature as one vast mechanism subject to the immediate operation of mind, and solely constructed for its trial and display. Now this complicated evolution of mental energy was conceivable enough in two regions of creation; in the management of the human frame which was superintended by human spirits, and in the inanimate world which was in consummate harmony guided and governed by superior powers. But that intervening region which was constituted by the lower animals broke the unity of the conception, and seemed to defraud the mental essence of a large and interesting province of its empire. Plato might have conciliated the difficulty as Descartes did, by classing the brute creation with the purely mechanical; he preferred to see in it an inferior and crippled form of the one universal energy of Soul,—a form which was still more closely associated with the human development of the principle by often containing it in a mysterious state of transition. It has been, indeed, much doubted how far Plato in reality assented to these doctrines; and it is usual to speak of him as countenancing popular fictions for public benefit. I suspect, however, that these easy solutions are in a great measure gratuitous. It is not very manifest what public benefit was to be derived from this form of the doctrine of reward and punishment; nor can it be easily shewn on what principle Plato should descend to gross deception in order to aid the cause of truth⁴. On the other hand,

Metempsychosis.

⁴ [It is clear from more than one passage in the *Dialogues*, that though Plato thought he had proved the doctrine of the immortality of the Soul, he was not inclined to overrate the importance of the mythical representations with which in the *Phædo*, *Timæus*, and Tenth Book of the *Republic*, that doctrine is associated. One pregnant passage in the *Phædo* seems to prove that he referred all such speculations to the *εἰκότων μύθων ἰδέα*,—the category of probability,—of which he speaks in the *Timæus*. "No man in his senses," he

LECT.
IV.

though I confess the doctrine is very alien to our habits of speculation, I seem to myself to see in it much that might have harmonized with the spirit of the Platonic system, more especially when we remember that he received it as a venerable tradition of immemorial wisdom, counter-signed by many of the names to which he was most accustomed to defer.

Considerations which recommend the doctrine of pre-existence.

It must also be allowed that there is much in the hypothesis of pre-existence (at least) which might attract a speculator busied with the endeavour to reduce the moral system of the world under intelligible laws. The solution which it at once furnishes of the state and fortunes of each individual, as arising in some unknown but direct process from his own voluntary acts, though it throws, of course, no light on the ultimate question of the existence of moral evil (which it only removes a single step), does yet contribute to satisfy the mind as to the equity of that immediate manifestation of it, and of its physical attendants, which we unhappily witness. There is internally no greater improbability that the present may be the result of a former state now almost wholly forgotten, than that the present should be followed by a future form of existence in which, perhaps, or in some departments of which, the oblivion may be as complete. And if to that future state there are already discernible faint longings and impulses which to many men have seemed to involve a direct proof of its reality, hopes that will not be bounded by the grave, and desires that grasp eternity, others have found within them, it would seem, faint intimations scarcely less impressive of the past, as if the soul vibrated the echoes of a harmony not of this world. The greatest of living poets has told us, that such convictions seem to be a part, though a neglected part, of the heritage of our race :

Hence in a season of calm weather,
Though inland far we be,

Wordsworth's Ode

observes, "would dream of insisting that the description just given corresponds to the reality: but that, the soul having been shewn to be immortal, this, or something like this, is true of individual souls and their habitations, I think reasonable in itself, and am disposed to risk the consequences of my belief (*ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οὐ μὲν εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν*). *Phaed.* p. 114 D. Similar is the purport of a remark in the *Gorgias*, 527 A. "This" (description of the state of souls after death) "may seem to you a fable, an old wife's tale. We might indeed be at liberty to despise it, as you do, if our researches could furnish us with a better and truer account: you see, however, that all the efforts of three of the wisest men in Greece, yourself, Polus, and Gorgias, have failed to prove that there is any other right life for man, than that which is conducive to his well-being in the next world, &c." He evidently means to say, that the beliefs to which he alludes, though not susceptible of proof, are consistent with proved truths; and have that degree of probability which is sufficient, in modern phrase, to influence practice. "Gross deception" is out of the question. E.D.]

Our Souls have sight of that immortal Sea,
Which brought us hither,
Can in a moment travel thither,
And see the children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.

LECT.
IV.

on the Inti-
mations of
Immor-
tality, &c.

And hence, he has dared to pronounce, in language worthy to give utterance to the thought of Plato, that

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
Shades of the prison-house begin to close
Upon the growing boy,
But he beholds the light, and whence it flows,
He sees it in his joy;
The youth who daily farthest from the East
• Must travel, still is Nature's priest,
And by the vision splendid
Is on his way attended;
At length the man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light of common day.

The substance of this noble stanza, which Wordsworth has with exquisite delicacy and art connected with the innocence of childhood, you will find given at great length in various passages of the *Timæus*, the *Phædrus*, and the *Phædo*⁶; but, of course, in a form more directly philosophical. And if it were permitted to venture, except as strict interpreter of my author, upon these seductive paths of conjecture, it might be observed that this supposition of pre-existence could be naturally connected with that most interesting fact of human nature, which all more or less experience, but minds of a pensive or imaginative cast especially,—the feeling of melancholy retrospect with which the past, and, above all, the extreme past of childhood, is recovered by the recollection, and the imaginary happiness with which the mind, in spite of its graver convictions, perpetually invests that period. A Platonist might say that this was but the natural tendency of the soul, which, haunted by dim recollections, vaguely stretches to its ante-natal state of perfect bliss; but, being unable to recover it, and, by an ordinary principle, remembering the emotion, where it cannot remember the cause, associates

⁶ [Where however it is by no means "connected with the innocence of childhood." The differences indeed between the Platonic and the Wordsworthian views of the doctrine are at least as great as their resemblances. What, we may ask, would have been the answer of the poet, if any one had recommended to him a course of Dialectic (under, let us say, Sir W. Hamilton) as the most efficient means of reviving his ante-natal intuitions? Ed.]

LECT.
IV.

the happiness which should belong to that forgotten world with any intervening incident, or state, or period, that agrees with it in being *past*. And this association, he would add, will, of course, become more complete, and the illusion more perfectly deceptive, according as the period in the present life approximates more closely to the true object preceding it; childhood, therefore, will be the chosen subject of this melancholy pleasure. But I ought, perhaps, to apologize for detaining you with these excursions of fancy. If, on the whole, there be any truth in these natural hopes, and even these "shadowy recollections," and if it be a certain fact that, at least within the compass of this life, we are discontented with the present, and incessantly strain after the past and the future, what shall we say but that the spirit of man gives clear intimations of its essential unfitness for the existing world, and would it even be too extravagant to imagine that these indications, pointing equally in both directions, seem to betoken a state to be the proper inheritance of the mind, which many, in every age since Plato's day, have dreamed of,—a state in which the soul, liberated to know Eternity its own, should find both Past and Future blended and lost in one unalterable Now?

Thoughts of this kind in boundless variety, doubtless, traversed the mind of the great Idealist; and we are not to suppose that, if he has given us the seeds of much reflexion, he has preserved among his writings all the fruit they bore in his own fertile intelligence. But one argument there is, upon which he has peculiarly and frequently insisted, and which lies near the root of his entire philosophy. You are, of course, aware that I allude to the doctrine of "Reminiscence;" the doctrine that the mind brought with it from a previous state, and now possessed by the way of memory, all those relations, in their ultimate and simplest form, which it here applies to sensible objects, or which, as Plato held, it recovers on occasion of sensible objects.

In the dialogue entitled *Meno*, Socrates is represented as entering into a very elaborate proof of this doctrine by experimental investigation. He shews*, what indeed can-

The doctrine of Reminiscence (ἀνάμνησις).

* [*Meno*, p. 82, B—85 C. This experiment upon the slave can hardly be considered crucial. The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις is again affirmed in the *Phædo*, p. 72 E, a passage to be understood as referring to the conversation in the *Meno*. The brilliant exposition of the same theory in the *Phædrus*, has already been presented to the reader. Metaphysically considered, the theory nearly answers to the Kantian doctrine of Ideas or Forms, which exist potentially in the reason antecedently to experience, but are brought into actual consciousness by experience and simultaneously with it. To this extent, the doctrine of reminiscence appeared to Plato demonstrably certain; but there is no proof that he regarded the physical hypothesis of pre-existence with which

not be denied, that by a series of well-adapted interrogatories, a person ignorant until the period of the interview, may be brought to recognize and admit rational truths. These truths are perceived by the native power of the mind, they may be said then to lie concealed in the mind since they are potentially contained in its faculties:—and if all knowledge must be given from some exterior cause, and the possession of these unexercised apprehensions may be called a dormant knowledge, we may then speak of a knowledge bestowed and possessed before (at any given period) it is brought into the sphere of positive consciousness,—but to gain a knowledge before possessed is nothing else than Remembrance. If this were Plato's meaning, the doctrine would amount to nothing more than a vivid statement in a figurative form, of the fact that in the present state, the faculties of the human mind become a source of ideas to themselves which yet have a real truth independent of the mind's apprehension of them. And, perhaps, if we examine the point more closely, we may be induced to believe that this important principle was the essential thought which Plato conveyed by the theory of reminiscence;—the principle in short which is expressed in Leibnitz's well-known exception—"nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu—*nisi ipse intellectus*."

Probable
explanation
of the
doctrine.

An important caution, however, must here be suggested. We are not, as too many of Plato's critics are wont to do, to transgress his own express provisions, and carry the forms of sense into the sphere of simple reason. The state to which Socrates is made to refer as being the original of these reminiscences, cannot be (by the very nature of the case) any state but that first and elementary condition of the soul in which alone it stood in direct contact with the ideas of beauty, truth, goodness, equality, and the rest. If then we look upon the soul of man solely in its rational element, we shall find it so disposed by its very constitution as to answer to certain ideas which, lying at the basis of all particular perceived relations, are to us the fundamental truths of the universe. This is the divinest element of the soul, it may, then, even on that ground, be fairly termed its first. But there is a reason more natural and obvious still. Plato, we saw, conceives it coeternal with its ideal objects in an ultimate unity. Moreover, we know that the

he connects it, as more than a probable belief: such at least seems to have been his feeling when he composed the *Menon*. See p. 86 B: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἅλλα ὅκ' ἂν πᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου δισχυριστάμην. ὅτι δὲ, κ.τ.λ.

In the *Phædrus* he affirms with greater apparent confidence an antecedent immortality: but here we must allow for the mythical form in which the belief is presented. ED.]

soul, likewise, as an active principle, claims an existence extrinsic to the sphere of time; and this active principle, itself eternal, but now consciously developed in the contingent world of time, may be considered as a connective medium which preserves the identity of the soul under these two opposite aspects; a consideration (by the way) which might lead us to imagine that the *ovola*, or intermediate substance⁷, in the composition of soul is no other than the active energy. But to our subject. When, now, in presence of sensible objects, and merely on occasion of their presence, relations are apprehended which, in their last analysis, resolve into certain fundamental ideas of the Reason, the conscious understanding refers for these its ideas to the Reason, receives them from the Reason, which itself in the order of nature possessed them first,—that is, the Soul in the sensible and contingent world receives what the Soul possesses in the eternal world, which latter, by the most natural of figures, is conceived prior to the former. It is no violent metaphor to call this reminiscence.

I do not assert that this is the precise explanation which Plato would have given of his theory; and yet it is not impossible that to his chosen friends and disciples many highly-coloured depictions of this kind were by himself translated into their more abstract significancies*. The doctrine of Reminiscences, which thus interpreted is purely metaphysical, naturally attached itself to the popular notion of pre-existence; and Plato would be inclined to leave it under that veil. But whatever he supposed the fortunes of the soul in the pre-existent state, and in whatever degree Plato favoured the ordinary conception of a conscious personal existence, it must be remembered that this theory of Reminiscence, or any other of a similar ideal description, must altogether be referred to the rational element of the soul and to it alone. It, therefore, proves only the immortality of the rational element⁸; that is, it proves that this element of soul furnishing to the conscious

⁷ [On this sense of *ovola* see note 1. to Lect. II. of this 3rd Series. Ed.]

* The most characteristic description of the Platonic speculative system might perhaps be,—that it translated Pythagorism into its metaphysical correlatives.

⁸ [It is interesting to compare the views of a more modern thinker upon this subject:

“Mens humana non potest cum corpore destrui, sed ejus *aliquid* remanet, quod æternum est...Est hæc idea quæ corporis essentiam sub specie æternitatis exprimit, certus cogitandi modus qui ad mentis essentiam pertinet, quique necessario æternus est. Nec tamen fieri potest, ut recordemur nos ante corpus existisse, quandoquidem nec in corpore ulla ejus vestigia dari, nec æternitas tempore definiri, nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere potest. At nihilominus sentimus experimurque, nos æternos esse,” seqq. Spinoza, *Ethices* Part v. Prop. xxiii. Schol. Ed.]

mind conceptions of the immutable and eternal, which conceptions suppose their corresponding objects, and are with them blended in unchangeable unity,—it is itself eternal. Hence the argument in the *Meno* concludes with the words, "If then truth be perpetually in our soul, that soul is immortal."

But even though it were granted that Plato would not have exactly thus explained himself, it may be allowable to say, that there may exist points upon which we understand Plato's teaching better than himself. This is high praise, but not of ourselves—of *him*. It supposes that there may be principles involved in his depth of view which even he himself never completely sounded; that by a kind of inspiration he may have caught truths which were too vast for his own intelligence, or for any intelligence belonging to his position and period in the history of metaphysical inquiry. But though I state this as possible, and as justifying a bolder and more enlarged method of criticism than, perhaps, is ordinary among readers of Plato, I confess I do not think it very likely. On the contrary, I have little doubt, that the logical views which I have attempted to sketch, or views akin to them, were really the principal foundations of the Platonic psychology, and I would thus venture to divide the entire subject of this system of the soul into two regions, which in your speculations on the views of Plato it may be well to keep distinct. One of these includes the purely metaphysical doctrines which concern the nature and relation of knowledge to the reality of things, and which lose themselves at length in the ineffable unity of the Last Principle of Being, the mysterious τὸ εἶναι;—and of these doctrines we have no reason to doubt that Plato had through his own path of dialectics, arrived at certainty; these, doubtless, were the favourite subjects of those more private esoteric meditations in which he indulged with the few who were adapted to apprehend them. The other division of the Platonic system of the Soul embraced all those more popular and accessible doctrines of pre-existence, transmigration, and recompense, which we may fairly conclude that Plato thought to a high degree probable, but to which he never assigns demonstrative certainty, and on which, it is possible, his degree of belief often varied. It was natural that the latter division should be most insisted on in the more public discussions of the master; and it was not difficult at any time (as in this very instance of the theory of *Reminiscence*) to slip the embroidered veil of figurative depiction, and admit the more thoughtful student to the sanctuary within.

LECT.
IV.

*Plato's
view of the
connexion
of soul with
body.*

Plato having thus, by the spirit of his whole philosophy, restricted essential immortality, essential eternity, to the purely rational and active elements of the soul, and being habituated, with a constancy and decisiveness far rarer, I suspect, in our times than in his writings, to regard these as wholly separable from the body,—he, with perfect consistency, represents the connexion of such an essence with the body as a misfortune and an imprisonment. The best service the bodily organs can do is (as in the case of vision and hearing), to suggest a state in which we may be altogether independent of their aid. In the *Timæus*⁹ he describes, carrying on his nomenclature of circles of sameness and difference, these circles as plunged into a river of Body;—as not allowing themselves to be hurried away by the current, and yet as unable to guide it; as distracted by the violent agitation of sensible impulse, their harmonious regularity destroyed, their appointed paths distorted. Hence the soul, when first united to a mortal body, is without intelligence. But according as the current of bodily alimention and enlargement decreases, the circles of the soul, gaining gradual tranquillity, assume their proper course, govern their motions in accordance with their kindred circles of the universal system, are no longer deceived about the variable and the invariable, and generate true Wisdom. Education does more still; philosophy most of all. For this he appeals even to experience. “The soul,” he affirms¹⁰, “exerts its reasoning faculties” (which are its eminent characteristics) “best when disturbed by no bodily connexion, neither by hearing, sight, pleasure, nor pain, but when it exists self-centered, eminently itself, discharging all thought of body, neither giving to it nor taking from it, but reaching out after real being.” In all its influences this base companion, degrades the state and dignity of the soul. It alone brings us those impressions which seduce the mighty stranger within us from its proper occupation. It is the sole cause of wars, seditions, conflicts¹¹; and all experience ascertains to us the profound truth, “either that we never can possess knowledge, or that after death alone we are to expect it.” Hence, Philosophy itself is distinctly defined, the meditation¹² and discipline of death; and all its functions in this state resolved into the one maxim of a death practical and perpetual.

⁹ [*Tim.* p. 43 A: τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν (οἱ Θεοὶ) εἰς ἐπὶ ῥῆτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπὸ ῥῆτον. αἱ δὲ εἰς πτόταμον ἐνδεθεῖσαι πολλὴν οὐτ' ἐκράτουν οὐτ' ἐκρατοῦντο, βία δ' ἐφέροντο καὶ ἔφερον, κ.τ.λ. *Eu.*]

¹⁰ [*Phædo*, p. 65 C. *Ed.*]

¹¹ [*Ib.* 66 C: καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμίαι. *Ed.*]

¹² [*μελέτη θανάτου.* *Ib.* 81 A. *Ed.*]

That this view, which undoubtedly contains a large measure of truth, is founded on a contemplation of man too extensive, and therefore absolutely imperfect; that it must consequently be received with reservation; that it subsequently led to gross and extravagant error;—are considerations which belong to another part of the subject. The topic to which at present this maxim of the philosophic death, arising out of the Platonic Psychology, conducts us, is that in illustration of which Plato himself employed it in the best known of all his writings, his famous dialogue upon the Immortality of the Soul.

The arguments which Plato used, and which he attributes (many of them, doubtless, with truth) to his illustrious master, on the eve of his death, may be conveniently distributed into those which involve a pre-existent, or even eternal duration to the soul, and those which contend for only its future perpetuation without any immediate or direct reference to its origin antecedent to the present mode of its existence. Of the former class I have in a great measure treated already. The doctrine of Reminiscence arising out of the conceptions which we possess of ideas not assignable to any sensible origin; the argument derived from the independent power of self-motion which Plato conceives equally irreducible to any temporal origination; these I have brought before you as essential elements of the Platonic psychology. A form of reasoning not very dissimilar to the latter makes the final argument of the *Phædo*¹³; although it is not certain whether Plato meant it to conclude with equal cogency for the eternity as for the futurity of the living state. All principles of being are essentially causative; and bring with them their inseparable results—the very attributes or characters of their existence. Now it is the nature of a principle to exclude its contrary, to subsist unaffected by any opposite principle, and independent of it. The first informations of our reason produce this; and Plato enters into great minuteness of example to illustrate the point. And if there be any thing so connected with a principle that where the principle is, there must be likewise its associates, it is equally certain that the principle will never tolerate the direct opposite of that associate nature. Now, as fire is the principle of heat, as fever is the principle of disease, as unity is the principle of odd numbers,—even so is the soul the principle of life. Wherever soul is, there also must be *life* as its necessary attendant; it therefore excludes death, it is deathless, and if deathless indestructible.

The arguments in the Phædo.

The argument founded on the inseparableness of the ideas of Life and Soul.

LECT.
IV.Bishop
Butler's
argument.

For if it be conceded, that the soul, as principle of life, is safe from that cause (whatever it be) which produces the phenomena of death, no one will deny its nature to be imperishable. The manner in which the immortal is here connected with the imperishable may remind you of the train of Bp. Butler's argument;—"If it would be in a manner certain that we should survive death, provided it were certain that death would not be our destruction, it must be highly probable that we shall survive it, if there be no ground to think that death will be our destruction." And the view that follows, in which it is urged that "we know not *what death is in itself*, but only some of its effects," is not dissimilar to the opposition Plato introduces between life and death as considered in their unknown causes or principles.

To such arguments as these, which seem to conclude equally for the duration of the soul both previously and subsequently to the present state, may be added those which are, without any very definite statement of their scope, drawn from what Plato calls the *divinity* of the soul, whether in its substantial being or in its faculties: a form of expression which, as you know, is constantly employed by Cicero likewise. It seems to have arisen from the general conviction, that while all things were durable in proportion to their perfection, while the best things in nature, the characteristics which we almost instinctively attribute to Deity, were in that very attribution regarded as incapable of mutation or decay, it would be strange indeed, if the *soul itself* which gave to man the *notions* of these enduring perfections, were itself destined to a transitory and evanescent existence.

Argument
from the
principle
of the mu-
tual repro-
duction of
contraries.

To pass from these, to arguments more immediately directed to convince of the continuance of future existence. With his usual spirit of comprehensive generalization, Plato argues this matter from the principle of contrary reproduction¹⁴. The System of the world, he reasons, is one of incessant change, in which opposites constantly generate their opposites. Were it not so, all the most precious attributes of existence would be lost in their contraries, and the order of the world suspended. More particularly is this observable in the animal system, in which all things seem to succeed in these perpetual cycles. Hunger and fulness, sleeping and waking, rest and motion, strength and weariness, are ordained to follow each other, and without such a disposition of consecutive states the universe would exchange its incessant activity for a dull and lifeless

¹⁴ [*Phædo*, p. 70 C--72 E. ED.]

monotony. So, doubtless, it is with the states which we call life and death; life at length gives way to death, death in its turn must bring forth life,—the eternal Soul remaining unaltered amid the succession of these superficial mutations.

With greater force Plato insists upon the incomposite nature of Soul¹⁵. Its close alliance with those beings which are themselves changeless and eternal, proves the true simplicity of its essence, for that which is absolutely immutable is also perfectly indivisible. If the True, and the Beautiful, and the Good, have any real existence in the Universe, it is absurd to imagine that these ultimate essences are capable of disception, and surely nothing less can be said for that as mysterious essence, which alone in this earth is capacitated to recognize them. Its separation from all sensible perceptibility is another circumstance in which it resembles these everlasting natures. And all experience of the operations of the Soul itself confirms these views, for, as Plato alleges, it is never perfectly at rest unless when engaged upon these self-existent and immutable objects of reason. Its obvious prerogative of command, and the as obvious function of the bodily adjunct to obey, further insinuate a being wholly exalted above that inferior nature in which alone we can directly detect the successful assault of the principle of death.

Argument from the incomposite nature of Soul.

Against such reasonings as these, however, one of the earliest forms of materialism erected itself. It was urged¹⁶ that the soul was, after all, analogous to the harmony of a lyre, the well-proportioned result of the bodily organization. This, too, appeared to possess some of the characters ascribed to the soul; it seemed to be simple and attenuated almost above sensible existence, in a great measure apprehended only by the understanding which perceives the proportion of harmonized sounds. To this objection Plato answers, not, perhaps, with as much psychological exactness as one could wish; for it plainly includes the essence of all materialistic theories. He replies, in the first place, by referring to the proof already given of the pre-existence of the soul. He urges again, that the soul controls the body and its desires, instead of being, as harmony, a simple result. He argues that vice, on this supposition, could only be *discord*, and that as the harmony would not suffer this, all souls must, on the hypothesis, be placed on a perfect equality of virtue, which contradicts all experience. It is pretty evident that the more subtle materialism of subsequent times would not have been sent away satisfied with such arguments as these. The pre-existence, in any sense

Refutation of the doctrine that the Soul is a Harmony.

¹⁵ [*Phædo*, p. 78 B—79 E. Ed.]

¹⁶ [*Ib.* p. 91 D, fol. Ed.]

LECT. IV. — of it, would be rejected as a fantastic hypothesis: and the oppositions between the soul and body would be referred to the same principles as the oppositions between even bodily desires themselves. It would appear, however, that the doctrine of harmony was not itself urged upon large and general grounds; and we know that one of the chief patrons of it was himself a musician. But Plato's usual promptitude at generalization might have led us to expect that he would himself have widened the grounds of the objection, and taken in its entire compass: more especially as the true answer lay within the reach of his ordinary field of thought,—the answer that denies any analogy whatever to exist between a combination of sounds affecting the human ear (for such, and no more, is "harmony") and that single self-conscious being which each man calls *himself*,—which is known by a different evidence, and, properly considered, bears no one point of similarity to the sensitive impression with which it is compared. By thus reducing *harmony* from its vague sense to its only true significance, it results, that the pretended analogy really amounts to a comparison instituted between the mind itself on the one hand, and a certain state or modification of it on the other, and that the argument concludes, that because the remote cause of the one effect is a certain *organization* of material substances, entitled a musical instrument, therefore, the immediate cause of the other effect, which is in every respect unlike the former, must be a certain material organization likewise.

But the spirit of the Platonic investigation is not very favourable to this kind of argument, for which, perhaps, we of these latter times are indebted mainly to our advances in physiological science. What Plato most insists on, as the necessary corollary to all his teaching, is, the possession by the mind of a class of ideas which themselves bespeak an origin immeasurably above body. It is in the furniture of the mind and its functions, rather than in its physiological aspect, that he sees stamped its essential stability. No modification of matter, however refined, however elaborated, can give to man the idea of the Absolute, Necessary, and Eternal: no modification of matter can be conceived the free and voluntary originator of motion. The brain may receive impressions as a vegetable receives air and light; the brain may be conscious of the impressions, and experience pleasure and pain; the brain may pass through a vast variety of passive states differing from each other, and even in the present obscurely remember the past; but to know that it has within it the real laws of the universe,—principles which it knows would subsist

for ever, though every conscious soul ceased to exist, though none below God Himself ever had existed,—by a free choice to deliberate, determine, and act,—these are powers, which, if man possess, man must infallibly be more than a chemical compound. That he does possess them, it was the direct or indirect object of all Platonism to establish: and, above all, that he possesses them in their loftiest form, when the one class becomes the absolute truths of immutable morality, and the other becomes the exercise of freedom in the achievement of virtue. To this last division of our subject, the Ethical System of Plato, I shall invite your attention on our next day of meeting.

LECTURE V.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. XI.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
V.

THE
ETHICS OF
PLATO.

THE Platonic system of the nature of Soul in general, and specially of the soul of man, conducts us, by an easy transition, to his views of *moral* rights and duties. The doctrine of the Soul's Immortality, which was the last subject of our consideration, was, indeed, by Plato himself viewed as, in some respects, resting on a moral foundation; and to the brief sketch which I¹ offered you, of the arguments by which he persuaded himself of the great fact of an existence perpetuated in the life to come, must be subjoined the very remarkable reasoning by which, in the tenth Book of the *Politeia*¹, he argues, that any living essence, to be destroyed at all, must be destroyed by some appropriate malady; that *injustice* is the main disease of the soul; that experience proves this worst of spiritual maladies unable to make it cease to exist; and that from this undeniable fact we may conclude that nothing else can². This assumption of the hostility of injustice to the very nature of the divine principle in man is certainly characteristic of the exalted tone of the Platonic morality; but the proposition will appear less surprising when we remember that the *δικαιοσύνη* of this philosophy is a term of rather more comprehensive signification than the corresponding "justice" of our ordinary language; that it less refers to the external *suum cuique tribuere*, than to a certain perfect proportionality of all the internal elements of the soul itself, from which, of course, the former, with many other excellent consequences, would flow. This application of the word we preserve when we speak of the "justness" of proportions, or the "justness" of critical taste, usually reserving "justice" to express the moral virtue of equity. In this sense, then, it no longer appears altogether out of

The Platonic "Justice," Comprehensive-ness of the term.

¹ [p. 608 E, fol. ED.]

² ὅποτε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἰκανὴ ἢ γε οἰκεία ποτηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχὴν, σχολῇ τὸ γε ἐπ' ἄλλου ὁλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ πλὴν ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται . . . οὐκοῦν ὅποτε μὴδ' ὑφ' ἐπὶς ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ, μήτε οἰκεῖον μήτε ἄλλοτριον, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι εἶναι, εἰ δ' αἰεὶ οὐ, ἀθάνατον. Ib. 610 E. ED.]

analogical experience to conjecture, that if the soul of man were at all capable of destruction, it could not survive the confusion of all its internal relations. But these considerations may appear plainer as we advance.

LECT.
V.

The connexion of ethics with psychology, in Plato's estimate, also arises out of the triple distribution of the soul, as it manifests itself in the body, into the rational and immortal, the irascible, and the concupiscible, elements; which latter two terms, belonging to the scholastic vocabulary, were, in Plato, the *θυμοειδές* and the *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. The rational element sprang from the formative.—at least the combinative, power of the supreme Creator; the inferior elements were framed by those same junior deities to whom He had committed the composition of the body. As the ethical, and even the political, views of Plato rest on this threefold distinction, itself a psychological fact, it may be well to subjoin his own account of it. "All things," he tells us³, "were at first without order; God alone originated, in each and all, harmonizing proportions as far as possible, for at that period none of them possessed any the least; nor could they, with any propriety, receive the names they now hold,—fire, water, or any other such element. The Deity began by fixing all bodies, then proceeded to compose the universe, of which He made a single animated being, which comprehends within itself all other animated beings, mortal or immortal. He Himself formed the divine, and He delivered over to His celestial offspring the task of forming the mortal. These subordinate deities, copying the example of their Parent, and receiving from his hands the immortal principle of the human soul, fashioned, subsequent to this, the mortal body, which they consigned to the soul as its vehicle, and in which they placed another kind of soul, mortal, the seat of violent and fatal affections;—first of all, pleasure, the too charming attraction to evil; then pain, the cowardly fugitive from good; boldness and fear, senseless counsellors; unrelenting anger; hope, easily deceived by unreasoning sensibility and unscrupulous love. Mingling these under laws of necessity, they framed the mortal kind; but, to avoid defiling the divine element more than was absolutely necessary, they assigned to the mortal part a separate portion of the frame, and set between the head and chest a kind of isthmus to divide them. It was in the trunk of the body that they lodged the mortal principle; and as there were, even in this mortal principle, a better and a worse portion, they divided the interior of the frame, as we separate the apartments of the men and

Connexion of Ethics with Psychology. The triple distribution of the human soul, the foundation of the ethical-political system of Plato.

³ [Timæus, p. 62 B, fol.]

LECT.
V.

women in our houses, and fixed the diaphragm as the partition. Nearer to the head, between the neck and diaphragm, they placed the manly and courageous division of the soul, prompt to war,—in order that, obedient to reason, and in concert with it, it may subdue the rebellion of passion and desire, when these refuse, of their own accord, to obey the commands that issue from the high citadel of reason...The division of mere alimentation was placed beneath the diaphragm, the stall or manger of the body, purposely placed as far as possible from the locality of presiding reason." This scheme of the parts of the human soul, which, whether the anatomical details be accepted or not, has itself sufficient foundation in experience, supports much of the Platonic system of moral self-government, and must, therefore, be constantly kept in mind. There is nothing very peculiar about it, except, perhaps, the special favour with which Plato views the *θυμοειδές*, or resolute division of the mortal soul; a favour which, indeed, rises into making its proper energies, when under the government of supreme reason, themselves the subject of one of the four virtues characteristic of the perfect man.

Further
peculiarities of the
Platonic
Ethics.

But to gain a just conception of the moral system of Plato, as distinguished from that of other teachers, we must rise into a region more peculiarly his own.

Nowhere more than in attempting some limited account of this last section of the general subject, do we feel how illusive are the ordinary heads of division under which this (with other philosophies) is arranged for didactic delivery. Although the triple distribution of Logic, Physics, and Ethics, is by Lactius attributed to Plato, I doubt much whether his philosophy can be most satisfactorily treated by adhering to that division, which I have followed in these sketches rather in conformity with ordinary usage, than from any fixed conviction of its propriety or utility. In Plato the entire mass of philosophical topics is so closely interlaced, everything so truly at once depends on and supports everything, that the division of a frame, thus animated with a single vitality, can scarcely be effected without rending the ligatures, and dislocating the joints, and dissembling parts that combine in a common function. Platonism is, perhaps, less a definite theory than a "way of thinking;" and the same elementary thoughts appear in the physical, the logical, the ethical views of this master. The only difficulty is to grasp these fundamental conceptions, to bring the mind into the same attitude in which he habitually held it, and the details of any separate branch might almost be predicted.

In speaking of the *Ethics* of Plato, if we use the word

in a large sense, we might say that his entire labours were subordinate to ethical purposes. Never was a philosopher so speculative with so practical an object. But in these speculations you will find very little answering to the theoretical ethics of modern times. Whether from the dialogic form itself, or from the absence of definite controversy upon them, you will not discover in Plato distinct and guarded answers to those questions which make the staple of our later treatises,—the nature of the moral principle as a state or function of the mind, and the precise criterion or rule of moral rectitude. To both these interrogatories, indeed, general answers might be collected, but it is by such a collection alone they could be obtained. And, therefore, those readers who come to Plato from the exclusive perusal of the analytic disquisitions of our own age are likely to be much disappointed,—to find much taken for granted which scepticism has since questioned, and much omitted which has since been regarded as essential. And yet it may, perhaps, be found by such readers that if, in a patient spirit of candid allowance, entering into different times which required different remedies, they resign themselves to the collective influence of the whole philosophy of Plato, they shall discover that solutions tolerably accurate will develop themselves out of his writings, and, perhaps, that in some instances his replies are not distinct, only because they are involved in larger formulas; that he is busied in laying his foundations so deep, that his voice is scarcely articulate when it arrives on a level with the surface. For example, the question so perpetually discussed—the nature of the moral approbation—was, with Plato, a mere corollary from his views of the supersensible origin of the rational element of soul; he would not have dreamed of degrading the immutable idea of virtue, with its appended notions of right and obligation, by referring them to any inferior region. And as to that other subject of controversy which regards the rule of duty, Plato descended from the elevation of his praxis of philosophical perfection, when he bade his fellow-citizens be brave, and temperate, and pious, and just. These notions of the immutability of ideal virtue, and the duty of constant effort to gain it, thereby liberating the soul in even the bondage of the body, and preparing it to meet its kindred essences hereafter, are omnipresent in the Platonic philosophy; and if they answer the problems of modern disputation, they do so on principles which, whether right or wrong, transcend the problems themselves, and place us in a region where we no longer remember their existence.

The whole philosophy, then, of Plato, is one vast scheme

LECT.
V.

The Perfection of the human soul the object of his whole philosophy.

of moral discipline, directed to the purification of the rational element in man; and its fundamental principle is the aspiration after perfection,—such perfection as competes to an unbodied spirit. Dialectics, physics, the science of mutual duties, are all but ancillary to this last and loftiest object of man; it is their relation to *it* which alone gives them a place in “philosophy,” and, deprived (as so often by sophistical traders in knowledge) of that relation, they sink into empty counterfeits, or tricks of mechanical art. Without this idea, perpetually preserved, you will read Plato in vain; the clue of the labyrinth will have been lost; the luminary that sheds impartial light on every object will have disappeared. It is this presiding object which still dignifies the minutest subtleties of his dialectics; they are parts of the general discipline for the apprehension of ideas perfect and changeless; it is this which gives interest to discussions, apparently worthless, on the pompous follies of the time; *they* serve to contrast the pretended wisdom of the popular schools with the only true and permanent wisdom which he professed to explain and uphold. Man is made for the immutable; this world in all, even of its best and happiest devices, is essentially the sphere of the fleeting and the variable: everything, then, which would lead the diviner element to content itself with these transient apparitions, whether it be the rhetoric of the sophist or the poetry of the more accomplished artist, is but an ingenious illusion, and dangerous in proportion to the strength of its treacherous fascinations.

But, that we may better judge of the execution, let us observe the circumstances that regulated the design of Plato.

A complete system of human life was a desideratum in Plato's age, and one which he strove to supply.

The design of Platonic philosophy, then, in this its moral, which is its principal, aspect, was nothing less than to supply its age with a complete system of human life. The want was manifest and alarming, and it had already called out the detached but powerful efforts of Plato's illustrious and martyred master. But Socrates was formed only to commence the work; it is his highest merit that he did commence it. To do more his very excellencies forbade. Sagacious, practical, fearless, he succeeded in revolutionizing the literary mind of Athens, but the very resoluteness and sincerity of his nature laid him open to assault, alarmed the vigilance of the public corruptors, and lighted their revenge to its object. But in another respect Socrates, perhaps, was hardly fitted to accomplish the entire task which the time demanded. With great force of ideas, he probably valued little the regularity of system; and the regularity of system is often required as well to assist the feeble combinations of inferior minds, as, by its imposing

majesty of aspect, to awe down opposition. That, then, which Socrates had begun, his greatest pupil undertook to complete, in the structure of a vast and symmetrical system which should at once provide a reply to the assailants of the reality of moral distinctions in all their varieties; should give to its defenders the means of allying it with all the advances of human science, and preserving its eminence unchanged; should supply appropriate nutriment to every faculty and disposition of the human soul; and should insinuate the principles of unchangeable truth, in such a form as to evade that opposition of interested adversaries which had already proved so fatal to Socrates.

Had there existed at this time a public establishment of religion, claiming and proving a divine origin, and extending its influence over every rank and division of society, to elevate, to purify, and to strengthen, this vast enterprize would, of course, have been, in many respects, superfluous; and though the powers of Plato would still have found salutary occupation in deepening and securing the metaphysical basis of morality, I persuade myself that none would have been readier than this majestic mind to ally itself, in all points of belief and practice, with such a religion, and to acknowledge that its noblest and happiest exertions were those devoted to appreciating and diffusing it. But, as Greece was then circumstanced, religion was itself to be numbered among the enemies of truth; and yet, in all that monstrous mass of fiction, there lay *some* scattered elements of reality, nor could the entire be supplanted without, perhaps, greater danger than it brought. The design of the Platonic system was adapted to this state of things with great skill. In the last Lecture I observed, that it consisted of two forms of teaching very easily distinguishable. The more popular formed the vestibule to the profounder, and, for those who could pass no farther than the vestibule, it supplied food for the imagination of a far superior quality to that furnished by any part of the degrading superstition of the state. But it is when we look at the entire, and when we thus place ourselves in the position of Plato's more gifted auditors, that we gain some conception of the completeness and grandeur of his plan. We then see in it nothing less than a vast and proportioned system of metaphysical, moral, and theological principles, designed to supersede, silently but effectively, the whole mass of the public superstitions, supplying the place of every rejected folly by some counterpart of forcible doctrine, and building up at the side of each gaudy edifice of vicious fancy some impressive tenet, decorated (for otherwise all were fruitless) with no less richness of imagination,

*Adaptation
of Plato's
system to
the religion,
condition
and re-
quirements
of his age
and coun-
try.*

LECT.
V.

but imperceptibly winning the spectator to penetrate into its inner chambers, and there discover the precious reality of moral truth. It is hence that Plato occasionally talks of the pursuit of philosophy under his auspices as the initiation to "mysteries," and borrows, to represent the course and result of the discipline he recommends, all the expressive phraseology of these awful observances⁴. And thus this singular system, adapting itself with equal accuracy to the reason and the imagination, at the same time that it deals with the darkest questions of metaphysics, constructs, by a parallel operation, a kind of philosophical mythology, and solders the whole fast to the very heart of Greece and of the age, by adopting the more innocent stories of the popular belief among its occasional decorations. By degrees, as the student became more and more habituated to thought, the change grew more complete; and, as Olympus and its vulgar wonders melted away, a new heaven came in its place,—no other than that *ideal world* which Plato has purposely brightened with the most ethereal colouring of fancy, that the transformation might become more insensible. The "gods" slowly descend into the humble ministers of a Supreme Intelligence, holding their very immortality at his will; and the purified mind of the disciple at length finds itself alone in a world solitary and eternal,—around him, the immutable forms of the good, the just, the fair,—and over all, the expanded arms of infinite power and infinite intelligence.

It was thus that the calm, comprehensive, all-conciliating mind of Plato conceived a system adequate to all the wants of the soul of man, and by its very nature susceptible of indefinite expansion, without losing the proportion of its parts. It was, of course, as every philosophical system, limited in its efficiency to the minds of the cultivated and reflective; but Plato knew, that if these were gained, the result would be more or less discernible in every corner of society. He could as little conceive as rival that wondrous system, which, sublimer than his own, is yet simple enough for the thoughts and the tears of childhood,—which awes the contemplation of sages, and regulates the morality of the cottage hearth: but we are not to expect in the philosopher the inspiration also of the prophet.

Incompleteness of the teaching of Socrates.

It was necessary to enter into these considerations of the position of Plato, as the great architect upon the Socratic foundation, in order to approach, with due pre-

⁴ [As in *Phædr.* 250 C, where the entire phraseology is borrowed from the "Mysteries." But I am not aware of any passage in which Plato represents himself as the mystagogue, except the evidently sportive one in *Theæt.* 156 A. Ed.]

paration, his theory of human life. When, satisfied of the importance and truth of the moral teaching of Socrates, the pupil proceeded to examine into the speculative principles on which, in systematic exposition, it should be founded, he saw nothing complete in the theoretic philosophy of his day, but the greatest dignity and the largest capabilities of improvement in that of the Pythagoreans. It has been the ceaseless burden of the anti-Platonists,—from Xenophon⁵, who sneers at the *ῥεπαρώδης σοφία* of Pythagoras, to Brucker (the worst section in whose six quartos is that on Plato),—that the philosopher alloyed the simplicity of Socrates with these heterogeneous combinations from the Italic school. I confess I never could understand what these objectors mean. The maxims of Socrates, admirable and pregnant and right-minded as they were, and forming the true elements of a great system, were *not a system*, if by that term be meant a strict concatenation of deductions from established principles, divided under distinct heads, embracing all parts of their subject, and fortified against objections. To frame *a system* it was absolutely necessary to transcend the teaching of Socrates; and they who censure Plato for having attempted to carry that teaching back into its metaphysical principles (in the spirit of Italicism), might nearly as well censure Clarke or Bishop Butler for not having been content with the profound but unconnected *Pensées* of Pascal. The System of Ideas, the great characteristic of Platonism, is no fanciful or gratuitous addition; it is a bulwark based deep in reflective inquiry, and built, in its original purpose, to resist the pressing assaults of contemporary scepticism.

This incompleteness supplied by the System of Ideas.

With that theory of ideas this part, as every part of Platonism, is directly connected. The “idea,” in three different views of it, stands at the head of the three divisions of Platonism. The object of Platonic *Dialectics* is to obtain a right conception, and, as far as man may, a direct apprehension, of the idea; the object of Platonic *Physics* is to illustrate the results of the participation of the idea by the sensible universe; the object of the Platonic *Ethics* is to make the idea the subject of perpetual imitation. In the latter sense man constructs his life, as the Deity constructed the universe, after the exemplar of the ideal.

The Ideal Theory in its application to Ethics.

Let me once more recall to your recollection the nature of *Ideas*, which are thus the basis of the Philosophy we are studying. Everything which becomes the subject of sensible knowledge may be said to possess three elements, which I will call the ideal, the material, and the formal. The material element is the mere impression of object on

⁵ [The pseudo-Xenophon, as stated in a previous note. Ed.]

LECT.
V.*Idea of the
Good.**Platonic
theory of
Imitation
or Partici-
pation.*

organ, itself no direct subject of consciousness; the formal is the mental element which receives, and, in receiving, qualifies that organic impression; the ideal is the foundation of the whole phenomenon in the world of reality,—a foundation to which Plato, with great subtlety, assigned as it were another foundation, *The Good*, thereby intimating that the last principle of the existence of all that does exist was to be found in the inconceivable Perfection: a notion which we familiarize to ourselves by saying (what we often do say without any reflection on the depth of the thought itself!) that for all that exists there *must* assuredly be, in the nature of things, some reason which makes it better that it should exist, and exist thus, than that it should not exist thus, or not exist at all. The connexion between the Idea and the Phenomenon is by Plato variously stated, and in the former course I endeavoured to collect and consider his expressions. The most usual, you all know, are Imitation and Participation (*μίμησις* and *μέθεξις*); words as unexceptionable, probably, as any that could be found to denote the bond between the Real and the Apparent,—the real cause, the apparent effect,—the real law, the apparent instance,—but which have sadly misled the ordinary critics of Platonism, who are wont to devise an imaginary world of shadows, and, having demolished this spectral region as a phantom, to exult in dismissing for ever the ideal system of Plato. The great character of the ideal essences, or original laws and reasons of things, is their independence of the mental act of apprehending them, as well as of all other influences:—as the external world discovered by sense is independent of that discovery, so the intelligible world discovered by intellect is independent of it, and of all things. In the discovery of both we draw these conclusions of both.

The intelligible element, then, gives itself to the sensible; and the intellect of man, the appointed interpreter of the universe, refers the sensible to the intelligible. But, from causes altogether mysterious, and which Plato treats with haste and brevity, the sensible result is ever inferior and disproportionate to the intelligible ground. You will reply, that, according to the interpretation already given, this is impossible; for that the effect can never be disproportionate to its own cause, the result inadequate to its own reason. But here we come upon one of those arrangements of Platonism, which, even when the reason hesitates to accept them, still endear it to every elevated mind. Plato, well knowing this difficulty, aware that this balance of inferiority,—this melancholy *deficit* in nature,—must be accounted for, determined yet to do it in such

a manner as to save the ideal world unharmed. Accordingly, he ascribed it to that undefinable something, the substratum of the sensible, on the nature of which I have already at some length engaged you. It followed, that the more we could detach phenomena from their sensible existence, the more we could consider qualities as in themselves, and not as elements of the visible series, the more we should have brought them into that state in which we could consider them as images of eternal realities.

Such views as these obviously extended to every form of existence; the theory included all nature, from its vastest to its minutest constituents. But, though every phenomenon of nature might thus form a step from the sensible to the ideal, some objects there were which stood as steps far higher than the rest in this ladder of the philosophic contemplatist. For, if there be difference of rank in the ideal world itself,—if there be some laws of the Universal System that originate all the rest, and make, as it were, the very charter of its entire legislation,—assuredly there must be proportionate differences in the sensible embodiment; and the judicious aspirant after the true dignity of man will attach himself with anxious earnestness to these. In every object, that even feebly exhibits them, he will see the reflected light of eternity, and know the quivering beam through all its dimness and distortion; if many such objects meet his gaze, he will abstract the blessed quality from them all, and thus condense the light in his intellectual focus; and it may be that patient contemplation shall at length enable him to gain some conception of the splendour of the original luminary. And that which encourages such a hope is the perceived fact, that the most commanding ideas of the invisible world do actually reveal themselves in this world in a form partially intelligible. For example, the qualities of sense, whiteness, sweetness, odours, sounds,—though they, doubtless, are finally referrible to ideal originals,—can at best bear but a faint analogy to their intelligibles; but it is not so with proportions, with mathematical regulations,—with first principles, the *ἀννρόθαρα* of the sciences,—above all, it is not so with *moral virtues*. Here, though still unable to behold except in particular manifestation, an easy effort of abstraction brings us almost within reach of the ideas themselves, and we seem to become conscious of the fact, that we have but to escape the body, and with it the world of sense, to stand in the simplicity of pure rational natures in front of the awful originals.

But when we inquire what it *is*, in the Platonic sense, thus to behold an idea, we cannot easily obtain a satisfactory answer. The question might be replied to in two

What it is to "behold ideas."

LECT.
V.

ways. 1st, It might be said that the disembodied rational faculty can and shall apprehend, by a succession of generalizations, the laws of the Universal System more and more widely unfolded; perceiving in each that perfection of wisdom which gives it the highest moral necessity. The idea of virtue, or rather the various forms of the one ultimate idea, may thus expand into a vastness of glory now altogether inconceivable, and so amplify for ever, itself indeed immutable, but the reason unconsciously widening in capacity. This presents a true and noble sense; nor, indeed, can any one among ourselves, who has learned to hunger and thirst after knowledge, as well as "righteousness," conceive, that for a little temporary endurance this infinite perspective of attainment is almost distinctly promised in the charter of our Christian hopes, without a beating heart and a resolve of high endeavour.

But there is a second sense in which the emancipation of the rational element for the direct intuition of ideas may be conceived. It may be supposed that the reason shall instantly apprehend the ultimate idea, shall grasp at once the very foundations of existence.

I need not again observe to you, that this anticipation supposes an ultimate unity between the rational element of the soul and the Ideal Realities themselves; for thus only could it be expected that the reason, when freed from its restrictions, would necessarily embrace them. It is one thing to know that there must be ideal foundations for all existences, another thing to apprehend the ideal foundations themselves. To suppose the latter faculty certain is, I repeat, to suppose the last reasons of things and the reason of man to be fundamentally one; a supposition which we have before seen is perfectly agreeable to the Platonic doctrine of the eternity of the soul; a supposition which wonderfully enhances, indeed, the dignity of the spiritual principle in man, by thus supposing it to hold the key of the universe; but a supposition for which, in this unlimited sense, there seems to be no foundation.

As concerns our present purpose, either of these suppositions might be accepted. I mention them because the Platonic expositors do not seem to have kept the distinction in view. But with reference to what I conceive the true and genuine value of the Platonic philosophy, speculative and practical,—with reference, especially, to the present division of the subject, you may adopt either. The infinite progression, or the changeless intuition, would alike suit the rule and tenor of the Ethics of Plato.

You are now prepared to entertain that subject. You have seen that the phenomenal images of ideas, that ideas

in their most perfect state of sensible manifestation can be obtained by the reflective mind. Separating these from all their debasing concomitants, conceiving them in a state yet purer than any which experience in its limited range can exhibit, the thoughts are raised on the ascent to absolute perfection. In the mean time, the soul is quickened by the remembrance of its own dignity and capacities, it laments the ignoble confinement to which it is reduced, it knows the path to freedom lies through self-purification, terminated by the brief and happy gate of death; it, therefore, resolves to exert its anticipated freedom by realizing the high vision of perfection for ever before it. Distinctly to know these truths, the necessary requisite to all useful effort,—practically to fix them as the rules of life,—this is prudence or wisdom,—*φρόνησις*,—the leading excellence according to the views of Plato; the virtue without which all others are but specious vices. You perceive from hence that the idea of the Rational in man is the leading idea of the Platonic morals; and the main exercise of the Rational, the separation of soul, as far as possible, from body and all bodily adjuncts.

The principle of Rationality the leading principle of the Platonic Ethics.

This principle of Rationality is a direct consequence from the entire scheme of Platonism. The system supposes the original unity of the Beautiful, the Just, and the Good, in the True; the True being, as it were, the supporting or substantiating; the Good, the characterizing idea; the Beautiful and Just accompanying both: the True being the very reality of things; the Good, the final cause of their being; and the others investing the True out of the strength of that final cause,—for wherever is the *ἀγαθόν*, there will infallibly be the highest measure of harmonious proportion; and proportion is the essential idea of both the Beautiful and the Just. Now the soul of man is originally formed to meet these governing ideas of the Universe; it is congenial, it is (in its rational element) coeternal with them. This must apply equally to every human soul, however debased by its contact with, and slavery to, the body; the depth of its degradation cannot efface the fact of its original adaptation; and though the vast majority of the race live unconscious of their privileges, the privileges nevertheless exist, and it is the function of "philosophy" to instruct how to enjoy them. The great requisite of virtue, then, is to gain the intuition of these ideal excellencies; and the original fitness of the soul to meet them is so certain, that it cannot be conceived that it can really apprehend these eternal objects without yielding to their divine attraction. But the intuition of ideas is knowledge or science in its highest, its only genuine sense; the moral

Unity of the great ethical ideas of the Beautiful, Just, and Good.

LECT.
V.

and the intellectual are thus identified in their highest point; and the νόησις of the philosophic mind sees beneath it, on one side, all the infinite varieties of human learning, on the other, all the diversities of human virtue, as its subordinate results, or dependent developments.

From this leading conception of the nature of the human soul, consequences naturally follow, which have often startled the readers of Plato, but which are really the necessary fruits of this principle.

Plato
adopted the
Socratic

as his
family
idea

For example, Plato inherits from Socrates the maxim that no man is voluntarily evil, κακὸς ἐκὼν οὐδεὶς*. The rationale of this doctrine seems to be,—that the immortal element of the soul, the directive power, is essentially formed to make good its object; that, therefore, it can only be through a suspension, or eclipse of that power, that evil can in fact become the aim of the man; a suspension which even then does not allow him to choose evil as evil, but which hides from his view the perfect idea of the good. Even when he is admonished, he may pursue the delusive phantom, but it is still from a belief of its reality; it is as the reality of *excellence* he follows it; and the original, the indestructible law of his rational being, still proclaims him a devoted worshipper of virtue, at the very moment that in his temporary blindness he adores its opposite. This doctrine, which in a certain degree is true and profitable, but which may obviously, by overlooking the operation of habit and passion, be carried to a very extravagant length*, is made the basis of many admirable arguments on the advantage of philosophy, the coucher of the eye of reason, the legislator of true and apparent goods. In its fullest form it resolves into the proposition that all vice is ignorance.

The prin-
ciple, that
"all Virtue

The principle, often directly or indirectly propounded by Plato, that all virtue is "one," that no man can be truly

* [See *Protag.* p. 358 C. *Tim.* p. 86 D. ED.]

* For it surely is most erroneous to deny, what all men can attest, that the force of habit or of violent propension may urge to the commission of vice at the very instant that the intellect is most abundantly cognizant of the excellence of virtue. To call *this* blindness, or the substitution of a false for a true good, seems wholly unwarrantable. Plato argues, that we commit vice *for the sake of* a supposed good, and that it is good which still is in view. This supposes man always to act with an ulterior view, which is likewise quite gratuitous. [It is difficult to reconcile this notion of the involuntary nature of evil with the passages in which Plato insists upon the necessity of allying the reason with the nobler emotions (τὸ θυμοειδές) in order to control effectually the lower appetites. The inconsistency will appear more distinctly in the course of the next lecture. Meanwhile it may be observed that the author of the *Magna Moralia* (attributed to Aristotle) represents Plato as differing from Socrates in *not* referring virtue exclusively to the intellectual region of the soul: a limitation which can alone justify the paradox in question. See *M. M.* I. c. 1, §§ 5-7. ED.]

virtuous by halves, is not far removed from the same leading notion. To us the doctrine seems easily derivable from the consideration that the same principle, whatever it be,—whether the will of God, or the fitness of things, or both,—which urges to partial virtue, must, if genuine, urge to all, as equally applicable to all. This seems to have been in Plato's mind, but not this only. Virtue itself, when contemplated from without, seemed to consist in a certain happy proportionality in all the elements of the system; this (which was justice) was the last result of the possession and exercise of that wisdom of which we have spoken. Now the very notion of just proportion brings with it the idea of unity in the midst of multiplicity; it is the diversified governed by the uniform. Virtue, then, the result of the presidency of the Rational, takes from this singleness of control a character of unity; for the harmonious relation of parts is a thing in itself indivisible. To these views contemplations more metaphysical allied themselves; the very unity of the supreme idea of good, in which all inferior manifestations were absorbed and lost, reduced to its own simplicity all human efforts to copy and embody it.

LECT.
V.*is one;” in
what sense
true.*

Lastly, the maxim which is the subject of so much discussion in the Platonic dialogues,—the maxim, “that virtue cannot be scholastically taught,”—finds its explanation in the same system of the human soul. It is Plato's perpetual admonition, that true knowledge is incommunicable, in the way of information, from man to man,—that it must be recovered out of the depths of the soul itself. On this principle turns the singular passage in the *Phædrus*, so alien to our modern habits of thought, in which Plato denounces the invention of writing as a misfortune to man,—as the prolific parent of borrowed, sophistical, and illusory wisdom. Now we have seen that the fœtal ideas of virtue and science are blended in the *φρόνησις*, or wisdom, of Plato. The same principle must, therefore, apply to virtue as to knowledge. In its true essence it cannot be conveyed; no series of practical maxims, however judicious, can reach this hidden reality; it must discover itself to the reflective mind by its own inherent light. It is when Plato treats of this subject that he rises into those expressions so deeply interesting to Christian readers, in which he intimates, though darkly, some belief of the operation of the Eternal Spirit upon the soul of man. Nor does it at all lessen that interest, that they are combined with his own theory of the natural prerogatives of Soul itself; inasmuch as the point alone practically important, the necessity of an aid distinct from ordinary influences, remains unaffected by any hypothesis of that description. These demands,

*The maxim,
“Virtue
cannot be
taught;”
in what
sense main-
tained by
Plato.*

LECT.
V.

echoing from the inmost nature of the profoundest and purest of moral reflectors, have their own unalterable value, although Plato considered them required, not so much, indeed, to communicate new impressions, as to restore the native functions of the paralyzed mind ; to "teach" virtue, but to teach it by a λόγος θεῖος,—a supernal element regained ; to teach it, not by conveying truths so much as renovating faculties, not so much by exhibiting objects before inconceivable, as by brightening the tarnished surface of the intellectual mirror, which then must, of its own accord, reflect the unchangeable images of virtue and of truth.

LECTURE VI.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. XII.

GENTLEMEN,

I ATTEMPTED on the last occasion to exhibit to you the leading idea of the Platonic morals, the idea that in the exercise, and thence the gradual enfranchisement of the rational element in human nature, its true dignity and duties consisted. The ceaseless effort at self-perfection by the imitation of ideal excellence, and in the hope of a thorough eventual union with this object of exalted contemplation, included, with Plato, all the obligations of life; and hence the notion of mere obligation in its directness and simplicity makes little figure in his writings. He composed, indeed, with great care an elaborate system of Laws of public polity; but the harsh external control of positive law is superfluous to the being of Plato's conception, or if it concern him, can only do so in its milder form of a code of moral education. Internal obligation is, in his view, less the immediate imperative of an instantaneous command, as our moralists more safely represent it, than the calm collection of a reason weighing its own dignity, and glorying in progressive supremacy over the seductions of sense. When I offer these general characteristics you will understand them *as general*, that is, as not beyond the possibility of occasional, though rare exception. Few moralists of antiquity,—perhaps on the whole not one,—can be said to have left maxims purer or more rigorous behind them; Plato has the force of the Stoics without their extravagance. And in enforcing these principles he employs language which it is not difficult to translate into the exactness and decision of the ethics of Butler or of Kant. But as the general strain of his discourse he rather assails vice as degrading humanity than as violating its explicit commands; he rather pities it as a blindness than arraigns it as guilt.

Wisdom, then, the philosophic insight, is the perfect glory of man, the chief of virtues, which alone gives their value to all the rest. Fortitude and temperance respect each of those two divisions into which the mortal part of man's soul is separated. And justice is the fitting proportion of the whole. The dependence of these qualities upon the presiding presence of Wisdom for all their genuineness

LECT.
VI.

THE PLATONIC
ETHICS
continued.
Further
peculiarities of the
system.

The four
Cardinal
Virtues, and
their func-
tions accord-
ing to Plato.

LECT.
VI.*Supremacy
of Wisdom,
illustrated
from the
Phædo.*

and real value is finely illustrated in a well-known passage of the *Phædo*¹, not less true or less instructive at this hour than when it fell from the lips of the dying Socrates. "If you but investigate the fortitude and temperance of any but philosophers you will find them very absurd.—How? —You know that the mass of mankind fear death as one of the greatest of evils?—Certainly.—When then they suffer death with some courage they only suffer it because they fear a greater evil...And consequently, none but the philosopher is courageous from any motive but fear; and surely it is absurd that a man should be brave from sheer cowardice...Is the case different with your ordinary men of temperance? Are they temperate from any other motive but intemperance; contradictory as it seems? For they never abjure one pleasure except through dread of being deprived of another which they prefer in their slavery. They call it intemperance to be mastered by their passions; but that does not hinder them from never thinking of subduing certain enjoyments, except with a view to others; which assuredly realizes what I said just now, that they are temperate through intemperance...What a spurious system of barter is this, to change pleasures against pleasures, pains for pains, fears for fears, like coin for coin;—the sole coin for which all the rest should be willingly exchanged is *Wisdom*". With this, one buys all, has all—fortitude, temperance, justice; in a word, true virtue is in and with wisdom, independently of pleasures, pains, fears, and all other affections; while without it, the virtue that consists in these transfers is but a shadowy, servile, false virtue. For the real essence of virtue is the purification of the soul from all these defilements; and temperance, justice, fortitude, yea, wisdom itself, all are but modes of effecting this purification. And such is the symbolical purport of initiation in the mysteries." It thus appears that the essence of perfect virtue is found in its origination in contemplative wisdom, and that its object is the purification of the soul from all earthly taint, in order to its easy passage to the state of disembodied peace.

Plato's system of disciplinary purification.

To conciliate a system so ethereal with the actual state and demands of human nature, so as to make it practically applicable and operative, may appear no easy task. Plato

¹ [p. 68 D, fol. Ed.]² [With this passage compare Euripides *Fragm. Œdip.* 546 ed. Nauck.

οὗτοι νόμισμα λευκὸς ἀργυρὸς μόνον
καὶ χρυσὸς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ κἀρετὴ βροτοῖς
νόμισμα κεῖται τῶσιν ἢ κτῆσθαι χρῶν.

This sentiment may have suggested the passage of the *Phædo*, or it may have been suggested to Euripides, according to the common tradition, by the teaching of Socrates. ED.]

seems to have effected this chiefly by representing his system as one of progressive discipline, one, therefore, in which every rank of mind could obtain its suitable place. The lowest step was dignified, for it was a step to absolute perfection. The whole array of the sciences (and Plato was conversant with all the knowledge of his time) were enlisted in the service of this great cause; for they all were subservient to the attainment of that calm and meditative spirit of abstraction which was the temper and the instrument of philosophic wisdom. And though Plato gave no great encouragement to the exercise of active talents, on which, except in minds of singular sobriety, he was apt to look with coldness and suspicion; yet even these tumults of public life might be converted to the same high and holy purpose by becoming a school of discipline in the art of self-control. But without this motive steadily understood and maintained, a motive which, in its true sincerity, was scarcely compatible with the feverish excitement of ambitious pursuits, man could not claim the skies. When in the *Phædo*³ Socrates is represented as speculating on the changes of the metempsychosis as determined by moral causes, after condemning the glutton and the tyrant to the state of the ass and the wolf, he declares that those who have practised those social virtues which men call moderation and justice, by mere habit and exercise, without reflective contemplation or philosophy, may be expected to re-appear in the forms of the more peaceable animals, the bee or ant, or in that of good men once more; but that to reach by a bound the rank of the immortals belongs only to him who has "philosophized," and who has by that exalted process left this life in perfect purity. And to compensate the limited application of this promise, you must remember that Plato everywhere insinuates that the attainment is really within reach of all, and, were political establishments regulated on the principles he proposes, would, through appropriate education, become the heritage of all. He felt and acknowledged that no existing state of society permitted the realization of those principles; but the error, he contended, was not in the principles, but in society. And it was from this consideration that he uttered the well-known sentence in the fifth book of the *Republic*⁴, that no polity would ever be perfect until *philosophers* became its kings, or its kings philosophers.

But even a system the most resolutely restricted to the cultivation of the rational element cannot neglect the rest of our nature. The object of such a system will be, therefore, to convert, if possible, the affections to the

*Ethical
use of the
Sciences.*

*Comparative deprecia-
tion of
the civic
virtues.*

*Of the emo-
tions, and
their place
in the Pla-
tonic scheme.*

³ [p. 82. ED.]

⁴ [p. 473 D. ED.]

LECT.
VI.

furtherance of its design; to recognise them but as inferior ministers of its presiding principle. This is the true link which connects Plato's doctrine of self-purification, through the intuition of truth, with his treatment of the questions of happiness and the emotions. This connexion will, I think, appear by a very brief consideration.

The question of happiness, and the summum bonum, as discussed in the Philebus.

The question of happiness is discussed in the dialogue entitled *Philebus*, the oldest regular disquisition we possess on what was afterwards called the "summum bonum." The point submitted to debate is,—the respective claim of pleasure and reason to constitute the chief happiness of man; and the matter is investigated with great refinement. A condition of pleasure altogether destitute of any rational element, a condition of reason altogether devoid of any element of sensibility, are both subjected to inquisition, and both rejected⁵. The true position of man ought then to consist of some union of the two⁶; and after a long, and in some respects very interesting analysis of the characteristics of pleasure and of philosophic science, Plato concludes by giving, as might be supposed, to the latter the unquestionable precedence, but allowing to the former its place in that temperate degree which shall in no respect interfere with the exercise and the supremacy of reason. The discussion is marked with peculiar good sense, and forms a striking contrast to the contemporary extravagance of the cynic school⁷. The philosophic discipline of Plato does not deny sensitive happiness,—it claims to regulate it;—and as far as possible to show that its purity and perfection consists in its dependence upon that regulation.

The Platonic Theory of Love.

But the relation of the emotions to the immortal element of the soul, and to its objects, is still more marked in the most celebrated, and unhappily the most perverted, of all the tenets of Plato,—his philosophic adaptation of the emotion of Love. It is not impossible that the large proportion of the writings of Plato devoted to this subject, in some or other of its aspects, may have been owing in a considerable measure to the habits of the time, which

⁵ [*Phileb.* p. 20 E: σκοπῶμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τῶν τε ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸν φρονήσεως βίαν ἰδόντες χωρὶς... to p. 22 B: τούτων γε περὶ δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν εἶχε τάγαθόν. The difference between the Platonic system and the purely Socratic is clearly brought out in this portion of the dialogue. See note to p. 470. Ed.]

⁶ [Styled ὁ κωμὸς, or μικτὸς βίος. *Ib.* D. Ed.]

⁷ [Who are generally (I am not sure whether correctly) supposed to be meant by the "seers" happily described as "prophesying under the inspiration of an austere but not ungenerous nature." *Phileb.* p. 44 C. An analysis of this abstruse, but interesting and important dialogue, is found in Trendelenburg's tract *De Platonis Philebi Consilio* and of course in Prof. Jowett's *Plato* and in the Introductions to Mr Poste's edition and that of Dr Badham, Berlin, 1837. Ed.]

rendered the topic an easy and natural one for those transactions in dialogue from things outward to things invisible, which perpetually mark his philosophic style. Thus we know that the *Symposium*, which, with the *Phædrus*, may be considered the text-books of this division of Platonism, was really the description of an ordinary Athenian scene. The succession of speeches, and even the special subject, were usual forms of festive amusement; and though in a very different style, the custom is still found in many parts of the East, where you will remember that these intellectual encounters date as far back as the days of Samson. I do not find that the Platonic theory of love coloured much of ancient literature; it may, perhaps, be recognised in passages of Euripides⁸, whose pensive muse congenially adopted it. Some of the Christian fathers, especially St Augustine, found it susceptible of a divine adaptation; but the period from which, in a form whose folly might well be enough to neutralize its danger, it became one of the staples of modern romance, seems to have been that of the revival of classical literature in Italy. It probably became, to the thoughtful and sedentary, pretty much what chivalry was to the active and ardent; and the same singular combination of devotion to the human and divine was equally characteristic of both.

The Platonic theory of ideal love rested upon principles similar to those I have already so often explained in considering his views of knowledge and of virtue, and was strictly subservient to both. As the sensible world was the exhibition (as far as its nature would permit) of absolute truth and absolute goodness, so was it also the exhibition of absolute beauty; and the faculties of the human soul were originally competent to apprehend them all. But for the illustration of his general theory, the case of the participation⁹ of the primal principle of *Beauty* was far the most convenient and forcible. It lent itself to expression with greater readiness, it found an echo more perfect in the peculiar genius of Greece, and it seemed to claim that emotion of the heart of man as specially consecrated to it, which the imagination in all ages had laboured to celebrate and to adorn. Its internal connexion with Plato's favourite principle of proportion, the very mysteriousness and power of its influences, added dignity to the theme;

⁸ [As in the celebrated choral song in praise of Athens, where the "Loves" are described as τῇ σοφίᾳ πᾶσι βροτοῖς...παρτοῖς ἀπερὶς εὐεργετοῖς. (*Medæ*, v. 838, ed. Pors.) Compare this with a fragment of the *Dictys* (Fr. VIII. ed. Dindorf.) and the lyrical passage preserved by Athenæus, XIII. p. 561 A. (*Frag. inc.* CXIII. Dind.) Chronological reasons it should be observed forbid us to suppose that Euripides "adopted" the Platonic theory of love, at least from Plato, for the *Medæa*, an early play, was acted two years before the philosopher was born. ED.]

LECT.
VI.

and even the ambiguous use of language, in which it is not easy to separate the moral and the sensitive, furnished means of heightening the effect by insinuating associations borrowed from either side of the analogy. And the very principle of Plato, that the true state of soul consisted in the intuition of truth, naturally led to the representation of the divine object of this contemplation as the object of love. And if all the preliminary studies, mathematical, musical, dialectical, are but preparatives for this final effort of the soul, then may they all be considered a discipline for this emotion which accompanies it. Nay, the very anxiety for truth becomes but a form of it; for this anxiety, when genuine, is but the struggle of the soul for the possession of the central beauty in the possession of the central truth. But, of course, the process becomes yet more direct in the contemplation of objects themselves sharing and manifesting the primal *καλόν*; and this holds through all the regions of creation, moral and material; for whatever their specific nature—whether inanimate or animate, visible forms, or actions high and heroic—they all bring to the enraptured memory the recollection of that ideal loveliness once the immediate object of the unembodied soul, and now faintly reflected in the sphere of sense and time. Hence philosophers are declared to be, by virtue of their vocation, *φιλόκαλοι* and *έρωτικοί*⁹; and Socrates, in the *Symposium*, professes that his whole science is nothing but a science of “love.” And in the *Theages*¹⁰, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος πλὴν σμικροῦ γέ τινος μαθήματος, τῶν ἐρωτικῶν.

You will perceive that “Love” is, then, a word of very general significance in this philosophy. It stands for all aspiration after a communion with perfection. And it assuredly is one of the peculiar excellencies of the Platonic way of thought, that it regarded the upward tendencies of the human soul in a light which no one before its author seems to have fully caught, and which few after him have seized who were not directly or indirectly his copyists. To Plato they were facts, and facts of transcendent importance.

The Platonic “love” may then be considered as developed in two forms, a superior and a subordinate. The former takes place when the soul strains after the infinite perfection of beauty, prompted on its path by earthly manifestations. The latter is engendered, when souls, as kindred immortal essences, recognise each other in the world of sense; and it thus includes the ordinary notions of exalted friendship. But the former is far more prominently Platonic, and even the latter is seldom conceived except as

⁹ [*Phædr.* p. 248 D. Ed.]¹⁰ [p. 128 B. Ed.]

connected with it. And the extraordinary importance assigned by Socrates himself, as well as Plato, to beauty of outward form, as the indication of a corresponding elevation of soul, combines them both*.

LECT.
VI.

"Some few alone," says Plato in the *Phædrus*¹¹, speaking of the imprisonment of the soul in the body, "preserve recollections sufficiently distinct. These, when they behold any image of things on high, are transported beyond themselves, and cannot repress their emotion; but they know not its cause, because they do not closely consider what passes within them. Justice, wisdom, all which soul can estimate, have lost their brilliance in the images we see of them here below; embarrassed ourselves by gross organs, it is with great difficulty that a few among us, when we approach these images, can recognise the model they represent. Beauty was then, indeed, resplendent, when among the choir of the blessed, our souls in the train of Jove, as others in the train of other gods, contemplated the glorious sight, initiated in mysteries the holiest of all,—mysteries which then, indeed, we rightly celebrated when enjoying all our essential perfections, and yet unknowing of sorrows to come, we gazed in rapture on those objects,—fair, perfect, simple, full of blessedness and peace, which unrolled to our eyes in the depths of the pure light,—no less pure ourselves, and free as yet from this tomb we call our body, which we drag along with us as the oyster drags its shelly prison!" "Pardon," he adds, "these fond delays devoted to the remembrance of happiness for ever lost. As for the *Beautiful*, it sparkled in that world among the other essences. Fallen into this sphere, we have recognised it more clearly than the rest, through the medium of the most luminous of our senses. Sight is the subtlest organ of the frame; it, however, perceives not wisdom; for our love would indeed be boundless could we apprehend the image of *it*, and of other lovely objects, as distinctly as we can visual beauty." He then describes with exquisite force of expression the trouble of spirit, the enthusiastic awe and reverence, which the apparition of this occupant of the celestial world in its earthly forms produces; but for this I must refer you to the original.

The
Phædrus.

In the *Symposium*¹², the course of successive generaliza-
tion by which the mind arrives at the first principle of

The Sym-
posium.

* It cannot be denied that this latter tenet has a tendency to promote the perversions which the subject has undergone. But as Plato himself has explicitly unfolded his views, it is but a very *inferior* stage of the ascending science of the Beautiful which concerns itself with beauty in its outward manifestations at all. It is the first step, and only the first.

¹¹ [p. 250 A. ED.]

¹² [p. 211 C, fol. ED.]

LECT.
VI.

beauty is still more distinctly portrayed. Beginning with single visible objects, it extends to many, to all; it rises next to estimate the beauty of the soul, as infinitely exceeding all exterior developments; it soon recognises the same pervading principle in actions, in laws, in the manifold creations of moral energy. But this is only the portal to the higher beauty of the products of pure intelligence; nor is the ascending soul to be satisfied till, from the loftiest eminence of thought, it sees one primary beauty commanding the whole universe of being; and recognises but one science, the science that regards it! "Oh Socrates," continues his instructress,—for the sage professes to be only repeating the discourse of a Theban priestess,—“the true prize of life is the sight of the eternal beauty! Compared with such a sight as this, what would be the poor images of earth which so often trouble and perplex us? What, I ask you, would be the destiny of that mortal to whom it should be given to contemplate the unmingled beauty in all its purity and simplicity, no longer invested with perishable human accompaniments, but face to face to see and know the beauty unchangeable and divine? Think you he would have ground for complaint, who, fixing his eyes on such an object, should give himself solely to celestial communion with it? And is it not solely in the contemplation of the eternal beauty with that organ by which alone it can be seized, that he shall be enabled to produce, not images of virtue, because it is not to images he is attaching himself, but virtues real and genuine, because it is truth alone that he loves. Now it is to him that thus produces true virtue and preserves it that it belongs to be the favoured of God; it is to him more than to any other that it belongs to be immortal.” Such a contemplation as this is a contemplation of God. It is the ultimate idea of beauty which is the subject of the mental vision; but “ideas, distinct in themselves, are bound in mysterious unity with the very essence of the supreme of all. He guides himself by the rational principles of the universe; but these principles are at the same time inseparable from his existence. To direct the thoughts to them is to be lost in Him. You will not, then, be surprised to find that the perfection of which virtue is the effort, is by Plato described¹⁸ as *ὁμολοις θεῷ*, assimilation to God. This assimilation is the enfranchisement of the divine element of the soul. To approach Him as the substance of truth, is science; as the substance of goodness in truth, is wisdom; as the substance of beauty in goodness and truth, is love.

You will now, perhaps, have seen by what means it is

¹⁸ [*Theat.* p. 176 B. 'ED.]

that Plato endeavours to connect the emotional part of the constitution with a system professedly providing only for the purely rational element. The baser passions are assigned to a merely bodily origin, and Fortitude and Temperance are to repress and subjugate them. The more noble are either busied in assisting the power of Reason¹⁴ to crush all opposition, or they are themselves the wing¹⁵ by which the philosophic soul rises into its appropriate world. Finally, the general desire of temporary happiness is consigned to the charge of presiding Wisdom, which, dreading its excesses, cautiously measures out its daily allowance.

I had intended to have passed from the subject of the Platonic system of morals to that of the Platonic political philosophy; but the occasion will not permit the extended discussion it would require. I shall, therefore, merely observe that the *Politics* of Plato are a wide but faithful development of his moral theory. He wrote two large works on the subject; one (*The Republic*) in which he presents the Ideal of a State then unrealized, and probably for ever to continue so¹⁶; the other (*The Laws*), in which he undertakes to apply the principles of his ideal as far as possible to the state of his age and the world¹⁷. The main political engine with Plato is *Education*,—education not, indeed, in the vulgar sense of elementary teaching, which he thought of little comparative moment, but education in that wide conception of it which includes the training of every faculty of mind and body from the instant of birth to maturity. His *Republic* is truly a large *University*, even to the "traveling fellows." The fault of Plato's ideal of political perfection is, that it converts the members of a state into mere machines of the public will, and, annihilating all individuality, endangers the impulse to personal excellence; overpowers the subjects of government with a legislation perhaps too private, officious, and minute; opposes the growth of the natural affections (destroying at a blow all filial and connubial relations), and leaves no room for national expansion or circumstantial alteration¹⁸. The necessity under which he conceived himself of making the state the exact counterpart of the individual soul,—three castes (of governors, warriors, and artisans) answering to the triple division

The Politics of Plato.

The Republic.

¹⁴ [*Republ.* IV. p. 441 A: τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐπικουρον τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει. ED.]

¹⁵ [*Phædr.* p. 246, fol. ED.]

¹⁶ [As he says himself in the *Repub.* B. IX. fin. ED.]

¹⁷ [The relation of the polity sketched in the *Laws* to the ideal or perfect state is described in *Legg.* B. v. p. 739. ED.]

¹⁸ [A good critique of the Platonic State will be found towards the end of the second volume of Brandis's *Handbuch.* ED.]

LECT.
VI.

of Man,—undoubtedly hampered his freedom of speculation. The systematic spirit of Plato reduces everything under vast generalizations, and sees humanity, whether individual or social, under a single aspect, the loftiest of all, but uniform in its loftiness—and you require nothing more to show you how remote are the political writings of this great Thinker from the spirit of our day, than to remember the fact, that some of the principal texts of his profoundest metaphysic occur in the midst of *The Republic*. But with all their peculiarities—in many instances in consequence of their peculiarities—these extraordinary works maintain their interest beyond all subsequent political essays; for the union, characteristic of Plato, of sublime and comprehensive conceptions of the possibilities of moral advancement with the minutest special observation of human nature, they are still, perhaps, unequalled; nor is the literary education of any statist completed who has not made them his own.

Concluding
reflections.

And now, Gentlemen, as I may trust that those among you who have accompanied me through the series of these discourses with any regularity, and listened to them with any attention, have obtained a tolerable idea of the chief features of the most remarkable of all the ancient systems of philosophy, it remains that, having traversed this vast and interesting region, we pause for a moment on its borders, and, ere we leave it, endeavour to compress in a single reverted view its beauties and its defects. I have attempted to introduce the philosophy of Plato at some length to this audience, because (no doubt on account of not presenting any single available text-book) it unfortunately forms no subject of examination, except incidentally, in any department of our collegiate studies. Yet it is certain that no accuracy of knowledge in the later Grecian theories can at all compensate for imperfect acquaintance with this mighty monument of earlier speculation; the beginning, and yet the masterpiece of Grecian system. To Christian students, especially, it presents topics of perpetual interest, both from the tone of the system itself, and from the influence it has exercised over Ecclesiastical Literature in almost every age. And surely nothing can be more instructive (ought we to doubt that it was purposely provided?) than to watch the efforts of human intelligence often struggling in the very same path which Revelation came afterwards to clear of all obstruction; when it coincides, to see in it the unbribed testimony of natural reason to the supernatural communication,—when it differs or omits, to mark in every separate instance the calm unboastful superiority of the message from heaven!

I shall not occupy the short time that remains with any special discussion of the pure metaphysics of Plato. The very detail of the subject brought its own criticism with it; and the occasion does not allow recapitulation. Platonism is essentially a system of moral discipline or purification; it was in that light its Author saw it, and to that sole purpose his labours, however diversified, were dedicated. This is the point too in which false impressions of its value, of the real nature of its merits and its defects, are likely to prove of highest practical importance; and I would not wish you to leave this place under mistaken notions of either.

LECT.
VI.

The merits of the Platonic practical philosophy are clear and commanding. They perpetuate the value of Platonism to this day; they unquestionably render its records among the noblest and most elevating studies that can engage a human spirit when unoccupied by the higher lessons of inspiration. These merits consist, in the immutable basis which this system assigns to the principles of moral truth, in the moral aspect under which it contemplates the creation and the Creator, in the grandeur of its conceptions of the destinies of the human soul, and in the purity of its practical morality. These are high claims to our reverential admiration; they are claims which in every age have taught the noblest and purest spirits of our race to recur with veneration to the memory of Plato. For all truths, whencesoever derived, are mutually consistent; they gladly countenance each other; and no certainty or abundance of revealed knowledge will ever place the candid mind above welcoming with joy the corroborating attestations of philosophy.

*merits of
Platonism.*

The defects of the Platonic system of humanity are not, however, less certain than its merits; and the tone of general encomium which I have so long employed in speaking of its excellences, may justify me in noticing its blemishes now. After making allowances so large on its behalf, you will not attribute to narrowness or bigotry the exceptions I am next obliged to subjoin...I am not about to enlarge upon what, perhaps, are the most ordinary articles of accusation against Plato, his gratuitous theories about the origin and fortunes of the soul, partly because the practical interest of these theories has disappeared, and partly because (according to the views already laid before you) I believe them to have been by Plato himself either accepted as probabilities only, or adopted as attractive forms of profounder metaphysical principles. I speak of points which more directly concern our own habits of thinking on subjects of the highest importance, on which Plato has often before

LECT. VI. now misled, and may still mislead, his enthusiastic admirers.

In the first place, then, there runs through all the views of Plato a want of any distinct apprehension of the claims of divine justice in consequence of human sin. Even in his strongest references to punishment, it is still represented mainly, if not entirely, under the notion of a purificatory transition, a severe but beneficial *κάθαρσις*. This arises partly from his conception of the divine character, partly from his theory of the human soul itself. From the former, inasmuch as he considers the attribute of indignant wrath, or its results, inapplicable to Deity,—from the latter, because in considering the soul essentially in its higher elements divine, he could only look upon the misfortunes of its bodily connexion as incidental pollutions which might delay, but could not ultimately defeat its inalienable rights. He must be a very uncandid critic who can censure Plato severely for these misconceptions; but he would be a very imperfect expositor who should not mention them as such. There is probably no single point in the moral relations of the creation for which we are so entirely indebted to revelation, as this of the enormity of sin and the severity of divine judgment. Thus instructed, it is possible that the demands of divine justice may be demonstrated accordant with the antecedent notices of the moral reason; but there is a wide difference between proving a revealed principle, and discovering it before it has been revealed. We are not, then, to blame Plato severely for overlooking that mystery of divine righteousness which even the reiterated and explicit intimations of Inspiration can scarcely persuade ourselves practically to realize. But we *are* to censure those (and it is for this reason I mark the matter distinctly) who labour by unwarrantable glosses to dilute into the disciplinary chastenings of a wise benevolence the stern simplicity with which the Scriptures declare the awful anger of a rejected God. These teachers have abounded in every age, and in one remarkable era of our English Church history were so closely and avowedly connected with Platonism (especially in its later and more mystical forms) as to have thence derived their ordinary title¹⁹. Gifted with extraordinary powers of abstract contemplation, and a solemn grandeur of style, they abound with noble thoughts nobly expressed, but they are all marked with the characteristic

¹⁹ [The 'Cambridge Platonists' are of course the writers meant. One of the causes of the existence of this school was mental reaction against the morose Calvinism of the Puritans by or among whom its members had been educated. They were probably saved by Plato and Plotinus from falling into the opposite extreme of high-church intolerance which prevailed after the Restoration. Ed.]

defect of Platonized Christianity—a forgetfulness, or inadequate commemoration, of the most tremendous proof this part of the universe has ever been permitted to witness of the reality of the divine hatred for sin—the fact of the Christian Atonement.

The next point in which the exclusive cultivation of Platonism may become injurious is—in its indirect discouragement of active virtue. I need not say that no moral teacher can recommend in higher terms the usual exercises of social duty; but the true influences of any moral system depend less on the duties it verbally prescribes than on the proportion it establishes between them. And no one that remembers the Platonic conception of the contemplative “philosopher” as the perfection of humanity, can hesitate in pronouncing that Plato inclines the balance to that very side to which the students of his writings, from their reflective and sedentary habits, may be supposed already but too much biassed. The results of this tendency are obvious. To contemplate ideas is in a certain sense—if the soul and its ideal objects ultimately blend—to introvert the mind *upon itself*; to do this exclusively, or as the main excellence of man, is—if constitutional temperament combine—to endanger sinking into moral egotism, intellectual mysticism. Nor are the meditative follies of the Indian Yogi any more than the last and worst form of the tendency. The busy activity of Athenian minds and habits, perhaps, prevented Plato from clearly seeing the inevitable consequences of a system of moral discipline which perpetually represents its highest stage as one of simple contemplation; but the *αὐτοψία* of the Alexandrian school long after developed the secret genius of this element of the system, when transplanted to a more favourable soil.

Nor can it be denied, again, that Platonism is defective in those engagements for *the affections* which no system of human nature can omit without fatal imperfection. We saw how, in the scheme of social life advocated in the *Republic*, the whole body of domestic affections are annihilated by a single provision, the community of wives. This disregard of the original constitution of human nature is too often manifested by Plato in his projects for its advancement. Nor can it be replied, that this deficiency is remedied in the peculiar theory to which I have this day referred,—a theory which in its author’s design bears little reference to any communion of affections in the present state, but is, on the contrary, intended to hurry the mind from the present and sensible into an invisible and impalpable scene with which the human feelings cease to have an element in common. And as Platonism supplies little

LECT.
VI.

aliment for the innocent affections, it may also be added, that it does not sufficiently estimate the power of the evil ones; that in reducing the moral education to the recovery from ignorance and the distinct perception of transcendent truth, it underrates the tyranny of passion, and the still more oppressive despotism of habit, which often triumph in their most fatal vigour in minds exquisitely sensitive to moral impressions. It is in the clear apprehension of these daily experiences that Aristotle excels his master²⁰. It is in the combination of the excellences of the two with an element higher than either ever attained, that the ethics of Christianity immeasurably transcend them both.

*Origin of
the defects
enumerated.*

Much, doubtless, of this practical deficiency in Platonism arose from its illustrious founder's extravagant conceptions of the essential evil of Body in all its possible human forms. Wholly engaged with the immortal essence it imprisoned, and attributing to matter the organization of almost all which restrains that glorious stranger from soaring to its native skies, Plato was accustomed to regard with coldness and suspicion every principle which could not trace its connexion directly with the rational part of our complex constitution. To him everything was measured by an eternal standard; that which was not fit for eternity was of little consequence in time. A noble maxim, surely, but one whose application must depend on the nature of the eternity we anticipate. In proclaiming the perpetuation of the bodily organization, the Christian system has for ever dried the source of those delusive dreams of superhuman purity which proceed, more or less, upon the supposition that 'there is something inherently debasing in the very possession of a material frame. And when we enumerate the internal proofs which establish the fact, that this divine system never could have been the natural growth of (at least) the fashionable or popular philosophy of its time, we ought not to forget, that, so universal and so deep were these impressions of the ineffaceable malignity of body, that the earliest internal dissentients from the general creed of the Christian Church were those who could not believe it possible that an immaculate Redeemer could have been invested with an earthly body, and therefore maintained that the Divine Sufferer was but the shadowy apparition of a human frame.

After all—it must be said on behalf of Plato,—and I

²⁰ [Aristotle, it should be remembered, speaks quite as strongly as Plato of the superiority of speculative thought (*θεωρία*) to all other forms of human energy. See *Eth. N.* x. c. 8. Even the much vaunted *τὸ τέλος οὐ γινώσκεις ἀλλὰ πράξεις* has this meaning, the opposite of that generally assigned to it by modern moralizers; *πράξεις* denoting not 'practical' but mental or speculative activity, as distinguished from the mere possession of knowledge. ED.]

rejoice in a qualification which allows me to close this subject in that tone of sympathy and admiration in which I began it,—after all, it must in fairness be allowed,—that these errors are rather the tendencies of his system, than his own original representation of it. They were assuredly *in* it, but under his superintendence they did not dare to show themselves as after ages saw them. Of the truth and value of his leading principles he thought highly, but he never long resigns himself unreservedly to their guidance. Man as he ought to be, was the favourite subject of his thoughts; but man as he is, was seldom forgotten. Such was the scope of this man's vision, such his wonderful equilibrium in even his loftiest flights, that, though the theory may lose sight of human nature, the theorist does not. But the principles—the commanding ideas—were too expansive for any control but his own; he was sober amidst excitements that made others insane. His spirit, practical and speculative at once, enabled him to combine what others could only catch in fragments; ideas that he governed, governed inferior men. In that realm of new and vast conceptions which he had made his own, Plato might be compared to some mighty conqueror (to him, for example, of the succeeding generation) who founds a single empire of many discordant nations, and, during his own life, keeps it together by the mastery of his personal genius—endowing the whole with the spirit and character of one unbroken monarchy; but at whose death the combining pressure is lost, the vast aggregate falls asunder, the dissolved confederates return by degrees into the diversity of their national character, and dynasties without number originate out of the fragments of one.

I shall here close the subject. I trust next term to carry you farther in the history of Grecian speculation.

FOURTH SERIES.

LECTURE I.

ON THE SUCCESSORS OF PLATO. THE ACADEMY.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
I.

*Introductory re-
marks.*

WITH the close of my last address to you from this place I brought to a conclusion the philosophy of Plato. I entertain some hope that the discussions which I offered to your consideration on the subject of this sublime and singular system have attained the object which alone I proposed to myself in presenting them ;—that they have stimulated a curiosity which I confess they were not competent adequately to satisfy; and, by inducing a few of my hearers to recur from the lecturer to his Author, have contributed to introduce some of the more advanced students of our University to the most interesting and attractive of all the rich relics of ancient thought. It is the peculiar, and in many respects the fortunate tendency of modern criticism, that, unsatisfied with receiving the learning of antiquity through the uncertain medium of subsequent versions and commentaries, it reverts at once to the originals, and refuses all interpretations which are not verified by *them*. This spirit has, in one important department of inquiry, been unquestionably carried to an unwarrantable excess, to a disregard of all the confirmations of contemporary authority and all the lights of traditional belief ;—but it has as assuredly been accompanied by valuable results, in an increased knowledge of the very thoughts and expressions of the great masters of ancient lore, and in that freshness of interest which new theories of their meaning, whether right or wrong, impart to their labours and to the subjects on which those labours were expended. And, viewed merely as a means of mental discipline, there can be no doubt that an hour devoted to this independent research, is infinitely more valuable than days devoted to the patient indeed, but servile and mechanical, acquisition of a merely traditionary philosophy, however ancient or authoritative.

With regard to the writings of Plato many other considerations contribute to give value to this course of independent investigation. We possess the entire body of his recognized productions, and are, therefore, placed above the necessity of explanatory supplements; and the character which continental philosophy has for many years been assuming, leading it over the same ground which Plato trod, has more and more impressed the conviction that we see little which he did not see with equal or greater perspicuity, and that his own genuine writings may, therefore, be searched as authentic monuments of which our own age, perhaps, beyond all others, was predestined to understand the real value.

There is, probably, no student of the history of ancient speculation who has not felt a deep interest in addressing himself to examining the fortunes of the philosophy of Plato after the decease of its illustrious founder. We are prompt to conclude that its results must have been commensurate with its importance; that such a Presence could not have visited our earth without leaving behind it a long retinue of glories. That great results of Platonism do live upon the page of history is, indeed, certain; but we should be much disappointed if we expected any immediate manifestation of its power. The successors of Plato added no brilliancy to his name. They inherited the skeleton of his doctrines, but the life had disappeared; and the colouring and expression with which the frame had glowed it was beyond their power to perpetuate. Never was there in the history of philosophy an instance of so sudden an extinction. Some of the details of the Platonic teaching they preserved and transmitted; but a strange and distant element was to be incorporated with the thin cold compound before it resumed any of the warmth and expansion that marked it in the master's hands. This unfortunate result must be referred partly to the vast influence of rival systems; partly to the comparative inefficiency of teachers. In the succession of five philosophic instructors¹ who are usually named as the chiefs of the old Academy, there is little to detain us,—nor amid all the learning which has been profusely lavished upon investigating their tenets, is there a single deduction calculated to elucidate distinctively the character of their progress or regression. The point most observable is, perhaps, to be found in the reign of Xenocrates of Chalcedon. Xenocrates, it would seem, revived the alliance of Pythagorism with Platonism. His psychology terminated in the affirmation that the soul of

The successors of Plato in the Academy.

Characteristics.

Xenocrates succeeds Speusippus, B.C. 339. Is succeeded by Polemo, A.C. 315.

¹ [Speusippus (Plato's nephew,) Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, and Crantor. Ed.]

LECT.
I.

man is "a self-moving number"³—a combination (as we may interpret it) of activity and proportion⁴. Such views are opposed to all forms of materialism; and accordingly Cicero tells us⁵ "animi figuram, et quasi corpus, negavit esse." Of his theology we can scarcely furnish so favourable a report. "Deos enim octo esse dicit; quinque eos qui in stellis vagis nominantur; unum qui ex omnibus sideribus quæ infixæ cœlo sunt, ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandus Deus; septimum solem adjungit; octavamque Lunam⁶;"—a system of divinity on which the Epicurean narrator makes certainly the justifiable comment, "qui quo sensu *beati* esse possint, intelligi non potest." The record of his contemporary Speusippus's opinion is even preferable to this: "Deum esse vim animalem omnia regentem, statuit⁷." In the estimate of Cicero, the great characteristic of this earliest academy was the abandonment of the Socratic principle of hesitancy,—a singular instance of the mutability of philosophical schools. In this respect they resembled the rival school of Aristotle, which had already begun to systematize its vast masses of doctrine. "Utrique, Platonis ubertate completi, certam quandam disciplinæ formulam composuerunt, et eam quidem plenam ac refertam; illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus, et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt⁸." Of Polemon, of Crates, of Crantor, Cicero (a valuable authority in the history of the school to which he had eminently attached himself) delivers the same verdict,—*"in vetere disciplina Platonica nil mutant⁹."* They had changed little or nothing in the formal recitation of doctrines; but everything shows how the spirit had evaporated. And what surely confirms our conviction that, with all this superficial sameness, a deep internal change must have passed through the traditions of Platonism, is the perpetual evidence of Cicero¹⁰, that all these teachers "*ab Aristotele nihil magno opere dissenserunt.*" They agreed with him in some of the formulas of their ethical instruction, and in some of the principles of their metaphysical philosophy, and they were content not to examine more deeply. A fuller appreciation of the system whose tenets they professed to represent would infallibly have committed

³ [Arist. *de An.* I. 2 and 4; where Simplicius observes *ἡνωκράτους ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς οὗτος λόγος.* Ed.]

⁴ [Rather, perhaps, the principle of Life and Law. Ed.]

⁵ [*Tusc. Quest.* I. 10, 20. Ed.]

⁶ [Cicero *Nat. D.* I. 13, 34. Ed.]

⁷ [Ib. I. 13, 32. Ed.]

⁸ [Cic. *Acad.* I. 4, 17. Ed.]

⁹ [He extends the remark to Speusippus and Xenocrates, *Acad.* I. 9, 34: "diligenter ea quæ a superioribus acceperant tuebantur." Ed.]

¹⁰ [*De Orat.* III. 18, 67. Ed.]

them with Peripateticism ; nor can the disciples have evaded the opposition which the master so largely attracted, except by a more or less constant evasion of his peculiar doctrines. LECT. I.

But the time soon arrived when the results of the teaching of Plato were to manifest themselves in a more definite form. And as this vast system contained within it elements of a very opposite character, such as the genius of the founder alone was adequate to harmonize, we may expect that, when relieved from his controlling hand, these elements should evince a strong mutual repulsion. Platonism presented itself under two aspects, and so forcibly under both that it became a favourite speculation of ancient criticism to determine which was eminently characteristic of the author. Whether Plato was to be enrolled in the list of sceptical or of dogmatical philosophers,—among those who denied the possibility of assured knowledge, or those who maintained a fixed scheme of doctrine,—was perpetually agitated. You will easily understand, that the difficulty is solved by apportioning his doubts and his beliefs to different regions of the mind respectively. And according as the inquirer is chiefly busied with each, will be his verdict of the Platonic theory of knowledge ;—if he be principally engaged in studying the value of the informations of *sense*, he will pronounce Plato a sceptic, for in the modifications of the sensitive organization we know that Plato refused to recognise any stable basis of truth ; if, on the contrary, his philosophical habits lead the inquirer to meditate on the notices of the pure intellect, he will pronounce Plato the most resolute of dogmatizers, for here alone he professed to see the form of truth, the reality of being, and that with a fulness of perfection which rendered denial or hesitation impossible. Further view of Platonism

From this distinction, then, we derive the great line which separates the two chief developments of the Platonic philosophy. In speaking of them we are enabled to follow the order of time ; for these developments were not contemporary, but successive. The first was nearly exhausted, when the second, and far more interesting, form commenced. The sceptical result of Platonism is exhibited in the Academic Philosophy, the immediate occupant of the School of Plato ;—the doctrinal result is revealed in that singular succession of teachers who at Rome, Alexandria, and Athens, accompanied and opposed the early fortunes of the Christian faith, and who under the title of the new, or later, Platonists, have intimately associated themselves with the very name of the philosopher, and materially affected his reputation. This is the doctrinal side of Platonism represented by the Academy, the doctrinal by the Neo-Platonists.

It is with the former of these—the Academic School—

LECT.
I.*The Academic School.*

that we are first to be engaged ; and we shall consider it, according to the plan adopted in these Lectures, not in its succession of names and forms, so much as in the course and changes of its spirit.

The Academic School was an attempted compromise between scepticism and belief, with a large balance in favour of the former. Its scepticism is its prominent characteristic ; and in this respect we shall now examine the *rationale* of its existence.

How then did the Philosophy of Plato lead to this spirit of doubt ?

Origin of the Academic Scepticism. Sceptical element in Plato.

In what I have just now said of the Platonic view of the knowledge attainable through the machinery of sense, I have supplied the first answer to this question. To those who were resolute to refuse all mental capacities beyond those which were directly concerned in elaborating the products of the sensitive consciousness, it is obvious that the discussions of Plato furnished the sure means of unlimited scepticism, in perpetually discountenancing these impressions of sense as the possible ground of real knowledge. To a reader holding this limited creed, the founder of the vastest of systems must have appeared the most unqualified of sceptics. He cut from beneath such a reader the only ground on which that reader would consent to rest.

Again, by the very *form of exposition* the Platonic treatises might encourage such a spirit. The dialogue which continually invites and supposes mutual opposition ; has a natural tendency to suggest the possibility of objections indefinitely prolonged. This result was heightened in the dialogues of Plato by the suppression of distinct conclusions. Compositions intended merely to stimulate meditation are seldom adapted to implant definite doctrine ; and the very irony in which the Platonic Socrates loved to indulge was more calculated to suggest misgivings as to the solidity of all received systems than to replace them by any settled creed.

To this must be added the *disciplinary* purpose of many of the discussions conceived or recorded by Plato. The search for truth was made a matter of mental exercise. It is not the object of the chase to capture the prey so much as to prolong and vary the pursuit. This, it is true, was in the Platonic scheme of intellectual education a merely preliminary process,—the hardening of the soldier for a genuine encounter to come. But it is not to be supposed that this arrangement of subjects and methods was understood or observed when the manuscripts of Plato were circulated in one collection. Passages which were originally meant as exemplifications of mental gymnastic, were readily adopted

as the philosopher's avowal and exhibition of the equal plausibility of every form of opinion.

LECT.
I.

And we can easily apprehend how these results were assisted by the very exaltation of the Platonic tone of thought. Truth when placed at such a height seemed to many minds unattainable; what was so lofty seemed out of sight. The multitude would readily declare, that it was as well to say, "there is no truth," as to say, "there is truth only in ideas;" the ideal was (as so often) confounded with the imaginary. Keen and suspicious critics would say that a system so aerial was the magnificent escape of a defeated logician, and pronounce that the reality which was found only in the eternal exemplars of things was not the reality for which they were interested or contended—the realities, as they are called, of life and experience. And the upholder of the inheritance of Platonism, discouraged by the want of sympathy, would gradually discard these higher elements; the opposition of influential schools would seduce them to a lower field of conflict; and on that lower field finding little countenance from their own master, yet unwilling to surrender the great cause of the reality and fixity of Knowledge, they would occupy themselves in subtle distinctions and evasive compromises, or under a show of resistance betray the question and deny the loftier prerogative of reason altogether.

The prominent tenets of the academic succession were fixed and matured by the rivalry of *Stoicism*. The disposition to doubt was prepared already; but the dogmatism of the Stoic teachers precipitated it into form and firmness.

Antagonistic influences of Stoicism.

The Stoics had occupied themselves deeply with the theory of human knowledge. After much consideration, they had devised a threefold distribution of the subject; classing the varieties of assent under the titles of science, opinion, and a mediate condition of the mind which they denominated *φαντασία καταληπτική*; if, indeed, this last term ought not rather to be interpreted as expressing that degree of conviction which belonged to those representations of which science (*ἐπιστήμη*) was composed. All knowledge, in the Stoical theory, resolved itself into communications between the exterior world and the soul; the *φαντ. καταλ.* expressed that impression which the soul detained as solid and certain. It was against this last tenet that the hostility of the Academy was chiefly directed. The doctrine of the *φαντασία καταληπτική* upheld, that impressions from objects distinct from the mind itself, when accompanied by a thorough conviction of the reality, were sufficient to establish knowledge and to satisfy the legitimate demands of the reason. The Academics met this

The Stoical theory of Perception and of the criterion of Knowledge.

LECT.
I.*Academic
denial of the
Stoical doc-
trine.*

affirmation with their ἀκαταληψία, which denied the certainty of the conformity of perceptions with their causes or objects. In this controversy the Stoics appear to have seldom grappled with the real difficulties of the case; though, it must be admitted, the small and fragmentary portions of their earlier writings which we possess, can scarcely warrant a very positive determination on this point.

*Academic
theory of
Probability.*

But while the Academic teachers rejected the certainty of the communication between the world of reality and the soul of man, they professed, nevertheless, to admit the necessity of fixed beliefs. Accordingly they constructed (chiefly under the guidance of Carneades) that scale of probabilities which forms one of the most distinctive characteristics of the school; and which, taken together with their "acatalepsy" or refusal of absolute certainty, completes the fundamental elements of their system. The impossibility of absolute certainty, the value of high probability,—these are the dominant maxims of the Academic philosophy.

*Five suc-
cessions.*

*Acemy. Ar-
cesilaus flor.
c. 278
Carneades
flor. b. c. 120.
Philo flor.
b. c. 92.
Antiochus
flor. b. c.
79.*

But the proportion of these elements varied at different periods of the history of the school, which stretches from the age of Plato to that of Cicero, and which critics have divided into five¹⁰ successions whose respective heads are considered to be (after the founder) Arcesilaus, Carneades, Philo, and Antiochus. I shall proceed to notice the principal stages of progress observable in these successions; purposely avoiding those minuter details of literary anecdote which you can easily obtain in the ordinary histories of ancient philosophy,—and endeavouring to confine your attention to the changes which affect fundamental questions. Of these the accounts are often contradictory and almost always vague; a few prominent points alone direct our course in a vast and shifting landscape.

*Arcesilaus,
the father
of the Aca-
demic Scep-
ticism*

Arcesilaus, a brother disciple of Zeno whom he was afterwards to oppose, a pupil of Pyrrho and Diodorus, first gave its peculiar character to the Academic school. His life and habits appear to have been perfectly suited to a teacher of the philosophy of indifference. It is recorded that he encouraged his disciples to desert his own teaching whenever they preferred that of any rival instructor; though it is indeed possible that this permission may have been the result of a thorough confidence in his own powers of attracting their attention,—powers which are attested by all the authorities. His blameless life was evidenced in the admission of even his opponents; his prompt and happy

¹⁰ [Cicero recognizes but two, others only three Academic successions—the Old, the Middle, and the New. Sext. Emp. *Pyrrh. Hyp.* l. 220. Ed.]

activity of intellect in the replies by which he discomfited them. None of the writings of Arcesilaus, however, are now extant; and the reports of the ancient critics and collectors are indecisive and perplexing as to his exact tenets.

For instance, certain passages of Sextus Empiricus and of Cicero seem to intimate that the scepticism of Arcesilaus was only apparent, and his devotion genuine to the system of Plato. "If we may believe what is related of Arcesilaus," says Sextus (*Pyr. Hypotyp.* 1. § 234), "his scepticism was only assumed; he used it as a test for his disciples; he afterwards entrusted his doctrine, which was no other than the doctrine of Plato, to those whom he had recognized as worthy to be admitted to his intimacy, and capacitated to receive his teaching." The general testimony of antiquity, however, does not strongly corroborate this representation; or, if it allow to Arcesilaus any definite scheme of tenets, overbalances them by a large weight of the declared maxims and objections of the sceptical philosophy. And Cicero himself allows that Arcesilaus had collected from the books of Plato and the discourses of Socrates this principal conclusion, "*nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit*,"—and in another place assures us that Arcesilaus had severed the feeble link by which Socrates had connected doubt with certainty,—"*negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset*." The *positive* system of Arcesilaus, I conclude, was altogether his practical system of moral life; the higher ideal theory of Plato we have no evidence that he maintained, and the probability is that he overlooked it; and against the stoical theory of irresistible belief we have his reasonings preserved,—that there can be no medium between absolute science and mere opinion, and that it is impossible to prove that perceptions may not misrepresent their objects. These things seem to show us in Arcesilaus the first complete development of the sceptical tendency of Platonism, as yet unregulated and unsystematized; accompanied by a conservation of moral propriety, derived from the authority of that great system, though supported on different grounds.

The second progressive form of the sceptical tendency is found in Carneades. Its character is systematic exposition. In the able administration of Carneades, the Academic philosophy assumed its definite form as a matured and finished theory. Carneades is the founder of the philosophy of probabilities. The great question of the day being the criterion of truth, Carneades denied the existence of any such criterion, but admitted differences in the degrees

LECT.

1

*Carneades.
His controversy
with
the Stoics
concerning
the criterion.*

¹¹ [*De Oral.* III. 18, 67. Ed.]

¹² [*Acad.* I. 12, 45. Ed.]

of assurance, and undertook to classify these differences. Of this classification some record is preserved; but we may easily believe that the philosopher carried his system into exacter details than any we possess. Truth, he held, was unattainable in absolute certainty; but we live in a world of resemblances to truth, and the practical assent of the mind must be determined by the degree of the resemblance, as far as this can be collected. You will remember that the Stoics, and the Academy in consonance with them, held that all knowledge was reducible to certain primary impressions made upon the soul by objects distinct from itself. These *φαντασίαι* are the elements of all knowledge, and upon the certainty of them as representations of realities (it was thought) all certainty of all truth depends. Now the *φαντασία* (I quote Sextus Empiricus's perspicuous statement¹⁸) has a double relation—to the object causing and to the mind perceiving (*τὸ ἀπ' οὗ γίνεταί*, and *τὸ ἐν ᾧ γίνεταί*),—to the external object (*τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον αἰσθητόν*), and to the man. Hence arise two considerations or habitudes of the *φαντασία*,—*πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν* and *πρὸς τὸν φαντασιούμενον*. Each of these *σχέσεις* or relations may be true or false, whether really or apparently. The *φαντασία* is true in relation to the *object*, when it is *σύμφωνος* or conformable; false, when *διάφωνος*, or discordant, with it. The *φαντασία* in its relation to the subject—to the mind—is *phenomenally* or *apparently* true or false (*ἐστὶ φαινομένη ἀληθής*); and in the determination of the circumstances which govern this apparent truth or falsehood lies the value of logical criterions. Carneades then proceeds to establish his degrees of probability, as the measures of the practical belief. The first degree is that which he terms *πιθανή φαντασία*, or *ἔμφασις*, a strong persuasion of the propriety of the impression made; the second and third degrees result from comparisons of the impression with others associated with it, and with itself. You will perceive, then, that Carneades—the great representative of the Academic school—having very clearly fixed the double relation of mental apprehensions to the reality of things and to the mind itself, denies altogether the possibility of attaining any certainty on the former relation, and reduces the latter to mere subjective persuasion, to which he undertakes to assign laws and canons. The position held by Carneades,

¹⁸ [*Adv. Math.* VII. § 166, fol. Compare Cic. *Acad.* II. 6. This controversy between the Stoics and the Academy will remind the modern reader of that between Reid and Brown on the nature of Sensation and Perception. See Brown, Lecture XXV., and compare Sir W. Hamilton's critique, *Discussions on Philosophy*, No. II. The *Theatetus* of Plato was probably the source of the Academic theory: as the Cynics seem to have drawn the first outlines of the Stoical doctrine of *κατάληψις*. Ed.]

then, bears a strong resemblance to that occupied in the last century by Kant; as the ulterior development of Platonism by the school of Alexandria resembles with equal accuracy the reform of Kantism attempted by Schelling and his followers in our own day. LECT. I.

The moral views of the Academics, however, as presented by this teacher, contrast very unfavourably with the inflexible ethics of the German philosopher. Their logic being degraded to the estimate of probabilities, their ethics were placed upon no solid foundation of immutable certainty. The Sovereign Good was usually expressed by such formulas of vague and ambiguous purport as "the enjoyment of the gifts of Nature"¹⁴, "the union of virtue and happiness," and the like; and the opposition of the Stoics probably produced an undue tendency to elevate the inferior member of the combination¹⁵. This, it probably was, which induced Carnades to deny the reality of all justice but that which springs from positive laws¹⁶, and to adopt the degrading practice of defending every side indifferently in questions of moral casuistry¹⁷. And Cicero, the avowed favourer of the Academic method of philosophy, in the greatest of his moral treatises deserted it for the spirit and teaching of the Stoics.

The character of the Academic philosophy under its most characteristic teacher, was, then, it is evident, that of moderation and compromise. Essentially sceptical, it endeavoured to evade extreme results, and thence gained the honour of a distinction from absolute scepticism to which it had only slender rights. The Academics, declares Sextus¹⁸, assert reflectively; the Pyrrhonists, by mere necessity and instinct; the Academics allow degrees of probability, the Pyrrhonists pronounce all probabilities equal. But it is manifest that these differences (and others which he mentions) draw a line of distinction only between Academicism and the more extravagant forms of the Sceptical doctrines; not at all between it and any judicious system of indifferentism. It is certain that the whole spirit of the Academic school was a betrayal of the higher logic of

¹⁴ [Cicero, *Tusc.* v. 30, 84. ED.]

¹⁵ ["Contra Stoicorum disciplinam ingenium ejus exarserat," says Cicero, *Ibid.* ED.]

¹⁶ [Jura sibi homines pro utilitate sanxisse, scilicet varia pro moribus—jus autem naturale esse nullum. Cic. *De Repub.* III. 15, 24. ED.]

¹⁷ [Cic. *De Nat. D.* I. 5, 11. ED.]

¹⁸ [*Pyrrh. Hyp.* I. § 226. The meaning is not very well represented in the text. Sextus alludes to the ethical difference of the two schools: ἀγαθόν τι φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαῖκοι καὶ κακὸν οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς (οἱ Σκεπτικοί) ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ περὶ εἶναι... ἡμῶν ἀδοξάστως ἐπομένων τῷ βίῳ, ὥστε μὴ ἀνερέγγητοι ὦμεν. ED.]

LECT. absolute truth ; and a substitution for it of a system of practical beliefs claiming no higher warrant than the obvious utility of a practical adherence. And the character which his Stoic opponents applied to Arcesilaus, that of "the traitor to Platonism," was really applicable to the main body of his successors with as perfect truth.

The great value of the Academical philosophy was its clear perception of *the importance of probabilities*. In this field it is, in antiquity, unrivalled. And hence it became an easy resort for those men of moderate temperament who, without force or firmness of speculation sufficient to make abstract truth a practical foundation, were yet pleased to refer to philosophy the duties and conduct of ordinary life.

*Philo and
Antiochus.*

On the third form of Academicism I shall not detain you long. Its masters were Philo and Antiochus : its predominant character, a gradual return to the original views of the founder. This seems very discernible in the accounts given by Cicero of the force of argument with which Antiochus upheld the reality and evidence of mental perceptions ; nor do I know a more interesting fragment in all the records of ancient learning than the account which this great writer gives of the views of Antiochus in the second part of the *Academical Questions*, from the 7th to the 11th chapters. Into Rome, which was now beginning to form the centre of intellectual exertion, the writings of Plato and Aristotle had been already imported ; and the treasure was beginning to attract an eagerness of examination which, for a considerable time, superseded original invention. *Eclecticism* was the inevitable result, and in Cicero himself (the greatest philosophical name of the period) we see it instanced. Upon this new ground a gradual reunion of all sects commenced ; the Academics began to admit the necessity of principles more definite ; the Stoics, under Panætius and Posidonius, to relax the repulsive sternness of their extreme dogmas. The fermentation at length settled in a new and distinct form of philosophy where Plato was again recognized as master ; but in which a portion of his philosophy long buried from the public eye was brought once more into strong and almost exclusive light.

LECTURE II.

THE SUCCESSORS OF PLATO CONTINUED.

* GENTLEMEN,

WE have seen the gradual transformation of the Academic philosophy into a moderated Stoicism; in conformity with that tendency to universal union which seems to have characterized the speculations of the age immediately antecedent and subsequent to the rise of the Christian religion. It appeared as if the wisdom of heathenism, moved by a common danger, had, through all its divisions, combined against the common enemy. The reappearance of old philosophy upon a new stage naturally produced this disposition,—first to neglect original research in the study of the ample treasures already provided, and then to attempt general reconciliation of systems from the absence of that polemical ardour which perhaps personal authorship alone can give. It is true that the four great divisions of the philosophic world still preserved distinctive characters, still sent forth their respective pupils and representatives; but each imperceptibly received influences from all the rest, and the feeling grew each day more and more powerful, that certainty, if ever attainable, was only to be attained by an equitable estimate of the entire mass of thought, and a patient selection from all of the best that each could bring.

LECT.
II.

*Eclectic
tendencies
of the later
Greek
schools.*

This eclectic tendency seems destined to arise at all the great pauses of the march of philosophy. When every path of escape through the tangled forest of speculation seems tried in vain, men are apt, as by a natural instinct, to collect in the centre and compare notes for some happier essay. But real eclecticism is, after all, a rare development; the fixity of its orbit is seldom undisturbed by surrounding attractions; and however impartially it begins, it usually ends in some form of unqualified partizanship. There is certainly little of this equitable indifference in that continental philosophy which claims the title in our own age; there was still less in the eclecticism of the first centuries of the Christian æra.

As, then, it was to be expected that some form of positive doctrine would eventually emerge ascendant from the general chaos, it may be worth reflecting, *which* form it

LECT.
II.*Inadequacy
of the sepa-
rate schools
to meet the
require-
ments of
the age.*

was likely to be, to what teaching it would bear affinity, what image and superscription it would boast to carry?

The competitors for the mastery of the age were the schools of the Epicureans, the Peripatetics, the Stoics, the Platonics. The last had, indeed, wandered widely from the prescribed injunctions of their master; but they were already shewing signs of retrocession, and the multiplication and critical revisal of his works were, at all events, likely to direct attention from the expositors to their original. The *writings* of Plato were there to vindicate his fame, whatever might be the perversions or inconsistencies of those who professed to bear his standard; and it was the very spirit of the Roman and Alexandrian literature of this period to lean to the ancient and disparage the new, to prize the comment in proportion to its antiquity, and the text above all.

*The Epicu-
reans.*

The philosophy of Epicurus could not claim this predominant position. Its popularity was unquestioned, its adaptation to a luxurious age could not be doubted. But it was not formed to satisfy the wants of the time, however it might minister to its pleasures. It was, indeed, as it still continues to be, the tacit philosophy of the careless; and might thus number a larger army of disciples than any contemporary system. But its supremacy existed only when it estimated numbers, it ceased when tried by *wright*. The eminent men of Rome were often its avowed favourers, but they were for the most part men eminent in arms and statesmanship rather than the influential directors of the world of speculation. Nor could the admirable poetic force of Lucretius, or the still more attractive ease of Horace, confer such strength or dignity upon the system as to enable it to compete with the new and mysterious elements now upon all sides gathering into conflict.

The Stoics.

The chances for Stoicism were greater. Its dignity secured respect; its utility in an age of trial and oppression recommended it to men prepared to suffer. With such expositors as Seneca, Epictetus, Arrian, Antoninus, it would be likely rather to acquire new distinctions than to lose any of its original lustre. But Stoicism had its weak points too. Its rigid and inflexible formulas allowed of no expansion, no universality of application, no variety of form; its notion of Deity—majestic, indeed, but cold, and debased, too, in some respects by unwarrantable physical conceptions,—was ill adapted to meet the spirit of the age, which, from various causes, had acquired a theological tendency to remote and solitary abstractions.

*The Peripa-
tetics, Aris-*

The philosophy of Aristotle, which attracted much attention, scarcely obtained much actual influence as a dis-

tinct guide of thought. It already, indeed, began to attract to itself those masses of commentary which at length overloaded and sunk it; the long line of Aristotelian critics begins so early as Andronicus of Rhodes, who flourished nearly a century before our æra; but, exclusive of this scholastic reverence and care, its power was not largely felt. This deficiency of influence is, probably, traceable to, what is, in some degree, the main excellence of the Aristotelian spirit, the exceeding *moderation* of it. It is traceable, also, to the kindred characteristic of this philosophy, its absence of appeals to the higher aspirations of our nature; which the age of which I speak (acted on by the influences of Christianity, and of the mystical wisdom of the eastern nations) peculiarly, and often extravagantly, demanded*.

LECT.
II.*Aristotle and his commentators.*

It remains, then, that we find in the philosophy of *Plato* the object which alone could fully correspond to the secret sympathies of the time. And, in spite of all affectations of impartiality, in *this* the eclecticism of Rome and Alexandria resulted. At Alexandria, which its situation and its commerce united to elevate into the natural theatre for the enterprise, the attempt at universal conciliation was chiefly made. Its vast library, the gradual accumulation of the Ptolemies, furnished materials for the work; the enormous aggregate of wisdom depressed the spirit of original inquiry, and threw every speculative mind into the attitude of criticism. The general conviction, that on subjects of mere speculation the mind of man had done its utmost in producing these piles of thought, had, however, the beneficial result of urging many to those positive sciences in which so much remained to be done. This is a portion of the history of the literature of Alexandria which deserves, perhaps, more attention than it has ordinarily received;—it lies, however, altogether beside my present object. “The expression,” observes Matter, in the preface to his valuable account of the Alexandrian writers—“the expression, ‘School of Alexandria,’ has of itself given rise to many incorrect opinions; it is very improper, inasmuch as it can be applied equally to the School of the Jews, of the Christians, of the Alexandrian Greeks...In fact the inquiry here relates not to ‘the School,’ but to numerous schools. Even those I have just named may be subdivided into many others...Demetrius Phalereus, Zenodotus, Aristarchus, &c. have founded at Alexandria

*The philosophic tendencies of the age result in Neo-Platonism.**Influences of the schools of Alexandria.*

* When the philosophy of Aristotle became really the dominant philosophy of an age, these tendencies were otherwise provided for; the human mind could bear Aristotelism as a supplement to Christianity, but it would have starved upon Aristotelism alone.

LECT.
II.

schools of grammar, of criticism, of recension; Herophilus, Erasistratus, &c. schools of anatomy, of medicine; Timarchus, Aristillus, Hipparchus, and Ptolemy, schools of astronomy; Euclid, Apollonius of Perga, Diophantus, &c. schools of geometry and arithmetic; Eratosthenes and Strabo schools of geography; Ænesidemus, Sextus Empiricus, Potamon and Ammonius Saccas, schools of philosophy; the sacred interpreters, Aristobulus and Philo, Jewish schools; the emissaries of Christianity, Pantæus, Clement of Alexandria, Christian schools. Besides this, each of the philosophical sects of ancient Greece formed a particular school or family at Alexandria. The poets themselves were distributed into pleiads..." Such was the diversity of intellectual exertion in the Alexandrian academies, to all of which the vast library and its appurtenances presented a common centre and a local bond of union. The Museum, indeed, of all the institutions of antiquity gives us the nearest resemblance to the modern university. The emulative, ambitious temper of the Athenian had never led him anxiously to desire, or even to conceive, this union of labour; while the very position of Alexandria,—the key at once of East and West, and receiving into its magnificent harbours the commerce of both,—seemed to mark it out as the natural emporium of the literature of the world.

Our path lies through only one region of this varied field, but it is one which became ultimately the most influential of all, and which is now almost alone remembered as the characteristic teaching of Alexandria. The sciences of pure observation, or of mathematical deduction, as they advance obliterate their own steps; each inventor absorbs his predecessor in himself, and obscures his fame in adding to his labours; the last layer of the pile hides all the rest: those of mere speculation, working by no such unvaried principle of advance, leave their great names almost unaltered by subsequent changes; their symbol is not so much a structure augmenting by additions in height, as a structure augmenting by collateral edifices of every form and order; their vast monuments of thought lie scattered over the whole field of history, and their most ancient performances are almost always as interesting, often as suggestive, sometimes as instructive, as their latest.

We must now proceed to consider the circumstances that prepared the formation of this new development of Platonism on the stage of Alexandria. Perhaps the subject may become simplified by separating the Grecian and native influences from those of foreign origin. Your attention is directed in the first instance to the former. The particulars which I shall present will probably contribute

to illustrate yet more fully those superior chances of Platonism in the contest for philosophic influence, to which I have already alluded.

LECT.
II.

We have seen through what varieties of depression the philosophy of Plato passed in the hands of his successors in the Academy. Having sunk into a system of restless disbelief in theory, and lost all its moral dignity in practice, it had at length, as if in weariness, reverted (though feebly and indecisively) to the lofty lessons of its founder.

*The Grecian
elements of
Neo-Plato-
nism.*

But the interests of *scepticism* were in the meantime adopted and patronized by a more vigorous band. It has been held by some authorities that the succession was preserved without the loss of a single link in the original school of Pyrrho and Timon; a point difficult to be clearly established, both on account of the obscurity of the names instanced, and on account of the very genius of scepticism, which tends little to decisive systematic formation, and still less to the perpetuation of it. But however this may be, it is certain that at the period of the Christian æra, the theory of suspension and unbelief suddenly manifested itself with a vigour and completeness scarcely paralleled in any previous or subsequent age. Indeed the sceptical system seems to have been the only one at this time which evinced the freshness and variety of original thought. Pyrrho, it is probable, had furnished the example—Ænesidemus, Agrippa, and above all, Sextus Empiricus, completed the project—of systematizing all the grounds of hesitation (*τρόποι ἐποχῆς*). Sextus reasoned and wrote at the close of the second century, at the period when the Alexandrian school was rising into distinction. We can easily conceive, then, how this bold uncompromising advocacy of the philosophy of doubt must have urged to its farthest extremes the dogmatism of Alexandria; how this denial of the reality of knowledge in any of its departments must especially have led to that peculiar theory of the nature and prerogatives of the human reason from which, as we shall hereafter see, everything important in the Neo-Platonic system arises.

1. *Reaction
against the
Sceptics.*

The second cause or element in the formation of this system operated not exteriorly, but within it. I have on a former occasion observed to you that the original system of Plato, as far as it depended on the teaching of previous masters, was principally due to Socrates on the one hand, to Pythagoras on the other; these ingredients being plainly distinguishable even in the compound which Plato's peculiar skill in fusing all things to one mass enabled him to present. As the Socratic principle became detached and prominent in the Academic scheme, so the Pythagorean

2. *The Py-
thagorism
contained
in Plato's
writings.*

LECT.
II.

rose into exclusive activity in the Platonism of Alexandria. This was due partly to the taste for antiquity which belongs to an age eminently critical, partly to the desire for the guarantee of high authority in preference to the mere force of reason which the same tendencies seem usually to generate. Those who shrank from the cold and comfortless exhortations of the sceptical teachers, from that melancholy play of argument by which every security of belief and practice was successively exhibited to be successively overthrown, and who yet found it hard to accompany the pure Platonist to his heights of speculation, naturally sighed for the easy repose of authority, for authority which might at once preserve to them the form of reason, and yet base reason upon foundations deeper than its own. Now the only existing system which professed to connect itself with an authoritative antiquity was that of Plato; and this chiefly through the medium of the Pythagorean traditions. It was well known that the old Pythagorean doctrine, delivered mainly in mysterious symbols, had itself reached Italy from remote sources, and affected an almost supernatural origin. The character of the founder was itself shrouded in mystery and miracle. Strange traditions had floated down the stream of ages, it was the very genius of the time to labour to collect them; these traditions had invested a single sage of antiquity with powers and privileges beyond those of man, it was the spirit of the time to exalt these claims to canonization. It is not unlikely that in Italy many local associations would contribute to increase the charm that encompassed the name of Pythagoras. And thus a remarkable revolution was effected; Plato had received the mystical formulas of the Samian sage, to transform them as far as possible into their logical equivalents, to translate them into the language of pure intellect; the later Pythagoreans received the doctrines of Plato, to transform them back into their mystical originals. It was no longer a Platonized Pythagoras, but a Pythagorized Plato. It would appear that some teachers—as Anaxilaus of Larissa, Moderatus, Nicomachus—endeavoured to blend the traditions of Pythagoras with the physical and logical theories of Plato; that others, leaning rather to the moral and ascetic views of Pythagoras, exalted his code into a religion. Of the latter class, the name which has come down to our times with most celebrity is that of Apollonius Tyaneus. In this famous person the religious element of Pythagorism reached its highest pitch, and being supported and modified by its mysticism of numbers and figures, resulted in the imaginary physics of magic and demonology. The identity of the influences in the

Alexandrian school is proved, not only by the confession of its chief writers, with whom Pythagoras is evermore the symbol of the perfection of wisdom,—but by the complete identity of the results,—Iamblichus, and even Plotinus, presenting, in many of their practical extravagancies, only milder forms of the folly and imposture that marked the life of Apollonius.

We must not forget, however, in the enumeration of these disposing causes, that there likewise existed a body of teachers who professed to expound the genuine doctrines of Plato himself. We possess the abstract of Platonism by Alcinous, which is really a valuable aid to students of this philosophy; Apuleius of Medaura, and, still more, Maximus Tyrius, were nearly contemporary with the rise of the peculiar doctrines of the school of Alexandria. The biographer and moralist Plutarch did for the Platonism of this period all which a style eminently popular, and peculiar facility of illustration, could effect. But in truth it is not easy to appropriate these writers to a distinct class. The tendency to religious speculation is equally theirs; and to speculation of the very same character and scope. The endeavour to fortify philosophical conclusions by supposed allegories in the poetical mythology of heathenism, characterizes them all. The abdication of the labour of new invention, the weariness of the seeming fruitlessness of the old, the consequent recurrence to ancient authority, and the willingness to be deceived in anything that pretends to be such, is as observable in the Platonist Apuleius as in the Pythagorean Apollonius¹.

These notices may serve to indicate some of the preparatives of the Alexandrian school which pre-existed in the philosophy of the West. We must now contemplate a distinct source of influence, whose infusions of spirit and of doctrine were even more conspicuous and lasting.

There is scarcely a question in the history of literature more difficult to decide satisfactorily than the circumstances that produced a fact in itself altogether unquestionable, the introduction of Oriental ideas into the later philosophy of Greece.* Some critics (as Meiners) have boldly decided that the Oriental philosophy and its influences are equally imaginary, and that the results which are ordinarily attributed to them, were the simple evolution of Platonic principles. Others, again, have recurred to India as the original centre from which all these influences radiated,

¹ [Not however in Plutarch, whose Platonicæ Quaestiones are marked both by learning and sobriety. Another perfectly sober Platonist is the great physician Galen, whose view, however, of the relation between the doctrines of Aristotle and Plato is conceived in the eclectic or syncretistic spirit of the time. ED.]

³ *The writings of the later expositors of Plato—Alcinous, Apuleius, Maximus Tyrius.*

Plutarch (flourished under Domitian).

Oriental element of Neo-Platonism.

LECT.
II.

and have carried them through Persia to Greece and to Egypt. It is the opinion of another class of critics, that the *ανατολική διδασκαλία*, the teaching of the East, consisted merely in a few detached formulas of doctrine, which were subsequently reduced into shape by the moulding and condensing power of the Grecian spirit at the period of the conquests of Alexander and after it. I confess I suspect that the enthusiasm of our later critics in favour of all which can exalt the authority and influences of the wisdom of India, has sometimes urged their sagacity to see in India, and her merchants and sages, the cause of far more than they ever effected. India has become a first cause in the history of philosophy, the *ne plus ultra* of the long series of successive transmissions; and the very mystery that seems to shroud her antiquities has made it easy to refer all that is inexplicable to this inexplicable source. The striking discoveries which have of late been made in the actual philosophy of the Indian literati (of which I endeavoured to give you an account on a former occasion) have quickened the ardour of living Orientalists, and led them to hope to find in this vast and ancient people the solution of all the difficult problems in the history of speculation. But though I conceive that the direct influence of India on the later Greek philosophy has been somewhat unduly magnified, I have no disposition to diminish that of the more adjacent eastern nations.

*Influence of
Persian
doctrines.
Judaism,
Gnosticism.*

Persia, above all, retains its manifest and unambiguous representatives in the whole literature of Alexandria,—influences transmitted partly by the direct agency of the visitants from each country to the other, partly through the medium of the *Jewish* residents of Alexandria, who had, from their well-known national relations with the Persian empire, become imbued with many of its philosophical conceptions; but mainly by those Gnostic sophists whose manifold caprices of heresy disturbed the early Christian church. The literary forgeries of an age betray its prevailing tastes; for men will not boast their possession of treasures which the public mind is not prepared to value. The compilations of the Alexandrian schools detect to the modern critic many of those favourite sources of ancient wisdom which they were wont partly to explore and partly to imagine. Among the Orphic verses (old Athenian records—for Plato mentions them—renewed and amplified by the Alexandrian professors), and the Books of Hermes, are found the oracles of *Zoroaster*, which, however interpolated and disguised, clearly manifest an Eastern origin, and whose very imitations palpably prove the existence of writings and traditions out of which the imitations

*The Orphic
poems,
Hermes,
Zoroaster.*

were constructed. These fragmentary "sentences" were first collected by Pletho at the revival of letters. In these various compilations, then, we may discern the points to which the Alexandrian mind perpetually veered. The Orphic verses represented the antiquity of Greece, the Hermetic Books passed for records of the antiquity of Egypt, the Chaldaic sentences spoke the ancient wisdom of the East; and antiquity in all three carried with it dim possibilities of Divine revelation, justified itself, and led the spirit into that repose of conviction which it coveted. But to the East, above all, the masters of learning emphatically pointed as the mysterious centre of all such wisdom as was alone worthy of the name. Nor amid all the difficulties that confessedly embarrass the research into the real learning of the East, can any candid mind observe the veneration almost universally conceded to it (as soon as *authority* became of any importance in philosophy), the peculiarity of its doctrines, their strong internal resemblance to each other and to the truth, the sublime character of many of them, the essentially religious character of them all, without feeling assured, that however the minuter specialties of the subject may be settled, there is that in the ancient wisdom of the Oriental tribes which irrefutably marks the country as, in some district of it, the original scene of real revelation. The sceptic may endeavour to confound the genuine record with its imitations; but how will he explain the common character of them all, a character which deepens in proportion to the very strength of the resemblance he would establish?

The principal channels through which the stream of Oriental learning entered the schools of Alexandria were the societies of the Jews, and the occasional writings and exhortations of those cultivators of a peculiar and mystical knowledge who were by the Greeks entitled Gnostics.

That impulse to reduce facts and beliefs of all kinds to recognized principles, which is the source of all genuine science, is not restricted to the phenomena of this world; it is equally and instinctively active in every department where truths are made known to the mind of man. Hence, the theology of a Divine revelation becomes subject to the same scientific activity; and as the result will vary according to the principles of the classification, systematic theology (which *is* this result) will take its colouring from the prominent philosophy—that is, from the recognized first principles—of the age in which it appears. A creed may remain unaltered, and yet the relations of the parts of it, so far as they are the inferences of human sagacity, may alter with the alterations of a popular philosophy.

*Effect of
prevailing
philosophies
in the formation of theological dogmas.*

LECT.
II.

*Clemens
Alexandri-
nus (flor.
A.D. 200).
(Origen
(born A.D.
186, died
A.D. 253).*

The Christianity of Clemens Alexandrinus—even of Origen—was, in all its leading particulars, and omitting one or two private speculations too ardently urged, the Christianity of Taylor and Barrow; yet it is probable, that there is not a single page in the extensive and various works of either of the former writers which could by any adequate judge be for a moment conceived as the production of either of the latter. Clemens and Origen lived in the atmosphere of Alexandria not more than in its learning; to breathe at all, they must have breathed its air, to reason and speculate at all, they could as little have avoided to employ the forms and language it had taught them. Now what these writers did for the received theology of Christianity, when they thus viewed its frame and lineaments through the medium of a peculiar philosophy, was done in a much higher degree for Judaism by a school of Jewish writers who preceded them. Aristobulus³, Philo, and Josephus, admitted all the facts and circumstances of the Old Testament; the Jewish history would remain attested by the philosophical writings of these men though the original perished, exactly as the Platonic Fathers of the Church contribute, notwithstanding all their peculiarities, to swell the stream of early tradition; but in philosophizing the facts—that is, in reducing them into the grasp of such first principles as they held,—they gave them—Philo especially—a position and a colouring which drew them within the Grecian field of view, and acquired for the simple and venerable record of Moses the questionable advantage of taking rank among the numerous relics that learning had discovered, or ingenuity invented, of the early and heaven-sent philosophy of the East. Plato, said Numenius, is but Μωϋσῆς ἀττικίζων.

*Aristobulus
(n.c. 180).
Philo (flor.
about A.D.
20).
Josephus,
(flor. about
A.D. 70).*

As the Jewish doctors contributed to the general body of thought at Alexandria their own ancient beliefs in this philosophic costume, so was the Museum indebted to another class of instructors for the dreamy mysticism of Persia and of Syria. The history of the *Gnostics* belongs to ecclesiastical literature, from their unhappy connexion with the early Church. They seem to have been of every form of professed religion, Jewish, Christian, and Pagan; exalting their own fantastic theology above all, and insolently intruding into every society of worshippers to transform its worship into this. And if it be warrantable to judge of the procedures of the invisible enemy of Chris-

³ [On the life and writings of this Alexandrian Jew, see Valckenaer's justly celebrated *Diatriba*, printed in the 4th volume of Dr Gaisford's edition of Eusebius's *Preparatio Evangelica*. Ed.]

tianity, as we trace those of its protecting Providence, assuredly it is no enthusiasm to affirm, that in the almost — LECT.
II. incredible absurdities of Gnosticism, supported by men of authority, learning, and acuteness, we may detect a fatuity more than is natural to man, an inspiration of evil which alone seems sufficient to account for the facts³.

To these various sources of opinion transmitting their collective influences into the Platonism of the second century, must be finally added the rise and spread of Christianity itself—of Christianity which in many most important respects presented the reality, of which the theories and practices of Neo-Platonism were the pompous imitation. The celestial reality and its earthly counterpart being thus met upon an earthly theatre, it would be strange if the advantage of the ground had not given some occasional successes to the inferior combatant; but we may rejoice in the conviction that the evil of its contact was never suffered to affect any vital part, nor suffered to affect any part until the entire system of Christianity had been sufficiently matured and exemplified for all future times, to render its subsequent corruptions or exaggerations a misfortune only to the age that endured them. But this is too important a subject to commence at the close of a Lecture.

³ [Unless indeed the enemies of Christianity had more reason to deplore the fatuities of Gnosticism than its friends. *ETC.*]

LECTURE III.

THE NEO-PLATONISTS.

GENTLEMEN,

LECT.
III.

I PROCEED to give you some account of the mode of speculation which was patronized by the school of Alexandria. I purposely omit minuteness of details,—confining myself to the task of arresting and representing the general spirit of the system. The materials for this undertaking are ample, so ample as to perplex the student by their very extent and variety. But though ample in number and size, and various in outward form, they are singularly monotonous in spirit and substance.¹ To master them all, is indeed a task exceeding the patience of most inquirers, not only from their extent, but from their very sameness; the mind being wearied not more by multiplicity of details than by uniformity of style and purport. The same leading thoughts occur in every conceivable shape; and the effort to disguise this internal identity results in exaggerating the obscurity that still guards from vulgar eyes the mysteries of Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus.

*Succession
of Alexan-
drian phi-
losophers.
Ammonius
Saccas, the
reputed
founder of
Neo-Plato-
nism.
Plot. iust.
Porphyry
and Ame-
lius.*

Iamblichus.

Proclus.

At the close of the reign of Commodus, about the year 192, Ammonius Saccas founded his school at Alexandria. The subsequent teachers of the views which Ammonius had introduced, appeared in three different theatres, Rome, Alexandria, and Athens. Plotinus (born A.D. 205 at Lycopolis in Egypt) removed to Rome and established his school there in the reign of the Emperor Philip, about the year 244. Porphyry and Amelius followed their master to Rome, the former in the reign of Gallienus¹, the latter some years earlier. At the death of Plotinus, in 270, the name of Porphyry became the most eminent among the cultivators of heathen wisdom. Iamblichus and Hierocles continued the succession at its birthplace, Alexandria; Plutarchus of Athens, Syrianus, and Proclus, restored philosophy to its old Athenian haunts at the close of the fourth, and through the greater part of the fifth century. The death of Proclus is assigned to the year 485. He was succeeded by Marinus, who wrote his master's life; he by Isidorus; and he, again, by Zenodotus; and the last-

¹ [See Porphyry. *Vit. Pl.* c. 4, quoted by Clinton, *Fast. Rom.* ED.]

named teacher brings us to the famous epoch of Justinian's decree for closing the schools of Athens, in the year 529.

LECT.
III.

To proceed minutely into all the peculiarities of these successive teachers, would be a laborious, though perhaps not uninteresting, task. My present object is simply to catch the predominating views which seem to have given their character to the entire.

We shall first speak of their logical views, of their theory of *knowledge*, and the privileges of the human soul in regard to it. *The Neo-Platonic Logic.*

Does man's knowledge grasp the reality of things? would it remain certain even though the cognitive faculty were annihilated?—this is the question which (as I have more than once intimated) occupied so many of the Grecian speculators, and which the different sects of the ancient philosophy answered, by very different solutions indeed, but which all strove to answer by some solution or other. The sceptical philosophers, we know, denied altogether the possibility of real knowledge; and they built their denial mainly on the allegation, that though real objects apart from the soul of man may exist, it would for ever remain impossible to prove that these objects sent true or adequate representatives of themselves to the human mind. Such a fact could only, they observed, be proved by a medium which itself in turn required proof; and this process was obviously endless. But when it was urged that the truth of the impression was itself in the first instance established by the irresistible conviction of the mind, they replied by denying the universality of such convictions; by alleging the imperfection, and the errors, and (as they endeavoured to shew) the contradiction, of the senses; and, finally, by maintaining that at best this indestructible conviction was itself but a state of the sentient mind, was purely subjective, and therefore could not warrant the reality of anything beyond its own sphere. Their antagonists rejoined that this last assertion (the only one of any consequence in the pleading) was altogether unfair; inasmuch as it was of the very nature of this irresistible conviction that it *did* attest the reality of mental knowledge; that, consequently, the sceptical objection involved a manifest *petitio principii*; that the same evidence of consciousness which taught us that we have mental states or qualities of any kind, equally taught us that some of these states were of a kind to pronounce on that which is not the mind, to transcend the subjective, and grasp the real, the absolute, the eternal.

But what, then, is the relation between the reality of things and the human knowledge which represents it? How are they *connected*, that the latter, a form of human

Earlier views of the relation of knowing and being.

thought, shall thus declare the former which is not a form of thought? What is the bond between the substance of the universe (for example) and the mental conviction that such substance is and must be? between the cause of all things and the law of the mind which necessitates its belief that such a cause exists?

We should perhaps be inclined to answer—that the Divine Artist, who constructed the soul of man, has given to it these convictions, and obliged it to believe them the evidences of corresponding realities. But such an answer as this, though commendable for its humility, and perhaps for its prudent sagacity, was not at all sufficient to content the more earnest speculators on the nature of knowledge. In the first place, they asked,—whence it was that we derived the certainty of the *existence* of this Divine Framer to whom we recurred in our solution; whence, but from that very faculty of knowledge which we appealed to Him to accredit? They argued, again,—that such an origin of certainty as this, degrades the entire prerogative of the human reason; that it makes it the arbitrary creation of a superior, without any essential and inherent power of authenticating truth; that it is fraught with most dangerous consequences to the great cause of the stability of moral rights and obligations;—that it might even be alleged by cavillers, that it were well for man to be deceived, to which supposition this theory would afford no satisfactory reply. By such arguments as these it was urged that the authority of human knowledge must be set upon different foundations to be of assured value. And thus the question was still triumphantly asked,—What more has man than his own beliefs, and how can his own beliefs establish the certainty of things? What connexion can be shewn between the real and objective on the one hand, and the forms and modifications of the human soul on the other?

Now you will easily perceive that there are two modes of connexion supposable. The first conceives that the two regions—the real and the mental—being distinct, the former transmits representatives to the human consciousness,—that the conceptions of the mind do in some way answer to the absolute nature of things. As to the process of this mysterious correspondence, there might be various suppositions. It might be held that the mental states are the *immediate effects* of their objects, and they possess the connexion and internal necessity of effect with cause; it might be held that the mental states are the *images or resemblances* of their objects (a plausible but deceptive form of expression common in all ages); it might be said

that they are arranged to be *consequent on* their objects, without any connexion beyond this arbitrary arrangement;—a supposition which naturally glides into that of denying them to have any objects at all, and maintaining that mental states are incapable of evidencing anything beyond their own transitory existence. This last is a theory of unity in which the objective is altogether abandoned. But there is another theory of unity which is formed by preserving both objective and subjective, both nature and the mind, both the Reality of Things and the Reason which apprehends it,—and *identifying* them as substantially one and the same, or as two forms of one incomprehensible original. This is the *second* general hypothesis as to human knowledge; and in this the Platonism of Alexandria was founded or resulted, as to this the original theory of Plato always really tended. The great majority of the Grecian schools held the doctrine that the Reality is essentially distinct from the Reason that knows it; the Sceptical party held that there is no Reality at all, demonstrable; the Platonists of Alexandria decided that there is a Reality and a Reason, but that both are blended in one absolute and ineffable conjunction.

LECT.
III.Neo-Platonism, then
of absolute
identity.

The moderation of Plato was eminently evinced in the caution with which he always *hinted* this form of speculation without ever actually venturing to affirm it. We perceive the speculation itself (as I formerly endeavoured to shew you) in his theory of the Coeternity of the Soul with its ideas, of the sameness of their original substance, of the final unity in which all things were involved; we equally perceive his cautious hesitancy in the distinction which to the very last he appears to intimate between the ideal object of the Reason and the Reason that contemplates them. But all this reluctance to pronounce on the ultimate question of philosophy, was abandoned by the Neo-Platonists. Stimulated by the boldness of certain oriental speculations, they affirmed that the cause of truth was lost unless the theory of unity was unreservedly admitted, and fortified their tenets by the rather ungracious measure of reviling the errors and the timidity of their Grecian master. It is the perpetual lesson of Plotinus, that the object of reason is not, cannot be, external to reason; that truth is not in the conformity of thoughts with things, but of thoughts with each other. Intelligence is at once the object conceived, the subject conceiving, and the act of conception. To rest on self, is to commune with the universe.

Comparison
with
pure Platonism.

Such is the main principle of the Alexandrian theory of the human reason. But in the speculations of the masters

LECT.
III.*Neo-Platonic theory of the Universe.*

of this school these views were united with a vast mass of theological and physical hypotheses; these last being however a mere development of the former. This brings us to the second consideration,—the Alexandrian system of the Universe. As knowledge consisted in unity of the knowing and the known, so was the first principle of the Universe a mysterious unity out of which all things emanated. This principle was superessential, it was alike above Being and Intelligence. You find them here upon the road which Plato had traced, but advancing with a bold and hurried step very alien to the spirit of the great master. The second principle is pure Intelligence (*νοῦς*), the third is Soul (*ψυχή*). These fill the sphere of the intelligible world, and actuate all things. There is nothing truly real but these; and these in all their forms, which are the "ideas" of Plato, are connected together by secret links that establish a sympathy between all the parts and elements of the Universe. Let us for a moment inspect more nearly this expansion of the system of Plato.

The One, according to Plotinus.

The first principle of the Universe is declared to be the One (*τὸ ἓν*). But as every existence, though single, includes a plurality, as reason (the highest of existences) involves a duality of subject and object, the One must be actually ranked above Being²; it is not to be regarded as an existence, but as the ineffable fountain of existence,—a fountain which for ever yields existence, itself absolute & inexhaustible. No quality or character can be ascribed to the One, for it transcends all qualifications and speciality³.

The Absolute Intelligence.

The second principle of the Universe is that which *contemplates* the One, and requires only it, to exist. This is the Absolute Intelligence. Thus immediately interwoven with the primal Unity, directly dependent on it, addressing itself to it, alone worthy to behold it, it is manifest that Intelligence is the first of existences, the highest essence in the world of reality and the foundation of every other. The operation of Intelligence is *thought*, and thought is (as we formerly saw) only conceivable as identical with its object; the principle of Intelligence, then, by the activity of thought, does actually constitute all true existences⁴,—create and comprehend them all. All that has being, therefore, is but the infinite varieties of intelligence; the universe of real existence is but a vast aggregate of the forms—the substantial forms—of supreme Reason. Whatever is real and eternal is not the product of this

² [Plotin. Enn. V. p. 491 A, ἐπέκεινα ὅντος τὸ ἓν. Ed.]³ [See the eighth book of the third Ennead, c. 8, p. 350, to end. Ed.]⁴ [Enn. V. 4, c. 2, p. 518 F, νοῦς καὶ ὅν ταύτων.....αὐτὸς νοῦς τὰ πρῶτα ματα. Ed.]

νοῦς, it is the thing itself in all the multiplicity of its aspects. I.E.C.T. III.

The third principle in the Plotinian Triad is the Universal Soul, which is produced by, and reposes on, Intelligence, as Intelligence derives from the original Unity^a. *Soul, or the Vital Principle.*

This principle of Soul seems to be described as possessing two energies; one, by which it attaches itself to Intelligence, and the other by which it becomes the active creator of the sensible universe, if indeed the latter is not implied as the result of the former. The immediate products of this universal ψυχή are the Forms of things (εἶδη, μορφαί, λόγοι σπερματικοί); which are *thought into* their material receptacle (if I may so render the expressions of Plotinus) by the "intuitive" force of nature. On the nature of this material receptacle, Plotinus is nearly as indefinite as Plato. He tells us that where the creative illumination of Soul fails, darkness begins; and that even this very darkness becomes impregnated by the vivific influences of the light that invests and penetrates it. Thus it is that Soul in the very power of its weakness forms to itself a body; endows blind matter with form and thought. This very allegorical representation, however, is rendered more obscure by other presentations which appear to contradict it; and which leave the reader altogether in doubt as to whether Plotinus meant or not to allow to matter any reality of existence at all^b. Thus it is that, in the inevitable feebleness of Roman speculation, systems which begin solely from mind are perplexed in accounting for its material antithesis; exactly as those which commence exclusively from matter are bewildered when they would solve the existence of the mind that arranges and governs it! The same obscurity belongs to Plotinus's account of the kindred question of moral evil, which by the eastern and Alexandrian speculativists was connected with the existence and nature of matter; and which naturally shares all the difficulties and contradictions which characterize their theories of this latter mysterious essence.

Thus it was that Plotinus, reasoning down from the absolute and inconceivable Unity, attempted to construct the actual universe. The connexion being purely that of *Emanation* emanation, the effect pre-existing in the cause, and the cause actualized in the effect, the system was essentially Pantheistic. And as naturally it was a system of fatalistic optimism; the production and all its parts and elements were as necessary, and as determinate, as the producer.

^a [Ψυχὴ εἰδῶλον νοῦ—ὅλον λόγος νοῦ, καὶ ἐνέργεια τις ὡς περ αὐτὸς (νοῦς) ἐκείνου (τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ), Enn. V. 1, c. 6, p. 487 F. Ed.]

^b ["Matter" is the subject of the fourth book of the second Ennead. Compare Enn. I. 8, c. 15. Ed.]

LECT.
III.

These considerations led to two characteristic results, which in their turn produced one of the chief practical extravagancies of this school. The elements of the sensible universe being all produced as developments of the Infinite Perfection, were bound together by a secret bond which suspended every one upon every other. While likewise, the principle of Soul becoming as it were arrested or incarnated in the entire material system, every visible thing was animated by this subtle essence; not only the brute creation, but that which we falsely conceive inanimate. The poetry of our own age was thus erected into a determinate philosophy; nature was literally alive through all her regions. These tenets obviously formed a philosophical basis for all the fantastic enterprizes of divination and natural magic; and the intercourse with the demons and spirits of the universe was the recognized privilege of the disciplined pupil of Alexandrian wisdom. The grossest follies of theurgy were the favourite resources of the emperor whose philosophy could not tolerate the mysteries of the Christian faith.

*Theosophical
relations of
Porphyry
and Iamblichus.*

As Plotinus had laid the foundation of the system in his teaching at Rome, so Iamblichus continued the enterprize in its original and more congenial Alexandrian atmosphere. His function was to deepen the theological character of the philosophy, by laboriously blending it with the heathen mythology and mysteries. Porphyry (who died about 305) had done much for this project; as a measure of resistance to the victorious progress of Christianity. To meet this powerful adversary it was also necessary to appeal to the prepossessions of antiquity, to construct a kind of catholic church of philosophy, with its unbroken succession, its expansive universality, and its venerable traditions. This was a favourite notion with the Alexandrian sages. About the period of the opening of the new Athenian school, Chrysanthius, Plutarchus of Athens, and others, endeavoured to accredit the supposition of their "golden chain" (as it was called), a succession of gifted men who, they affirmed, had perpetuated from the earliest times—from those Orphean days when gods haunted the earth and gave wisdom to mankind—a single unaltered philosophy. Accordingly, all their ingenuity and research was expended on the effort to discover this precious treasure in the records of every age; the books of the philosophers held the dogmas of it, the mysteries of Greece, Egypt, were but the rites and ceremonies of this divine theology. By Proclus, the last great name among the later Platonists*, this hypothesis was

Proclus.

* He died, as before stated, A.D. 485.

maintained with great pomp of language and subtlety of thought. Proclus, who succeeded Syrianus at Athens (for philosophy had returned to her Grecian birthplace to expire), treated Plato very much as Philo treated Moses. Commingling all philosophies in one, he professed to study Aristotle as the grammar of Plato, and found in Plato all he wished to find. He styled himself the hierophant of the universe; and avowed his belief that he constituted the last link in that mysterious chain of interpreters of the hidden wisdom whom Hermes of old had ordained to perpetuate divine truth in the world. His claim was not disallowed; and Proclus died with the reputation of miraculous powers. In the voluminous writings of Proclus the whole genius of the system is eminently displayed;—its sublimity, its puerility, its sagacity and poverty, its daring independence and its grovelling superstition. It is not improbable that these writings were indebted to Christianity for a term that occurs with peculiar frequency in them; the term *πίστις* or faith, which Proclus regards as direct communion with the Infinite and Absolute and the highest faculty of the human soul. This, you will remember, is a departure from the original Platonic phrasology. This author is not content with a single Trinity; his philosophical triads recur in every page. Essence, identity, variety; being, life, intelligence; limit, illimitation, mixture; are some of the instances of this threefold partition which Proclus conceives to obtain universally through nature. But over all, he, in common with all his brother teachers, enthrones the Absolute Unity; and with them he maintains that with this Unity the soul of man is by a special faculty enabled to converse, until absorbed in the intricacy of the communion it is lost in its object, and becomes, in a manner, itself divine.

Let us now endeavour to recapitulate some of the particulars which distinguish the Alexandrian philosophy as a form of Platonism. We see, then, that the later school with peculiar force insist on the superessentiality of the Absolute One out of whom all existence and existences are projected. We observe that (doubtless to meet the Christian system) the Triad of supreme natures is asserted with a distinctness little discoverable in the genuine writings of Plato. We can observe that the habit of reasoning, not upwards, from the multitude of facts to the Unity of Laws and of the Author of Laws, but downwards, from the single and absolute, to the subordinate creation, is manifested in the Alexandrian speculatists, far more prominently than in their Grecian master. The activity of intelligences through the universe is another doctrine, Platonic indeed, but elevated to a height for which Plato never

*Recapitulation.
General characteristics of Neo-Platonism.*

LECT.
III.Ethical
aspect..

meant it by the theologues of Alexandria. The *sympathy* of the parts of the universe is almost wholly their own; and the superstitious practices derived from it find no countenance in the spirit of elder Platonism. But none of the doctrines of the later school is more characteristic than their exaggeration of those tenets on which Plato so often and so impressively dilated, relative to the immediate intuition of the Good and the Beautiful. This conducts me, finally, to the *moral* aspects of the school of Plotinus, which were almost wholly determined by this peculiar doctrine. This connexion of the practical life with the logical tenet, may appear from the following passage of Proclus (*De Provid. et Fato*).

"There are," he declares[†] after enumerating five functions of the soul,—“also five orders of knowledge.” Those which are of the lowest grade seemingly deserve the name; they include things material and subject to mere compulsion. The second order addresses itself to the characters common to sensible objects, the general notions of Aristotle; it rises from variety to unity. The third order departs from this unity, dividing and resolving general notions, knowing causes, deducing consequences, &c. It embraces the mathematical sciences, beginning with the unit and the point, and thence deriving its demonstrations of complex propositions. The fourth order rises to knowledge more simple still, abandoning methods, resolutions, compositions, definitions, demonstrations; it consists in contemplative speculation (autoptic), of beings and essences, it penetrates to intelligibles. The fifth and last order, which Aristotle never reached, which Plato and preceding theologues alone have described, is a knowledge superior to the understanding, an exaltation (*μωρία*) which assimilates the soul to God Himself;—“for the like can only be known by the like:—objects sensible by the senses, scientific relations by science, intelligible by the understanding, unity by the principle of union.” The attainment of this exalted state was the object of the entire philosophical discipline of the Alexandrians; which was thus only calculated for a very few among mankind, and liable to be even by them perverted into an indolent and inoperative quietism. The leaders of these schools professed to have themselves attained supernatural presences; not Plotinus only but the shrewd and inquiring Porphyry boasted to have been favoured with the actual realization of a state of the soul in which in the depths of absolute perfection it beholds and is absorbed in the very Deity it adores.

Asceticism
and exag-
gerated

Hence the means of self-perfection were all reduced to self-denial; purification through the mastery of the body.

[†] [c. 20, p. 37, ed. Cous. En.]

The material frame became an object of disgust and detestation to the sublimated apprehensions of the Alexandrian; as interfering with the completeness of this contemplative effort. Plotinus refused to permit his picture to be taken, because it would unduly perpetuate the image of a body he deplored; and avoided all mention of the date or locality of his birth, as too dark and miserable an epoch to be remembered.

• These exaggerations, which were displayed in a thousand fantastic forms, are indeed in this degree preposterous; yet we ought not to forget that they become absurd only when unbalanced by other principles and exalted into the exclusive objects of moral discipline. That bodily abstinence through all its varieties is in its measure suitable to a course of spiritual advancement, can only be denied by those who forget the closeness of the alliance which in this world subsists between the corporal frame and the conscious spirit; and the peril of the influences which the former can exert to depress and fetter its divine associate. If there be such an exercise of devotion as the contemplation of God in those attributes of His nature which we can make subjects of thought, it cannot be doubted that according to the ordinary laws of nature, certain states of the body are more favourable than others to the success of the effort. The management of the bodily frame becomes then a plain portion of Christian duty; and as such it is recognized in all the Christian Scriptures. They never derogate (with the Alexandrians) from Body in the abstract;—for they perpetuate it in the state of glory; but they do teach us to look with suspicion and jealousy upon the peculiar species of body we carry with us in the probationary state;—to mark and withstand its overweening influence, to “mortify the deeds of the body,” to “keep under the body, and bring it into subjection,” to “present the body a living sacrifice.”

*Comparison
of Neo-
Platonic
with Chris-
tian mor-
tality.*

The “shew of wisdom in neglecting the body” (for of this also the Apostles speak) which characterized the Alexandrian teachers, and which proceeded on extravagant suppositions, nowhere countenanced by inspiration, of the radical evil of the material nature itself in all and any of its forms, was—as I have said—connected with their discipline for the *ενωσις*, or union with God by direct intuition of His substantial being. Into this interesting subject you would scarcely permit me now to enter at any length. I merely observe, then (for it is most instructive), that their view of the union with God was founded in the error common to the many forms of mysticism in all ages; the error of conceiving that spiritual connexions between God and man must be *conscious* connexions, felt, and known, and anticipated, and remembered, as a part of the actual series

LECT.
III.

of thought. As Christians you are bound to believe such intercourse possible and real; but as philosophic reasoners you will decide that they pass in a region of the spirit to which, though it be the basis of consciousness, consciousness cannot attain; that we must receive them in faith, and verify them not in themselves but in their results—those results which the Christian phraseology entitles the “fruits,” and “gifts,” and “witness,” of the Spirit.

*Concluding
remarks.*

But amid the errors and extravagancies to which this perversion led, surely no candid man can contemplate the peculiar design and tendency of all earthly wisdom at this very period, without regarding it as in a great measure providentially ordered. The mind of man yearned for Divine Communion, and grew extravagant through its very disappointment. The actual revelation was assuredly “the Desire of all Nations,” even though it was by so many overlooked or rejected. All human wisdom seemed at length to have paused in its exhaustion, turned to Heaven, and sighed for a voice from thence. The whole field of speculation had been traversed and explored; and though glittering spoils lay around its many labourers, the treasure which all sought was not found, the deep want of the soul of man was not met, and—as if instinctively—the whole host of earthly philosophy abandoned its position of inquiry, and in strange wild fantastic devotion asked of Heaven to give what earth had hopelessly failed to supply. Heaven had, indeed, supplied its remedy, had anticipated and answered the call; but the capricious activity of the human mind had meanwhile constructed its own device to meet it, and the broken cisterns mocked in unhappy imitation the fountain of eternal life. Christianity was, to many, lost among its counterfeits. For every Divine wonder it could narrate, a thousand mocking miracles rose around it; for every promise it could offer, ecstasies and raptures more transcendent still—the felt presence of a Deity—were boasted by its foes; its visions and prophecies were not altogether denied, but they were depreciated as the easy attainments of ordinary wisdom; and its defenders might almost become ashamed of its pure and lofty maxims, when they saw how easily they could be debased into the decorations of a fanatical imposture. But the genuine work of God was at length vindicated as His; it remained, it still remains,—the strength and consolation of thousands; while, after a faint expiring struggle, shifting from city to city,—like the ghastly spectre of Philosophy haunting her old abodes, the illusive Wisdom of Rome, Alexandria, and Athens vanished from the world, to become in a remote age the harmless object of speculative inquiry among the disciples of its celestial Rival.

UNFINISHED SERIES
ON
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE.

THREE LECTURES
ON THE
ARISTOTELIAN PSYCHOLOGY.

ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE.

LAST SERIES.

THREE LECTURES.

LECTURE I.

IT will probably be found most eligible—certainly most in accordance with the usual course of modern philosophical investigation—to commence an account of the views of Aristotle, with his opinions on the nature, faculties, and destinies of *the Soul*. Much of the interest which belongs to such a writer—to one of such antiquity, and in many respects so unlike our modern teachers—arises from the peculiarity of his way of contemplating the subject itself; I mean, his conception of the general problem to be solved, as contrasted with particular opinions on its details. This can best be conveyed by keeping close to the original, though perhaps with some sacrifice of grace and variety. In commenting on Plato the case is different; there we are in most cases obliged to collect the great author's principles from a vast number of distinct sources;—to gather his primary principles is itself an exercise of inductive inquiry. But Aristotle's writings are express philosophical treatises, probably among the very earliest of their kind; they profess no other object but the didactic exposition of simple truth; and though certainly the conciseness of the style, and the utter dissimilarity to modern views of many of the arguments and propositions advanced, create much difficulty—sometimes an almost impenetrable obscurity—it does not appear that Aristotle himself ever contemplated any object but the unadorned declaration of what he conceived to be truth, or that his contemporaries found any perplexity in those reasonings which so painfully tax our powers. We must endeavour to throw ourselves into their attitude, to read with their eyes, and hear with their ears; a transformation difficult indeed, but necessary, if we would escape the narrow-minded superciliousness of modern criticisms of antiquity. The best preparation for either Aristotle or Plato, but especially for the former, on account of his constant habit of historical reference, is the careful study of the few relics that remain of the ante-Socratic philosophy.

LECT.
I.

Aristotle's
method com-
pared with
that of
Plato.

LECT.
I.

Without this, it is impossible to do justice to Aristotle as the great systematizer of Grecian speculation; we cannot measure his advance unless we know precisely where he stood. In a former Course, I believe, I noticed this special benefit to be derived from study of these neglected but most majestic fragments of the earliest philosophy of Greece; they are the rough-hewn masses, cumbrous and ungainly, but often solid, which Plato and Aristotle, Epicurus and Zeno, employed in constructing those magnificent edifices which are still the wonder of mankind.

*Aristotle's
Treatise
περί ψυχῆς.*

We will turn, then, to the treatise of Aristotle, *περί ψυχῆς*¹; a treatise which he regarded as a portion of his general course of physical inquiry. You must now be prepared for assertions laboriously supported, which you will probably deem unworthy of such anxious disquisition; but you must not outshine Aristotle with his own light, or forget that he has himself powerfully contributed to make those propositions trite and familiar whose triteness surprises you in his pages. Aristotle at one time (in that long period of gestation which preceded the birth of the modern philosophy) exerted an influence so powerful and so universal, that everything he upheld became incorporated in the general mass of thought; and every *truth* he maintained we have directly from *him*. This influence, protracted as it is into the very philosophy of the present hour, and manifested in the common terms of philosophical language, is the great glory of Aristotle—his truest monument. Instances of this, proofs that the phraseology and recognized principles of our late and living teachers, are in a large degree such as they are, just because of this man who taught two-and-twenty centuries ago in Athens, will, I think, start up before you at nearly every step in the very subject and treatise we are about to consider.

*Character-
ist.*

I confess I consider this treatise a very extraordinary production. It is (with the exception of a few passages in which the author, perhaps, confounds merely logical distinctions with physical differences) a perfect specimen of fair inductive inquiry, pursued according to the legitimate method, and often with very satisfactory results. There can be no question, it must, at the time of its publication, have conveyed a vast quantity of new and well-arranged information; nor is it to be doubted, that, however we may be perplexed with some of its conclusions, and however we may be forced to admit that now and then the illustrious author escaped with pronouncing an ambiguous verdict rather than give up a difficulty, the books *De Animâ*

¹ [On Soul, or "On the Vital Principle," under which latter title the book has recently been translated by Dr Collier. Ed.]

are the true foundation of the "inductive philosophy of the Mind." LECT.
I.

Aristotle, who never delays at the threshold of his subject, begins with a few rapid observations on the dignity of the investigation he is about to undertake. If we value *knowledge*, he observes, and if we make a distinction in the *objects* of knowledge, either for superior exactness or superior dignity, both these characteristics meet in the *ἱστορία τῆς ψυχῆς*—the natural history of the Soul. Further, this species of knowledge plainly tends to elucidate all varieties of truth, especially the science of *Nature*; inasmuch as the soul is, as it were, the principle of living things (*οἶον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζώων*). This statement marks at the very outset the wideness of significancy which Aristotle imports in his use of the term Soul. You will soon see that his view extends beyond the human to the brute, and even to the vegetable creation; though of the last he speaks briefly and conjecturally. The treatise, you must remember, is itself only one of a series on the various characteristics of the animate creation. We seek, he continues, to discover the nature and essence of the soul (*φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν*). This subject of inquiry, which modern teachers (especially after the well-known disclaimer of Locke) have generally repudiated, belonged naturally to Aristotle's conception of soul, and to the place his investigation occupied in a general course of physical instruction. It was also in some measure forced upon him by the bold assertions of the elder schools; and it corresponded, in fact, to nothing more mysterious or transcendental than our modern controversies about life and organization. Besides the inquiry as to the nature of soul, he professes further to examine its phenomena (*ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν*), whether actual manifestations of the soul itself (*ἴδια πάθη*), or indirectly its results in living beings. It would not be easy to sketch the outlines of the subject with more completeness; and we must always remember that in the history of science, whatever be the success of a solution, it is no small merit to have stated the problem correctly. But in reference to the nature and faculties of this principle of Soul, he unaffectedly confesses that it is exceedingly difficult to obtain any satisfactory assurance about it. Here we observe the struggles of a powerful intellect, whose experience of scientific discovery had not been sufficiently extensive to decide his logical views. He professes some uncertainty as to the mode of proof by which the inquiry is to be regulated;—whether the essence, the *τί ἐστίν*, is to be ascertained in this instance as in any other, or by some peculiar process; the latter supposition increasing the difficulty of the investigation.

and analysis
of the treatise.

Book I.
Chap. I.
Preliminary
inquiries.

LECT.
I.

But even when this preliminary point has been settled—whether demonstration, or division, or any other method be adopted—other difficulties remain; the principles of different subjects are themselves different, and throw little or no light upon each other,—thus the fundamental ideas of geometry and arithmetic. Aristotle next proceeds to mention the questions whose solution he conceives indispensable to a complete comprehension of the subject. They are such as these:—to what *genus* the Soul belongs?—is it to be entered under substance, quality, quantity, or any other of the categories? Again,—is it of those things whose being is merely *potential* (ἐν δυνάμει), or is it a positive principle of activity (ἐντελέχεια τις)?—is it divisible or indivisible? Are all souls of the same *species* (ὁμοειδεῖς)? and if not, is the distinction even *generic*? A question of importance, because inquirers seem altogether to restrict themselves to the soul of *man*. Is, then, our definition (λόγος) to describe it simply as the common principle of animated existence; or is there to be a particular one for each class—as of horse, of dog, of man, of the divine nature?—for, as to the “universal animal” (τὸ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου) of the Platonists, it is either a nonentity or a formation of the mind subsequent to observation of particulars [ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν, ἢ ὕστερον]². Again,—if there exist not a multiplicity of souls in the frame, but only parts of the same soul, should we first inquire into the whole or the parts? Nor is it easy to determine which of these parts—intellect, sense, and the rest,—actually differ from the others. Another important point in the management of the subject is this,—should the parts of the soul, or their operations, be the first matter of examination; and if the operations, should not even their *objects* (τὰ ἀντικείμενα) take precedence of these (the αἰσθητὸν before the αἰσθητικόν, &c.)? It is true that such inquiries as these do not directly answer the question, what the Soul *is*? but they tend to that answer. For as the knowledge of essences enables us to discover properties, so the knowledge of the latter leads us to the former; and hence it is, that every definition which does not state, or suggest, the properties of things, is merely disputative. To resume,—another most important question regards the interdependence of soul and body: it being manifest that some affections (πάθη) are dependent on body—as anger, courage, desire, and all the forms of sense;

² [*De An.* i. 1, § 5. This passage is noteworthy, as it involves the controversy between the Realists and Nominalists. It is not the only passage in Aristotle in which his consciousness of the problem is apparent: but I know no other which seems to pronounce so decidedly against the realistic theory. Comp. Trendelenburg's note, and see the references in note 2 to Lecture VIII. of the 2nd series. Ed.]

LECT.
I.

—while such operations as those of intelligence seem exclusively mental. Yet even (as he sagaciously observes) if intelligence require a basis of conception³ (*φαντασία*) to 'work on, it would seem that to supply this requisite the material organization is demanded. The question whether soul is separable from body, will depend upon the question whether any of its operations or affections are altogether and exclusively its own; if this be not the case, we can speak of its separate properties no more than we can of those of a line or surface whose purely mathematical relations can never be exemplified in real existence. Accordingly, without here stating anything definitively with respect to the purely intellectual principle, Aristotle pronounces that there is satisfactory evidence that the passive affections are dependent on the body, and thus that they are λόγοι ἐνυλοί⁴. Hence it follows that they become a portion of the territory of the physical inquirer, who defines chiefly by the material cause, as the logician chiefly by the formal; though in truth, both these causes, as well as the final, concern the student of nature. In short—the *physical* inquirer is engaged with all the affections and properties inseparable from particular bodies, and considered as such; the *mathematician*, with properties separable not actually, but by abstraction (ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως); the student of the *first philosophy*, with those which are actually separate existences. To the first of these classes, then, belong the passive affections of the soul.

Such are the chief topics of the introductory dissertation of Aristotle's treatise. They are calculated to impress the difficulty and variety of the investigation; and do in reality comprise nearly all the principal psychological problems which have perplexed mankind since the days of the author. The materialist tendency of Aristotle's views is clearly enough observable throughout; a tendency which is not very fully counteracted by his subsequent assertions (few and rather ambiguous) of the distinctness of the higher (or active) intellectual principle. But of this hereafter.

The next chapter brings us to Aristotle's invariable preliminaries, an historical summary and discussion of the opinions of his predecessors. He observes, that all inquirers have seen that the animate differs from the inanimate in two principal characteristics, in motion and sensation (*κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι*). And inasmuch as they conceived

comp. II.
Aristotle's
criticism of
anient
the vices.

³ [Rather "imagination," reproductive or passive, as distinguished from creative; for this is the import of *φαντασία*. ED.]

⁴ [This phrase is explained by Philoponus (ap. Trendelenb. *Comm.* p. 206) as equivalent to *εἶη ἐν ὅλῃ τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα καὶ οὐ χωριστά*, "forms which have their being in matter, and are not separable." ED.]

LECT.
I.*Democritus
and Leucippus.**Anaxagoras.**Empedocles.**Heraclitus,
&c.*

(erroneously, according to Aristotle, for this is one of his most cherished principles^b) that that which moves another must itself be in motion, they pronounced the soul to be itself in this state of constant agitation. Hence Democritus and Leucippus endeavoured to apply their coarse atomic conceptions to the substance of the soul;—with whom Aristotle joins some of the Pythagoreans, who, it seems, were guilty of the same preposterous hypothesis, that the matter of the soul was the same as the restless motes in the sunbeam, though others rose a step higher, in declaring the soul to be identical only with the influence that moved these particles. Aristotle remarks that these philosophers—as well as, in a less decided degree, even Anaxagoras himself—lost sight of the fundamental distinction between the mere moving principle and the mind in its higher faculties (*ψυχή* and *νοῦς*); when he especially (Anaxagoras) proclaimed that Mind not only governed but directly moved the Universe (*νοῦν κινῆσαι τὸ πᾶν*). Thales, impressed with the importance of the character of motivity in the soul, attributed a soul to the magnet. In all these instances, as well as in others, we observe the universal confession of this attribute, combined in most cases with the ungrounded supposition that the mover must itself be in motion. The other class established by Aristotle, is that of those teachers who were chiefly struck by the attribute of perception and of knowledge. With these philosophers there reigned a maxim of great antiquity, whose author is probably undiscoverable,—*γινώσκεισθαι ὁμοίῳ ὁμοιον*,—that like is known by like; and hence they determined the nature of the soul by the number of elements they admitted in the external world. Thus Empedocles composed it of all the recognized elements. Others, struck by the intellectual capacities of the soul, and in accordance with their theory that numbers were the true principles of the Universe, applied their numerical formulas to the perceptive and cognitive powers of the mind—to intellect, science, opinion, and sense (*νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, αἴσθησις*). And when to this they had added the capacity of originating motion, they obtained their well-known definition that the soul is a “self-moving number.” Another influence affected these determinations, the conviction that the essence of the soul was removed from body; and hence those who did not unite all the elements, selected that which seemed to be most refined to incorporeality. Democritus (indirectly) pronounced for fire, Heraclitus conceived it as that exhalation (*ἀναθυμίασις*) from which, as ever fluent, his obscure system deduced the universe. Alcmaeon, Hippo, Critias, sought it in such sub-

^b [*Phys.* VIII. c. 5 seq. Ed.]

stances as approached, in their estimation, nearest to these attributes: and even those who formed the world from contraries, assumed the same rival principles for the soul. The *earth* alone, Aristotle observes, except in the system of Empedocles, has not been numbered among its constituents. And thus, on the whole, the attributes apprehended in the soul have universally been motion, sense, and incorporeality (*ὀρίζονται...κινήσει, αἰσθήσει, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ*). I need not remark to you how valuable are these scattered notices of the elder philosophers to the critical student of speculation; or how the rapid summary of Aristotle attests the great attribute of his mind—its unrivalled power of classification.

The arguments by which Aristotle, according to his usual custom, proceeds to overthrow the theories of each of his predecessors, conduct us into a world of thought so foreign to our existing habits, that I fear it would be impossible to secure them from (perhaps very undeserved) depreciation without an extent of detail and comment for which we have now no time or opportunity. He first attacks the system which finds the essential character of the soul in self-motion; by which you are here to understand—not the power of originating motion in the body, but the power of putting itself in motion—a doctrine which (as we shall hereafter see) would negative one of the main tenets of the whole Aristotelian metaphysics, the impossibility of motion being produced in any substance by its own energy. The soul does indeed move the body, but its own actual motion is only that in which it participates with the body it moves. If the soul be thus in motion, it must move either *καθ' αὐτὸ* or *καθ' ἕτερον*—either by a proper motion of its own, or by being in that, or attached to that, which is moved,—either as a man walks, or as he is borne in a vessel. Its motion too (which seems much the same division) will be either natural or accidental. But the former of these suppositions is not admissible. A natural or essential motion of the soul would infer the occupation of place; it would include the possibility of a violent impulse of the soul to motion and rest, which is altogether inexplicable. If it be held that the soul is moved as it moves, it must be moved by a motion of translation (*φορά*); it is capable then of leaving the body and returning to it, of which no instance is producible. Nor, if the soul be “essentially” motive, can it be rightly conceived moveable indirectly by some distinct object; yet this impulse *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, incidentally by objects distinct from itself, is the very mode of operation to which we are most accustomed in the phenomena of sensation. Aristotle pursues

the subtle argument into the inmost intricacies of possibility, by urging, that as motion is the outgoing of the thing moved, if the soul (as is maintained by his adversaries) move itself, and therefore be itself also moved, it must issue out of its own very essence. Democritus, it appears, urged that the soul in its motions moved the body it animated; but Aristotle replies that the perpetual motion which that philosopher attributed to the soul would, on this supposition, prevent the possibility of rest;—while it is also inconsistent with the true mode of mental influences. Aristotle next enters into a refutation of the account (not dissimilar in principle to that just mentioned) given by the author of the *Timæus*, of the constitution and agency of the soul of the world; a refutation perfectly justifiable, indeed, if we regard that account as intended for a literal statement, and at all events not unwarranted by the unnecessary particularity to which Plato carried his too romantic hypothesis. Modern criticism will however, I fear, pronounce that the refutation is nearly as unintelligible as the original doctrine. It attributes, says Aristotle, *magnitudo* to the universal soul; and thereby deprives that soul of its purely intellectual character, degrading it to the merely sensitive or concupiscent principles. For intellect is essentially indivisible (*ἀμερής*), or if continuous, not continuous as magnitude, but like its thoughts (*νοήματα*), in the successive way of number. I will not delay you with the further prosecution of this part of the argument; but notice another objection which is characteristic. Aristotle denies that the operation of intellect can be symbolized by the circular motion of this general Soul; inasmuch as the act of ratiocination is not thus perpetually recurrent, but terminated at the one extreme by its principles, at the other by its conclusion; and the active exertions of intellect are similarly bounded by the end for which they are wrought.

Aristoxenus, "The Soul is a Harmony."

Another theory in much vogue in the age of Aristotle was that which was principally patronized by his own pupil the musician Aristoxenus, and which pronounced the soul to be a "Harmony." This doctrine, you may remember, is also controverted by Plato in the *Phædo*. The harmonists alleged that the body was composed of contraries, that harmony was the "crasis and synthesis"—the temperament and conciliation, of contraries,—and that this office being performed by the soul, the soul must be truly definable as Harmony. But the soul is no composition of mixed elements, replies Aristotle; yet this alone is harmony. The soul gives motion to the frame; but what harmony originates the motion of the instrument? The *health* of the body may be styled its "harmony;" but the principle

of soul is more and higher than bodily sanity. Harmony implies composition and proportion of its constituents; but if we pronounce that the soul exists wherever these are discoverable in the body, we must admit not one soul but many, according to the number and variety of its different combinations. Hence, concludes Aristotle, after a cursory notice of some peculiar views of Empedocles,—“the soul can neither be a harmony, nor move in circular motion; it can be moved indirectly, and even move itself by a reflex operation, when it moves the body in which it is; in no other sense can it possess local motion.” “It is not the soul that is angry, compassionates, learns, reasons; but the man *by* the soul,” and considered as *having* a soul, which gives him consciousness and recollection of all organic changes;—while as to the higher intellectual principle it is essentially impassive, and undergoes the appearance of decay merely on account of the failure of its instruments.

The Pythagorean definition of the Soul—the “self-moving number”—is next transpierced by the rapid and penetrating criticism of Aristotle. To all the former objections to the actual motion of the soul, he adds a cluster of new difficulties that beset the arithmetical metaphysics of Pythagoras. The very motion of this “unit in position” will geometrically form a *line*! Such a unit is incapable of being more than the agent in motion, it cannot be also moved. Numbers are capable of subtraction, and thus leave a number different from the former; but the soul remains unchanged in animals that have undergone amputations. With such arguments I will not detain you. It is hard to believe that the symbolical language of Pythagoras did not carry some weightier import than the puerilities which are here so easily overthrown; but though we owe Aristotle much for his records of the old philosophy, we certainly are not much assisted by him to its illustration. His criticisms are almost without an exception depreciable; nor does he seem to have known the enjoyment to be found in tracing truth through all her disguises of antique symbolism and mysterious proverb. In this he offers a striking contrast to the more conciliating spirit of Plato. We may however grant his concluding objection to the Pythagorean definition; that it will be found no easy task “to explain from it the affections and operations of the soul, its thoughts, sensations, pleasures, and pains.”

I have already mentioned the opinion so largely entertained in remote antiquity, that “the like can only be known by its like;” a maxim which Plato applied chiefly to the ultimate unity of Reason and Truth, of the Spirit of Man and the Spirit of the Universe. In the natural philo-

*The Pythagoreans.
“The soul is a self-moving number.”*

*Chap. V.
Aristotle's refutation of the theory of Empedocles.*

LECT.
I.

sophy of Empedocles, this principle seems to have been employed for an humbler purpose; which indeed Plato himself did not altogether disdain, though I cannot believe that he valued it much. The soul, thought the philosopher of Agrigentum, must itself be the counterpart of the external world; to comprehend that world it must be similarly constituted; it must, then, be a composition of the same form of elementary natures which surround it, mingled and actuated by the same two powers of concord and discord. Aristotle refutes this notion in his 5th chapter in a great variety of ways. There are, he urges, substances which the soul apprehends and which yet cannot be traced to these elements; or, at least, which depend on an union and proportion of these elements forming a new whole, which whole ought, therefore, according to the principle of similars, to be found in the soul. Grant that it apprehend the elements of beings by virtue of its own elementary affinity with them; ὅλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίνι γνωριεῖ;—how shall it get to know the whole?—unless it carry within it the very proportions and combinations (λόγοι ἢ συνθέσεις) which regulate these elements. His next objection is taken from the doctrine of the categories. Real being (τὸ ὄν) comprises *all* these generic notions or classes:—shall the soul, then, be of a structure to correspond with them *all*? This is inadmissible, for the principles of these categories are mutually distinct; shall it consist only of the principles of *substances*? (ὕλη and εἶδος); how then shall it apprehend anything else, as the very arrangement of these categories presumes it can? Must it not become a mere quality or quantity in order to detect these classes; and how is this consistent with its substantial being? This doctrine of Empedocles is likewise inconsistent with his own maxim, that “the like *suffers not* from the like” (ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου); for his school will allow that sensation, and even intellection, are passive affections. Why also are none of the outward *earthly* constituents of Body endowed with these perceptive powers? Why, indeed, is not perception universal, and every portion of elementary existence capacitated to recognize itself through the universe? Nor is this system suitable to the real dignity of the intellectual, or even the vital and conscious, essence,—which stands altogether above the bondage of material elements, and the former, plainly prior to them in existence [νοῦς προγενέστατος καὶ κύριος κατὰ φύσιν]. Aristotle adds a curious observation, which may remind us of the peculiarity of the philosophy we have to deal with, and serve to warn us in how different a climate of speculation we are breathing, when we open these ancient pages. If, he re-

marks, "the soul must be formed of elements, there is no need of them *all* in its constitution; for either member of a contrariety will discern both itself and its opposite;" adding a maxim which has become proverbial, that "by the straight we judge both itself and the crooked, for the rule is singly the test of both" [κριτὴς ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανὼν*].

Nor will Aristotle admit that the principle of soul is c. 5. § 17. diffused through the world universally, as Thales and others hastily decided. We cannot admit soul where there is no evidence of animation, without destroying all grounds of reasoning; nor will the most resolute upholder of this fantastic theory venture to give the title of "animal" to the elements singly or in their insensible combinations. But the following argument was urged, it seems, as the strength of their case. The whole and the parts of the elements are homogeneous (ὅλον ὁμοειδὲς τοῖς μορίοις); and since the parts are endowed with animation in animal organisms, we may conclude the whole must be so. This is of course easily answered, by reminding the objector that the principle of soul may be superadded to some matters, though not to all; but Aristotle further keenly retorts, by arguing that this allegation would infer that the soul diffused through the elements must be of literally the same kind with that in animated bodies, which is confuted by the very admission of the adversary, who cannot deny the distinction between his soul of fire or air, and the principle of life, motion, and thought.

Finally, Aristotle asserts the unity of the principle of soul. It constitutes in his view the combining power that comprehends and binds the whole organization of the frame; and as there must be such a bond until death has removed it, we shall have to seek it in an infinite series unless we stop with the soul itself as the simple and indivisible principle of unity. And thus, he observes, the whole soul of the insect is found in each of its parts which live and move after section. The whole soul, then, is engaged in each exercise of the faculties of the soul; and wherever one faculty exists in the frame the entire is *formally* present, even when, as in the case of the insect, not *numerically* the same in each portion. You will, I think, be inclined to consider that this obscure distinction does not throw much light on the subject; this formal presence of an indivisible soul is, however, of much consequence in the Peripatetic psychology*.

* [c. 5. § 16. ed. Trendelenburg. The maxim occurs in Euripides :
οἶδεν τό γ' αἰσχρὸν, κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μαθών.

Ilac. 602.

Ed.]

* Aristotle frequently returns to the same perplexing problem, and allows

LECT.
I.

Having thus rejected all preceding solutions of this great problem, the founder of the Lyceum has cleared the way for his own views; views which you will not expect to remove the difficulty of the question, when you remember that the very interpretation of them has been among the bitterest and most protracted controversies in the whole history of philosophy. The chief obscurity of Aristotle's account arises from his having connected it with his own dark, and often, it must be allowed, ambiguous metaphysical principles; for Aristotle, though always attached to the pursuit of truth by observation, valued the conclusions of observation mainly as they tended to illustrate these ultimate arrangements. Another cause of the obscurity of the Aristotelian definition is—its exceeding generality; a feature which you must always bear in mind in criticising its merits. Aristotle found the principle of soul wherever there was a moving organization, a perpetual succession of changes under a common form of being, and with an internal principle regulating the change. The definition was, therefore, to be framed so as to meet all the varieties of this organic condition; it was to apply to this internal principle of organic changes wherever discernible; it was to suit vegetable, animal, and rational existence. *Εἴ τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν*,—and *τις ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς*, is his introduction to his definition. He compares it (II. 2. 1) to a geometrical definition of figure, common to all and peculiar to none. And, though I am aware that our proud conceptions of our own nature (perfectly just as regards its exclusive and special prerogatives) tolerate with impatience the notion of such an affinity in the inferior elements of our being, there can be no question but that the views of Aristotle as to a progressive chain of organic existence are verified by true scientific observation. Between organic and inorganic beings there are plain, palpable, and absolute differences,

it *ἀποπλανέειν*. (II. 2. 7). Vid. *Hist. Animal.* IV. 7. The property itself of separate vitality and reproductive power, is a characteristic of the lowest forms of organic nature, and diminishes as we ascend in the scale. Thus (as Aristotle himself constantly observes) it is chiefly manifested in plants, in which every slip will propagate its species; it is manifested in the polypus kind most of all the animal kingdom; in worms the sections generate a head and tail, but, as I am informed, with a limit to the number of possible divisions; when we advance farther, the separative power ceases, but in the part that retains the centre of vitality the reproductive power is still strong,—thus the lobster regains its claws. This, too, gradually diminishes: and from the recovery of an entire limb, the power at length lessens in man to that *vis medicatrix* which heals a wound. . . . In elementary animals (as they may be called from their simplicity) this independence of parts is found united with another curious property—a facility of exchanging functions among the different organs. If the polypus be turned inside out, its nutrition is performed with equal effect, by its exterior surface.

Springing from a germ and so reproducing its species; nourished by intimate combination of matter according to laws of assimilation; every part contributing to the common purpose of the whole; and after evincing a peculiar power of resisting the common laws of matter, decaying and dying after definite periods;—the organized portions of the creation are at once and easily recognized. Nor does it appear (though it has been attempted) that any real terms of continuity can be established (as in crystallization) between these separate provinces. But the case is very different when we have once arrived among organized natures. There are, indeed, decided differences between animal and vegetable beings; the powers, namely, of sensation and voluntary motion which belong to the former;—yet we know how difficult it is in the case of (for instance) the zoophyte, to determine whether any such distinctive attribute is really possessed. And it may be questioned whether the most perfectly organized brute does not differ more from the zoophyte than the latter from the sensitive plant. Aristotle, then, by what is substantially an admissible generalization, comprehended all organized beings in one vast class as gifted with a $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ or soul, whose different kinds or faculties ($\deltaυνάμεις$) distinguished the different species; each species in the ascending scale retaining the faculties that preceded it, and adding on the new ones. It was necessary, then, to construct a definition applicable to all these developments of soul; and such a definition as would also compete with those characters of substantiality and indivisibility which Aristotle thought universally recognizable in all its manifestations. Now, there are two ways of declaring the nature of a thing;—one, to reduce it to some known class; the other, professing it to be unique and irreducible, to direct the mind to observe it, by simply pointing out where and when and how it is found to exist. It was, unquestionably, a misfortune to the Aristotelian philosophy, and one of the great causes of its injurious influence on the progress of knowledge, that it too ambitiously attempted the former of these modes of communicating scientific information. You must at once perceive how this habit of reducing all things to genera already known, must inevitably confine the energies of investigation; the true business of science and its greatest glory is, as far as possible, to establish *new* genera, to discover modifications of being before altogether unsuspected. Afterwards it will, by these vast and simple properties, explain multitudes of phenomena; and thus verify its discovery;—but the crown still belongs to him whose sagacity has detected the new genus. It is not too much

LECT.
I.

to say, that the whole of the Baconian reform turns upon establishing this simple maxim; that the logical definition by genus and difference is *not* to be the great primary aim of physical science, but its subsequent and inferior application;—and, as a consequence, that the proper work of “syllogism” is also not the establishment, but the application, of the general laws of man and nature.

LECTURE II.

ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE.

THE object of the Aristotelian investigations, I concluded by observing, is mainly classification, the reduction of beings to previously known genera. The attempt to perform this office for the soul in Aristotle's universal sense of the word, must necessarily lead to unprofitable subtleties; even though, as in many other unprofitable pursuits of mistaken science, valuable observations may be gained on the journey. The principle that maintains life, sensation, and reason, in conjunction with an organized body, and with whose cessation these cease, is *single* in the world; it is plainly different from anything observable in the inanimate creation; and we may be assured that any attempt to generalize it, must terminate in some false, or ambiguous, or nugatory proposition. It is clear that it can be done only by two courses; either by quickening the inanimate world or by deadening the animate;—and, as far as I have penetrated the spirit of Aristotle, it seems to me that he had an evident, though subdued and disguised, tendency to the former;—which, for the rest, is as you know, not strange to the philosophy of antiquity. Let us now see by what means Aristotle endeavoured to fix the idea of soul among his logical assortments; premising that you will find his definition chiefly intended to apply to the inferior functions of the soul, from which he afterwards separates the supreme agency of intellect so decisively as to lead some of his interpreters to conceive that he attributed a double soul to man.

LECT.
II.

In his strong faith of the value and sufficiency of the categories, Aristotle begins with the most abstract of conceptions, in order by regular descent to obtain the due location of soul in that system of human thoughts. The most universal of ideas is τὸ εἶναι, bare existence, which comprises all the categories. Among the rest, and holding a position of great importance, it includes the notion of οὐσία, or *substance*. Substance is either possible, with a capacity of reality, or it is that which gives reality to mere possibility, or finally it is the compound of both¹. In tech-

*Aristotelian
distinction
of soul from
body.*

¹ [λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἐν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὅλην, (ὁ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι,) ἕτερον δὲ μορφήν καὶ εἶδος, καθ' ἣν ἡδὲ λέγεται τόδε τι; καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων. *De Animâ*, II. I. 2. F.D.]

LECT.
II.

*Distinction
of δύναμις
and ἐντελέ-
χεια :*

*of ἐντελέχεια
and ἐνέργεια.*

nical language, it is either matter (ὕλη) or form (μορφή, εἶδος, or λόγος) or the resultant of both in real existence—the actual natures that surround us in the universe. Now it is a characteristic of Aristotle's philosophy, that his "forms" are essentially active; our word "actual" to express reality is strictly Aristotelian, for forms alone confer reality, and they, as real, are by Aristotle conceived to consist in a state of "energy" ever active yet ever complete. Whether this conception originally arose from regarding the soul as a "form," or from purely metaphysical speculations as to the best mode of accounting rationally for the existence and laws of the universe, it is plain that it aided the construction of Aristotle's definition, and naturally led to it. Matter, then, being *capacity* (δύναμις), and Form being *act* or *ἐντελέχεια*; Aristotle proceeds to affirm that bodies are plainly substances², and that natural bodies are universally so, as being the groundwork of all others. When to the natural body is added the possession of *life*, it still remains a substance, and as such cannot be confounded with or affirmed of soul; it is not the attribute of a subject but itself a subject-matter³. Body, then, considered apart, is materially and potentially a natural living substance, and the soul is that which formalizes and exalts to actuality this natural living substance previously endowed with a mere susceptibility of these attributes. But we have not yet reached the entire definition. In the general notion of activity Aristotle discovers a distinction which is in various forms of very extensive application in his metaphysical philosophy. There is a principle of energy, and a direct exercise of energy; a dormant activity and an operating activity; even as there is a habitual knowledge and an immediate contemplation; or, as he otherwise illustrates it, as there is the state of sleep and the state of waking. This seems to be the previous distinction of power and act transferred to the region of energy:—thus he compares the soul shortly after, in this same respect, to ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὀργάνου, sc. the organ of sight. Now, in the nature of the case, the former of these—the *source* of energy—is prior to the other; it is the first conceivable state of the activity afterwards manifested. Here the soul becomes "the *first* energy" of the body. Further, the body, both in plants and in animals, is evidently instrumental or "organic;" a term and notion first, as far as I know, fully developed in the writings of Ari-

² [οὐτοίαι δὲ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικά. Ib. 93. Ed.]

³ [οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα ψυχῆς, οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μάλλον δὲ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. Ib. 94. Ed.]

stotle, and for which the world is still indebted to him. And thus we gain the entire definition, so famous and so contested, which pronounces the soul universally considered, to be "the first *entelechia*" (or energy) "of a natural organic body, which body itself has life potentially⁴." The soul, he adds, is not separable from the body in so far as it is the "energy" of this body; were the eye an animal the visive power would be its soul, and that power being removed, it could no longer, except homonymously, be termed an eye;—thus also, passing from part to whole, the soul is the essence of the particular organized body to which it is attached. At the close of the following chapter (II. 2. 12) he recapitulates his views succinctly. "The soul is λόγος and εἶδος, not ἴλη and ὑποκείμενον. And as substance is three-fold,—form, matter, and the compound of the two; of these matter is capacity, form is act; and as that which is made up of both is ἐμψυχον, animate, the body is not the act (ἐντελέχεια) of the soul, but the soul itself is the act of a certain body. And therefore they rightly judge, that neither is the soul without the body, nor is the soul body, but (σώματος τι) something pertaining to the body...And each soul is in its own proper and peculiar body; for such is the nature of things that the 'entelechy' of each thing is in that particular thing which is it potentially, and thus is ever inherent in its own proper matter." All this refers to the inferior nutritive and sensitive soul only; though Aristotle (not according to his usual precision) leaves us to collect this from other passages in the same and subsequent chapters, in which he expressly declares his opinion that the νοῦς or theoretic faculty is another genus of soul, and separable, and eternal. I may here observe, that it forms no slight difficulty in determining the sense of Aristotle's psychology, to fix in what degree he meant to include the intellectual faculty (whether passive or active) in his general descriptions of the nature and qualities of soul. He perpetually meets us with—περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος (II. 3. 10).

Such, then, is Aristotle's effort to fix the generic character and essence of the soul. He afterwards proceeds, in the spirit of the modern method, to describe it by its properties, and with remarkable sagacity and success for his age of science. But we may pause for a moment on the investigation we have completed. *Remarks.*

It is evident that this reduction of the notion of soul to the notions of substance, form, and energy, is of little

⁴ [ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δινᾶμις ζῶν ἐχόντων.
§ 6. Ed.]

LECT.
II.

scientific value; that it shares the fate of all attempts to classify that which is absolutely unique. To say that it is *real* substance, is merely to affirm that it has more than possible existence; to call it a form is merely to intimate that the body is more than a confused heap of undetermined capacities of being; to name it an energy of the first order, is to pronounce that it has that in faculty which subsequently appears in act. The defect, then, of the definition is this, that it adds nothing to our knowledge of the subject, and gives little or no assistance in mental classification; the merit of it, as compared with its predecessors, is, however, this,—that it also assumes nothing hypothetical. It may also be observed, that Aristotle having once divided universal being into the two classes of potentiality and actuality, of matter and form, he at least allied the vital and conscious principle with the loftiest elements his scheme of existence supplied; and having established his form, causes, or principles of being, he found in the soul the noblest three—the formal, the efficient, and the final,—for these he blends together as accomplished in the nature of the soul, which is at once the form, the agent, and the ultimate end, of the body it animates (II. 4. 3).

*Analysis of
chap. II. of
the second
book of the
treatise de
Anima.*

*The gradations of or-
ganic being.*

• There is a distinction of perpetual recurrence in Aristotle (see *Phys.* I. I. 2; *Eth. Nicom.* I. 4), between that which is clearest in the nature of things and that which is clearest to our apprehensions; and this forms the ground of transition from his definition of the nature of the soul in itself to a description of its faculties. The animate is manifestly distinguished from the inanimate by the possession of life, which manifests itself in many various faculties. The lowest is the nutritive, possessed by the vegetable creation in common with all other living things; which world of mere vegetation is accordingly said to “live,” every plant having within it this ἀρχὴ and δύναμις of increase in all directions. That this faculty can exist without the rest, is plain; but that the others can exist without it, is manifestly impossible, at least in things subject to death,—ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς. The animal rises above the vegetable by the attribute of sensation, διὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν; not necessarily, observes Aristotle, by that of local motion; for all admit that the animal nature truly belongs to beings altogether unable to change their place (as the whole tribe of zoophytes and adhesive shell-fish). In the sensitive faculty itself the feeling of *touch* is itself as separable as the nutritive function from the sensitive; being frequently possessed by animals who seem to be endowed with no other sense whatever. And this according to the scheme of progress; for touch, which includes taste as one of its species, is the

sensitive faculty most necessary for the purposes of the nutritive. With sensation, again, is necessarily connected *appetite* (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν); since sensation involves the pleasurable and the painful (see III. II. 1), and these must infer desire and aversion. Beyond these again, is the motive and the intellectual faculty*. And thus we gain a second and more intelligible definition of the soul (II. 9. 12), as being *that* (τοῦτο) by which we live, and feel, and reason—πρώτως—that is) as the first principle of these faculties:—always remembering, for this he perpetually impresses, that the soul is not to be considered as the matter or simple subject of these powers, but as a nature essentially active, and which by its innate efficiency, even when dormant, rules, animates, and *realizes* the body. We are said, he observes (II. 2. 15, 16), to be healthy by health itself as a principle, or healthy as to the body as a subject; this principle of health is as an εἶδος, a λόγος, an ἐνέργεια of the body, inherent in it; and it is in this sense of activity, not that other of passivity, that we are to affirm that by the soul we live, and feel, and understand. The history of the soul, then, is the history of the principle that pervades organized nature; and rises by regular and distinct gradations from the lowest form of vegetable being to the mind of Aristotle himself. Nutrition and reproduction, sensation by touch, sensation by the other senses, desire and aversion, power of local motion, faint powers of memory and conception, intellect recipient and intellect active,—such are the successive regions to be surveyed and characterized by the philosopher of soul.

I need not remind you that this fine outline of physiological inquiry, thus drawn by the masterly hand of Aristotle, and comprehending the whole organized creation, has directed nearly all subsequent investigations, and in some form or other prefaces our treatises to this very day. It is difficult to say in what degree Aristotle was indebted for it to his predecessors; his powerful faculty of reproducing all antecedent learning in new forms doubtless was manifested here; and it is not improbable that Plato has lost much of his due credit by preferring his own graceful way of dialogue (in which systems of this kind can scarcely be clearly stated) to—except in one or two instances—the form of methodical exposition. But though Aristotle, who, we must remember, was the descendant of a long line of physicians, may have obtained many hints towards his arrangement, the style of the whole performance is marked

* Each step of advance implies the rest that precede it; "As," says Arist., "the triangle is implied in the square, so the nutritive in the sensitive faculty." (II. 3. 9.)

LECT.
II.

The fourth
chapter.
Character-
istics of
vegetable
life.

with characters of independent research scarcely to be mistaken.

To the vegetative principle—the first manifestation of an organic “form”—Aristotle assigns the same two leading characters which are still attributed to it,—those of alimentation of the individual, and reproduction of the species. The latter he ascribes, singularly enough, to a certain mysterious appetency of the immortal and divine, which, unable to realize itself in the perishable individual, tends to the perpetuation of the kind. As the soul is in three respects the *αἰτία* and *ἀρχή* of the body;—as its formal principle of being, and the actuality of its mere capacity; as its final cause, nature working ever with an end in view, and the body being to the soul an instrument for its own purposes; as its efficient or moving cause;—so this last cause is manifested not merely in local motion, but also in the other species of motion,—those, for example, of change (*ἀλλοίωσις*) and augmentation or diminution (*αὐξήσις* and *φθίσις*). The motion of variation is instanced in sensation; the motion of augmentation in the process of nutrition. The remaining discussion of the subject of this inferior soul does not offer much matter of interest. Aristotle censures the idle hypothesis of Empedocles, that the growth of plants downward and upward depended on the principles of earth and fire respectively; and discusses the agency of heat in the business of nutrition—a notion which seems to have got currency, according to Aristotle,—and these rude conceptions are not without interest as illustrating the progress of physical science,—from the fact that fire alone, of the four supposed elements, appears to be itself capable of assimilation and increase. But though Aristotle exalts fire to the dignity of a *συναίτιον*, he still contends for the disposing and moderating power of the soul. The soul or vital principle employs heat to modify aliment; as the pilot uses his own hand to move the rudder of his vessel (II. 4, § 16). Whether alimentation takes place by the operation of contraries on contraries, was another question which these early physiologists attempted to solve by supposed universal maxims; as “the impossibility of like affecting like,” &c.... Aristotle justly enough distinguishes by the period of the process; which in its early stage will present contraries, and in its final stage similars, as we are accustomed to recognize in our term “assimilation.” The philosopher’s power of distinction is next exercised upon the respective ideas of augmentation, nutrition, and generation;—the animated body possesses the first, as it is a quantity (*ᾗ ποσόν τι*); the second, as it is a definite substance; for the conservation of the same substance is the

purpose of nutrition ; the third, as it is qualified to preserve, not the same, but the *similar* (οὐ τοῦ τρεφόμενου, ἀλλ' οἷον τὸ τρεφόμενον, § 13).

LECT.
II.

The great cause of imperfection in Aristotle's treatment of these subjects is his unhappy preference of merely logical distinctions to physical observations. The reader perpetually laments that a sagacity so perspicacious and so universal should be wasted through half a treatise, in labouring to reconcile hasty observations of nature to arbitrary maxims previously assumed ; and in applying a multiplicity of distinctions which at best can avail for little more than mere propriety of expression. Potential and real, passive and active, are the feeble keys, that, easily fitted into all the wards of nature, have yet no strength to stir the bolt. His treatise on the soul, as all his treatises, contains many valuable suggestions and many important facts ; but no matter how interesting the particular discussion, the chance of a minute metaphysical distinction is ever sufficient to win him from his subject into a labyrinth of obscure and profitless disquisition ; and he seems to value facts only as they may grace or illustrate these artificial classifications.

*Cause of the
imperfection
of Aristotle's
physiology.*

This character is too applicable to the chapter that succeeds the one on which we have been engaged. It treats of *sense* in general ; but altogether in reference to these distinctions of which you have already had so much. Aristotle determines that sensation is motion and passion ; and of all the species of motion, variation. Elsewhere he defines actual sensation with great exactness as "a motion or excitation of the soul through the body," and as thus belonging equally to both. (*De Somn.* I. p. 185 B.) The question next arises,—why there is no sensation of the sensitive faculties themselves ? and this difficulty is solved by establishing that the æsthetic or sensitive is only *potential*, even as the combustible has only a fitness for combustion ; the sensitive, therefore, cannot feel until its power be exalted into act. This customary distinction is then elaborately reiterated, and its differences multiplied by new dissections. In passive variation there are also two species,—alteration destructive and alteration preservative, the latter of which brings the faculty into act. After insisting on these distinctions, which Aristotle seems to consider of very high importance, though till then, as he tells us, without a definite name ; he proceeds to the more obvious differences of the acts of sensation and of general science. The objects and active causes of the former are external, are singular, are necessarily present (and only occasionally *can* be present) for the act of sensation ; those of the latter

*The fifth
Chapter.
(On sensa-
tion.)*

LXXI.
II.

The sixth
and seventh
Chapters.
On the ob-
jects of sen-
sation.

are inward, universal, and ever the property of the soul. The knowledge of things merely sensible is similarly restricted with its objects themselves: and thus the *αἰσθητικὸν* is in power only until the *αἰσθητὸν* is in act; the active operation of the latter on the former is *αἰσθesis*, in the accomplishment of which the sensitive and the sensible quality become ultimately alike (II. 5, § 7)*.

Aristotle considers that the *objects* of the senses—their external causes—should first be discussed; the acts and the faculties of sense next in succession. It of course necessarily follows, that the obscurity in which the external media of sensation were in that age involved,—they, as you know, forming the last and most refined subject of physical inquiry,—must affect many of his conclusions with error. Yet hints of native sagacity offer themselves often to the reader, and render these pages still of interest to the historian of physical research.

The proper objects of sense, declares Aristotle, are twofold:—those which are apprehended by a single sense, and those apprehended by more, or all the senses. You will recall this division in the "Essay" of Locke. The subjects of all the senses are, motion, rest, number, figure, magnitude; of which motion is plainly sensible to touch and sight. And all the rest, he elsewhere observes, are perceivable by *motion* (III. 1. § 5); "as magnitude by motion; as well as figure, for figure is a mode of magnitude; so also rest, as the absence of motion; number by the negation of continuity (*τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς*); unity by every sense. And thus there is no special sense of each of these:—for it will be as we now apprehend the sweet by sight,—because we have a sense of both, in which when they coincide (*ὅταν συμπίσωσι*) we know accordingly." See also *ibid.* 4. To these two classes of sensible objects is to be added a sort of sensation *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, as when we are said to *see* the son of Cleon, when that he is "the son of Cleon" is really an inference from the direct object of sense. The senses are not deceived, but false conclusions may be

* In the act of sensation, Aristotle urgently maintains a distinct being for the sensible *object*. The ancients, says he, (III. 1. 16; see also *Metaph.* IX. 3,) have not correctly conceived that nothing is white or black except when *seen*, and that there is no saporific quality without *taste*; this is true as respects *act*, but not as respects *power*. Both the sensitive and the sensible are to be understood, each of them, as existing potentially and actively; in sensation the *act* of both is combined into one, though still essentially different; and in this active sense hearing and sound (for instance) arise and expire together; but potentially their existence is mutually independent. And he observes that it is only in some of our senses that language supplies distinct names for the active or energising state in the *αἰσθητικὸν* and the *αἰσθητὸν*;—thus while we have in one case sound and hearing, we have no term answering to "vision" for the active or operative state of colour, as exciting it.

drawn from sensible appearances. The cases of deceit he states (III. c. 3)⁵. The perception of each object of proper sense is scarcely at all false (ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος); the inference as to the subject of the sensible quality may be false; judgments as to the common qualities, such as motion and magnitude, still more so. This observation might lead us to expect a close analysis of the ideas ordinarily attributed to mere sense; by which the modern inquirers might have been anticipated in that detection of associated judgments which has made one of their chief titles to glory; but Aristotle pursues it little farther.

I do not purpose to present you with any detailed account of Aristotle's views as to the objects or media of the various senses. They belong less to the history of general speculation than to that of natural philosophy. A very brief notice may, however, be most uninteresting, as illustrating the slight advance the most sagacious mind can make in such a field without patient experimental investigation.

With regard, for instance, to the object of *sight*, the question turns in Aristotle upon the conception of three principal subjects: colour, transparency, and light. Colour is the direct object of vision; it affects that which is actually transparent, and by means of this actually transparent medium becomes visible; it is *κίνητικόν τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς*. The transparent medium, then, must possess some activity of transparency, some diaphanous virtue, to effect this; and it must be when deprived of this activity that colours become invisible. Now this actuality of the transparent medium, which makes it indeed transparent, is light; which is hence described by the definition so often—and not altogether unjustly—subjected to modern ridicule, as “the act of the diaphanous considered so far forth as diaphanous.”* (§ 2.) Sound is the sonorous body in act, light is the pellucid body in act; and the latter reveals *colours*, as the former reveals the varieties of acuteness and gravity (II. 8, § 8). They differ, however, in this—that sound is *motion* and light is not (*De Sens.* VI. p. 675 B). Light, according to Aristotle, is not itself a body, nor the efflux of a body; for then it should occupy the very same place with the diaphanous medium; which is contradictory:—it is, “as it were, the colour of the diaphanous medium, when it *is actually* diaphanous by fire or the like.”

⁵ [This curious chapter seems to have been suggested by the discussions on the conditions of false opinion in the *Theætetus* and *Sophista*. § 9 is an evident critique of p. 264 of the latter dialogue, though it seems to have escaped the notice of Prof. Bonitz, whose excellent Index to Aristotle recognizes five other references to the *Sophista*—more than sufficient, one would have thought, to have set at rest the question of its genuineness. Ed.]

LECT.
II.*On Sound
and Hear-
ing, c. 8.*

He proceeds to treat of sound and hearing in the same style; maintaining for both, as for all the senses, the absolute necessity of a *medium*. He observes that there is a reflection of both sound and light, and considers both to be the perpetual conditions of hearing and seeing; plainly enough accounts for sound by impulses of the air continued to the organ (II. 8. § 3, &c.), and seems to have had some conception of slow and rapid vibrations as causes of differences of pitch (ib. § 8); though this (affirmed by Dr Gillies, p. 50) is very doubtful in my judgment. Aristotle attempts to explain the fact of hearing by the supposition of a *συμφυγὴς ἀήρ* in the meatus of the ear; a notion which seems to have originated in a principle countenanced elsewhere by Aristotle, and stated by Plato in the *Timæus*,—that there is an internal relation between each “element” and the constitution of each organ, and the cause of the possession and privation of voice;—observations which, as all Aristotle’s physiological remarks, display wonderful vigilance and variety of observation, with an equally singular confidence in precipitate and superficial explanations.

*On the
senses of
Smell,
Taste, and
Touch,
c. 9—c. 11.*

Of smell Aristotle observes that it is our most defective sense, that air and water are its appropriate media, and that its objects are usually dry, as those of taste are eminently moist. This latter sense he considers a species of *touch*, and in truth only one of its numerous varieties. Nor is either taste or touch absolutely without a medium; though the objects of these senses differ from the rest in affecting at once the medium and the sense. It is, says Aristotle, as the soldier receives at once the pressure of the shield and the stroke that smites it. The real organ of both these senses is, he considers, beneath the outer surface; a faint conjecture not unlike the real truth. The objects of touch he pronounces to be the differences of body as body (*διαφορὰς σώματος ἢ σώμα*), in other words—the “primary qualities” of Locke. The organ holds a kind of mediate position between the extremes of its objects; and it is the excesses or deficiencies above or below this mediate intensity which it detects⁶.

*The twelfth
Chapter.
On sense in
general, its
reciprocity of
forms with-
out the mat-
ter.*

Aristotle closes this book of his treatise, by stating of the senses in general,—that they are all “recipients of sensible forms without the matter;” an assertion not absurd if understood in the author’s sense of matter and form, and not in the gross way of atomic effluxions; an assertion the substance of which is, perhaps, involved in all our ordinary admissions, that the material ground of sensible qualities is not itself directly apprehended by sense. He illustrates

⁶ [On this and the other departments of the Aristotelian psychology no student of the subject should omit to consult Mr Grote (*Aristotle*, Chap. XII.). Ed.]

it by the well-known comparison of the impression of the signet on the wax;—"the wax receives the brazen or golden seal, but not *quatenus* it is brass or gold; and the sense of each object is affected by that which has colour, or taste, or sound, yet not as each of its objects substantially and materially exists, but as it is *such*, and according to its *formal essence*". And thus though the sensorium and the object agree, yet they differ also:—the sentient organ *may* be a definite magnitude⁷, but the sensitive faculty is no magnitude, but a proportion and power answerable to it. This proportion must be duly maintained between the sense and its object; and hence excessive impulses destroy the organs. And the reason why plants are without the sensitive power is just this; that they are naturally without this proportioned recipient to detach the forms of the sensible objects, and are thus affected by the whole complex material mass, when they are affected at all. And in all similar cases, inanimate bodies are not affected by light or darkness or sound or smell as sensible forms; but by the bodies in which these sensible forms are conveyed;—it is not the sound but the concussion of the air that cleaves the tree in a thunder-storm"...§ 5. Elsewhere expressions occur more emphatic as to the transference of these sensible qualities; yet they are still essentially distinct from any effluxion of matter. As (III. 2, § 3) "That which sees is *in a manner coloured* (*ἐστὶν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται*); for each sensorium (*αἰσθητήριον*) is receptive of the sensible quality without the matter; and hence when the sensibles themselves are absent, sensations and *φαντασίαι* remain in the sensoria." Such are nearly the expressions of Aristotle on this important question of the communication of the senses with the external world. You will observe that the sensible forms of which he speaks are essentially immaterial; and certainly, whatever may be thought of the value of the theory in any shape, are very different from the coarse caricatures which are presented of his doctrine in many modern publications. The "forms" of Aristotle may be illustrated by comparing them with the "forms" of Kant, the modern metaphysician who in every respect most

The "forms" of Aristotle compared with those of Kant.

⁷ [ἡ τοιοῦτὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. § 1. i.e. in virtue of its qualities, and formal description. ED.]

⁸ [The vulgar reading (retained by Bekker and Trendelenburg) of this passage is, μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οὐ μὴν τό γε αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι. Simplicius reads here τῷ γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι.—So at least Aldus represents. If this is right, tr. 'The sentient organ may be a definite corporeal magnitude, but not *as* it is sentient:' i.e. its perceptive power is no function of its material bulk, nor *vice versa*: it is an immaterial power, not a certain quantity of matter. But probably τὸ is the right reading, the sense of which is fairly given in the text. ED.]

LECT.
II.

nearly resembles him. Aristotle—impressed, as all must be, with the *mental* character of the qualities of the external world—separated them from their material substratum, at least in conception—*κατὰ λόγον*, and held that from their posts in the external world they, and they exclusively of their “matter,” held connexion with the mind, becoming in a manner one with the mind that apprehended them. And if matter be real, and the qualities of matter real, this statement cannot be thought extravagant; it is true that matter is directly perceived by no sense, and that the qualities or “forms” of matter are the subjects and furniture of the sentient soul; it is these that detach themselves from their material basis, and alone affect the sensitive principle. The view of Kant is simpler; but it recognizes, at least as regards the principal of these qualities, the same general problem, and attempts its solution in a way not dissimilar. He thought it preferable to regard the chief of these same forms as completely the issue of the mind itself, which according to its own laws invests external objects with them; they do not come to us, but we create them. His theory of forms was indeed more limited in its application to the objects of sense than that of Aristotle; being confined to the ideas of time and space;—and it was also confirmed by researches into the distinction of the evidence of experience and demonstration, of which Aristotle appears little cognizant;—but the separation of form and matter belongs to both, and is as justifiable in the one as in the other.

*Aristot. de
Animā.
The third
Book.*

Aristotle proceeds to shew that there exist no senses beyond those he has enumerated. The arguments employed are scarcely worth delaying your attention; turning chiefly on the ancient notions concerning the four elements. He remarks a principal advantage in the possession of a variety of senses; that thereby we are enabled to distinguish the primary qualities of number, magnitude, motion, &c. from the secondary with which they are associated; were everything white we should not distinguish colour and extension⁹. This is one of those pregnant observations that make us regret that Aristotle should suddenly desert the most promising investigations; after (as we should imagine) getting so admirably within view of them. He also raises the question of a consciousness distinct from the mere sensation, which you will perhaps remember has been largely discussed by a late writer¹⁰. “Since,” says our author¹¹, “we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary that we be conscious of our seeing either by sight or by

⁹ [B. III. c. 1, § 8. Trendelenb. Ed.]

¹⁰ [Dr Thomas Brown, Lecture XI. on Consciousness. Ed.]

¹¹ [B. III. c. 2, § 1. Ed.]

some other faculty. The sense must be conscious of itself, or there will be two sensations of the same object. Moreover, if there be this further sense of the sensation, either the process must go on to infinity, or some sensation must be conscious of itself; this, then, may as well take place at the first stage. On the other hand, arises the difficulty, that as the proper object of sight is colour, if the sight perceive itself, that self must be coloured." To this he replies by a distinction, and by observing that there is a certain quality of colour even in the organ (as before cited); as often, stating the question better than he solves it.

The second chapter of the third book of the treatise *De Animâ* introduces us (§ 10) to a tenet which has been considered a peculiar glory of the psychology of Aristotle—his doctrine of the common sense, to which all sensible apprehensions are supposed to be referred. Many expositors seem to consider this doctrine, as in Aristotle's view of it, a conclusive proof of the unity and immateriality of the soul; it may however be much doubted whether this inference does not exaggerate and distort his real meaning. The "common sense" of Aristotle appears to be still a "sense," and generically nothing more, though invested with more extensive prerogatives than any single sensitive faculty. His argument for its necessary existence is nearly this. The differences of things sensible must be apprehended by sense. Yet this detector of differences cannot be any peculiar or special sense among the five external ones; for each can but perceive its own object, and none can compare with the rest:—οὐτε κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίναι. It can no more be effected by distinct *senses* than by distinct *persons*. There must then be some single faculty of sensation, the common judge of all. Nor, again, can the objects be presented to the sense in different *times* any more than by different organs, if a single indivisible judgment is to be pronounced: the two objects must be included in the one instantaneous judgment. Hence there must exist some common centre of sensation in which all the sensations of all the senses are received and compared. This sense must indeed include contraries, and is thus in one sense indivisible, in another capable of division. It is strange that the necessity of admitting this fact should not have suggested to Aristotle that he had no right to assimilate this faculty as a discerning faculty, in any manner to the functions of sensation. This seems to be little raised above the confusion of Condillac and the other French expositors of Locke...* Aristotle seems to assign other

*Aristotle's
theory of a
"common
sense."*

* However it may be that Aristotle merely meant to make it the general receptacle of sensations, and to attribute the discerning power to the intellect.

functions likewise to this centre of sensation. It is it which becomes singly conscious of the separate organic affections; it is it (he sometimes seems to say) which becomes cognizant of those notions which are derived from many senses—as motion, figure, and the rest; it is it also, he tells us, which is mainly affected in the state of sleep;—the sense of touch, as the universal one, he appears to associate intimately with it, and argues from hence that the true seat of this sense cannot be merely external. The *sensus communis*, then, is what we should in this day call the nervous centre; Aristotle's inaccurate anatomy refers it to the heart¹².

However difficult it be to conceive that the perception of a relation of difference should by Aristotle be ascribed to sense (whether special or general sense), the difficulty is scarcely alleviated by his subsequent affirmation of the essential distinction between intellection and sensation. This (whether reconcilable or not with the former) he strongly asserts. Many, he observes, among living things possess the one; comparatively few the other; sense is never false in its report of its proper objects, reasoning often erroneous. Fancy again (*φαντασία*) is also very different from mere sensation; a truth with the obvious grounds of which it is needless to trouble you. From all the faculties that tell us of true or false, the *φαντασία* is plainly separated; as Aristotle, repeating some of his previous reasonings, establishes through all the spheres of sense, opinion, intellect, and science, with a minute exactness which we could gladly exchange upon this evident argument for greater clearness where it was more required*. These gradations conduct us to the last division of the Aristotelian psychology;—the intellect active, passive, speculative, and practical.

See III. 5, 10. [This can hardly have been Aristotle's meaning. Compare the treatise *De Somno*, c. 2. *De Sensu*, c. 7, 8. *De Interpretatione*, c. 1. τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητηρίων ἐν τε κοινὸν ἔστιν αἰσθητήριον, εἰς δὲ τὰς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεις ἀναγκαῖον ἀπαντᾶν. Ed.]

¹² [*De Juv.* c. 3. ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ τῆς θρεπτικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῖς ἐνάλμοις. Ed.]

* Of *memory*, Aristotle tells us that it is founded on the *φαντασία* or conceptive [imaginative? Ed.] power, even in the remembrance of things "intelligible." He observes that recollection is guided by associative laws, in a passage which has often been quoted since modern investigations have given a peculiar interest to the topic; and distinguishing it from *ἀνάμνησις* or voluntary reminiscence, makes the possession of this latter faculty a prominent distinction between the human and the inferior animal creation. The book *περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀνάμνησεως* is not unworthy an attentive perusal. [The second chapter of this treatise is especially interesting, as it contains (§§ 7, 8) the only attempt at a theory of the so-called "association of ideas" to be found in any Greek philosopher. The student should compare Coleridge's remarks on this subject in the *Biographia Literaria* with those of Sir J. Mackintosh in his *Dissertation on Moral Philosophy*. Ed.]

LECTURE III.

ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE.

WE proceed to the consideration of Aristotle's view of the intellectual faculty—a subject of great intricacy and obscurity, from the unhappy conciseness of the author's style. For this conciseness, which is a beauty where the subject is, and properly admits of being, expounded with the exquisite exactness and regular consecution of mathematical method, becomes a most harassing tax upon attention, and a most invincible obstacle to perfect intelligibility, where the subject is new to the reader, is to be explored by observation of facts, and is liable to be viewed in a great variety of aspects. Still more is the difficulty increased, when to this conciseness of each sentence is added a most perplexing collocation of the sentences themselves; uncertain queries, positive assertions, doubts, and decisions, following each other without any discernible ground of connexion; and resembling less the finished treatise of a great writer than the loose hints and incomplete speculations of his note-book. However admirable the *method* of Aristotle appears in some of his writings (the Nicomachean Ethics, for example), it is certain that some of his chapters as they now stand present the most puzzling combination of brevity and prolixity—brevity in every clause, prolixity in their number and reiteration—to be found in the compass of philosophical literature.

LECT.
III.

The intellectual faculty according to Aristotle.

The human intellect, it is well known, is divided by Aristotle into two chief departments—the intellect passive and the intellect active; or, as they might perhaps be more truly termed, in relation to his metaphysical views, the intellect potential and actual: for it is on this universal and characteristic distinction that the psychology of Aristotle, as every other portion of his philosophy, mainly turns. "Since," he declares (III. 5. 1), "in all nature there is a something which is the matter to each kind, and is all things in capacity; and another something which is the cause and efficient (*αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν*) in the actual effecting of all things (just as art is related to its material), it is necessary that in the soul also these differences should sub-

The Intellect distinguished into Passive and Active. De Animâ, B. III. c. 5.

sist. The intellect is one thing because it *becomes all things*, another thing considered as it *produces* all things—as a certain ‘habit,’ even as light; for this latter intellect is as light, which actualizes those colours which without it were only potentially colours. And *this* intellect is separable, unmixed, impassive, its very essence being activity¹; for the efficient ever ranks above the patient, and the principle (*ἀρχή*) above its matter (*ὑλη*).” The active and patient intellect² of Aristotle, then, are manifestly *that* in the world of mind which the efficient cause of form and matter are in the external world. The active intellect impresses forms upon the patient, exactly as the efficient cause in the universe combines them with the recipient matter; and thus the same process is acted over in the mind of man as in the world it contemplates. Aristotle (as you must now remember) perpetually illustrates his doctrine of power and act by the various states of knowledge. A man may be conceived wholly without knowledge, yet with a capacity of it; with knowledge habitual, yet not in direct exercise; and with knowledge in actual exercise of contemplation. These states exemplify the patient intellect in its original apathy, in its habitual condition, and in its formalized activity as inspired by the higher energy of the active. Aristotle gives no proof from immediate experience of consciousness—or next to none—of this duplicity of the human intellect; from the nature of the case it could indeed admit of none, for the patient intellect can as little be the object of knowledge as the *materia prima*; his statement altogether rests upon what he considers the self-evident universality of the principle. The same considerations that establish it in the outer, establish it in the inner world. Another analogy which confirms it, and which forms a kind of transition from the material to the mental, is the process of sensation (*αἴσθησις*), in which we have already seen that the two elements are carefully distinguished; the activity of the sensible object and the passivity of the organ of sense, which excited by the former accomplishes the reality of sensation. It may indeed be asked why the *νοητὰ* or “intelligibles” might not themselves, according to the spirit of Aristotle’s teaching, possess enough of this “energetic” quality to be independent of the *νοῦς ποιητικός*? It seems to me that Aristotle was on this point impressed partly by the felt activity of the intellect in the work of thought; partly pleased by the

¹ [So Simplicius understands the passage, reading τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὡν ἐνέργεια. Vulg. ἐνεργεία, which is probably the right reading. Ed.]

² [Νοῦς ποιητικός, νοῦς παθητικός. The latter γίνεταί πάντα, the former ποιεῖ πάντα. See Trendelenburg’s Commentary, p. 493, fol. Ed.]

opportunity which the doctrine gave him of identifying (in the universal spirit of antiquity) the "agent intellect" in the mind with the prime efficient cause in the universe, by thus making it energize the intelligible, as that does the sensible, objects of the soul.

Aristotle accordingly treats of the patient and agent aspects of the soul together³. The intellect in general must be considered as impassive (*ἀπαθές*), but as recipient of forms (*δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἶδους*), and as being such potentially as it becomes in act. As the sensitive faculty to sensible objects, so the intelligible to intelligible objects. There is here, however, (c. 4, § 3,) some variety of reading. It must be *ἀμυγής*—unmixed, as otherwise it could not rise superior in its comprehending power to all things, but be confined by its peculiar composition; it must be specially unmingled with the body, as if it were corporeal in its constitution it should undergo bodily modifications—as heat and cold, and should possess some definite instrument as the sense does, which Aristotle denies it. The *ἀπάθεια* of the sensitive and intelligent is also remarkably different in this;—that a powerful impression fatigues or destroys the sense, while the most perfect object of intellection only strengthens and extends the intellective power;—the sensitive being bodily, but the intellect distinct from body. This noetic faculty receives and is conversant with forms of being abstracted from their particular material subjects. He, therefore, in accordance with the view I have given you, pronounces the intellect, in its passive or *potential* aspect, to be the *τόπος εἰδῶν*, or place of forms, as it had been styled by the Platonists⁴; the region in which alone they could dwell in a state separate from matter; an expression which (as I before hinted) is literally suitable to the most celebrated philosophical system of our day. The intellect,

The intellect recipient of forms.

³ [*De An.* III. c. 4. ed. Trendelenb. Ed.]

⁴ [The original runs thus: *Καὶ εἰ δὲ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν οὐκ οὕτω δὴν ἀλλ' ἢ νοητικὴ, οὐκ ἐντελεχεῖα ἀλλὰ δυναμὶς τὰ εἶδη*, c. 4, § 4; i. e. the Platonists would be right in affirming that "the soul is the region of forms or ideas," if they would limit the assertion to the intellective (noetic) soul—for it is *there* only that ideas exist, and even there not actually, but potentially. The intellect must produce (or, as we say, develop) them by its own energy. The passage, it will be seen, is more in the spirit of Kant than appears from Mr Butler's translation, from which the reader should omit the words "in its passive or potential aspect," the Greek words which correspond referring to the *εἶδη*, not to the mind.

It may be observed, that great obscurity hangs over the Aristotelian distinction (found, I believe, only in the *De Animā*) of "the passive and active *νοῦς*," an obscurity which Aristotle himself nowhere clears up. Trendelenburg has attempted an explanation (in his Commentary on the *De Anim.* III. c. 5, § 2), which, however, is far from satisfactory. The difficulty is clearly stated by Zeller in his *Philosophy of the Greeks*, Vol. II. pt. 2, p. 440 seq., 2nd Ed. See also Grote, *Aristotle*, II. p. 231. Ed.]

LECT.
III.

however, seems assigned by Aristotle a complete supremacy over all the functions of the soul, as extracting its tribute of knowledge from each; it knows the sensible by sense, the intelligible by its own inherent power. Aristotle enters into a very abstruse disquisition to determine in what sense the intellect is to *itself νοητός*. In things "actually" intelligible, the intellect and its object become one—a result which we before saw admitted in the case of sensation. In this way, then, the intellect becomes itself its own object, as being itself intelligible *ἐνεργεία*. On the other hand, things potentially intelligible, and still immersed in matter, are *not* thus blended with the intellect that apprehends them. How this doctrine of the unity of the intellect and intelligible is Platonic, I need not remind you.

All this is mainly spoken of the receptive intellect, of which Aristotle in this place tells us in words which have been so often quoted and commented,—that "the intellect is potentially intelligibles, but actually none of them until it intelligize; as a page on which nothing has yet been actually written" (III. 4, 11). Of the agent intellect Aristotle adds to what I have already cited, that it incessantly is *in act*, our forgetfulness arising from the deficiency and corruptibility of the *νοῦς παθητικός*; that the former alone is separable, immortal, and eternal⁶.

The objects
of Intelli-
gence

The objects of intelligence are simple ideas, as moderns call them, (*τὰ ἀδιάλετα*, "indivisibles,") and propositions; of the latter of which truth and falsehood are the attributes, the office of intellect being to combine them into the unity of a single judgment⁵. The indivisibility of the act and object of intelligence in its simple apprehensions is closely pursued by Aristotle. There is that which is actually undivided, and that which is impossible to be divided. Things actually undivided are quantitative or formal. The latter—as, for example, the essence of any kind of animal—are apprehended by a single instantaneous act of the mind. The former are of different sorts; as we consider the whole,—or the parts,—or the parts as one with the whole; and the act of mind will be single or manifold accordingly. The other class—things which have no continuity—an instant, a point,—are apprehended only by their opposites; we know them as the privation of the contrary quality.

The intellect
cannot act
without the

This whole work of intelligence depends, according to Aristotle, on sensible conceptions (*οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἀνευ φαν-*

⁵ [Οὗτος ὁ νοῦς... οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. Χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀίδιον, c. 5, § 2. ED.]

⁶ [c. 6, ad fin. ED.]

τάσματος ἢ ψυχῇ...τῇ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει...τὰ εἶδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ⁷; and ultimately on sensible perceptions, of which phantasms are the images πλὴν ἀνευ ἡλῆς. So that, as he adds, he who has no sensible perceptions can neither learn nor understand anything; and the business of contemplation, the theoretic function, cannot be carried on without these φαντάσματα⁸. Yet he could not but perceive that there appear laws and principles in our minds not obviously reducible to this standard; and he therefore subjoins the question as to these πρῶτα νοήματα which closes his 8th chapter (B. iii.), and in which, separating them from phantasms, he still seems to affirm that they cannot be entertained without them.

LECT:
III.senses and
imagina-
tion.

These φαντάσματα, which here may be called "associated conceptions," are peculiarly important in the practical operation of the intellect, to which a separate chapter is devoted⁹. The intellect is moved by these in the same way as sense by sensible objects; it decides them to be, not merely as the theoretic reason, true or false, but good or evil; and according to its verdict urges the will to desire or aversion. The theoretic reason terminates in knowledge; the practical, in an end or object of pursuit (τῷ τέλει), c. 10, § 2.

The entire account of the perceptive and intellective faculties of the soul is closed by the remarkable proposition (before occasionally suggested and inferred) that "the soul is in a manner all things; for things are sensible or intelligible,—αἰσθητὰ and νοητά; and science is in some sense its own objects, sensation its own sensibles⁹." If, then, the αἰσθητικὸν be thus the αἰσθητόν, and the ἐπιστημονικὸν the ἐπιστητόν, we must at the same time perceive that this mysterious identification cannot be with the entire material things themselves; it must then be with their εἶδη or forms. "Wherefore the soul is as the hand; for the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the intellect is the form of forms, the sense the form of sensibles." The soul, itself the form of the organized frame, becomes one with the forms of all nature, receives, and employs, and produces them; even as the chief instrument of that organized frame constructs, and wields, and combines itself with all other exterior organisms.

Ultimate
unity of the
intellect
with its
objects.

The remaining subject is the *motive* faculty of the soul; the faculty that impels the animal to local motion. this topic Aristotle presents us with two very interesting

Aristotle's
view of the
motive fa-
culty of the
soul.

⁷ [c. 7, §§ 3, 5. Compare the Treatise on Memory, c. 1, p. 449, Bekk. Ed.]

⁸ [c. 8, § 3. Ed.]

⁹ [c. 8, § 1. Ed.]

LECT.
III.De An. III.
c. 9 and 10.

chapters, in which, as always in questions that border on ethical speculation, he becomes remarkably plain and perspicuous.

The motion of "augmentation" and "consumption" obviously is but a development of the nutritive faculty. The motions of respiration and other internal physical processes are postponed to subsequent distinct treatises. The power of *changing the place of its limbs* is the immediate subject of the present discussion. To what faculty, then, does this belong? Not to the merely "nutritive;" for this power of local motion is always *ἐνεκά του*, with an end in view, and dependent on imagination or desire, being merely compulsory when not originating in the effort to obtain or avoid. It is also not possessed by *plants*, which yet possess this nutritive function. Nor again does it belong to the "sensitive" faculty, as is obvious in numbers of stationary animals capable of sensation; and in which we cannot suppose that nature, *οὐδὲν ποιούσα μάτην*, can have failed to supply all the requisite organs, if she has indeed supplied the power and impulse of motion. Nor can we ascribe the principle of motion to the "intellectual" power *merely as such*; which pronounces nothing directly about avoidance or pursuit, and has no direct reference to action (*πρᾶξις*); which, also, is often wilfully disobeyed. "We see," says Aristotle, "that he who carries with him the medical art is not healed"¹⁰; so that action according to knowledge plainly depends on something else than knowledge." Nor does mere "desire" (*ὁρεξις*) absolutely and necessarily govern motion, for we see that those who have the habit of temperance act deliberately against the solicitations of appetite, and follow reason.

Of the practical intelligence.

A further prosecution of the analysis thus auspiciously begun would have led Aristotle into a clear perception of the peculiarity of the pure spontaneity or the voluntary effort as distinct equally from appetite and from deliberation. His object in this place seems however to have been different; at least he appears content with a lower aim. He therefore pronounces that the sources of the motions of animated beings are two, *intellect practical*—that is, intellect which reasons with an immediate view to action—and *desire*¹¹: *imagination* being often (and to some animals always) the substitute for the former; and even in the very agency of reason, interposing immediately before the operation of desire. He elsewhere, treating the same question,

¹⁰ [c. 9, § 8. *Οὐκ ἔλθει*, "does not practise as a physician," being withheld, says Simplicius, by some opposing passion, which interferes with the natural impulse of the professional man to work in his calling. ED.]

¹¹ [*ὁρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική*. c. 10, § 2. ED.]

names other operations or faculties concerned in the work ; and reduces them similarly (*De Animal. Mot.* vi.). Both these faculties work in view of an end (τέλος, ἕνεκά τινος). But desire is plainly the ultimate ground of action ; for the practic intellect itself and imagination tend to action only as they are animated by desire ; while desire can urge to action independent of them. The desirable, which is either real or apparent attainable good, when its possession is regarded as dependent on our agency, is then the object of action. This desirable (τὸ ὀρεκτὸν) is manifested in many ways according to the faculties of the soul ; thus in beings that have the χρόνου αἴσθησιν—the sense of time—contrary desires contend, pressing the claims of the future, and mere appetite those of the present ; still, however various the motives, the desirable as desirable is the prime source of action. Now, according to Aristotle's great principle, the ultimate mover must be itself unmoved ; all change must originate from something itself unchangeable ; nor should philosophy ever rest until it has traced up, through all the departments of scientific observation, every series of successions to its final stationary principle. In the present case, then,—animal activity,—this last immovable mover is τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν (practicable good) ; and as secondary to this, the appetitive faculty, which both moves the living being and is moved in the very act of appetition ; that which is moved by this faculty is (as has been said) the animate being ; and that organ by which the motion is effected is in Aristotle's physiology the heart, finally,—and in each limb its point of flexure¹². And even in those animals which seem to possess no sense beyond that of touch, desire must exist, since pleasure and pain exist ; and a sensitive though not a deliberative (αἰσθητικὴ though not βουλευτικὴ) fancy, which urges them by the mere force of the preponderating suggestion.

The subject of these chapters (*De An.* III. 9, 10) is further and more largely treated in the curious and interesting dissertation on the Motion of Animals, which appears, from a citation of the present treatise (vi. apud init.), to have been written subsequently to it. It is every way worthy of perusal ; but it would be premature to enlarge in this place further on a subject which, in Aristotle's comprehensive mode of treating it, belongs chiefly to ethical inquiry. The operation of appetite is reduced under the syllogistic formularies (ch. vii.) ; it becomes the general principle in an argument. Ποτέον μοι, declares desire ; this is a potable liquid, declares sense, or imagination, or judgment ; the act is the conclusion. But, as he remarks,

*Treatise
περί ζῴων
κινήσεως.*

¹² [Ib. § 8. ED.]

LECT. appetite is so very prone to reason in the rapid way of
III. — enthymeme, that it is only by very minute observation we
can discover it to syllogize at all.

*Aristotle
The Animæ,
III. chapters
12, 13.*

This celebrated Treatise on the Soul is closed by some general observations on the utility and mutual relations of the different functions; some of which are necessary that the animal exist, others that it exist well and happily;—and on the complex composition of the body which the soul animates. The necessity of the functions of nutrition is obvious in a being formed for growth, vigour, and decay. Sensation is impossible, as Aristotle thinks, in perfectly simple bodies; and needless when there is no faculty capacitated to receive immaterial “forms;” it is thus not found in the vegetable creation. But in animals it is plainly indispensable for alimentation, as well as the power of local motion, in all whose proper aliment is not supplied by nature in their stationary abodes. And those endowed with intellect will also find in the power of sense a principle requisite both for soul and body. Of the senses, touch and taste (a species of touch) are universally needed for conservation. The others, which are affected by media, belong to the more perfect stages of animality; but touch is essentially connected with very vitality; and hence, argues Aristotle, while excesses of other sensible impressions are borne without loss of life, that which injures or destroys this universal and primary sense injures or destroys life itself.

*What were
the opinions
of Aristotle
on the Im-
mortality of
the Soul.*

The real opinions of Aristotle as to the immortality of the human soul, have in all ages been a subject of discussion. I do not hesitate to pronounce that to me the evidence in favour of his having really held this sublime and consoling doctrine is far from satisfactory. It is impossible that if he held it, the very importance of the question, and the natural earnestness which such a conviction would bring with it,—as well as its certainty of a strong sympathetic support in the hearts of all his auditors,—should not have led to statements more decisive and unequivocal than any which the most scrupulous research can detect in his extant writings. It is not sufficient to satisfy the demands of human anxiety on this subject, that an eternity should be pronounced essential to an active intellectual principle, which itself seems described as unable to exercise any conscious energies apart from the bodily structure; a quickening essence whose very existence retreats into nothingness when it is left nothing that it can quicken. The spirit of Aristotle’s physiology unquestionably is materiality; and in exalting the “active intellect” above the human bodily structure, he seems to have exalted it above humanity itself.

It is quite evident that Aristotle was (and naturally) perplexed to conceive the kind of existence that could belong to a separate reason; and has altogether evaded the consideration of it. Here a striking difference is manifest between him and Plato. Plato, perpetually regarding the intellectual principles of the universe as separate from their sensible manifestations and prior to them from all eternity, could easily imagine a state of being in which these alone might be the direct objects of the emancipated rational faculty: it was but to replace that faculty in its original state and relations to its proper objects. Reason and its objects had dwelt together from all eternity: they were both immersed in body for a brief temporary period; but it was only that they might again meet and embrace in the same eternal world to which they both inherently belonged. All this was perfectly consistent; whether true or false, it was at least beautifully harmonious. But the theory of Aristotle, which, proclaiming the eternity of the world itself, conceived the forms which the reason contemplates as naturally inseparable from matter, evidently laboured under a peculiar difficulty when it attempted to represent the reason as detached from a bodily organization, and still contemplating these objects. For though even in this state of existence, he held that the mind did habitually separate the "forms" or mental element from material things, yet this he always represented as achieved only by a series of processes in which the sensuous organization and the imagination performed a necessary part. How the reason, left to itself, was to converse with its own peculiar objects, he nowhere attempts to shew; and hence the sort of existence which he allows the active intellect after death, fades into a state of mere being—a state with which our present consciousness can scarcely find anything in any degree common.

And thus—though the portion of our human nature to which Plato positively and frequently, and Aristotle occasionally and hesitatingly, allows immortality, be really the same,—namely, the rational,—yet in their historic results, Plato has been the perpetual patron of the doctrine of human immortality, and Aristotle almost as constantly has been cited as unfriendly to this great tenet. In almost every age, it is unquestionable, the majority of his followers have spoken doubtingly of the doctrine; unless where the Aristotelic views have been forced to harmonize (however rudely) with the principles of a different system. The ancient fathers assuredly regarded Aristotle as specially perilous on this account (Euseb. *Præpar. Evang.* xv. 9); and the ablest of his own commentators, in proportion as

they have escaped foreign influences, have verged to the doctrine of utter and absolute materialism. Alexander Aphrodisiensis (perhaps the best of his earlier expositors) does not hesitate to maintain the doctrine on the part of his master; and it is well known with what eagerness and constancy the Arabian Averroes endeavoured to uphold it. I do not speak of the professed assailants of Aristotle (Bessarion, &c.) who of course made his views on this question a capital article in their pleadings; but there is no mistaking the tendency of his avowed disciples, or the force of their admissions,—of such teachers as Pomponatius, and his contemporaries. I conceive it to be the safest verdict upon this long-disputed point, to conclude that Aristotle held, indeed, the imperishable nature of the supreme rational principle in man; but that he held it in such a sense as was altogether foreign to human and earthly interests; in a sense which leaves the surviving principle scarcely any link of connexion with the present form of being, or with any conscious nature of any kind. Nor, it must be conceded, has any thing, ever since his day, been done to make an utter and absolutely unbodied condition of soul combined with real consciousness in any degree more easily conceivable. As far as *our* interests are concerned, the Christian revelation, by asserting the resurrection of a bodily structure, has provided for the most important section of future existence; and for the intermediate state, the hypothesis is always possible for those who find an insurmountable difficulty in the notion of a purely unbodied soul, of a very refined material organism which (like many other material agents) may be imperceptible to any of our present organs of sense.

It is, indeed, scarcely possible to express the service which has been done to human knowledge by the revelation of this momentous truth—the recovery of the bodily organization, for the purposes of a future state. It at once supersedes all those discussions of painful difficulty that regard the possibility of unbodied existence in a world of space; discussions in which every step only betrays the confined limits of our real knowledge, and whose uncertainty may best be judged from the fact that nearly all the ancient upholders of the eternity of the pure reason of man, have, like Plato, their chief guide, been forced to introduce it after death into a mysterious world which transcends space and time, and all the other forms of our present consciousness altogether; and in which, therefore, it is almost impossible that we should here feel any practical interest. The ordinary escape from this course has been the doctrine of a perpetual transmigration, by which the

desire of futurity, and the discontinuance of the present, and the apparent necessity for some future bodily apparatus, might all be conciliated. And this did not appear altogether impossible, when the strong indications of some faculties common to man were observed in the brute creation; a temporary eclipse of the higher powers might easily be imagined, such as so often takes place in the state of dreaming. Still one great difficulty seems to have been unnoticed in this hypothesis,—the removal of the conscious and vital principle from one frame to another, with its identity and immaterial quality still preserved;—for it is very evident, that if the soul can exist apart from body during one minute of time, or the transit of one inch of space, there is no inherent reason to prevent its doing so for any indefinite period whatever;—and such a state of absolute separation from body is conceived in the period of translocation from one animal frame to the other. Whether this or any similar objection convinced them of the imperfection of this hypothesis, it is manifest that it was never regarded by the leading teachers of antiquity as an ultimate solution of the question; as anything more than a temporary supposition which might assist the imagination in conceiving the posthumous existence of human beings. To all these difficulties Christianity has brought its peculiar light;—by informing us that for the vaster portion of the everlasting future a system of bodily organs shall be ready to minister to the undying spirit; and, as regards the intermediate state, by leaving us (where it is of less consequence) to adopt the supposition of total, or only partial, disembodiment, as may seem most suitable to the analogies of existing nature. It has ascertained to us that not the pure reason alone, but the whole aggregate of our faculties shall accompany us into the world to come; rendering us capable in that state not merely of an abstract intellectual contemplation (itself surely not easily conceivable without a power other than pure intellect to supply its materials), but also of a happiness and a misery far more exalted, that arise and can only arise from the exercise of the affections—from remorse and hatred and despair, or from a love and hope and gratitude that then alone shall find their own real privileges of happiness when expanded to meet an infinite and eternal object.

INDEX.

A.

"*Absorption*," of the human soul in the divine essence, 432, 434.
Abstraction, faculty of, in Plato's view, 381.
Abstractions, not identical with the Platonic "Ideas," 370, 381; but symbolical of them, 404.
Academius, 303.
Academy, the New, represented the sceptical side of Platonism, 491; Theory of Probability, 494; five successions, *ib.*; Carneades, its great representative, 496; moderation and compromise its main characteristics, 497.
 Ackermann, 298.
 Adhikarāṇas, 159.
ἀδιαιρέτα, "indivisibles," objects of Intelligence in Aristotle's system, 554.
ἀδιδόρα, 282.
 Æschines, pupil of Socrates, 246; dialogues attributed to him, 247.
Age, tendencies of the present, an argument for the importance of Metaphysical Study, 101, 102; materialism of, 326, 361.
ἀγαθα δόγματα, attributed to Plato: mentioned in Aristotle's *Physics*, 321.
αἰώνιος, opposed to *θνητός*, 406.
Αἴρ, see *ἀρχή*.
 Akenside, 99.
 Alexamenus of Teos, invention of the Dialogue ascribed to, 305.
 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Greek commentator on Aristotle, 127, *n.*; maintained on behalf of his master the doctrine of materialism, 560.
Alexandria, Schools of, 8, 324; influences of, 501; intercourse with India, 155, *n.*
 Anacreon, 230, and *n.*
Analogy, arguments from, their object, 255, and value, 389; principle of, as an aid to knowledge, 345, 346.
Analysis, an indispensable basis for all synthesis, 13; tendency to analyse, a characteristic of modern times, 105.

ἀνάμνησις, Plato's theory of, 237, 319, 448, 450; Aristotle *πρὸς μνημὸς καὶ ἀνάμνησιν*, 550, *n.*
 Anaxagoras, 184, 187, 200—204; Aristotle's judgment of him, 187; Socrates complains that he did not carry out his own great physical principle, 398; criticised by Aristotle, 528.
 Anaximander, 174, 192, 196, 197, 203; his hypotheses of eclipses, 181, 182.
 Anaximenes, 197.
 Ancillon, Frederic, *Essai sur le système de l'Unité absolue, ou le Panthéisme*, 261.
 Andronicus Rhodius, commentator on Aristotle, originator of the term "Metaphysics," 47, 501.
Antichthon, the, of the Pythagoreans, 217.
 Antiochus, a teacher of the *Academy*. Upheld the reality and evidence of mental perceptions, 498.
 Antisthenes, founder of the Cynics. An auditor of Socrates, 275, 279—285; upheld the Nominalist theory, 362, *n.*
ἀνὰ θεῶν, Stilpo's "summum bonum," the "animus impatiens" of Seneca, 269; Cicero ascribes this principle to the Pyrrhonic sect, 270.
ἀπειρον τὸ, of Anaximander, 203; "Matter" of Plato, a mere potentiality—*mera essendi possibilitas*, 386, 410, *n.*
Aphorisms, their use and abuse, 96—98; specimens of those of Heraclitus, 199, *n.*
 Apollonius, reputed author of the Ptolemaic system, 423.
 Apollonius Tyaneus, 504, 505.
A priori reasonings, 27.
 Apuleius, 300, 314.
 Arcesilaus, the father of the Academic Scepticism, 494, 495.
ἀρχή, "Principle" of the Universe, 191, 192; distinguished from *στοιχεῖον* by Plato, 192; "water" according to Thales, 193, 195; "air" according to Anaximenes, 197; "fire" according to Heraclitus, *ib.*;

- "earth" according to Pherecydes, 199
- Architecture*, old Indian, 158
- Archytas, of Tarentum, Plato's instructor in the doctrines of Pythagoras, 302
- Argument*, the "dominative," *ὁ κυριεύων λόγος*. Sometimes ascribed to Diodorus Cronus, 262, *n.*
- Aristippus, founder of the Cyrenaics. An auditor of Socrates, 275; his "Hedonism," 277, 285, 288
- Aristobulus, a Neo-Platonist teacher, admitted the facts of the Old Testament, 508
- Aristotle, his sentence on poetry, 22; his interpretation of "Wisdom" (*σοφία*), 42; of "Dialectic," 46, *n.*; his "Metaphysics," 47; his description of the "Philosophia Prima," 48, *n.*; his character as an Historian of Philosophical systems, 121, 189; his treatment of his predecessors criticised by Bacon, 121, *n.*; is studied at the period of the revival of letters, 130, 131; his judgment of Anaxagoras, 187; his criticism of the Pythagorean "Antichthon," 217, *n.*; his testimony as to the doctrines of Xenophanes of Colophon, 221, *n.*; his relation to modern "Nominalism," 362, and *note*; he traces a connexion between the "Numbers" of Pythagoras and the "Ideas" of Plato, 367, 368; which latter he invariably represents as true, and real, and distinct existences, 372; he pronounces *exemplar ideas* to be mere "poetical metaphors," 388; accuses Plato of neglecting efficient and final causes, 399; criticised by Bacon, *ib.*; contrasted with Plato in respect of their physical theories, 399; he denied the creation of "Time," 408, *n.*; his *ἄλη* corresponds to Plato's *ἀπειρον*, 410, *n.*; his astronomical dogmas, 423; his small influence on the age immediately preceding the Christian era, 501, and *note*; dictum of, falsely explained, 486, *n.*; HIS TREATISE *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, 523—561; his style, 523, 551; analysis of his treatise, 525; his materialism, 527, 560; his criticisms on his predecessors, 527—533; power of classification, 529, 535; asserts the unity of Soul, 533; his "forms," 538; compared with those of Kant, 547; his view of Body, 538; definitions of the Soul, 539, 541; value of his physiology, 541; imperfection of, 543; characteristics of "vegetable life," 542; his analysis of *sensation*, 543—548; *Sound, Hearing, Smell, Taste, Touch*, 545, 546; his "*common sense*," 549; *Fancy*, 550; *Memory*, 550, *n.*; theory of the *Intellect* distinguished into Passive and Active, 551, 553, *n.*; his view of the *motive faculty* of the soul, 555; of the *motion of animals*, 557; his opinions on the immortality of the soul contrasted with those of Plato, 559, and with the Christian revelation, 560
- Aristoxenus, his doctrine "The soul is a Harmony" criticised by Aristotle, 530
- Arithmetic*, its use, in Plato's view, as a guide to "Dialectic," 341
- Arrian, his discourses of Epictetus, 262
- Art*, taste for, favourable to speculative habits, 177; the outward expression of conceptions of order and harmony, 177; genius of the Greeks for Art, 227
- Asceticism*, 277; it fosters pride, 282; practised by the Neo-Platonists, 518
- "*Association*," 105, *n.*; theory of in Aristotle's treatise *περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως*, 550, *n.*
- Ast, denies the genuineness of the "Platonic Epistles," 302, *n.*; rejects as spurious twenty-one of Plato's Dialogues, 321, *n.*
- Astronomy*, study of, has been found historically to precede that of the other physical sciences, 7; Indian, 156; notions of the Pythagoreans, 217; scientific study of, a prelude to "Dialectic," 342; system presented in the *Timæus*, 421
- Atheism*, of Leucippus, 206; tendency of materialism to, 288
- ἄθεος*, Theodorus, one of the Cyrenaics, 289
- Athenæus, 126; his list of some of the most distinguished of Plato's pupils, 303
- Atoms*, Buddhist theory of, 167; doctrine of, attributed by Plutarch to Empedocles, a fact which Aristotle seems to deny, 200, *n.*; theories of Democritus and Leucippus, 205, 206
- Atomistic doctrine "points to the corpuscular theories of modern times" (Whewell), 205, *n.*
- Attention*, of mind, indispensable element of scientific genius. Example of Newton, 108
- Augustine, believer in the objective reality of knowledge, 28; influenced by Platonism, 293; believed in the immediate inspiration of Plato,

- 316; passage from his *De Doctr. Christiana*, claiming for Christianity the truths discovered by heathen philosophers, 317; his view of the Platonic theory of Love, 477
Authority, excessive deference to, more prevalent in the field of human than of natural philosophy, 113
 Averroes, the Arabian, maintained materialism on the part of Aristotle, 560

B.

- Bacon, Lord, his opinion of the value of the "Philosophia Prima," 47, 48; his justification of his aphoristic method, 54; he considered his inductive method applicable to mental no less than to physical phenomena, 78—80. M. Cousin's critique of him, in comparison with Descartes, examined, 79—82; Dugald Stewart's opinion of his genius for the philosophy of mind, 81, *n.*; his influence on psychology, 82; speculative side of his philosophy imperfect, 82; his views of the relation of Religion to Philosophy, 83, *n.*; not responsible for the errors of his followers, 83; his division of the faculties into Memory, Imagination, Reason, 106; his censure of Aristotle's treatment of his predecessors, 121, *n.*; his idea of a History of Philosophy, 131: his term "Lumen Siccum," possibly derived from a false reading of Heraclitus, 199, *n.*; his "globus intellectualis" explained, 200, *n.*; Globes—of matter and of form, 200, *n.*; compared with Socrates, 233—235; his belief in magic and witchcraft, 239; his criticism on Aristotle's "final causes," 399
 Bailly, his opinion of the antiquity of the Indian Astronomy, 156
 Barrow, influenced by Descartes, 82; one of the "Cambridge Platonists," 293
 Baur, his essay "Das Christliche des Platonismus, oder Socrates und Christus," 298
 Bayle, 134
Beautiful, the, 336; unity of with the Just and the Good, 469; treated of in the *Phædrus* and the *Symposium*, 479, 480
Being, one of the three principles pre-existent to the formation of the Universe, according to the *Timæus*, 414. (See *Place and Production*)

- Bellarmino, Cardinal, dissuades Clement VIII. from sanctioning Platonism, 299
 Bentley, believed in the authenticity of the *Platonic Epistles*, 302, *n.*
 Berkeley, 305
 Bernays, his *Heracleitica*, &c., 198, *n.*
Body, its connexion with the soul, according to Plato, 452; his hatred of, 486; contempt of by the New Platonists contrasted with the Christian reverence, 519; Aristotle's view of, 538
 Bopp, 158
 Bouterwek, 33, and *note*
Brahma-Sûtra, the, 164
 Brandis, his *Commentationes Eleaticæ*, 219
 Brown, Dr., his relation to Hume, 28; denied the possibility of a *priori* deduction as applied to the Deity, 28; his controversy with Reid, 353, *n.*; 496, *n.*; question of consciousness distinct from sensation, 548
 Brucker, his history of Philosophy, 134; considered philosophy the science of *happiness*, 139; his account of the philosophy of Empedocles not to be relied on, 202, *n.*; his section on Plato the worst part of his great work, 465
Brutes, Plato's view of them in relation to man, 445
Buddhists, 161, 165—167; Buddhism known at Alexandria, 155
 Buffon, 139
 Burnet, his notice of the "Cambridge Platonists," 293, *n.*
 Butler, Bishop, his *Analogy*, 397; his account of the course of temptation compared with the myth in the *Phædrus*, 438; his argument for a future life, 454

C.

- Callippus, his astronomical notions, 423
Cambridge Platonists, 293, *n.*
 Campanella, 222
 Campbell, Thomas, his lines on the rainbow, 99
 Capla, the founder of the Sāṅkhyā, 161, 163, 164
Capilists, the, 165
 Carneades, the most celebrated teacher in the *Academy*, 494—497; his position similar to that of Kant, 495, 497
 Casaubon, Isaac, 298
Causation, 10, 11, 65

Cebes, disciple of Socrates. His *Μετέμειψις*, or *Tabula*, 246, 247, and *n.*
Cenobites, 218
Century, 17th, Philosophy in the, 15; religious wars of, 103
 Chabrias, a pupil of Plato, 303, *n.*
 Chuor, expresses probably the *ἀπειρον* of Anaximander, 203
Chemistry, influence of the study of, on mental science, 105, and *note*, 205, *n.*
 Chladni, 68
Christianity, its bearing on the study of the Philosophy of Mind, 89—91; connexion of, with Platonism, 295—299, 316—318; compared with Platonism, 325, 485, 486; doctrine of the resurrection of the *Body*, 486, 519, 560, 561
 Chrysippus, 256, 257, 263
 Cicero, his definition of philosophy, how to be understood, 46, and *note*, 60; his character as an Historian of Philosophy, 122, *n.*; his notice of the Socratic style, 245; his complaint of the *indelicacy* of the Cynics, 282; his eulogy of Plato's style, 305, 306; his description of Phidias's *ideal*, 394; his testimony as to the date of the *Phædrus*, 437, *n.*; as to the Academic system, 490; his account of the doctrines of Antiochus, 498
 Clarke, 185; his *a priori* arguments for the existence of God similar to those of the Eleatics, 224
Classics, rediscovery of the, 130
 Cleanthes, 263
 Clemens Alexandrinus, wrote on Buddhism, 155
 Colebrooke, 161; he assigns the Vedas to 1400 B.C., 159
Commentators on Aristotle, 501
Conceptualism, theory of, stated and rejected in the *Parmenides*, 362
 Condillac, a development of Locke, 149
 Condorcet, his *Esquisse*, 136
Consciousness, 146; question of a, distinct from mere sensation, raised and discussed by Aristotle and Brown, 548
 Copernicus, his acknowledgment of his debt to Cicero's notice of Hicetas, 422
 Cousin, Victor, his critique of Bacon, examined, 79—82; his character as an Historian of Philosophy, 136, 148; his essays on Xenophanes and Zeno, 219
 Cowell, Professor, cited, 174
 Crantor, an Academic teacher, 490
 Crates, an Academic teacher, *ib.*
 Cratylus, Plato's teacher in the doc-

trines of the Heracliteans, 302, 355
 Cudworth, his *Intellectual System*, 133
Cynics, the, maintained that Virtue is *διδασκόν*, 237, *n.*; their doctrines distortions of the Socratic teaching, 278; ethical rather than speculative, 279; discussed, 275—285
Cyrenaics, the, compared and contrasted with the Cynics, 275—280; their philosophy discussed, 285—291

D.

Dæmon, so-called, of Socrates, 238, and *note*
 D'Alembert, his character as an Historian of Philosophy, 136
 Damastes, his work *Περὶ ποιητῶν καὶ σοφιστῶν*, 120
Death, Plato's view of, 343, 452
Definitions, of Philosophy, 138, 139
 Dégérando, his *Histoire Comparée*, 129, 136
 De Launoy, 133
Democracy, leads to examination of principles, 102, 103
 Democritus, of Abdera, 205—207, and *notes*; criticised by Aristotle, 518
 Descartes, 27, 36, 47, *n.*; his *Méditations de Prima Philosophia*, 48; his rules in the *Tract. de Methodo*, 80; Dugald Stewart's opinion of him compared with M. Cousin's, 81, *n.*; his influence on the Cambridge Platonists, 82, *n.*; influenced by Plato, 293; his doctrine of the nature of *matter*, 405; he classed the brute creation with the purely mechanical, 445
Design, popular argument of, incomplete, 66
De-polism, its effect on philosophy, 152
 Destutt-Tracy, 50
 Diagoras, 231, and *note*
διαφέρεσις, the, of Plato, collected by Aristotle, 321
Dialectic, Aristotle's description of, 46, and *note*; its invention attributed to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius, 223; in Plato's treatment, the science which treats of eternal existences, 333; the "*air*" to which other sciences are the "*preludes*," 342; examination of, 344—390; answers to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 344; the term derived from the Socratic mode of discussion, 344; the science which apprehends *absolute certainty*, 348

Dialogue, invention of the, attributed to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius, 305; Plato's treatment of it compared with that of Cicero and others, 305; tendency to encourage scepticism, 492

Dialogues, of Plato: disputed genuineness of some of them, 321, *n.*, 322; order of composition, 323; classification of by Thrasyllus in *tetralogies*, 323; Schleiermacher's principle of arrangement, 323

Diderot, 265

Diodorus Cronus, of the Megaric School, 258—266

Diogenes Apolloniates, 197, and *note*.

Diogenes, the Cynic, 251; styled Σωκράτης μωρόμενος, 279; his character, 281

Diogenes Laertius, his character as an Historian of Philosophy, 125, and *note*.

Dominicans, their name (*Domini canes*) compared with that of the Cynics, 281, *n.*

Dorner, his *Christologie*, 296, *n.*

δόξα, see *Opinion*.

Duhamel, his *De Consensu Veteris et Novæ Philosophiæ*, 133

E.

Earth, see ἀρχή: rotation of, held by Plato, according to Aristotle's erroneous statement, 421

Eclecticism, of the later Greek Schools, 498, 499

Education, feebleness of all human, in Plato's view, 303, 304

Egoism, 50, 51, and *note*.

Egypt, influence of on Grecian philosophy, 178; did *Geometry* come from? 178, *n.*; Plato's sojourn in, 301, and *note*.

εἶδος, how far distinguishable from ἰδέα, 372, and *note*.

εἰσுவελα, the, of Socrates, Schleiermacher's description of, 237, and *note*, 238

Eleatics, the, connexion with the atomists, 205; mainly a *metaphysical* sect, 210; their school founded by Xenophanes, 219; its doctrines discussed, 219—225; connexion with the Megarics, 249, 266

Elements, the four, according to Plato, 428; their geometrical forms, 428, 429

Eliac, or *Eretriac* School, 274; identified with the Megaric by Cicero, 275, *n.*

Ellis, R. L., his opinion of the educa-

tional efficacy of mathematical analysis, 109, *n.*

Emanations, theory of, according to Empedocles, 201, *n.*; according to Plotinus, 515

Emotions, their place in the Platonic scheme, 475, 476, 481

Emotive part of the soul conceived by Plato to be mortal, 434, *n.*

Empedocles, his poetry, 174; his doctrines, 199—202; his σφαῖρος, 200, *n.*; his theory of emanations, 201, *n.*; his scheme a compound from the Ionic, Pythagorean, and Eleatic Schools, 202, *n.*; his composition of the soul, 528; criticised by Aristotle, 531, 542

Empirical, see *Knowledge*

Empirics, the, or *Sensationalists*, 349 ἐντελέχεια, distinguished from δύναμις by Aristotle, 538

Epic poetry, the parent of history, 173

Epicureans, the, a development of the Cyrenaics, 149, 278; their theory of the divine apathy anticipated and refuted by Plato, 401; their notion of *Time* compared with Plato's, 407; inadequacy of their system to satisfy men in the age immediately preceding Christian era, 500

Epiphanius, author of a short History of the Greek Philosophy, 126

Epistles, the Platonic, question of their authenticity, 302, and *note*, 317

Eristics, the, 224

Eros, the Platonic, 380, 381, 477

Eternity, not merely an infinite extension of *time*, 408, 450, *n.* See also αἰώνιος

Eubulides, his seven sophisms, 256, 257, and *notes*.

Euclides, founder of the Megaric School, 249—255; a hearer of Socrates, 250; he identified the Good and True with the Eleatic One, 253, and *n.*; he rejected analogical reasoning, and attacked not premisses but consequences, 255; anecdote of his evasive sarcasm, 273

Eudoxus, a pupil of Plato: modified his astronomy, 422

Eunapius, his *Lives of the Sophists*, 126

Eusebius, his remark on an ironical passage from the *Timæus*, 306, *n.*

Eustathius, his *Commentary*, 127, *n.*

Euthydemus, 231

Euthydemus, the, 307

Euthyphron, the, 309, 430

Evidence to the divine origin of Christianity furnished by the study of *Psychology*, 152, 153

Evil, an impersonal negation of excellence, in Plato's view, 385; its origin, *ib. n.*; connected with *matter* by the Alexandrian School, 515
Expectation, principle of, 345

F.

Fabricius, his *Bibliotheca Græca*, 134
Faith, use of the term by Proclus, 517
Fathers, the Christian: as authorities on the History of Philosophy, 126; opinions respecting Plato, 314
Fichte, 50, *n.*, 149
Final Causes: teleological character of Plato's Physics, 398
Fire, see *ἀρχή*. Its place in Aristotle's physiology, 542
Foreign influences on Greek Philosophy, 177, 178; on Plato's doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul, 442
Force, 10, 11
Forgeries, literary, frequent in the last century before Christ, 210, *n.*
Form, keenness of the Greek perception of, in preference to substance, 227
"Forms," of Aristotle, 538; compared with those of Kant, 547; the intellect, *τόπος εἰδῶν*, 553
Free Governments, their influence on philosophy, 152; exemplified in Greece, 176
Free Will, 93, 113
French Materialists, the, 86, 87
French Revolution, the first, 103
"Fusion," in relation to mental states, 105, *n.*

G.

Gale, Theophilus, his *Court of the Gentiles*, &c. 133
Galen, the physician, his tract on the History of Philosophy, 124, 125
Gedike, his collection of the passages in Cicero relative to ancient Philosophy, 122
Genesis, book of, first verse, 187
Geographical position, influence of, on the speculation of a people, 152, 162, 179
Geometry, 10; did the Greek come from Egypt? 178, *n.*; Pythagoras's view of, 212, 213; study of, an introduction to Dialectic according to Plato, 341
Gibbon, his notions of Plato, 295 and *n.*, 296; an error of corrected, 301, *n.*
Gnostics, the, 507, 508
GOD, His existence proved by *a priori* reasonings, 27

Gods, subordinate, employed in the work of creation, according to Plato, 400, 443
Godwin, 21

"*Good*," the idea of: the ultimate object of Plato's Philosophy, 329, and *note*; did Plato identify it with God? 330, and *note*; his conception of, 340, 466; unity of, with the Just and the Beautiful, 469
Goguet, his work on the *Origin of Laws, Arts, and Sciences*, 136 *
Gorgias, 231
Gorgias, the, 308
Greek Empire, literati of, 130
Grote, G., his view of the *Sophists*, 227, *n.*; his remarks on Protagoras and Xenophanes, 231, *n.*; his belief in the authenticity of the *Platonic Epistles*, 302, *n.*
Grotius, 127
Guizot, his notions of Plato, 295, *n.*

II.

Habits, influence of upon Philosophy, 151
Hamilton, Sir W., mistaken in attributing Cartesianism to Newton's Cambridge successors, 82; in the date which he assigns to the tradition of *μηδεις ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσῆναι*, 341, *n.*; his critique on Perception, 353, *n.*
Harmony, "Unity in Multiplicity" the leading idea of Pythagorism, 214, 215; the doctrine of Aristoxenus that the soul is a "Harmony" probably Pythagorean, 211, *n.*; criticised by Aristotle, 530
Hebrew writings, supposed influence of upon Plato, 301, 302, 314, and *note*.
Hedonism, of Aristippus, 277; its connexion with *sensationalism*, 286; its dark side, 289
Heeren, his edition of Stobæus, 126
Hegel, the author of the term *Phenomenology*, 49, *n.*; his conception of an *a priori* history of human knowledge, 148, *n.*; his opinion of Heraclitus, 199; his treatment of the Sophisms of Eubulides in his *History of Philosophy*, 257, *n.*
Hegesias, surnamed *πρωτόδωρος*, 290, and *note*
Helvetius, his comment on the story of Coriolanus, 25
Heraclideæ, invasion of the, 173
Heraclitus, ὁ σκορεῦνός, his *ἀρχή* "fire," 197; doctrine of *λόγῳ*, 197, 351; his melancholy and obscurity, 198; Jus-

- tin Martyr's opinion of him as virtually a Christian, 198, *n.*; Schleiermacher's dissertation on him, and Bernays' *Herakleitos*, 198, *n.*; his influence on Plato and the Stoics, 198, 199, *n.*; Hegel's opinion of him, 199, *n.*; his description of the soul as an *ἀναδυλάσις*, 528
- Hermotimus, of Clazomenæ, said to have anticipated the conclusions of Anaxagoras, 187
- Hesychius, of Miletus, 127
- Hicetas, of Syracuse, his conception of the rotation of the earth, 421
- Hipparchus, followed Apollonius in establishing the Ptolemaic system, 423
- Hippias, the Sophist, 231
- Hippias Major*, the, 307
- Hippias Minor*, the question as to its author, 322, and *note*
- Hippocrates, his remark on the success of scientific experiments, 128
- Hippolytus, Bishop of Portus, his *Philosophumena* ascribed to Origen, 125, and *note*; his *Confutatio Iheresim* throws some light on the Fragments of Empedocles, 200, *n.*
- History* of philosophy, included in the philosophy of Man, 20—25; sentence of Aristotle asserting its inferiority to Poetry, 22; its course determined by minute causes, 24, 25; Grecian History the child of Epic Poetry, 173
- Hobbes, his opinions called forth the Cambridge Platonists, 293, *n.*
- HOLY SPIRIT, the, Plato's apparent belief in His operation, 471
- Homer, the Bible of the early philosophers, 186
- Homœomeria*, described by Lucretius, 205, *n.*
- Huet, his *Evangelical Demonstration*, 133; his philosophy impaired by his religious habits, 151
- Hume, a disbeliever in Ontology, 28; his theory of cause and effect, 347

I.

- Iamblichus, of Alexandria, commentator on Pythagoras, 44, *n.*; one of the principal teachers of Neo-Platonism, 510; theological character of his philosophy, 516
- Idea*, the, of Milton, 44, 45
- Ideas*, the Platonic doctrine of, connected with the teaching of Pythagoras, 44; connected by Aristotle with the Socratic "*definitions*," 318; historical genesis of, 363; the theory of, stated, 366; compared

- with the "Numbers" of Pythagoras, 367, 368; of *relations* and of *every* existence, 369, 377; the *Laws* and *Reasons* of all phenomena, 369, 370, 376; separate from the Divine Mind, 370; not *abstractions*, 370; nor *conceptions* in the mind of God, 371; objectivity of, 466; Phrascology of the Theory, 372—374; *Ideas* and *Eldes*, how far distinguishable, 372, and *note*; *Ideas* have a threefold relation, *first*, to the human reason, 379; *secondly*, to the sensible universe, 385; *thirdly*, to the Divine Nature, 388; their co-eternity with the pure "*reason*," 383; their use in the construction of the Platonic *Physics*, 393, 394; their application to Ethics, 465; *Idea* of the Good, 466; how we "*behold ideas*," 467, 468; unity of the *Ideas* of the Beautiful, the Just, and the Good, 469
- Ideology*, a term invented by M. Destutt-Tracy, 50
- Imagination*, one of the three Faculties of Bacon, 106; predominance of in the speculations of the early Greek Philosophers, 150, 174—176
- Immortality*, see *Soul*
- Incarnation*, Doctrine of the, peculiar to Christianity, 91; its pagan counterfeits, 91
- Independence*, desire of, the common root of the Cynic and Cyrenaic philosophies, 275
- Indian* philosophies, 155—169; astronomy, 157; date of the *Indian Tables*, 156; Indian Dialectic, 163; possible connexion of Indian systems with the Greek, 155; influence of, upon Greece, has probably been unduly magnified, 506
- Induction*, employed by Socrates, 234, *n.*; described in the *Phædrus*, 234, *n.*
- Intellect*, Aristotle's view of, 551—556; *Passive* and *Active*, 551; *τὸ πρῶτον ἐκδιδόν*, 553, and *note*: is it *νοῦς* to itself? 554; cannot act without the senses and imagination, 554, 555; ultimate unity of, with its objects, 555. See also *Noûs*
- Ion*, the, of Plato, 307
- Ionian* School of Philosophy, 183; classification of, 193; distinguished from the Pythagorean and Eleatic, 210
- Irony*, see *εἰρωνεία*. Sceptical tendency of the Platonic, 492
- Isocrates, passage in the *Phædrus* respecting, 319, *n.*
- Italic* School of Philosophy, 183

J.

- Jacobi, his definition of Philosophy, 139
 John, St, borrowed the term Logos from Alexandrine Platonism, 295, *n.*, 297
 Jones, Sir W., his opinion as to the dates of the Vedas and of the Laws of Manu, 159
 Josephus, 314, *n.*
 Juba, king of Mauritania, his patronage of literature led to literary forgeries, 210, *n.*
 "Justice," use of the term by Plato, 458
 Justin Martyr, his assertion that Socrates, Heraclitus, and the like followers of Reason, were Christians, 198, *n.*

K.

- Kali-yuga*, 157
 Kant, his *Critique of the Pure Reason*, 32; his sympathy with Platonism, 294, 338, 406; relation of his "Ideas" or "Forms" to ἀνάμνησις, 448, *n.*; his position resembles that of Carneades, 497; his "Forms" compared with those of Aristotle, 547
 Kāvrikā, the, 166—168
 Karsten, editor of the Fragments of Empedocles, 200, *n.*; his remarks on the sect and theology of that philosopher, 202, *n.*
 Knowledge, distinguished in the *Republic* from δόξα, 337; three theories of, 345, 364, 365; its nature discussed in the *Theætetus*, 350—359; it is the "intuition of ideas," 469. See also *Neo-Platonism*
 "Know thyself," Plato's interpretation of, 236, *n.*

L.

- Laches, the, of Plato, 330
 Ladies, attendants on Plato's teaching, 303
 Language, a key to the Laws of Consciousness, 68, 71; Plato's reverence for, 382
 Laplace, his opinion on the date of the Indian Tables, 157
 La Rochefoucauld, 97
 Laws, the, of Plato, 396, 443, 481; question of their genuineness, 322, *n.*
 Laws of Manu, the, 159
 Lectures, object of, distinguished from books, 3

- Leibnitz, 16; his opinion of the Schoolmen, 37, and *note*, 134; influenced by Platonism, 293, 393; his "nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu—*nisi ipse intellectus*," 449
 Leucippus, the father of the Atomic Philosophy, 205, and *note*, 206; criticised by Aristotle, 528
 Life, art and objects of, 62
 Light, nature of, explained by Aristotle, 545
 Locke, his Essay on the Human Understanding, 106; his chapter on Memory compared with a passage in the *Theætetus*, 356, *n.*; his "simple ideas," 357; his "primary qualities," 546
 Logic, defined, 37
 Logos, the, use of the term by Plato and St John, 295, *n.*, 297
 Love, see *Eros*
 Lucian, his satire on the Cynics, 284; his eulogy on Plato's style, 305
 Lucretius, as an interpreter of Epicurus, 123; passage from, on the *homœomeria*, 205, *n.*
 Ludovicus Vives, 131

M.

- Mackintosh, Sir J., 105, *n.*
 Magna Moralia, the, 470, *n.*
 μαευτική τέχνη, the, of Socrates, 237
 Malebranche, 29
 Manicheism, opposed to Plato's philosophy, 386, 405
 Manu, Laws of, 159
 Marathon, battle of, its true value 171; legend connected with, *ib.* *n.*
 Materialism, of Aristotle, 527, 560
 Mathematics, origin and character of, 8; limitation of, 10; compared with metaphysical studies as an instrument of Education, 109—112, and *note*; Plato's view of them as preparatory to the study of real existence, 383, *n.*
 Matter, Plato's conception of, 387, and *note*, 404; various names for, 405; its attributes those of pure space, *ib.*; question of its eternity, 405, 408; a logical rather than a physical entity, 409; a *mera essendi possibilitas*, 410; cognisable only ὑδθω λογισμῷ, 410, 413; Plotinus's account of, 515; Aristotle's, 548; his ὕλη, 410, *n.*
 Mechanists, of the Ionian School, 193, 195
 μηδὲς ἀγνομήτηρος εἰσέρω, 341
 Megarics, the successors of the Eleatics, 224; asserted that virtue is

διδάκτων, 237, *n.*; examination of their philosophy, 249—273; criticised by Plato, 254, *n.*

Melissus, one of the Eleatic leaders, 219; he denied the being of Space, 222, and *note*.

Memorabilia, of Xenophon, the true Socratic gospel, 120

Memoria technica, 107

Memory, one of the three mental faculties in Lord Bacon's analysis, 106; Aristotle's account of, 550, *n.*

Memra, Chaldaic equivalent for Logos, 297, and *note*

Menedemus, second founder of the Eliac or Eretriac School, 274

Meno, the, 319, 384, *n.*, 448, and *note*

Metaphysics, the name, 47, and *note*; division of, into Psychology and Ontology, 31; study of, as an instrument of education, 109—112. See also *Philosophy*

Metempsychosis, 445

μέθεξις and *μύησις*, meaning of the terms, 466

Methods, the last things perfected in philosophy, 190

Milton, his "*Idea*," 44, 45; his "*Reason Discursive*," and "*Reason Intuitive*," 383, *n.*

Mīmāṃsā, the *Pārva*, 159, and *note*; the *Uttara*, 164

Montesquieu, his *Esprit des Lois*, 135

Morality, independent of God's will, 389

Morgenstern, his opinion of the *Republic* of Plato, 335, *n.*

Motion, presupposes *Force* and *Space*, 11; eternity of, according to Democritus, 206; reality of, denied by Zeno and the Eleatics, 223, and by Diodorus, 265; motion of the soul criticised by Aristotle, 529

Mullach, his *Questions Democriteæ*, 205, *n.*

Music, Pythagoras's view of, 216; of the spheres, 216

Mysteries, the Greek, 177; phraseology of, adopted by Plato, 464, and *note*

N.

Necessity, principle of, in the philosophy of Leucippus, 206; of Diodorus, 262; of Plato, 403

Neo-Platonism, represents the doctrinal result of Platonism, 491; discussion of its teachers and characteristics, 510—520; its theory of knowledge, 511; comparison of, with pure Platonism, 513; theory of the Universe, 514; tendency to

produce asceticism, 518, 519; its ethics compared with those of Christianity, 519

Newton, Sir Isaac, his use of the aphoristic method, 98; his account of his own genius, 108, *n.*

Nominalism, adopted by Antisthenes, 362, *n.*; Plato's relation to, 362; Aristotle's support of, 526, *n.*

Noûs, in the philosophy of Anaxagoras, 204, and *note*; distinguished from *δῶξα*, 413; in the philosophy of Plotinus, 514; distinguished from *ψυχή* by Aristotle, 539; his theory of, as the intellectual faculty, 551; "passive and productive," 553, and *note*

Numbers, their relation to the Pythagorean system, 211, *n.* 213; the soul a moving "number," 217; comparison of, with the Platonic "*Ideas*," 367, 368; application to the soul in the *Timæus*, 420

O.

Ontology, relation of, to Psychology, 31; of the Schoolmen, 37; defined and described, 38—41; Plato's method for arriving at, 412

Opinion (*δόξα*), distinguished by Socrates from knowledge, 337, 338, 355—358, and *notes*; "false opinion" analysed in the *Theætetus*, 356, and *note*; distinguished from *Noûs* in the *Timæus*, 413

Optimism, the basis of Plato's physical system, 396, 414

Oral teaching, its peculiarity, 3; prevalence of, one cause of the corruption of the early Greek Philosophy, 228

Order, idea of, its influence on the mind and doctrines of Pythagoras, 210—213

Orientalism, its influence on the Schools of Alexandria, 507

Origen, erroneous ascription to him of the *Philosophumena* of Hippolytus, 125, and *note*; influenced by Plato, 293

Orphic verses, the, 507

οὐδὲν ἐκὼν κακόν, Socratic maxim adopted by Plato, 319, 470, and *note*

P.

Panætius, the Stoic, 498

Pantheism, of the early Greek Philosophers, 186, 187; of Empedocles, 202, *n.*; of Plotinus, 515

Parmenides, a leader of the Eleatic

School, delivered his doctrines in a poem, 174; his relation to the atomists, 205, *n.*; his philosophy, 219, 220; his dictum τὸ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι, 220, *n.*; Plato's ascription to him of θαυμαστὸν βάθος, 220, *n.*, 250; his counsel to Socrates, 377

Parmenides, the, of Plato, 311, *n.*; objections against Realism discussed in, 362; argument against its spuriousness, 365, *n.*; restriction of the Ideal Theory, refuted in, 377

Pascal, his philosophy impaired by his religious habits, 151

Patricius, his *Dissensiones Peripateticæ*, 131, *n.*

Patriotism, 23

τὸ πέρας, opposed to τὸ ἀπειρον (*matter*), 386, 410, *n.*

Perception, Plato's theory of, corresponds with the modern "representative theory," 352, *n.*; Sir W. Hamilton's critique on the various theories of, 353, *n.* and 496, *n.*

Peripatetics, the, 500

Personification, tendency to in the infancy of Philosophy, 194

Phædo, founder of the Éliac or Eretriac School, 274

Phædo, the, of Plato, 398, 399, 453, 474

Phædrus, the, of Plato; question of its order in the Platonic dialogues, 320, and *note*, 437, and *note*; argument for the eternity of the soul derived from its principle of self-motion, 432; celebrated myth of the charioteer and the two horses, 438—441; denunciation of *writings*, 471; the Ideal *Beauty*, 479

φαντασία καταληπτική, doctrine of the Stoics, 493, 496; Aristotle's use of the word, 527, and *note*, 550, *n.*

φαντάσματα, "associated conceptions," term employed by Aristotle, 555

Phenomenology, 49, and *note*.

Pherecydes, supposed master of Thales, declared *Earth* to be the original matter, 199

Philebus, the, of Plato, passage from, respecting the Reason, 382; question of the highest happiness discussed in, 476, and *note*

Philetas, died over the study of the sophisms of Eubulides, 256

Philo-Judæus, his coincidence of phrase with St John, 295, *n.*, 297, 315, *n.*; admitted the facts of the Old Testament, 508

Philo, one of the leaders of the Academy, 494, 498

Philolaus, questionable character of the fragments attributed to, 196, *n.*, 415, *n.*; said to be the first Pytha-

gorean writer, 210, *n.*, 212, *n.*; his fragments present coincidences with parts of the *Timæus*, 415, *n.*; his saying about the revolution of the sun, moon, and earth, 422

Philosophia Prima, described by Descartes, Lord Bacon, and Aristotle, 47, 48, and *notes*

Philosophy, the term ascribed to Pythagoras, 43; defined by Cicero, 46, and *note*; definitions of, 138—140; its first manifestation usually in the form of a metaphysical physics, 150; with tendency to Personification, 150, 194; how influenced by circumstances, 150—152

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. May be regarded in two lights—as the beginning, or as the end of all human studies, 4—6; historical genesis of, 6—13; all special sciences lead up to it, 12; description of, 13; practical influence of the study of, 14, 16; considered as inductive psychology, it embraces four great fields of enquiry, 25; but it is not exclusively Inductive, 26; surpasses all other Sciences in dignity, 86

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 118, 130; object of, 148; sphere of, 143—149; involves the Philosophy of History, 144; difficulties in the way of, 152; its tendency to produce tolerance, 153

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY, 154—169

GREEK PHILOSOPHY. Poetical origin of, 174; transition from poetry to philosophy, 175; auxiliary developing causes, 176, 177; foreign influences, 177, 178; three great periods in, 179; boldness of the early period, 180

Philosophy of the Mind, the term, 51

Philostratus, his *Lives of the Sophists*, 126, *n.*; his definition of the art of the Sophists, 226, *n.*

Phocion, mentioned by Plutarch as one of Plato's pupils, 303, *n.*

Photius, his *Myriobiblion*, 127

φρόνησις, high dignity of, according to Plato, 469

Physics, relation to Metaphysics, 10, 15, 16; the Ionic, 181, 191, 192, 209; early interest of Socrates in, 233; study of regarded by Plato as a *relaxation* from Dialectic, 333; sphere of, τὸ δοξαστὸν, 338; PHYSICS OF PLATO, 392—431; use of the Ideal Theory in, 393, 394; uncertainty of, admitted by Plato himself, 394, 415, *n.*, 429; teleological character of, 398; mathematical rather than experimental, 399, and *note*;

- anti-mechanical character of, 400;
optimism of, 414
- Place*, Plato's account of, 414
- PLATO, not strictly an historian of
Philosophy, 120; how far he repre-
sents the Socratic method of argu-
ment, 234, and *note*; influenced by
the popular Sophistic method, 257,
and *note*
- PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO, 292—487;
main divisions in the treatment of—
A, discussed generally, *as a whole*,
328—343; B, Platonic *dialectic*,
344—390; C, *Physics*, 391—431;
D, *Psychology*, 431—457; E, *Ethics*,
458—487
- Widespread influence of, 292—
294; congeniality with Christian
sentiment, 295; relation to Chris-
tianity, 295—299, 325; personal
history of Plato, 299—304; form of
his writings, 305—309; ancient
testimonies to the excellence of his
style, 305, 306; his irony, 311;
question of Hebrew influence, 301,
302, 314, 318; cannot be understood
without a knowledge of the systems
which preceded his, 313; his real
monotheism, 313; influence of So-
crates, 318; of Heraclitus, 318; of
Pythagoras, 320; disputed genuine-
ness of some of his Dialogues, 321;
their order, 323; eminently *ethical*
character of his Philosophy, 318, 328;
his conception of Philosophy, 329,
334; Union of the Good and the
True, 331; his *Dialectics*, 332, 342;
Physics, 333; *Politics*, 334, 481;
his views regarding arithmetic, geo-
metry, and astronomy, 341, 383,
and *note*; on death, 343; mediator
between the Eleatics and Empirics,
349; his THEORY OF "IDEAS,"
363, 390; conceivability of, 366;
his "Ideas" compared with the
"Numbers" of Pythagoras, 367;
his Eros, 380, 477; contrasted with
Bacon, 396; his conception of *Mat-
ter*, 404; of *Time*, 406, and *notes*;
his habit of representing the abstract
by the concrete, 414; his astronomy,
421; his modesty, 437; how far he
is original, *ib.*; his view of his own
myths, 445, and *note*; his *ἀνθρωπι-
σμός*, 319, 448; union in him of the
speculative and the practical, 461;
perfection of the soul the aim of his
whole philosophy, 462; the com-
plement of Socrates, 462, 463; his
practical merits, 483; defects, *ib.*;
had no adequate conception of the
punishment due to *Sin*, 484; com-
pared to Alexander the Great, 487;
sceptical and positive elements in,
491; question of his identification
of *Reason* with *Being*, 513; his view
of immortality contrasted with that
of Aristotle, 559
- Platonism, "a way of thinking," 460
- Plotinus, the Neo-Platonist, 510; his
doctrines, 514—516; refused to al-
low his picture to be taken, 519
- Plutarch, as an Historian of Philo-
sophy, 124; as an expositor of
Plato, 505
- Pneumatology, 49
- "Poem," the term said to have been
invented by Plato, 320, and *note*
- Poetry, included in the Science of
Mind, 20; Aristotle's saying that it
is of higher dignity than *History*,
22; versatility of the poetic faculty,
99; various kinds of, 175
- Polemon, a teacher of the Academy,
490
- Politics, connexion of with Philosophy,
102, 103; of Plato, 334
- Polypsychism, belief in, among savage
nations, 150
- Polytheism, Socrates' toleration of,
239; discussed in the *Euthyphron*,
388, 430; influence of in shaping
Plato's *Physics*, 416
- Porphyry, disciple of Plotinus, 510
- Posidonius, the Stoic, 498
- Pre-existence, Platonic doctrine of,
384, 442—457
- Prejudices, arising from *scepticism* and
dogmatism, fatal to metaphysical
study, 115
- Press, the, influence of in converting
a conflict of passions into a conflict
of opinions, 103, 104
- Priesthood, evil influence of in Hindo-
stan, 160; nature of the office in
Greece, 176
- Proclus, the Neo-Platonist, 510; his
doctrines, 517, 518
- Prodicus, the Sophist, charge against
him of corrupting youth, 231, and
note
- Production, Plato's account of, 414
- Proselytism, spirit of in Socrates and
his followers, 241, *n.*
- Protagoras, the Sophist, his maxim
"man the measure of all things,"
230, and *note*
- Protagoras, the, of Plato, passage from,
illustrative of the estimation in which
the Sophists were held, 231; its
subject, 307
- Psychology, the term, 49; viewed in-
ductively, a physical science, 26.
See also *Metaphysics*, and *Philo-
sophy (Mental)*
- Ptolemaic System, due to Apollonius,
423
- Publicity, influence of in fostering

- Greek Philosophy, 176; in corrupting it, 228
Purāṇas, the, 159
Purusha, the, or Soul, 166
 Pyrrho, the Sceptic, disciple of Stilpo, 266, 269; his *ἀνδρεία*, 270; his School, 497, 503
 PYTHAGORAS, said to be the author of the term "Philosophy," 43; his verses, 174, and *note*; contrasted with Thales, 184
 DISCUSSION OF HIS PHILOSOPHY, 210—219; his worship of order, 210; his extension of mathematical conceptions to the sciences of mind and nature, 211; his "Numbers," 213, 367, 368; "unity in multiplicity" the leading idea of his system, 214; his views of music as a link between the ideal and practical, 216; "Music of the Spheres," *ib.*; his astronomical notions, 217; Psychology, *ib.*; Ethics, 218; defects in his system, *ib.*; compared with the Eleatic, 219; his influence on Plato, 320, 503; Pythagorean definition of the Soul—the "self-moving number"—criticised by Aristotle, 531
- Q.
- Quintessence, (πέμπτη οὐρα of Aristotle) 201, and *note*
 Quintilian, his eulogy on Plato's style, 306
- R.
- Reality, of matter, how far admitted by Plato, 411; of the sensible world, *ib.*
 Reason, one of the three mental faculties in Lord Bacon's analysis, 106; the faculty which grasps "*ideas*," 348; eternity of, 383; the phrase "pure reason," and Milton's distinction of Reason Discursive and Reason Intuitive, 383, *n.*; identified with *Being* by the Neo-Platonists, 513; the *theoretic* and *practical* in Aristotle's system, 555. See also *Noûs*
 Reid, doubted the truth of Ontology, 28; his controversy with Brown compared with that of the Stoics and Academics, 353, *n.*, 496, *n.*
 Republic, the, of Plato. Noble passage from, on the inadequacy of human education, 304; continued in the *Timæus*, 334, *n.*; could only exist with philosophers for inhabitants, 334, 475; regarded by some critics as an allegorical description of an individual human soul, 335, and *note*; passages from, on the nature of *Knowledge*, *Ideas*, &c. 331, 334—338; allegory of the *Cave*, 338—342, exhibits the *Ideal Theory* in its bearing upon *morals*, 394, and *note*; criticism on, 481
 Rewards and Punishments, doctrine of in a future state, held by Plato, 384, *note*
 Rhetoric, an art to which right and wrong are indifferent, 229
 Ritter, as an Historian of Philosophy, 136; maintains the self-organisation of Grecian Philosophy, 178; his view of the philosophy of Anaximander opposed by Brandis and Zeller, 203, and *note*
 Rousseau, reflection of upon government, 24, and *note*
- S.
- Sacrifice, not essentially necessary to virtue, 283
Sanskrit, 158
 Scepticism, common among the Sophists of the Socratic age, 229; of Socrates, 236; of Plato and the Academy, 491—493; reaction against it when systematised, 503; arguments of, 511
 Schelling, his description of his use of the term *Anschauung*, 33, and *note*; his theory of the Absolute Identity coincides with the Eleatic, 261; in its *physical* aspect, 272; his relation to Kant compared with that of the Neo-Platonists to Carneades, 497
 Schlegel, Frederic, his conception of the Philosophy of History, 21
 Schlegel, William, his translation of the *Bhagavadgītā*, 161, 162
 Schleiermacher, his dissertation on "Diogenes of Apollonia," 197, *n.*; on Heraclitus, 198, *n.*; his account of the *irony* of Socrates, 237, *n.*; his arrangement of Plato's Dialogues, 323
 Schoolmen, the frivolous nature of their discussions, 15; hampered by ecclesiastical dogmas, 27
 Scottish School, of metaphysicians, 28
 Seneca, as an interpreter of the Stoic system, 123
 Sensation, the mind first aroused to consciousness by, 6, 7; how regarded by Democritus, 206, and *note*, 207; the basis of the Cyrenaic philosophy, 286; discussed in the *Theætetus* as a definition of *Know-*

- ledge*, 351—355, 352, and *note*;
Aristotle's account of, 543
- Sequence*, 10, 65
- Sextus Empiricus, the Sceptic, as an
Historian of Philosophy, 123; a sys-
tematizer of the *ῥητορικὴ τέχνη*, 503
- Shaftesbury, compared with Plato as
a writer of Dialogues, 305
- Similia similibus percipiuntur*, maxim
held by Empedocles, 201, *n.*; also
by Proclus, 518; application of by
Empedocles, and Plato, 531, 532
- Simmius, the Theban, writer of dia-
logues, 247
- Simo, writer of dialogues, 246
- Simplicius, Greek commentator on
Aristotle in the 6th century, 127, *n.*
- Smell*, Aristotle's view of, 546
- Smith, Adam, his use of the term
Pneumatics, 50; his Fragments, 136;
his remarks on the early physical
systems, 423
- Smith, John, one of the "Cambridge
Platonists," influenced by Descartes,
82, *n.*; passage from his writings,
341, *n.*
- SOCRATES, his development of the
Noûs of Anaxagoras into a Pro-
vidence, 204; general discussion on,
232—245; condition of Philosophy
when he appeared, 233; compared
with Bacon, 233—235; the in-
ductive mode of inquiry, and the
practice of seeking general defini-
tions, ascribed to him by Aristotle,
234, *n.*; considered the reform of
physical science impossible, 236;
his "scepticism," 236; principle of
his Ethics, 236; his dogma, "Virtue
is Science," 237, and *note*, 240, *n.*;
his "*Maieutic*," 237; his "*irony*,"
237, and *note*, 238; his *δαμόνιον*
238, and *note*; his religion tainted
with superstition, 239; his tolera-
tion of Polytheism, *ib.*; made
justice the foundation of Political
Science, 240; his spirit of pro-
selytism, 241, *n.*; extent of his
influence, 243; mixed character of
his audience, 244; his *style*, 245;
his influence on Plato, 318; his
account of his own early love of
physical investigation, 398; unfitted
to be the founder of a complete
system, 462, 465
- Socratics*, the two classes of, 245, 248
- Sophisms*, of Eubulides, 256, and *note*
- Sophistes*, the, of Plato, 410
- Sophistry*, defined, 226, 227
- Sophists*, the, 226—232, 226, *n.*; the
artists of Philosophy, 227
- Soul*, the, of the Universe, in the Pla-
tonic Philosophy, 400—402; the
type of all inferior souls, 419, 426,
432; composed of three elements,
425; the *third* principle in the triad
of Plotinus, 514, 515
- Soul*, immortality of, 92; antecedent
to *Body*, 401, 443; is it an *idea*?
379, and *note*; creation or composi-
tion of, 419; application of num-
erical relations to, 420; account
of in the *Timæus* and *Phædrus*,
431—441; number of souls con-
stant, 432, *n.*; immortality of, 433;
rational part eternal, *emotive* part
mortal, 434, and *note*; triple di-
vision of, 440, 441; this the founda-
tion of the ethico-political system
of Plato, 459; of brutes, 444; chief
Platonic arguments for the pre-exis-
tence and immortality of, discussed,
442—457; doctrine that the Soul is
a *Harmony* refuted, 455, 530, 531;
Aristotle's treatise on, 523—561;
his definition of *σὺν ἀρχῇ τῶν ζώων*,
525; his denial of the Platonic
"universal" soul, 526; Pythagorean
theory, that the Soul is a "self-
moving number" refuted, 531;
applied to all vegetable, animal,
and rational existence, 534; his
complete definition of as *ἐντελέ-
χεια ἡ πρῶτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δι-
νᾶται ζῶντι ἔχοντος*, 539; another
definition of, 541; his opinions on
the immortality of contrasted with
Plato's, 559—561
- Sound*, Aristotle's explanation of, 545,
546
- Space*, idea of, 8; midway between
matter and mind, 11, and *note*; Pla-
to's conception of, 411
- Speusippus, a teacher of the *Academy*,
489, *n.*, 490
- σφαῖρος*, of Empedocles, 200, *n.*, 419, *n.*
- Spinoza, his system one of the six
forms of philosophical Unitarian-
ism, 260, 261, 289; passage from,
on the eternity of the rational part
of the Soul, 450, *n.*
- Stallbaum, error in his conception of
the origin of the Platonic *matter*,
410, *n.*; his opinion of a passage in
the *Timæus* on the numerical rela-
tions of the Soul, 420
- Stanley, his *History of Philosophy*,
132
- Stewart, Dugald, doubted the truth of
Ontology, 28; his judgment on the
merits of Bacon and Descartes, 81,
n.; his *Dissertation*, 136
- Stilpo, of the Megaric school, 225,
258; his philosophy discussed, 266
—273; his logical dexterity, 267;
attacked the doctrine of *ideas*, 254,
n., 267, and *note*; held that only
identical propositions are true, 268;

his *Ethics*, 269; his *ἀνδρεία*, 269; his contempt for the popular religion, 273
 Stobæus, his fragments on the History of Philosophy, 126
 Stoics, the, 42; successors of the Cynics, 280; rivals of the *Academy*, 493; their theory of perception, and of the criterion of knowledge, *ib.*; their *φαντασία καταληπτική*, 493, 496, and *note*; weak points in their system, 500
 "Subject," and "Object," 182; identified by the Neo-Platonists, 513
 "Successions," danger of arranging philosophers in, 190, 191, and *note*
 Suicide, recommended both by the Cynic and Cyrenaic systems, 280; especially by Hegesias (*πεισιθανατος*), 290, 291, and *note*; why forbidden by Plato, 343
 Suidas, his *Lexicon*, 127
Sūrya Siddhānta, the, 155
Syllogism, the Hindū, 164, and *note*
Symposium, the, of Plato, 308, 479
Systems, Adam Smith's remarks on the early physical, 423; Socrates not qualified to establish a philosophical system, 465

T.

Telcius, his account of the philosophy of Parmenides, 131, *n.*
 Tennemann, as an Historian of Philosophy, 136, 148; his definition of Philosophy, 139
 Tertullian, his condemnation of Plato as "condimentarius hæreticorum," 299
Testament, the New, as a guide to truth, 325
Tetralogies, see Thrasyllus
 Thales, did he write poetry? 174, and *note*; his geometry more perfect than that of the Egyptians, 178; not the founder of any "school," or "sect," 184; the father of the Ionic School, 193; his philosophy discussed, 195, 196, and *notes*
θέρεον, term used by Plato to indicate matter, 410
Theætu., the, of Plato, 309, 310; careful analysis of, 350—359; its negative result, 358; and real importance, *ib.*; probably the source of the Academic theory, 496, *n.*
Theism, was it held by the early Greek philosophers? 184, and *note*; two forms of, 260
 Theodorus, "Ἄθεος, of Cyrene, 289
 Theodorus, the mathematician, an interlocutor in the *Theætetus*, 350, 355

Theology, connexion of with Philosophy, 508
 Theophrastus, on Democritus, 206, 207, *n.*
 Thomasius, his *History of the various Fortunes of Metaphysics*, 134
 Thrasyllus, arranged Plato's dialogues in tetralogies, 323, *n.*
θυμοειδές, τὸ, the "spirited" element of the soul in the Platonic system, 460
 Tiedemann, his *Spirit of Speculative Philosophy*, 136
 Timæus Locrus, treatise ascribed to, 210, *n.*, 219, and *note*
Timæus, the, of Plato, 306, and *note*; continuation of the *Republic*, 334, *n.*; its object and character, 392, 394, 395; plan of, 396; passage from, respecting the generation of soul, 402; further analysis of, 403; psychology of, 412, 431; astronomy of, 421; quotations from, 392—435; *passim*, 459; its account of the constitution of the soul of the world attacked by Aristotle, 530
Time, Plato's conception of, 406, and *notes*; created as a "moving image of eternity," 407; Epicurean notion of, 407; not an abbreviated eternity, 408, 450, *n.*
 Timon, the Sillographer, his contempt for the Megaric leaders, 251, *n.*
Tirvalore, the tables of, 156
 Trendelenburg, his *Platonis Doctrina de Ideis et Numeris*, 321
Trinity, in the Brahmin and the Buddhist systems, 165; doctrine of the, is it found in Plato? 315, *n.*; of the Neo-Platonists, 517
Truth, love of, for its own sake, 115; its manifestations diverse, though itself one, 147, 148
Tyrants, among Plato's pupils, 303, and *note*

U.

ὕλη, Aristotle's term for matter, 410, *n.*
Unity, of the Eleatic School, 252, 259—261; its relation to the system of Schelling, 261
Universals, reality of, denied by Stilpo, 268
Universe, the, living, 194; intelligent, according to Plato, 416; single, τέλει καὶ ἀγέρω καὶ ἀνοσοί, and *spherical*, 418, 419. See also *Physics*, *Soul*

V.

Vacuum, question of free-will con-

- nected with, by Leibnitz, 15; existence of, denied by Aristotle and Plato, 405, and *note*
Vaisheshika, the, of Kanáda, 166
 Valerius Maximus, his account of Plato's travels in Egypt, 301
Vedas, their antiquity, 155, 159; storehouses of theological controversy, 167
Vice, identified by Socrates and Plato with *ignorance*, 319, 333; this doctrine criticised, 470, and *note*.
 Virgil, his description of the Soul of the Universe, 401
Virtue, is it science? 237, and *note*, 240, *n.*; different results of the Socratic identification, 248, 249; Plato's treatment of the question, 471; how far is Virtue "*one*"? 471
Virtues, the cardinal, according to Socrates, 240, *n.*; according to Plato, 473
Vitalists, the Ionic School, 193, 194
 Vossius, Gerard John, his work *De Philosophiâ et Philosophorum sectis*, 132

W.

- Warburton, his division of Plato's dialogues into "exoteric" and "esoteric," 312, *n.*; his opinion ascribing the notion of the derivation of the souls of men from the divine essence to *all* the ancient philosophers, 432, *n.*
Water, considered by Thales the ἀρχή of the universe, 195
 Whewell, Dr, his remark, "that the atomistic doctrine "points to the corpuscular theories of modern times," 205, *n.*; error in a passage of his *Platonic Dialogues*, 281, *n.*

- Wisdom*, use of the term in primitive times, 42—45; Socrates' view of, 240, *n.*; supremacy of, in Plato's system, 473
 Wolf, his opinion against ascribing the *Tabula* to Cebes, 246, 247, and *note*.
 Wordsworth, passage from his Ode on the *Intimations of Immortality*, &c., 446, 447

X.

- Xenocrates, of Chalcedon, succeeded Speusippus as a teacher of the *Academy*, 489; his philosophy, 490
 Xenophanes, founder of the Eleatics, delivered his doctrine in a *poem*, 174; his notion of the stars as condensations of the clouds, 182; his philosophy, 219—222, and *note*; did he deny plurality? 220, and *note*; his God, 221, *n.*; ridiculed the gods of the popular Pantheon, 231, *n.*
 Xenophon, his description of the Socratic method of arguing, 234, *n.*; never mentions the *εἰσωνεία*, 237, *n.*; his memoirs of his master, 120, 246

Z.

- Zeller, his classification of the ante-Socratic philosophers, 203, *n.*; his remarks on the derivation of *Cynicism* from the teaching of Socrates, 285, *n.*
 Zeno, of Elea, his paradoxes, 223; called by Plato the "Palamedes of Elea," 223; his dialectic, 223, and *note*; one of the first who wrote philosophical dialogues, 223, *n.*

Cambridge:

**PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.**

WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

SERMONS, DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL.

• Edited with Memoir by THOMAS WOODWARD, M.A. Dean of Down.
With Portrait. Ninth Edition. 8vo. 8s.

SECOND SERIES OF SERMONS. Edited by J. A.

JEREMIE, D.D. Regius Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. Seventh Edition. 8vo. 7s.

LETTERS ON ROMANISM, in Reply to Dr Newman's Essay on Development. Edited by the Very Rev. the Dean of Down. Second Edition, revised by the Ven. Archdeacon Hardwick. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE: a

Treatise on Man's Knowledge of the Infinite Being, in answer to Sir W. Hamilton and Dr Mansel. By the REV. H. CALDERWOOD, M.A. LL.D. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Cheaper Edition. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

A HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. By PROFESSOR CALDERWOOD. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s.

SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY: founded on the Teaching of the late SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE. By the late JOSEPH HENRY GREEN, F.R.S. D.C.L. Edited with Memoir by JOHN SIMON, F.R.S. 2 vols. 8vo. 25s.

THE METHOD OF DIVINE GOVERNMENT, PHYSICAL AND MORAL. By JAMES M'COSH, LL.D., President of Princeton College, New Jersey. Tenth Edition. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

THE INTUITIONS OF THE MIND. By JAMES M'COSH, LL.D. New Edition. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

AN EXAMINATION OF MR J. S. MILL'S PHILOSOPHY: being a Defence of Fundamental Truth. By JAMES M'COSH, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LONDON.

MACMILLAN AND CO.'S PUBLICATIONS.

CHRISTIANITY AND POSITIVISM: a Series of Lectures to the Times on Natural Theology and Apologetics. By JAMES M'COSH, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

RECENT BRITISH PHILOSOPHY: a Review with Criticisms; including some comments on Mr Mill's Answer to Sir W. Hamilton. By DAVID MASSON, Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature in the University of Edinburgh. Crown 8vo. 6s. Cheaper Edition.

SOCIAL MORALITY. Twenty-one Lectures delivered in the University of Cambridge. By the REV. F. D. MAURICE, late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. New and cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

THE CONSCIENCE: Lectures on Casuistry delivered in the University of Cambridge. By the REV. F. D. MAURICE. New and cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo. 5s.

MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY. By the REV. F. D. MAURICE. Vol. I.—Ancient Philosophy and the First to the Thirteenth Centuries. Vol. II.—The Fourteenth Century and the French Revolution, with a Glimpse into the Nineteenth Century. New Edition, with Preface. 2 Vols. 8vo. 25s.

THE SCIENTIFIC BASES OF FAITH. By JOSEPH JOHN MURPHY, Author of *Habit and Intelligence*. 8vo. 14s.

THE MYSTERY OF MATTER; and other ESSAYS. By J. ALLANSON PICTON, Author of *New Theories and the Old Faith*. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Contents—The Mystery of Matter; The Philosophy of Ignorance; The Antithesis of Faith and Sight; The Essential Nature of Religion; Christian Pantheism.

OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS; with some of their Applications. By W. T. THORNTON, C.B. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Contents—Anti-Utilitarianism; History's Scientific Pretensions; David Hume as a Metaphysician; Huxleyism; Recent Phases of Scientific Atheism; Limits of Demonstrable Theism.

THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION OF LIVING THINGS; and the Application of the Principles of Evolution to Religion, considered as Illustrative of the Wisdom and Beneficence of the Almighty. By the REV. GEORGE HENSLOW, M.A. F.L.S. Crown 8vo. 6s.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LONDON.

